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

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OPTIMALISM AND THE RATIONALITY OF THE REAL: ON THE PROSPECTS OF AXIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

NICHOLAS RESCHER

I

Is the Real Rational? Can we ever manage to explain the nature of reality—the make-up of the universe as a whole? Is there not an insuperable obstacle here—an infeasibility that was discerned already by Immanuel Kant who argued roughly as follows:

> The demand for a rationale that accounts for reality-as-a-whole is a totalitarian demand. As such it is illegitimate. All explanations require inputs. Explanation always proceeds by explaining one thing in terms of something else. There thus is no way to explain Reality, to give an account of everything-as-a-whole. For this sort of thing would evade neither a vitiating regress nor a vicious circle.

So goes Kant's reasoning, and there is much to be said for it. After all, in the realm of factual explanation we always have recourse to factual premises to substantiate our factual conclusions. Thus, an all-encompassing explanation of the facts is clearly impossible.

Or so it seems, but here appearances are deceiving. In the present, genuinely extraordinary case of totalitarian explanation, another very different option stands before us. For here we can—and in the final analysis must—shift the framework of explanation from the descriptive/factual to the normative/axiological order of explanation. What would such an explanation look like?

II

The Turn to Axiology. From its earliest days, metaphysics has been understood also to include "axiology," the evaluative and normative assessment of the things that exist. Here lies the doorway to

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another mode of explanation—an explanation of facts in terms of values and of reality in terms of optimality.

Accustomed as we are to explanations in the mode of efficient causality, this idea of an axiological explanation of existence on the basis of an evaluative optimalism has a decidedly strange and unfamiliar air about it. Let us consider more closely how it is supposed to work.

The approach rests on adopting what might be called an *axiogenetic optimality principle* to the effect that value represents a decisive advantage in regard to realization, since in the virtual competition for existence among alternatives, the comparatively best is bound to prevail.[1] Accordingly, whenever there is a plurality of alternative possibilities competing for realization in point of truth or of existence, the (or an) optimal possibility wins out. (An alternative is *optimal* when no better one exists, although it can have equals.) The result is that things exist, and exist as they do, because this is for the (metaphysically) best.

No doubt it will be a complicated matter to appraise from a metaphysical/ontological standpoint that condition X is better (inherently more meritorious) than condition Y. Optimalism maintains, however, that once this evaluative hurdle is overcome, the question "Why should it be that X rather than Y exists?" is automatically settled by this very fact via the ramifications of optimality. In sum, a law of optimality prevails; value (of a suitable—and still unspecified—sort) enjoys an existential bearing, so that the nature of things is that (one of) the best of available alternatives is realized.[2]

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[1] The prime spokesman for this line of thought within the Western philosophical tradition was G. W. Leibniz. A present-day exponent is John Leslie, for whom see especially his *Value and Existence* (Totowa: N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1979). See also the present author's *The Riddle of Existence* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984).

[2] To make this work out, the value of a disjunction-alternative has to be fixed at the value of its optimal member, lest the disjunctive "bundling" of a good alternative with inferior rivals so operates as to eliminate it from competition.

III

Abandoning Causality. Optimalism is certainly a *teleological* theory: it holds that reality's modus operandi manifests a tropism toward a certain end or *telos*, namely optimization. Such an axiology represents a doctrine of final causes in Aristotle's sense, but it is emphatically not a causal theory in the current standard sense of efficient causation. It does not—and does not need to—regard value as a somehow efficient cause, a productive agency.

On the contrary, value is not productive at all but merely eliminative in functioning so as to block the way to the availability of inferior productions. It does not drive causal processes but only canalizes or delimits them by ruling certain theoretical (or logical) possibilities out of the realm of real possibility. Consider an analogy: the English language allows double letters in its words, but not triple letters. But that doesn't mean that the double *l* of "follow" causes that *ll*-successive letter to be something different from *l*. The principle explains without causality; it merely imposes a structural constraint of possibility. The lawful principle at issue explains the factual situation without any invocation of causality, seeing that an explanation via inherent constraints on possibility is not a causal explanation at all.

It would be deeply mistaken to see value as somehow an actively productive agency. Values play an explanatory role, but not in the causal mode. Causality is, after all, not our only explanatory resource. For example, when natural laws obtain, there is, no doubt, a reason for their obtaining (an axiological reason, as we ourselves see it). This reason can presumably be provided by an explanatory principle that need not carry us into the order of efficient causality.

Optimalism readily concedes that value does not engender existence in the mode of efficient causations, and that it would indeed be rather mysterious if values were asked to do so. This is to be seen as irrelevant. The fact is that the complaint, "How can values possibly operate causally?!", simply confuses axiological explanation with productively efficient explanation.

Only with the explanations of why physical objects and events exist need we involve causes and effects. Yet laws of nature themselves do not "exist" as constituents of the physical realm—they just obtain. They don't have causes—and don't need them. It would be inappropriate to ask for their explanation in the order of efficient causation.

Thus, the fact that axiology does not provide such an explanation is not an occasion for appropriate complaint. It does not stop value-explanations from qualifying as explanations; they present perfectly good answers to "Why is something-or-other so?" type questions. But in relation to laws, values play only an explanatory role though possibility-elimination and not a causally productive role though actual creation. This is no defect, because a productive process is simply not called for. And so, to inquire into how values operate causally in law-realization is simply to adopt an inappropriate model for the processes involved. Value-explanation is simply not causal: values do not function in the order of efficient causality at all.

IV

Why Optimalism? Why should optimalism obtain? Why should what is for the best be actual? What sort of plausible argument can be given on this position's behalf? The law of optimality to the effect that "whatever possibility is for the best is *ipso facto* the possibility that is actualized" is certainly not a logico-conceptually necessary truth. From the angle of theoretical logic it has to be seen as a contingent fact—albeit not about nature as such, but rather about the manifold of real possibility that underlies it. Insofar as necessary at all, it obtains as a matter of ontological rather than logico-conceptual necessity, while the realm of possibility as a whole is presumably constituted by considerations of logico-metaphysical necessity alone.[3]

To be sure, optimalism itself presumably has an explanation, seeing that one can and should maintain the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason to the effect that for every contingent fact there is a reason why it is so rather than otherwise. With the law of optimality this explanation resides in itself—in its own nature. For it is, in the final analysis, for the best that the law of optimality should obtain. After all, there is no decisive reason why that explanation has to be "deeper

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[3] The operative perspective envisions a threefold order of necessity/possibility: the logico-conceptual, the ontological or proto-physical, and the physical. It accordingly resists today's positivistic tendency to dismiss or ignore that second, intermediate order of considerations. This is only to be expected since people nowadays tend to see this intermediate realm as predicated in value-considerations, a theme that is anathema to present-day scientism.

and different"—that is, no decisive reason why the prospect of self-explanation has to be excluded at this fundamental level.[4] After all, we cannot go on putting the explanatory elephant on the back of the tortoise, on the back of the alligator, *ad infinitum*: as Aristotle already saw, the explanatory regress has to stop somewhere at the final theory—one that is literally self-explanatory. What better candidate could there be than the law of optimality itself, with the result that the division between real and merely theoretical possibilities is the way it is (that is, value-based) because that itself is for the best?[5]

Optimalism has many theoretical advantages. Here is just one of them: it is conceivable, one might contend, that the existence of the world—that is to say, of *a* world—is a necessary fact while nevertheless its *nature* (that is, of *which* world) is contingent. This would mean that separate and potentially different answers would have to be provided for the questions, "Why is there anything at all?", and, "Why is the character of existence as it is—why is it that this particular world exists?" However, an axiogenetic approach enjoys the advantage of rational economy in that it proceeds uniformly here. It provides a single uniform rationale for both answers—namely, that "this is for the best." It accordingly also enjoys the significant merit of providing for the rational economy of explanatory principles.

In the end, we must expect that any ultimate principle must explain itself and cannot, in the very nature of things, admit of an external explanation in terms of something altogether different. The impetus to realization inherent in authentic value lies in the very nature of value itself. A rational person would not favor the inferior alternative; and a rational reality cannot do so either.

To be sure, the law of optimality presupposes a manifold of suitable value parameters, invoking certain physically relevant features

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[4] After all, there is no reason of logico-theoretical principle why propositions cannot be self-certifying. Nothing vicious need be involved in self-substantiation. Think of, "Some statements are true," or, "This statement makes a particular rather than universal claim."

[5] Optimalism is closely related to optimism. The optimist holds that "whatever exists is for the best"; the optimalist maintains the converse, that "whatever is for the best exists." However, when we are dealing with exclusive and exhaustive alternatives the two theses come to the same thing. If one of the alternatives $A, A_1, \ldots A_n$ must be the case, then if what is realized is for the best it follows automatically that the best is realized (and conversely).

(symmetry, economy, regularity, or the like) as merit-manifesting factors. It should be acknowledged that the optimization at issue is, and should be, geared to a scientifically reputable theory of some suitable kind, coordinate with a complex of physically relevant factors of a suitable kind. After all, many a possible world will maximize a "value" of some sort (confusion and nastiness included). For present purposes, value will have to be construed in its positive sense—of being valuable by way of worthiness of positive appraisal.

The manifold of logical possibility is subject to various reductions. Conformity with the laws of nature induces a reduction to physical possibility. Conformity with the principles of metaphysics induces a reduction to metaphysical possibility, and conformity to considerations of value induces a reduction to axiological possibility—which is perhaps the most stringent of these. Along these lines—for example as Leibniz sees it—the value of a system is determined by an optimal balance of procedural order (uniformity, symmetry) and phenomenal variety (richness, plenitude)—both reflected in such cognitive features as intelligibility and interest. It is its (presumed) gearing to a positive value which, like economy or elegance, is plausibly identifiable as physically relevant—contingently identifiable as such, subject to scientific inquiry—that establishes optimalism as a reasonable proposition and ultimately prevents the thesis "optimalism obtains because that's for the best" from declining into vacuity. This of course means that optimalism is not so much a practice as a program.

V

Is Optimalism Theocentric? Yet what if one is skeptical about theism? Would one then not have to reject optimalism? Here the optimalist replies, "Not at all. Optimalism does not require theism—it need not call upon God to institute optimalism. The doctrine is perfectly self-supportive: it obtains on its own basis, not necessarily because God willed it so, but just simply because that's for the best."[6]

The fact of the matter is that optimalism does not require a creator to provide for the productive efficacy of value. The insistence

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[6] Indeed, an over-enthusiastic optimalist could take the line that theism hinges on optimalism rather than the reverse because "God's own existence issues from optimalism: he exists because that's for the best."

upon the need for a productive agency is based on the mistaken idea of requiring an explanation in the mode of efficient causality as nowadays understood. This is problematic since, as indicated above, an operative principle can require conformity without any sort of productive action.

A word of caution is needed at this point. One of the prime motives for taking an axiological explanation seriously is that it enables us to avoid the temptations and difficulties of theological explanation. The rationale for this is not an *odium theologicum*—an aversion to theological considerations as such. It is rather the idea of the medieval dictum *non in philosophia recurrere est ad Deum*—that we should not ask God to pull our philosophical chestnuts out of the fire. Synoptic questions like "Why is there anything at all?" are philosophical questions, and they ought ideally to be answered by philosophical means.

On the other hand, it must be stressed that axiological explanation is altogether congenial to theism, although it does not require it. After all, it is only to be expected that if the world is created by a God of the sort that the tradition encourages us to accept, then the world that such a God creates should be one in which values play a role. Thus it would seem that theism requires axiological explanation even more axiological explanation requires theism.[7]

All the same, the present axiological approach thus differs decisively from that of Leibniz. He proposed to answer the question, "Why is it that the value-optimizing world should be the one that actually exists?", with reference to the will of a God who chooses to adopt value-optimization as a creative principle. Thus, Leibniz was committed to an idea that it is necessary to account for the obtaining of a principle in terms of the operation of an existing entity (specifically the agency of an intelligent being—namely God). Instead, an axiological approach sees the explanatory bearing of a principle of value as direct, final, and fundamental, without mediation through the agency of a

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[7] Would such argumentation *subordinate* God to a principle of optimality? Not at all! The theistic optimalist can take the following stance in the interests of orthodoxy. In the order of beings (or entities or substances) God has absolute primancy. In the order of principles (of factual propositions or truths) the principle of optimality is paramount. And neither order is subordinate to the other; rather, they are coordinated via God's knowledge of the truth.

substantial being, however extraordinary.[8] On grounds of explanatory economy, at least, purpose is thus something that we would be well advised to forego if we can actually manage to do so. Let us have a closer look at this issue of purposes.

VI

Is Optimalism Purposive? In taking the axiological route, one is not saying that the realization of value is reality's purpose. We need not personify nature to account for its features. To say that nature embodies value is a very far cry from saying that the realization of value is one of its purposes. That reality operates in a certain manner—that its modus operandi follows certain laws or principles—is in general an entirely impersonal thesis. The values involved in axiological explanation need not be *somebody's* values. No element of personification, no reference to anyone's aims of purposes, need be involved in axiological explanation. Purpose, on the other hand, necessarily requires a purposer—it must be somebody's purpose. In this regard, value stands with order rather than with purpose. Order-seeking in nature does not presuppose an orderer, nor value-seeking a valuer. The maintenance or enhancement of a value can be a matter of the blind operation of impersonal, optimific forces.

Let us return to the idea of purposiveness and consider the objection, "It is only by constituting the motives of agents that wishes can obtain explanatory efficacy. Only by serving as some deliberate agent's motivational repertoire can a value come into effective operation." Such a view of value-explanation is nothing new; it has existed in embryo since Plato's day, thanks to his conception of demiurge. The guiding idea has generally been that the only way in which values

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[8] Our metaphysical invocation of a principle of value is akin to A. C. Ewing's theological application of similar ideas in his interesting article "Two 'Proofs' of God's Existence," *Religious Studies* 1 (1961): 29–45. Ewing there propounds the argument that God's existence is to be accounted for axiologically: that he exists "because it was supremely good that God should exist" (35). This approach has the substantial merit of avoiding Leibniz's tactic of grounding the efficacy of value in a preexisting deity by contemplating the prospect that value is so fundamental that the deity itself can be accounted for in its terms.

can be brought to bear in the explanation of phenomena is through the mediation of a creative agent.

Accordingly, thinkers from classical antiquity onward have defended (or attacked) the principle that explaining the presence of order in nature—the fact that the world is a cosmos—requires postulating a creative intelligence as its cause. That nature manifests and exemplifies such cognitive values as order, harmony, and uniformity was thus explained by regarding these as marks of purpose. On this basis, the mainstream of Western thought regarding axiological explanation has taken the line that there is a supernatural agent (God, demiurge, cosmic spirit) and that values obtain their explanatory bearing by influencing the state of mind which governs his creative endeavors.

This essentially purposive approach characterizes the traditional argument from design, which explains the creation with reference to a creator (as its *ratio essendi*) and infers the existence of this creator from the orderly structure of created nature (as his *ratio cognoscendi*).[9] The sequential explanatory slide from design to value to purpose to intelligence was historically seen as inexorable. And so the idea of a recourse to an explanatory principle that is geared to values without any such mediation represents a radical departure. The guiding conception of the present deliberations—that value is the natural place to sever this chain—reflects a break with a longstanding tradition.

The justification of this break with the tradition of design-explanation lies in observing the important distinction between values and purposes. Granted, a purpose must be *somebody's* purpose; it must have some intelligent agent as its owner-operator. It lies in the very nature of the concept that purposes cannot exist in splendid isolation; they must, in the final analysis, belong to some agent or other. For purposes as such, to be is to be adopted. Purposive explanations operate in terms of why conscious agents do things, and not in terms of why impersonal conditions obtain.

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[9] For a useful collection of relevant texts see Donald R. Burrill, *The Cosmological Arguments: A Spectrum of Opinion* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967). Two interesting recent accounts of the issues and their historical ramifications are: William L. Rowe, *The Cosmological Argument* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and William L. Craig, *The Cosmological Argument From Plato to Leibniz* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

A value, however, can be altogether impersonal. This means that value-explanation is not necessarily purposive. Being a value does not require that somebody actually value it (any more than being a fact requires that somebody actually realizes it). A person can certainly hold a certain value dear, but if it is indeed a value, then its status as such is no more dependent on its actually being valued than the symmetry of a landscape depends on its actually being discerned. Values admit of being prized, but that does not mean that they actually are, any more than a task's being difficult means that anyone actually attempts it.

To be of value is to deserve to be valued, but that of course need not actually happen: the value of things can be underestimated or overestimated or totally overlooked. Neither the items that have value nor the facts of their being of valued depends on apprehending minds for their reality. This holds in particular for "ontological" values like economy, simplicity, regularity, uniformity, and so forth, that figure in the axiological explanation of laws. In sum, the being of values does not consist in their being valued any more than does the being of most other sorts of things demands their being perceived. We surely do not need to anthropomorphize here, just as a claim to end-directed transactions in the world ("Nature abhors a vacuum") is without any implications about a purposively operating mind. A system can be goal-directed through its inherent natural "programming" (for example, heliotropism or homeostasis) without any admixture of purpose, just as a conservation of energy principle need not be held on the basis of nature's seeking to conserve energy.

Thus, while axiological explanations fail to address a question for which design explanations have an answer—namely, the causal question, "How do values operate productively so as to bring particular laws to actualization?"—this reflects no demerit. For it seems plausible to see this question as simply inappropriate. Values don't operate in the purposively causal order at all. Value-considerations render certain law-possibilities real in somewhat the same way as law-conformity renders certain event-possibilities real. The issue of a specifically purposive efficacy simply does not arise.

VII

Further Difficulties. However, a threatening difficulty seems to arise in the form of a possibility-range that is evaluatively "topless"—that is, which does not have some alternatives that are optimal in the sense of not being bettered by any others.[10] In such a range, each alternative is surpassed by yet another that is better. And so, on optimalistic principles it would transpire that there are no real possibilities at all. Within such a range there will be no optimum and thus no possibility of actualization. Here optimalism must take the bull by the horns. Insofar as situations can be imagined which—like that of a topless infinite alternative spectrum—could raise difficulties for the theory, it could and should simply be seen as part and parcel of optimalism to assert that such situations cannot actually arise: that a reality that is benign all the way through is thereby such that it excludes such a problematic situation with respect to what is really possible. As optimalism sees it, the very fact that toplessness conflicts with optimalism excludes it from the range of real possibilities.

What if there is a plurality of perfection-contributory features so interrelated that more of the one demands less of the other? Here everything is bettered in some respect by something else, so that to all appearances it would result that nothing is synoptically and comprehensively all-in best.

However, in such cases one can—and should—resort to a function of combination that allows for the interaction of those different value-parameters. For example, with two operative value-making factors, say cheapness (that is, inverse acquisition cost) and durability in the case of a 100-watt light bulb, one will use the ratio of (cost of purchase) to (hours of usability) as a measure of merit. This prospect possibilizes the reduction of the multifactor case to the situation of a single compound and complex factor, so that optimization is once again possible. That this should obtain is guaranteed by optimalism itself; it is part and parcel of the best possible order of things that optimalism should be operable within it.

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[10] Leibniz saw the existence of the actual world as a decisive argument against hopelessness, since existence could not be realized in a realm of topless meritoriousness. Here a benevolent creature would be effectively paralyzed.

VII

Violating Common Sense. To anyone who is minded to object to optimalism as somehow violating common sense, I have only one thing to say: "Where have you been recently and what have you been doing?" One thing you certainly have not been doing is keeping track of the expository literature of contemporary microphysics and cosmology, and one place you have certainly not been is at your television set watching any of the recent science channel programs on string theory. Surely common sense no longer qualifies as a club for any explanatory theorizing on reality's fundamentals. Insofar as common sense is to be used as a yardstick, it is surely not optimalism but contemporary cosmology that falls short.

Nonetheless, how can sensible people possibly embrace the conception that the inherently best alternative is thereby automatically the actual (true) one? Does not the world's all-too-evident imperfection stand decisively in the way here?

The matter is not all that simple, however. For the issue is going to pivot on the question of what "inherently best" means. If it means "best" from that angle of your desires, or of my interests, or even of the advantage of homo sapiens in general, then clearly the thesis loses its strong appeal. For the sake of plausibility, that "best" had best be construed as looking to the condition of existence-as-a-whole rather than to that of one particular privileged individual or group. Optimality in this context is clearly not going to be a matter of the affective welfare or standard of living of some particular sector of existence; it is going to have to be a metaphysical good of some synoptic and rather abstract sort that looks to the condition of the whole.

Yet is such a theory of axiological ontogenesis not defeated by the objection? If it really were the case that value explains existence, then why isn't the world altogether perfect?

The answer lies in the inherent complexity of value. An object that is of any value at all is subject to a complex of values. For it is the fundamental fact of axiology that every evaluation-admitting object has a plurality of evaluative features. Take an automobile. Here the relevant parameters of merit clearly include such factors as speed, reliability, repair infrequency, safety, operating economy, aesthetic appearance, and road-handling ability. In actual practice such features are interrelated. It is unavoidable that they trade off against one an-

other: more of *A* means less of *B*. It would be ridiculous to have a super-safe car with a maximum speed of two miles per hour. It would be ridiculous to have a car that is inexpensive to operate but spends three-fourths of the time in a repair shop. But perfection—maximum realization of every value dimension all-at-once—is simply unrealizable, and of course it makes no sense to ask for the impossible.

Thus, the objection, "If value is the key to existence, the world would be absolutely perfect," proves to be untenable. All that will follow on axiogenetic principles is that the world will exemplify an optimal balance of the relevant evaluative factors. An optimally realizable best need not be "perfect" in the normal sense of that term which unrealistically demands value-maximality in every relevant respect.

Because some desiderata are in conflict and competition with others, it is an inherently inevitable feature of the nature of things—an inevitable fact of life—that value-realization is always a matter of balance, of trade-offs, of compromise. The reality of it is that value-factors always compete in matters of realization. A concurrent maximum in every dimension is simply unavailable in this or indeed any other conceivably possible world. All that one can ever reasonably ask for is an auspicious combination of values. Here optimalism can take comfort in the view that there indeed is just exactly one overall optimal alternative, precisely because that's for the best.

IX

Wishful Thinking. Is not optimalism merely a version of wishful thinking? Not necessarily. For even as in personal life what is best for us is all too often not at all what we individuals want, so in metaphysics what is abstractly for the best is very unlikely to bear any close relationship to what we would want to have if we humans could have things our way.

What prevents optimalism from being too Pollyanna-ish to be plausible is the deeply pessimistic acknowledgment that even the best of possible arrangements is bound to exhibit very real shortcomings. The optimalist need not simply shut his eyes to the world's all-too-evident parochially considered imperfections. For what the optimalist can and should do is to insist that, owing to of the intricate and inherent interrelationships among value-parameters, imperfections in this

or that respect must be taken in stride because they have to be there for an optimal overall combination of value to be realized. Leibniz took the right approach here: optimalism does not maintain that the world is absolutely perfect but just that it is the best that is possible—that, all considered, it outranks the available alternatives. There is, in fact, a point of view from which optimalism is a position that looks to be not so much optimistic as deeply pessimistic. For it holds that even the best of possible arrangements is bound to exhibit very real imperfections from the angle of narrowly parochial concerns or interests.

X

Conclusion. The upshot of these deliberations is that once one is willing to have recourse to axiological explanation there no longer remains any good reason to think that both the existence and nature of the real is something so deeply problematic that it remains inexplicably unintelligible—an issue which, on Kantian or other principles, we really ought not to inquire into. The axiological approach to explanation that optimalism employs is, to be sure, a drastically unusual and extraordinary one. But then of course the question of why reality should be explicable is a highly unusual and extraordinary question, and it is a cardinal principle of cognitive sagacity that if one asks an extraordinary question, then one must expect an extraordinary answer.

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SCIENCE AND THE SYNTHETIC METHOD OF THE *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

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A PREOCCUPATION WITH THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE is a thread that runs the entire length of Kant's career.[1] Often this preoccupation expresses itself through Kant's concern for proper methodology, since Kant understands the very idea of what a science is in methodological terms. The mark of a proper science—as opposed to a mere "aggregate" of knowledge—is the requirement that it "be established according to a method."[2] Principally at stake for Kant is the status of metaphysics as a science: this is the central concern of his 1764 "Prize Essay" and likewise the *raison d'être* of the *Critique of Pure*

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[1] With some exceptions, references to Kant's works follow the pagination of the German Academy edition (*Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, later the Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 29 vols. [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–]). Following custom, references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* follow the pagination of the first (A) and second (B) editions. Translations are my own, but I have consulted the commonly used English translations.

Of Kant's first published work (*Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte*, 1746), his biographer Ernst Cassirer remarks: "What is noteworthy in this maiden paper is that the first step Kant takes into the realm of natural philosophy immediately turns into an inquiry into its method. His entire critique of the Leibnizian conception is subordinated to this point of view; at one point he expressly explains that he is not so much combating Leibniz's result as its foundation and derivations, 'not actually the facts themselves, but the *modus cogniscendi*'"; *Kant's Life and Thought*, trans. James Haden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 27.

[2] *Logic*, §95 (9:139). Kant consistently distinguishes between "method" (*Methode*, *Lehrart*), and mere "procedure" (*Verfahren*). For an example, see Kant's remarks in the Doctrine of Method that aim to distinguish Hume's "censorship" of reason from a true "critique" of reason. Hume's haphazard manner of inquiry is deemed a mere "procedure" (*Verfahren*, *CPR*, A760/B788), which Kant consistently distinguishes from method proper (*Methode*). Kant also distinguishes between "method" and "manner": a manner, like a procedure, yields an aggregate of knowledge and not a system. This comes out particularly clearly in the critical-period *Logik Hechsel*. "*Method* is the unity of a

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Reason. As Kant remarks in its Preface, the *Critique* is meant to be a "treatise on the method" of metaphysics.[3]

It is not my present aim to come to terms with this remark or to trace the evolution of Kant's views on the proper method of metaphysics from 1764 to 1781. My aim instead is to advocate a methodological approach to the *Critique* itself—one that is based on Kant's own conception of what scientific methodology involves. For the *Critique*, Kant insists, is a "whole new science," the "science of an a priori judging reason."[4] If critical philosophy is some kind of science, then Kant's general conception of scientific method should be a legitimate guide to its method.

I will begin with Kant's explicit remarks about the method of the *Critique*, which are found in the *Prolegomena*, and which suggest a powerful connection between that method and the need for a "transcendental deduction" of the categories. In order to understand what that connection might be, I then take a step back and consider Kant's general conception of proper scientific method. This will yield a methodological model to hold up against the text of the *Critique*. But what is the exegetical payoff? What prize awaits us if this methodological approach to the text is sound? As I hope to show, clarification about the method of the *Critique* yields a way of thinking about the role of the Transcendental Deduction in the work as a whole that promises to resolve longstanding debates about the Deduction's internal structure.

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whole of cognition according to principles. A unity of cognition can be empirical, . . . in so far as it is in accordance with rules that can be drawn from experience. But there is also unity in accordance with universal principles of reason, where we can produce a thoroughgoing coherence [*Zusammenhang*], and can produce a system, in which we discover the nature [*Art*] of the whole through the connection [*Verknüpfung*] of the manifold. In so far as the unity of cognition rests on empirical rules, it is called manner, in Latin *modus*. But in so far as the unity of the manifold rests on principles of reason, it is called *methodus*, method [*Lehrart*]"; *Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentliche Nachschriften II*, Kant-Forschungen, vol. 9, ed. Tillmann Pinder (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998), 114.

[3] *CPR*, Bxxii. See also A13/B27 and "Erste Einleitung in die *Kritik der Urteilskraft*" (20:195).

[4] See *Prolegomena*, Preface (4:261–2), and Kant's letter to Christian Garve (10:340). In the closing passage of the *Critique*, Kant claims that the *Critique* is pure theoretical reason's "scientific and fully illuminating self-knowledge" (A849/B877). See also Axi–xii and Bxxxv–xxxvi for closely related remarks.

I

In the *Prolegomena*, Kant remarks that the method of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is "synthetic."[5] The *Prolegomena* is offered as a popular presentation of the results of the *Critique* that does not submit itself to the same methodological restrictions. Its method is "analytic," and this is supposed to "lighten the task considerably."[6] One conspicuous difference between the two works is the absence of any "transcendental deduction" in the analytic *Prolegomena*. Might it be the case, then, that the need for a transcendental deduction in the *Critique* is closely related to the peculiarities of its method?

We cannot appreciate the function of the Deduction apart from the aim of the *Critique* as a whole. That aim is to address the possibility of a viable metaphysics of nature. True to the spirit of much of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the *Critique* aims to achieve this end through an examination of our cognitive capacity. Now, the concept of nature does not figure in the main argument of the *Critique* at all until the very end of the Transcendental Deduction: this "deduction" apparently allows for a conclusion about the possibility of nature on the basis of its account of the pure understanding.

The Transcendental Deduction is part of the first book of the Transcendental Analytic, the overall aim of which is to provide an account of the pure understanding as a capacity to judge a priori about objects that can only be given in experience. The Transcendental Analytic begins by announcing that the "pure understanding separates itself not only from everything empirical, but also completely [separates itself] from all sensibility."[7] On this ground, appeal is made to pure general logic—a science that deals with the intellect but abstracts entirely from the content of concepts, and thus from any relation of the understanding to sensibility. It deals only with "the mere form of thought."[8] From the table of the "functions of judgment" borrowed from pure general logic, Kant presents a table of "categories." But their status as genuine concepts, applicable a priori to objects as appearances, hangs in the balance. At this point, they figure as mere "forms of thought."[9]

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[5] *Prolegomena*, §4, 274–5.

[6] *Prolegomena*, §5, 279.

[7] *CPR*, A65/B89; see also A62/B87.

[8] *CPR*, A54/B78.

[9] They remain "mere forms of thought" until rather late in the Deduction; see *CPR*, §24 (B150).

The Transcendental Deduction is supposed to show that these posited concepts are valid of "whatever objects *may come before our senses.*"[10] It is the "explanation of the way that concepts can relate to objects a priori."[11] It is an argument of legitimation, showing that the "forms of thought" that are first revealed when the understanding is considered in isolation from sensibility are applicable a priori to appearances in general. When this is shown, we entitle ourselves to the idea that these forms of thought are indeed pure concepts, or "categories." From there, we claim that the categories "prescribe laws a priori to nature, as the totality of all appearances."[12]

It is striking that the parallel text in the *Prolegomena* argues in the opposite direction: it argues *from* some concept of nature *to* the categories as the principles of its possibility. The trajectory of this argument has everything to do with the *Prolegomena*'s analytic method. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant accounts for the difference between the two methods in terms of what each admits as given starting points. The *Prolegomena* takes as given certain "actual" bodies of synthetic a priori knowledge; through the analysis of each, it "ascends to the sources"—to the "principle of the possibility"—of what is given.[13] Pure natural science is one such starting point. Thus, the second main section of the *Prolegomena* begins by identifying the conception of nature that is implicit in the idea of a pure natural science: we begin with a "material" conception of nature as the "*totality of all objects of experience*," from which we derive a "formal" conception of nature as the "*necessary* conformity to law of all objects of experience."[14] Kant then argues that a certain sort of empirical judgment is proper to the sort of project that a science of nature is supposed to be. From there, Kant concludes that the understanding must be constituted a priori by certain concepts that are to be thought of as conditions of the possibility of experience; the understanding must be conceived in this way, if the judgments of natural science are to be what they purport to be.

Schematically, the argument looks like this: p is not possible without q; p is given; therefore q. Our given, p, stands for something like "pure natural science is a viable cognitive endeavor that is every-

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[10] *CPR*, §26, B159.
[11] *CPR*, A85/B117.
[12] *CPR*, B163.
[13] *Prolegomena*, §4, 275.
[14] *Prolegomena*, §16, 295 and §17, 296.

thing that it purports to be." The argument establishes the necessity of q through an iterated analysis of p.[15] Our starting point is the conception of nature that is analytically implied by the idea of pure natural science. This starting point ensures that the further analysis that leads us to the claim that the understanding must be constituted a priori by certain pure concepts also leads to the recognition that those pure concepts would necessarily be valid of appearances in general. The argument of the *Prolegomena* does not require a separate deduction of the categories. Their legitimacy is established by default.

That there is no separate question about the legitimacy of the categories in the analytic *Prolegomena* certainly seems to be part of what lightens the philosophical load. In the *Critique*, the categories come into view for us through pure general logic, and for this very reason their applicability to given objects remains at stake until the end of the Deduction. Has this given us a glimpse into the "synthetic" method of the *Critique*? Yes: for the fact that we begin by separating the pure understanding from everything empirical and from all sensibility means that we will need to "unite" the understanding with sensibility once again, at least as long as we are seeking an account of it as a capacity to judge a priori about objects that can only be given in experience.

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[15] Interpreters who suppose that the Transcendental Deduction is an antiskeptical "transcendental argument" take its form to be analytic in this way. Of course, the issue of whether the Deduction is a "transcendental argument" turns on more than mere analyticity; it also has to do with what is admitted as a starting point for the analysis—whether it is some bare conception of self-consciousness, or a full-blooded conception of experience or empirical knowledge. The "transcendental argument" view of the Deduction (for example, as found in Strawson and his followers) supposes that the Deduction refutes Cartesian skepticism by admitting as given only the minimal premise that one is self-conscious. Stephen Engstrom clearly shows that the Deduction is not offered as a refutation of Cartesian skepticism, and hence is not an example of a "transcendental argument" in this sense ("The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 32 [1994]: 359–80). For other arguments against taking the Deduction to be a "transcendental argument" in Strawsonian terms, see Karl Ameriks, "The Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument," *Kant-Studien* 19 (1978): 273–87; and Manfred Baum, "Transcendental Proofs in the *Critique of Pure Reason*," in *Transcendental Arguments and Science: Essays in Epistemology*, Synthese Library: Studies in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, vol. 133, ed. Peter Bieri, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Lorenz Krüger (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979).

But why this arduous method? Would we be so impoverished if we had only the analytic *Prolegomena* on our shelves, and not the synthetic *Critique*? The simplest answer that Kant would give turns on the idea that reason must come to complete self-knowledge, and that it is only the synthetic *Critique* that can carry this out. The *Prolegomena*, apparently, does not yield a satisfying form of reason's self-knowledge. In its Preface, Kant suggests that it is only the *Critique* which "presents the faculty of reason in its whole extent and bounds," something that the mere "preparatory exercises" of the *Prolegomena* are in no position to do.[16] Why? After all, the *Prolegomena* seems to be concerned with the same things that the *Critique* is: we learn about space and time as "pure forms of intuition," we learn about the "categories" and the "principles of the pure understanding," and we learn about the "ideas" of reason. The separate analyses of the *Prolegomena* correspond roughly to the *Critique*'s Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Analytic, and Transcendental Dialectic. What does the *Critique* give us that the *Prolegomena* cannot—or, at any rate, *does* not?

Kant would reply that the *Critique* gives us a "science." This is required because the problem at hand is, at least in some sense, foundational: we need to establish the scientific viability of any future metaphysics.[17] Kant thinks that only a genuine science, the insights of which rest on the discovery of a rational principle, could provide the sort of completeness in its results that would be necessary for this foundational project to be achieved.[18] But still this sort of response must grate upon contemporary ears, because it is precisely Kant's var-

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[16] *Prolegomena*, 261. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant expresses the hope that its gentler pastures will kindle a longing in the reader to head down the critical path. "I can already imagine beforehand that everyone whom I have led down the thorny paths of the *Critique*, and whom I have made weary and indignant, will ask me on what indeed I ground this hope. I answer: *upon the unavoidable law of necessity*" (*Prolegomena*, 367). Kant says that his hope is founded upon some sort of necessity, which presumably has to do with the nature of reason. Reason cannot remain as it is, in its unsatisfied state of internal conflict. It cannot stay this way because of its reflective character, and its drive for complete, harmonious determination of all things—including itself.

[17] In the Preface, Kant draws our attention to the problem of the possible scientific status of metaphysics; in the Introduction, the problem at hand is generalized and reformulated as the problem about the possibility of synthetic a priori judging.

ious claims for the scientific character of his project—especially regarding the completeness of his results—that sound so quaintly ludicrous to us now.

But perhaps we could begin to take this idea seriously from an exegetical perspective: the *Critique* possesses a certain unity in its exposition that the *Prolegomena* lacks. The careful reader of the *Prolegomena* soon recognizes that the individual analyses that make up that work—the analysis of pure mathematics, then pure natural science, and even the analysis of the hitherto failed enterprise of metaphysics—are not really independent of one another at all. And yet there is no explicit account of how the three analyses relate to one another.[19] The *Prolegomena* lacks a unifying principle: as we will see, the role of just such a principle in the *Critique* is precisely what would make it a "science" in Kant's view.

A proper science, Kant claims, is a "whole of cognition as a system" that is "established according to a principle."[20] The *Prolegomena* is not a science, because it lacks a principle that could establish the unity of the results of its three analyses. In the *Critique*, this principle is known as the "principle of the synthetic unity of apperception." It is revealed in the Transcendental Deduction, where it is also put to work in establishing a unified account of our capacity to judge a priori about objects that can only be given in experience. This makes it the highest principle of "pure theoretical reason." Now, this principle is

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[18] For consideration of this point in relation to one aspect of the *Critique* (the derivation of the table of categories), see A67/B92 and A80–1/B106–7.

[19] For example, the first analysis in the *Prolegomena* reveals space and time as pure forms of intuition—"principles of the possibility" of pure mathematics. In the second analysis, which takes pure natural science as given and reveals the pure concepts of the understanding, we suddenly learn that these pure concepts are also required for a science of pure mathematics (at the end of §20). In other words, what was elucidated apparently independently in the first analysis—without any mention of the pure concepts of the understanding—turns out to require the concepts that only come into view in the second analysis. Similarly, it is only when we get to the third analysis that we discover that the operative conception of nature in the second analysis—that is, nature as the "*totality of all objects of experience*" (§16, 295)—has its source in reason. The "*absolute whole of all possible experience*," Kant tells us, "is not itself an experience but is a necessary problem of reason" (§40, 328). The three analyses are clearly not independent of one another; at the same time, there is no clear account of their relation to one another. We are lacking a unifying principle.

[20] *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, 467–8.

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merely mentioned (not discovered, and not employed) in the analytic *Prolegomena*.[21] Hence the *Prolegomena* is not a science, but at best a mere report (which is laid out in analytic form) of the results of the *Critique*'s "science of an a priori judging reason."

For Kant, then, the *Critique*'s synthetic method is the source of its status as "scientific and fully illuminating self-knowledge." To understand this method better, I will turn now to the topic of Kant's general conception of scientific cognition.

II

Kant claims that scientific cognition begins with an "idea of the whole": apparently, we start out with an indeterminate grasp of the very subject matter of which the science itself will provide the determinate account. An emphatic, if not particularly clear, statement of this idea can be found in a passage from the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. Although this passage specifically concerns the proper role of reason with respect to empirical cognition, its main point holds of scientific cognition in general.

> If we survey the cognitions of our understanding in their entire range, we find that what reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about concerning them is the *systematic* of cognition, that is, its *interconnection from a principle*. This rational unity always presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of cognition, which precedes the determinate cognition of the parts, and contains the conditions for determining a priori the place of each part and its relation to the others.[22]

One can find a very similar passage in the Doctrine of Method, which tells us that a science begins with a "rational concept" that "contains the end and the form of the whole." According to that passage, a science is a "whole" of cognition that is "articulated and not heaped up; it can grow internally . . . but not externally, like an animal body whose growth does not add limbs but rather makes each limb stronger and fitter for its end without altering the proportion."[23]

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[21] See *Prolegomena*, §36, 318.
[22] *CPR*, A645/B673. My emphasis.
[23] *CPR*, A833/B861.

The curious proposal here is that scientific cognition begins with an idea of the whole and moves to a determinate grasp of the parts. What makes for a determinate grasp of the parts is apparently some kind of appreciation of their relation to one another, and their contribution to the end of the whole. This need not imply that there can be no role for an "indeterminate" account of the parts or elements of a science. An indeterminate account of these elements would simply not address their relation to one another, nor would it explain how they contribute to the end of the whole. As I will suggest later on, the account of sensibility in the *Critique*'s Transcendental Aesthetic, as well as the account of the understanding in the initial stages of its Transcendental Analytic, are "indeterminate" in this sense.

Let us recapitulate these remarks about scientific cognition. Kant claims that scientific inquiry begins with an idea of the "whole": presumably, this refers to the very subject matter regarding which the science will go on to give the determinate account. Now, Kant says that this idea of the whole contains the conditions for the determinate cognition of the parts, suggesting that it may be through some kind of analysis of the idea of the whole that we arrive at the conditions through which the determinate cognition of the parts is possible. Finally, it seems that the conditions for the determinate cognition of the parts are called principles.

Now, in what sense are the projects of inquiry that we today most comfortably think of as "sciences" accounted for by this general model? The method just sketched seems to be a method of exposition rather than a method of discovery. And the demonstration of the unity of a body of knowledge—the exposition—typically follows a stage of discovery. Lamenting this a bit, Kant writes: "It is unfortunate that only after we have spent much time collecting cognitions, as building materials, in a rhapsodic way at the suggestion of an idea lying hidden in our minds, and indeed after we have, over a long period of time, assembled them in a technical manner, does it first become possible for us to discern the idea in a clear light and draw up a whole architectonically according to the ends of reason."[24] Clearly Kant is not supposing that his general model of scientific exposition pertains to the order of discovery in empirical natural science.[25]

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[24] *CPR*, A834–5/B862–3.

[25] The method of exposition, I take it, is concerned to give a clear account of the domain of inquiry. Critical philosophy is the "science of science," because its principles (the principles of the pure understanding) are supposed to determine what it is to figure in the domain of nature *at all*. Thus it offers an account of the domain of all theoretical (as opposed to practical) inquiry.

Furthermore, there are certain modes of inquiry that could never, at least in Kant's book, achieve the kind of systematic expression that is the mark of a proper science. Why not? The answer has to do with the kind of principles employed. In the broadest sense, a "principle" is any universal proposition from which further claims can be established; thus, even an empirical generalization can be a "principle" in this sense.[26] But such a principle, or even a set of them, cannot be the basis of a proper science, according to Kant. What are sometimes called the "human sciences" could never figure as proper sciences on Kant's view, for the simple reason that they cannot contain rational principles. Take art history as an example: there may well be propositions which function as "principles" for art historians, that is, propositions on the basis of which they are able to give a unified account of the practice (say) of painting. These could be propositions about style or the constraints of the medium, or even general determinations about the influence of economic and social conditions on the development of the practice. But in this sort of case, the character and development of the practice itself is prior to the theoretical apparatus that accounts for it. We might consider a more specific example, this time from second-rate theorizing about couture: the proposition that "hemlines rise in good economic times" conceivably allows one both to account for given sartorial phenomena, as well as to anticipate future sartorial phenomena. In this sense, it is a principle. But again, "principles" like this one shift with the development of the practice itself. (After all, there may well come a time when hemlines fall when the markets are up.)

The upshot is that we could never expect to give an exhaustive account of the principles involved in the so-called human sciences. And Kant thinks that it must be possible to give an exhaustive account of the fundamental principles involved in any cognitive enterprise that merits the title of "science." Proper scientific cognition rests on rational principles. A rational principle is prior to the elements of the system. The principles of the pure understanding, which Kant supposes are the foundation of the laws of physics, determine what it is to figure in the domain of nature at all. Thus, what figures as an element in a system of a priori rational cognition (for example, a particular rule or law), as well as any datum that can be cognitively accommodated

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[26] *CPR*, A300/B356.

by that system (for example, an object of possible experience), owes that status to the principle or set of principles that express the "form of the whole" of the science in question.

Scientific cognition must arise from a certain kind of principle, a "rational" one. But how do we get this sort of principle? It is not helpful to say that "it comes from reason." We are now facing the real methodological question: how does all of this work? Kant's conception of a science as a whole of cognition that is established according to a method, on the basis of rational principles, suggests that there may be two aspects of scientific method. For one thing, we will need to arrive at these principles in some methodologically sound way. For another, it seems that we must order or establish the science according to these principles once we find them. These aspects are called analysis and synthesis by Kant in his logic lectures. Analysis, he says, "begins with the conditioned and grounded, and proceeds to principles."[27]

Analysis figures in the work of a science proper as the path to the first (or highest) principle of the science. But the end of scientific inquiry is systematic knowledge, and it is not evident that analysis alone can give us this. Analysis leads us to the principles, and hence to the elements, of the subject matter; but it does not account for their unity. In the Preface to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant distinguishes between these two stages of inquiry when what is at stake is the "determination of a particular faculty of the human soul." The analysis yields a provisional grasp of the "parts" of the faculty in question. Following the analysis is a task that is both "more philosophical and *architectonic*: namely, to grasp the *idea of the whole* correctly and from this to see all those parts in their reciprocal relation to one another by means of their derivation from the concept of that whole in a pure rational faculty." This is the "synthetic" stage of inquiry, which is supposed to afford some kind of "examination and guarantee" of the preliminary results of the analysis.[28]

Before we could appreciate how this would work, we would need to clarify our conception of what a principle is. For the *Critique*, at any rate, seems to deal in at least two different kinds of "principle." The bulk of the *Critique*—everything except the Prefaces, the Introduction, and the Doctrine of Method—is called the "Doctrine of

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[27] *Logic*, §117, 9:149.
[28] *Critique of Practical Reason* 5:10.

Elements." This divides into a Transcendental Aesthetic and a Transcendental Logic, suggesting that the "elements" in question are sensibility and the intellect (broadly construed). There are principles expressing the nature of each of these elements. Space and time, as pure forms of intuition, are "principles" in this sense. So are the "principles of the pure understanding," which are developed from the categories. At the same time, the general account of scientific method that Kant expounds in his logic lectures suggests that there must be another sort of principle in play: the principle on the basis of which the relation of these elements to one another can be established. This sort of principle would count as the "first" or "highest" principle of a science. The elements of the critical science would have that status insofar as they are united, or ordered, by means of such a principle.

In order to understand how this general conception of scientific inquiry might actually play out, we need to be particularly clear about our starting points. An analysis of any kind is intelligible only with respect to its starting point; hence, if we want to track the analyses in the *Critique*, we need to be clear about where the work begins. Kant is not as clear about his starting point in the *Critique* as he is, say, in the *Groundwork*. The first two parts of the *Groundwork* contain an analytic ascent to the categorical imperative from the starting point of "ordinary moral rational cognition." The categorical imperative is not a principle of abstruse metaphysical navel-gazing; it is in play, tacitly, in ordinary moral life. Whatever doubts we might have about the analysis that follows, its starting point (the idea of a "good will") is clearly announced.

Our top priority, if we want to understand the method of the *Critique*, should be to determine what its starting point is. Any analytic argument in the *Critique* will presumably follow from that starting point; and we will not be able to track the line of analysis if we are not clear about what that starting point is. The analysis is supposed to lead us to a highest principle on the basis of which the systematic unity of the investigation can be established. Early on in the *Critique*, Kant remarks that any analysis carried out in its pages must be "purposeful" (*zweckmäßig*), which Kant says means that it would be carried out for the sake of making a certain synthesis possible. This synthesis, he remarks, is that "for the sake of which the entire *Critique* actually exists."[29] The importance of this remark will become evident later on. For now, we should simply hold onto the idea that analysis

and synthesis are complements in scientific investigation: the analysis is carried out for the sake of the ensuing synthesis, and it is in virtue of this synthesis that the investigation becomes a science.

Thus, in order to understand fully the synthetic method of the *Critique*, we would need to address the following questions:

(1) What is the starting point of the *Critique*?

(2) What are the "elements" of this science?

(3) What is the first principle of this science, and where is the analysis that uncovers it?

(4) What is the "synthesis"?

In the following, I will only be able to give detailed responses to questions (1) and (2). These first two questions pertain to the overarching methodological framework of the *Critique*. However, careful consideration of these two questions will yield conclusions about the methodological role of the Transcendental Deduction in the *Critique* as a whole. These conclusions will in turn suggest preliminary answers to questions (3) and (4)—which, as it turns out, pertain to the internal structure of the Transcendental Deduction. In short, if we can clarify the *Critique*'s general methodology by answering the first two questions here, then we should find ourselves in a better position to resolve existing debates about the Deduction's internal structure.

III

Let us begin with the surprisingly vexed issue of the *Critique*'s starting points. What does it take as given? It is tempting to point to the remark at the beginning of the Introduction—where Kant nods to the empiricists, proclaiming "there can be no doubt that all of our knowledge begins with experience"[30]—and to conclude that the starting point of *Critique* itself must be experience. Some influential commentators have supposed that this is the case.[31] After all, in a letter to

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[29] *CPR*, A14/B28.

[30] *CPR*, B1.

[31] This is a pervasive feature of Patricia Kitcher's work on Kant, from *Kant's Transcendental Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) to more recent work—see "The Presupposition of Kant's Transcendental Deduction" (paper delivered at the Fourth Athens–Pittsburgh Symposium, Delphi, Greece, June 2003).

J. S. Beck, Kant himself characterizes an unspecified stretch of the *Critique* as an "analysis of experience in general [*Erfahrung überhaupt*]."[32] But this should indicate that the *Critique* does *not* begin with an empirical premise: the *überhaupt*-formulation tells us that it is not any particular experience, or even any particular collection of them, that is our starting point, but rather some idea of "experience as such." It should go without saying that it is far from clear what this is supposed to mean.

There are three candidate "answers" to the question about the *Critique*'s starting points. I will argue here that they come down to three different ways of saying the same thing. The first candidate is "experience in general"; I will return to it after considering the other two. The second candidate comes attached to the idea that the method is synthetic. While the analytic *Prolegomena* takes as given particular systematic expressions of rational activity (particular sciences, or putative sciences), the *Critique* claims to admit only reason itself. Its starting point is the faculty of reason, rather than any expression of its actuality. I quote the passage now in full:

> In the *Critique of Pure Reason* I intentionally went to work on this question [about the possibility of metaphysics] *synthetically*, namely in such a way that I investigated into pure reason itself and in this very source sought to determine the elements as well as the laws of its pure employment according to principles. This work is difficult and requires a resolute reader to think his way gradually into a system which lays nothing as given for its basis except reason itself, and thus, without resting on any other fact [*Faktum*] seeks to develop the cognition from its original germs.[33]

So Kant says. But when we turn to the text of the *Critique* itself, we find no clear indication of how to understand this, apart from the idea

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[32] 20 January 1792 (11:313).

[33] *Prolegomena*, §4, 274. In the Doctrine of Method, Kant contrasts the genuine criticism of reason with Hume's "censorship" of reason. Hume's project "subject[s] the *facta* of reason to examination [*Prüfung*] and, when necessary, to blame" (*CPR*, A760/B788). The "*facta*" in question are presumably particular claims of reason. The Humean project of censorship is contrasted with critical philosophy, "which subjects to evaluation [*Schätzung*] not the *facta* of reason but reason itself, as concerns its entire faculty and suitability for pure a priori cognitions" (*CPR*, A761/B789). In the passage from the *Prolegomena*, Kant says that the *Critique* takes as given nothing except the "fact [*Factum*]" of reason itself. This means, I take it, that the only starting point is the faculty of reason; the *Critique* does not admit as given any particular actualization of reason's capacity.

that the *Critique* is reason's self-investigation. This characterization of the project is so general that it offers little concrete guidance for getting our bearings in the text.

Moreover, when it comes time to specify what our starting point is supposed to be, Kant does not seem to point to reason. Instead, at the end of the *Critique*'s Introduction—just as we are about to embark on the work proper, the Doctrine of Elements—Kant says that the only "preliminary" is his characteristic thesis about the heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding.

> All that seems necessary for an introduction or preliminary is that there are two stems of human cognition, which perhaps arise from a common, but to us unknown, root—namely, sensibility and understanding. Through the first objects are *given* to us, while through the second they are *thought*. To the extent that sensibility may contain a priori representations, which constitute the condition under which objects may be given to us, it would belong to transcendental philosophy.[34]

So we have a third candidate starting point: the thesis about the heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding, the former a capacity to represent objects insofar as they can be given, and the latter a capacity to represent them insofar as they can be thought. I shall refer to this as the "heterogeneity thesis."

On the face of it, the heterogeneity thesis is not a controversial starting point. Nearly any philosopher, with the possible exception of a Platonist committed to disparaging the cognitive value of sensory representations altogether, would be prepared to give some lip service to the idea that sensibility and understanding contribute in distinct ways to knowledge. In this passage, however, Kant suggests a further ramification of the view that clearly is controversial. For it seems that if this thesis is to serve as the starting point of critical philosophy, then it entails not only that sensibility and understanding contribute in distinct ways to our cognition, but also that each capacity is constituted by certain a priori representations. At any rate, this is the condition under which sensibility would figure in "transcendental philosophy," as Kant says in the passage above. If the heterogeneity thesis entails this much, even as a mere "preliminary," it is much more radical than any garden-variety empiricist or rationalist would be prepared to accept. The rationalist digs in his heels with the idea that sensibility is

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[34] *CPR*, A15/B29–30.

constituted a priori, while the empiricist would dispute that either capacity could be constituted a priori.

Furthermore, this preliminary thesis shapes everything that follows. We suppose the heterogeneity thesis at the outset, it seems—and with it, the more radical implication that sensibility and (presumably) the understanding "contain" a priori representations. So, when we turn the page, and begin the Transcendental Aesthetic, we set out to give an account of sensibility that presupposes the possibility of "isolating" it both from "what the understanding thinks through its concepts," as well as from "everything that belongs to sensation." This is to leave us with the a priori representations that we suppose sensibility must "contain"—that is, nothing but "pure intuition and the mere form of appearances."[35] As we have already seen, Kant makes a similar move at the outset of the Transcendental Analytic, announcing that the pure understanding "separates itself" from "everything empirical" and from "all sensibility." Hence, the heterogeneity thesis seems to underwrite a methodological strategy, which I shall call the "strategy of isolation."

The heterogeneity thesis says that the elements are irreducible to one another, and this irreducibility is cashed out in terms of the idea that each capacity is characterized by a distinct mode of representation (sensibility by intuitions, understanding by concepts). This idea of a "mode of representation" pertains to the distinct expression of each capacity. Is there not something ambiguous about the notion of "representation" in this story? For Kant takes a further step beyond the mere idea that each element is distinguished by its mode of representing: he supposes, as part of the heterogeneity thesis, that each element "contains" a priori representations that are constitutive of its capacity.

The hidden presupposition here, it seems, can be traced back to the B-edition Preface, where Kant puts forward a new model for conceiving of the possibility of a priori cognition. It is an "altered method of our way of thinking, namely, that we cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them."[36] We cannot conceive of the possibility of a priori cognition, Kant argues, if we suppose that our cognition must conform to its objects. So a new explanatory model is

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[35] *CPR*, A22/B36.
[36] *CPR*, Bxviii.

admitted: we are to conceive of the possibility of a priori cognition in terms of the idea that our cognitive capacity makes some necessary contribution to cognition.

This contribution can only be an anticipation of what can be cognized at all. The contribution would have to be independent of any particular occasion of the exercise of these capacities; in other words, this contribution would not be generated as a mere response to the world. This seems to lead Kant to the idea that we can conceive of this contribution in terms of certain a priori representations that distinguish each capacity.

When each capacity is considered in isolation from the other and from everything empirical, we discover the a priori representations that are constitutive of the capacity. For Kant, this means that we can give an exhaustive account of each capacity in terms of these representations (although he is not explicit about why this follows, and it is not clear that it does). At any rate, the point is made emphatically at the outset of the Transcendental Analytic: the table of the pure, elementary concepts of the understanding must "fully exhaust the entire field of the pure understanding."[37] The categories exhaust the capacity of the understanding in the sense that any particular empirical concept (*Erfahrungsbegriff*) is simply a pure concept of the understanding considered *in concreto*; they are "forms" of concepts in general.[38] Likewise, the pure forms of intuition exhaust the capacity of sensibility, at least in the sense that anything that can figure as a sensible representation must "stand under" these forms: no singular representation can register in our consciousness if it is not given in space or time.[39] Thus, Kant's heterogeneity thesis says not only that sensibility and understanding make distinct contributions to knowledge, but also that each "contains" a priori representations that are constitutive of its capacity.

Yet this "preliminary" for Kant's entire investigation is something that neither an empiricist nor a rationalist could accept. On what

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[37] *CPR*, A64/B89.

[38] *CPR*, A567/B595.

[39] For one clear statement of this, see Kant's reminder in the Deduction about the principal result of the Aesthetic: "The highest principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of sensibility stand under the formal conditions of space and time" (*CPR*, §17, B136).

basis can it be invoked as a preliminary, rather than as a conclusion? We can address this question by considering the relation of the heterogeneity thesis to the other main candidate for the *Critique*'s starting point: "reason itself." Presumably, Kant says that the *Critique* takes nothing as given except reason itself because it is supposed to be reason's project of self-knowledge. But this oversimplifies matters: it is reason's examination of its theoretical capacity. Kant begins in the B Preface by considering successful cases of scientific cognition and the failure of metaphysics to attain the "sure path" of a science. The problem of metaphysics is reformulated in the Introduction as the problem about the possibility of judging a priori about objects that can only be given in experience. Kant understands this as the problem about the possibility of synthetic a priori judging, which he then dubs the "general problem of pure reason."[40] At stake is the viability of judging that claims both apodictic necessity and objective validity. In these passages, Kant claims that the only resolution to such a problem is for reason to examine its own capacity. For the claims of reason are at stake—and, as Kant says elsewhere, reason "recognizes no other judge than human reason itself."[41] The passages leading up to the presentation of the heterogeneity thesis as the starting point set out the framework of the project as reason's examination of its theoretical capacity.[42]

No doubt, the argument leading to the presentation of the heterogeneity thesis is somewhat suppressed. But the line it takes must be something like the following. If cognition of objects is possible a priori, then it must be independent of any particular occasion of objects appearing before the senses. Yet if the critical science is to account for the possibility of a priori cognition of objects (phenomena), then it must rely on the existence of a priori conditions of the possibility of objects appearing before the senses. This is why Kant admits the heterogeneity thesis as a "preliminary," underscoring the idea that sensibility must "contain" a priori representations if it is to figure in this science at all.

The heterogeneity thesis figures as a "preliminary" under the proviso that we accept Kant's description of the general problem of pure

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[40] *CPR*, §6, B19.
[41] *CPR*, A752/B780; see also *Prolegomena*, 263.
[42] *CPR*, A14–5/B28–9; see also Bx.

reason and his prescription for its resolution.[43] There is no real tension between the idea that the *Critique* takes nothing as given except reason itself, and the idea that its only preliminary is the heterogeneity thesis. Reason is investigating itself as a capacity for a priori theoretical cognition. It does so by inquiring about the possibility of judging synthetically and a priori. What distinguishes synthetic a priori judging from analytic (a priori) judging is that it concerns empirical objects, rather than the content of concepts. Supposing that it is possible to judge in this way, then some receptive capacity must be part of this faculty for a priori judging. As such, it would have to be constituted by its "own" a priori representations if it is to be genuinely distinct from the capacity for thought, and yet part of an "a priori judging reason." So if this is how pure theoretical reason investigates its own capacity, then sensibility and understanding are, in this respect, "elements" of it. They are not derived from reason—reason is not the "unknown root"—but rather, they are part of reason only insofar as they are unified by it, as we shall see.[44]

Thus, the heterogeneity thesis falls out of the idea of the project itself, as pure theoretical reason investigating its own capacity. This is also, I think, another way of saying that the starting point is "experience in general," or *Erfahrung überhaupt*—the first candidate for the *Critique*'s starting point. Kant's *überhaupt*-formulation tells us that we are dealing with an idea of reason: that is, not any particular experience or finite set of exeriences, but something like the sum total of them. Of course, we can only grasp this modally, in terms of a priori conditions for the possibility of experience. Bearing in mind that Kant takes experience to be "empirical knowledge,"[45] the compatibility of this candidate starting point with the other two should be clear.

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[43] In the Doctrine of Method, Kant suggests that the starting point of critical philosophy is the "nature of synthetic a priori propositions" (*CPR*, A762/B790).

[44] I take it that the heterogeneity thesis would be compromised if we could indicate what this "unknown root" is.

[45] *CPR*, B146; B165–6; B234; see also B1 and B128.

IV

What does the heterogeneity thesis, and with it the strategy of isolation, tell us about the *Critique*'s synthetic method? To answer this, consider Kant's reminder of the heterogeneity thesis at the outset of the Transcendental Logic. Each capacity, he says, is characterized by a distinct mode of representation—sensibility by intuitions, and understanding by concepts—which are the "elements of all our cognition." Knowledge requires both: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."[46] Thinking is a source of knowledge only to the extent that it is applicable to what can present itself to us in sensibility, our capacity to enjoy given representations. Intuition is a source of knowledge only insofar as it can be brought under concepts. As cognitive faculties, sensibility and understanding are fundamentally distinct: the form of representation that characterizes the one can never be reduced to the form of representation that characterizes the other. At the same time, they are necessarily unified: "These two faculties or capabilities can never exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, and the senses can think nothing. Only through their unification can cognition arise."[47] This thesis about the unity of sensibility and understanding complements the heterogeneity thesis; I shall call it the "cooperation thesis."

When we begin the Transcendental Deduction, we have in place a preliminary account of sensibility as constituted by two "forms of intuition," and a preliminary account of the understanding as constituted by twelve "forms of thought." But merely pointing to the a priori "forms" of representation that are constitutive of sensibility and understanding respectively is not enough to entitle us to a conception of these as elements of a capacity for a priori knowledge of nature. Their status as cognitive capacities hangs in the balance: the cooperation thesis tells us this. Thus, the strategy of isolation must be complemented by an argument that, in effect, brings these elements together. This is why the method is "synthetic," and this is why the Deduction is the pivot on which everything else in transcendental philosophy turns.[48]

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[46] *CPR*, A50–1/B74–5.
[47] *CPR*, A51/B75–6.

V

Our general model of scientific method involves analysis and synthesis as complements. So far our account of the synthetic character of the *Critique*'s argument has focused on the need to combine sensibility and understanding as elements of pure theoretical reason. Where is the analysis and where is the synthesis that the methodological model tells us we should expect?

Kant conceives of the *Critique* as reason's scientific examination of its own capacity. On the basis of Kant's remarks about methodology, we should expect to find some preliminary conception of reason as the "idea of the whole" from which we would begin. This preliminary conception comes to light in the Preface and Introduction, which are both concerned with the nature of rational cognition. The topic of the B Preface, after all, is rational cognition that "takes the sure path of a science." What better way to adumbrate a preliminary conception of theoretical reason than by considering its paradigmatic activity (scientific cognition)? There isn't time to examine Kant's remarks about scientific demonstration in the B Preface, and, at any rate, those remarks are more suggestive than conclusive. Yet this, at least, should be clear: Kant begins with a general account of rational cognition in the B Preface which puts forward an idea of the "whole," which is pure theoretical reason as a source of scientific cognition. In the Introduction, Kant clarifies this idea of the whole when he introduces the problem about the possibility of synthetic a priori judging, which he presents under the heading of the "general problem of pure reason."

But what follows when we embark upon the main text of the *Critique*—the Doctrine of Elements—are separate accounts of sensibility

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[48] Dieter Henrich remarks that the argument of the Deduction is "synthetic" for something like this reason: the Deduction "proceeds on the basis of the fact that the two doctrines of the *Critique* are initially developed independently of one another—the doctrine of the categories as functions of unity in self-consciousness and the doctrine of space and time as given representations"; "The Proof Structure of the Transcendental Deduction," *Review of Metaphysics* 22 (1969): 649. He continues: "Within the structure which Kant had already given his book, the advantages of a construction according to the synthetic method were in any case obvious. This construction allowed him to ground the two fundamental positions of critical philosophy, the sensible a priori and the active role of the understanding in knowledge, separately—and unite them by means of a single argument" (650).

and understanding, each considered in "isolation" or "separation" from the other. I have argued above that the strategy of isolation on its own cannot yield an account of either element as a cognitive capacity. As long as we labor under the strategy of isolation, we have only an "indeterminate" account of these elements because we still lack the principle that would determine their relation to one another in their contribution to the end of the whole. This means that we have no basis to claim that the characteristic representations that we take to be constitutive of each element are "objectively valid." We still have no basis to claim that these representations put us on to objects.

This gives us another way to think about the justificatory task of the Deduction: the Deduction aims to establish that the elements in question are indeed cognitive capacities. Kant's general conception of scientific method gives us some idea of how this should work. We want a determinate account of the elements (sensibility and understanding) on the basis of a rational principle. This means that the account of each element will be complete only once we reveal this principle and employ it to ascertain the relation of each element to one another insofar as they contribute to the end of the whole. Given the way Kant sets things up in the Preface and Introduction, that "end" seems to be scientific knowledge of material nature (be it physical or metaphysical).

As we have already seen, Kant's general model of scientific method involves two parts: analysis and synthesis. Thus, it seems to apply quite directly to the Transcendental Deduction chapter. After all, Kant divides this chapter into two parts with a signpost: about halfway through, Kant tells his weary reader that "a beginning [*Anfang*] of a *deduction* of the pure concepts of the understanding has been made." It has, moreover, just been made—"in the above proposition [*obigen Satz*]."[49] Halfway through a text of punishing difficulty, we suddenly learn that we are just getting started.

Many commentators have remarked on the Deduction's two-part structure, but there is little agreement among those commentators about what is going on in each of the two parts, and how they relate to one another. The general account of the *Critique*'s method that I have offered prepares us to understand why the Deduction has two parts. The strategy of isolation leaves us with two separate and there-

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[49] *CPR*, B144.

fore preliminary accounts of the elements, sensibility and understanding.[50] We still need the rational principle that will allow us to unify them into the account of a single cognitive capacity.

That principle is the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception: it pertains to—even expresses—the reflective or self-conscious nature of reason. We uncover and establish this principle in the first half of the Transcendental Deduction. What follows that is the deduction argument in the strict sense: this is the "synthetic" account of the relation of sensibility and understanding insofar as each is capable of contributing to scientific knowledge of material nature. It is only when we have this principle in view, and employ this principle to establish the relation of these elements to one another, that our account of the elements can be complete and determinate. To see whether and how this succeeds, we would need to examine the details of the Deduction. That is work for another day. I simply hope to have made a compelling case for the potential exegetical payoff of taking seriously Kant's own conception of the *Critique* as a science of pure reason.[51]

Georgia State University

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[50] My claim about the provisional status of the account of sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic is rather more controversial than the parallel claim about the provisional status of the account of the pure understanding in the initial stages of the Transcendental Analytic. At this point, my claim about the provisional status of the separate accounts of sensibility and understanding rests largely on Kant's heterogeneity and cooperation theses. I offer an account of the provisionality of the Transcendental Aesthetic in another manuscript.

[51] I wish to thank Steve Engstrom, John McDowell, Jim Conant, Nick Rescher, and Tony Edwards for their help and encouragement in advising the dissertation from which this essay is drawn.

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INDUCTION AND EXPERIENCE IN *METAPHYSICS* 1.1

THOMAS A. BLACKSON

IN *POSTERIOR ANALYTICS* 2.19 AND *METAPHYSICS* 1.1, Aristotle describes the natural process by which man acquires reason and the knowledge that belongs to reason. He says that from perception comes memory, from memory comes experience, and from experience comes reason and the knowledge that belongs to reason. This is the sequence in induction, and it is common to the description in both passages. In the *Metaphysics*, however, unlike in the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle goes on to explain how the expertise gained in experience is different from but easily mistaken for the knowledge that belongs to reason. He says that men of experience know that the thing is so, but not the why and the cause, and this can be perplexing because it can seem to conflict with his epistemology and ontology of reason. As I understand Aristotle, he thought that wisdom, not the knowledge that belongs to reason, varies among men, and that every adult who is not defective acquires the knowledge why in the course of his natural development. It thus follows that the experience that men of experience possess cannot be the experience in induction, for otherwise reason and its knowledge would come to man late in life, if at all, and would come to only those who had acquired the expertise that belongs to men of experience.

Now one might take these remarks in the *Metaphysics* to show nothing more than that my understanding of Aristotle's epistemology and ontology of reason is incorrect, but I think that the case for this interpretation is too strong to reject so easily. As I understand it, Aristotle's epistemology and ontology of reason is part of a tradition that dates back to Plato and ultimately to Socrates and his love of wisdom. In an attempt to understand Socrates, Plato developed a rationalist epistemology according to which the knowledge of the

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structure of reality necessary for a good life belongs to reason. Aristotle accepted this rationalist epistemology but rejected the Pythagorean ontological framework in which Plato had cast it. Aristotle thought that reason and its knowledge are acquired naturally over time in the process of induction.

It is not easy to prove that Plato developed a rationalist epistemology, but this interpretation becomes hard to resist if one supposes that Socrates had no theory of knowledge but presupposed the existence of a body of knowledge in his love of wisdom. It is, of course, notoriously difficult to know what Socrates thought, but it is clear that the early dialogues can give the reader the impression that Socrates assumed that people have all the knowledge they need to live in accordance with the good, that they know the correct answers to the "What is it?" questions, but because they also have managed to acquire various false beliefs in the course of their life, they do not always act on the basis of this knowledge. To make their knowledge more reliable for living a good life, Socrates seems to have thought that he and his interlocutors must engage in question and answer dialectic to eliminate this inconsistency.[1]

This method can seem to presuppose that the correct answers to the "What is it?" questions are in the person all along, for otherwise it is hard to see how eliminating inconsistency can be a way of identifying the truth, and Plato makes this presupposition central to his theory of recollection. Plato proposed a theory of the knowledge that Socrates seemed to presuppose. According to the theory of recollection, the answers to Socrates' "What is it?" questions belong essen-

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[1] Michael Frede makes the point. "On the whole one is inclined to think that Socrates presupposes that, as far as the important questions are concerned, we, directly or indirectly, already do have the right answers, except that we are so confused that we also have the wrong answers, either directly or indirectly, in so far as we have beliefs which entail the wrong answer. This is what puts Socrates in a position to refute anybody whatever he says. It is not the case that Socrates' interlocutors would need to uncover new facts to make themselves immune to Socratic refutation. They know all they have to know to defend themselves. What does them in is that in each case they, in their confusion, also hold incompatible beliefs. So it is not the case that, to make themselves immune to Socratic refutation, they have to acquire new beliefs. They rather have to abandon all the false beliefs which are incompatible with their true beliefs"; *Rationality in Greek Thought*, ed. Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9–10.

tially to reason and are in the person all along, the soul has these answers before it enters a body, and the human person must recollect and separate this knowledge from the false beliefs he acquires because of his undue attachment to the body and its concerns.

If this interpretation is right, Plato stands as perhaps the most striking example of the Greek enlightenment idea of rejecting tradition and championing the ability to figure out the truth for oneself. According to the theory of recollection, the human person can figure out the truth for himself because he has something called "reason." Contrary to what the word "reason" might suggest, having reason does not simply give a person the ability to conform to the correct procedures for acquiring beliefs. Reason, as Plato seems to have conceived of it, includes knowledge of the things Socrates uses his "What is it?" questions to ask about. This knowledge is part of reason itself, and to identify and hold this knowledge firmly in mind, the inquirer needs to eliminate the confusion produced by the cultural tradition in which he lives and ultimately by the experience of being embodied. During its time in the body, the soul in its weakness wrongly takes on the concerns of a bodily life and thereby becomes so confused that it has trouble holding on to the correct answers to the "What is it?" questions. It must take charge of its life in the body so that it can hold these answers firmly in mind and thereby restore itself, as much as possible, to the state of contemplation it enjoyed prior to incarnation, and it achieves this restoration by living in the body as a lover of wisdom. The soul must take control of natural but incorrect habits of belief-formation, and it must engage in dialectic to eliminate false beliefs.

Aristotle, as I understand him, tried to free this Platonic rationalism from what he thought was a confused ontology. He rejected the Pythagorean ontology of soul and body in which Plato had cast his epistemic rationalism. Aristotle did not suppose that reason in the human person is inborn but becomes confused because in its weakness it mistakenly identifies and takes on the ends of the body. On the contrary, he thought that reason and its knowledge naturally come to be present over time through the process of induction. This interpretation makes good sense of the well-known passages in *Posterior Analytics* 2.19 and *Metaphysics* 1.1 in which Aristotle discusses induction, and it makes his epistemology and ontology of reason an easily understandable and relatively straightforward development in a epistemic

rationalist tradition that derives from Plato and his attempt to understand Socrates and his love of wisdom.

Given this understanding of Aristotle and his place in the rationalist tradition, it is possible to see more clearly why the discussion of experience in *Metaphysics* 1.1 can appear inconsistent with Aristotle's epistemology and ontology of reason. It starts out as one might expect. Aristotle seems to be talking about experience as a state of mind in the inductive process that precedes and gives rise to reason and its knowledge:

> And from memory experience is produced in men; for many memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. Experience seems to be very similar to knowledge and art, but really knowledge and art come to men through experience.[2]

Soon, however, he seems to talk about experience differently. He seems to talk about it, not as a state in the inductive process, but as the justification that gives the practitioner knowledge:

> With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and we even see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without experience.[3] . . . But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience (which implies that wisdom depends on knowledge); and this is because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the why and the cause.[4]

This experience, the experience that men of experience possess, cannot be the experience in induction. The experience in induction is a state that characterizes the soul in the course of its natural development and presumably early in life. It is from memory and gives rise to reason and its knowledge. The experience that constitutes the expertise that men of experience possess is something entirely different. It comes late in the life of the adult, if at all, and its presence is over and above the knowledge *why* that belongs to reason. This knowledge comes to be present through induction in everyone who is not maimed or otherwise defective.

To understand what Aristotle may have had in mind in his talk about "experience" in induction and in men of experience, it is useful

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[2] *Metaphysics* 1.1.980b28–981a3.
[3] *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a12–15.
[4] *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a24–30.

to recall the contrast between practice and theory that Plato had drawn previously in the *Laws* at 720a6–b7 and 857c7–e1. The contrast is between kinds of medical expertise. Experience gives the practitioner the expertise to make the correct diagnosis in circumstances in which the layman is more likely to make a mistake. This sort of expertise, however, is not the same as the expertise that the "free doctors have learned and pass on to their pupils."[5] The practitioner is able to recognize that certain situations require certain treatments, and this puts him ahead of the layman who is likely to make a mistake and apply an incorrect treatment in those situations. On the question of why, however, the practitioner is no better than the layman. Unlike the free doctor, as Plato puts the point in the *Laws*, the practitioner cannot discuss "the course of the disease"[6] and its connection to "the whole nature of the body"[7] without falling into confusion.

This discussion in the *Laws* suggests a natural solution to the problem in Aristotle. If Aristotle does have in mind the medical practitioner and this contrast between practice and theory, although his remarks in the *Metaphysics* 1.1 are confusing, then perhaps they are not confused. He might be plausibly understood to give an analogy to illuminate the "experience" in the inductive process. Experience gives the practitioner the confidence that something is the case, but he is not an expert in the art of medicine. He cannot hold in mind the explanation, and Aristotle may have thought that a similar relationship exists between experience and reason in induction. Whereas experience is a state of having knowledge *that*, reason strictly and without qualification includes the knowledge *why* and the demonstrations the wise hold in mind in living a good life. If this were Aristotle's view, it need not be understood to run contrary to the epistemic rationalism he inherited from Plato. He could suppose, in line with his view that things are said in many ways, that there is reason with and without qualification and that the state of experience in the inductive process is a state of reason with qualification.

I think that this is a natural and plausible solution to the problem, but it is not the interpretation Michael Frede gives in his discussion of Aristotle's epistemology and ontology of reason in "Aristotle's

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[5] *Laws* 720b4–5.
[6] *Laws* 857d3.
[7] *Laws* 857d3–4.

Rationalism." According to Frede, Aristotle thought that reason and the knowledge that belongs to reason come naturally but take "a great deal of effort on our part" and "a great deal of often highly specialized observation and of often highly technical reflections":

> To say that it is somehow a natural process by means of which we arrive at first principles is to exploit Aristotle's generous conception of what is natural and to focus on just one aspect of it. This becomes particularly clear if we keep in mind that on Aristotle's view it also is the case that by nature we are meant to be virtuous and are thus constructed as to naturally be virtuous. Nevertheless, Aristotle also assumes that it takes a great deal of effort on our part to come to know the first principles in general (and thus to become wise), or even just the first principles in some domain. What is needed for this is a great deal of often highly specialized observation and of often highly technical reflections. But this should not obscure the fact that the insight, if it is an insight, does not derive its epistemic status from these observations and reflections which lead up to it. What makes it an insight is not the support it gets from observations or considerations, but that one finally sees in a way which fits how the features in question are related to each other and to other relevant features.[8]

Frede does not say explicitly that this "specialized observation" causes men of experience to have reason and its knowledge, but his distinction between what he describes as "empirical" and "real" or "true" knowledge clearly suggests that this is what he has in mind.

Frede says that Aristotle thought that men of experience do not have "true" or "real" knowledge because "real knowledge, unlike experiential knowledge, has to be truly universal" and "involves understanding of what is known" in that "it involves knowledge of the reason why something is the case and not just the knowledge that something is the case."[9] To illustrate the distinction, Frede uses passages from the *Metaphysics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> Perhaps it turns out, as a matter of experience, that it is those people who have a certain complexion who respond positively. This allows us to form the empirical generalization that those patients afflicted by this kind of fever who have this complexion benefit from this kind of treatment. All of this, Aristotle thinks, does not suffice to give us true knowledge because it does not give us genuinely universal truth.[10]

> We might know by experience that meat of fowl is good for one and hence particularly good for patients in their weakened condition. This

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[8] "Aristotle's Rationalism," in *Rationality in Greek Thought*, 172.
[9] Ibid., 159.
[10] Ibid.,161.

> is an empirical generalization. What mere experience does not provide us with is a grasp of the salient universal feature. It is an insight, and not a matter of experience, to realize that the salient feature is the lightness of the meat. So it is, in fact, all light meat which is good for one, and fowl just happens to be light meat. Its being fowl in a way is irrelevant to its being good for, just as in the earlier example the patient's having a certain complexion in a way was irrelevant to his benefitting from the given treatment.[11]

Experiential knowledge really is knowledge for Aristotle;[12] however, it is not the knowledge that belongs to reason because it is knowledge of an empirical generalization over an observable feature of many things. Having a certain complexion, or being a particular kind of fowl, say a chicken, is supposed to be something that one can know by looking. The same, however, is not supposed to be true for having a bilious or phlegmatic condition, as in the *Metaphysics* example, or for being light meat, as in the example from the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

I think Frede is right about this. Aristotle presumably did not think that all knowledge belongs to reason. It is the knowledge of the structure of reality that belongs to reason. This is the knowledge necessary for living a good life, and this is the knowledge that cannot have its justification in experience. It is not essential to epistemic rationalism that there be no other knowledge. Aristotle presumably did think that the experience ordinarily understood to provide the expertise that characterizes a practitioner does constitute the justification for the knowledge constituting the expertise the practitioner possesses. In this case, the experience that characterizes the expertise of the men of experience is the justification for some knowledge; however, it is not justification for the knowledge why that belongs to reason.

My disagreement with Frede is not on this point but on the connection between the experience of the men of experience and the experience in the inductive process. Frede seems to think that they are one and the same. He seems to think that Aristotle thought that in the inductive process the "highly specialized observation" causes the "insight" that constitutes the "true" and "real" knowledge that belongs to reason and that the wise hold firmly in mind. Before the insight there

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[11] Ibid.

[12] It is not clear that Frede thinks that "experiential knowledge really is knowledge." He says that, for Aristotle, "[t]hings are known a posteriori only in a debased sense of 'knowledge'"; ibid., 158. I doubt that this is Aristotle's view, but nothing in my argument depends on the point.

can only be empirical knowledge. After the insight there is real knowledge, and the change takes place in human beings by nature if they are not maimed or otherwise defective.

Although Aristotle certainly does little in his remarks in *Metaphysics* 1.1 to discourage this understanding, it seems to me that there is good reason not to accept this interpretation. If the experience that men of experience possess is the experience in the inductive process, then reason and its knowledge would become present only relatively late in life, if at all, and only in those who have first acquired the expertise of the practitioner. In this case, Aristotle is at odds with the epistemic rationalist tradition that stems from Socrates. Socrates seems to have assumed that he and his interlocutors already had all the knowledge they need to live a good life. He does not seem to think that anyone has to do anything special to get this knowledge. Plato, in his theory of recollection, is consistent with Socrates on this point. Plato thought that this knowledge was innate, so he could not have thought the experience that provides the expertise of the practitioner is necessary for reason and its knowledge. The Stoics, finally, are also in agreement with Socrates and Plato on this point. Since they seem to have thought that reason and its knowledge become present early in life, and indeed that the acquisition is complete by age seven,[13] it would seem that they could not have thought that the experience that provides the expertise of the practitioner is necessary for the acquisition of reason and its knowledge.

Although Frede is in agreement with the broad outline of the rationalist tradition I have presented,[14] he does not accept my interpre-

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[13] Aetius 4.11.1–4 (Hans von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* [Leipzig: B. G. Teubneri, 1903–05], 2.83; A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenic Philosophers* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], 39 E). Galen, *De dogm. Hipp. et Plat.* 5.3.1 (*Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, ii.841).

[14] Frede has set out his understanding in a now classic series of papers on the development of the notion of reason in the ancients. For the main points from Socrates to the Stoics, see the introduction to *Rationality in Greek Thought*, 9–10; "On the Stoic Conception of the Good," in *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 83; "Aristotle's Rationalism," 157–8; "An Empiricist View of Knowledge: Memorism," in *Companions to Ancient Thought: Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 236; and "The Stoic Conception of Reason," in *Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. Konstantine Boudouris (Athens: International Society for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1993–94), 54.

tation of induction and its place in the tradition. He understands the Stoic theory of induction to be very similar to the theory of induction he attributes to Aristotle, and he argues that the Stoic theory makes a place for something like the notion of "highly specialized observation" that he takes to be a part of the Aristotelian theory. He says that the Stoics thought that some of the concepts belonging to reason require a certain amount of work on the part of the agent to become present in the soul:

> [T]he acquisition of at least some of the natural notions, like the notion of the good or the notion of god, does presumably involve a certain amount of reflection (cf. Cic. De fin. III = SVF III, 72). The crucial point is that, though this reflection puts the notion of the good into our mind, the notion does not have its epistemic status, because we have correctly inferred from what we already know that there must be something in or about the world which corresponds to this notion. It rather is the case that we by nature are constructed in such a way that at some point when we reflect on our natural behavior, we naturally come to think of our behavior, and to understand it, as being directed towards the good conceived in a certain way.[15]

> Cicero [in *De finibus* 3.20–1] identifies the point at which we naturally come both to have a notion of the good and to see what is good in the following way. If we have developed naturally we would reach a point at which we invariably and unhesitatingly, as nature means us to, select things in such a way that we go for what is conducive to our survival and avoid what is detrimental to it. And we are told about this pattern of selection and behavior that in it we find the beginnings of the good and begin to understand what it is that deserves to be called 'good'; that is to say, looking at and reflecting on this pattern of behavior, we naturally come to have not only a notion, but the right, the natural notion of the good.[16]

In the case of the good, the reflection required does not amount to an argument that the good is such-and-such. The Stoics, according to Frede, did not think that the person asks himself what is good and answers by appealing to his past behavior as premise in an argument to justify the conclusion that the good is such-and-such. On Frede's interpretation, the reflection on past behavior causes the concept of the good to come to exist in the mind.

Although one might agree with Frede about the Stoic theory and try to argue that this theory is an innovation in the thought about induction, I think it is better to reconsider his interpretation of Cicero's

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[15] "The Stoic Conception of Reason," 55.
[16] "On the Stoic Conception of the Good," 79.

remarks. Since, as Frede himself notes, Cicero's report in *De finibus* is "very brief and very sketchy" and "becomes tantalizingly vague precisely when it comes to the crucial step we are interested in,"[17] it seems possible that Cicero is not explaining how the natural concept of good is acquired in a causal process, as Frede has claimed, but rather is explaining how the content of an existing concept becomes salient so that the person can begin to consider whether it is open to refutation. If nature is provident, after all, as the Stoics believed, presumably there must be some such natural process to put man on the road to wisdom.

This idea might have been familiar to the Stoics on the basis of a similar point in the *Phaedo* in the argument from recollection for the preexistence of the soul. Socrates begins by trying to get straight on what recollection is. He suggests that something is a case of recollection "if someone, on seeing a thing, or hearing it, or getting any other sense-perception of it, not only recognizes that thing, but also thinks of something else, which is the object not of the same knowledge but of another," and that "we then rightly say that he has been reminded of the object which he has got the thought."[18] Once his interlocutors have granted this understanding of recollection, he says that the use of the senses causes us to remember the forms. He says that "having them before birth, we lost them on being born, and later on, using the senses about the things in question, we regain those pieces of knowledge that we possessed at some former time, . . . [and] that this was being reminded."[19] In this way, although the incarnate soul becomes confused about the content of the concepts belonging to reason, experience naturally begins to reorient the soul and put it on the road to eliminating this confusion.[20]

It seems possible to understand Cicero similarly. The Stoics, of course, did not believe that reason is inborn. They followed Aristotle in thinking that reason naturally becomes present over time, but perhaps they did think that reflecting on past behavior does not cause the natural concept of the good to become present but rather helps one to notice and begin to hold firmly in mind the content of this concept. Here is what Cicero says (in Frede's translation):

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[17] "On the Stoic Conception of the Good," 72.
[18] *Phaedo* 73c5–d1.
[19] *Phaedo* 75e2–7.

> An appropriate action (for this is what I call a *kathekon*) is first that one preserve oneself in one's natural state, then that one hold on to those things that are in accordance with nature and reject their opposites; once one has discovered this pattern of selection and also of rejection, there next comes selection according to what is appropriate, then selection invariably follows this pattern, until, finally, it does reliably so and accords with nature. It is first in this sort of selection that that which can truly be called good comes to be present and that one can understand what it consists in. For originally man comes to be attached to those things which are in accordance with nature. But as soon as he has gained this understanding, or rather this notion which they call an 'ennoia,' and as he has come to see the order and, to put it this way, concord of the things to be done, he has come to value this concord so much more than all those things he had originally come to hold dear. And thus by insight and reasoning he has come to the conclusion that this highest good of men which is worthy of praise or admiration and desirable for its own sake lies precisely in this. It rests in what the Stoics call 'homologia,' but we may call agreement, if this is acceptable, the good, that is, in the sense that everything has to be referred to it, including right actions and righteousness itself, which alone is counted as a good; though this good emerges later, it alone is desirable in virtue of its own force and dignity, whereas none of the things which come first by nature is desirable for its own sake.[21]

I do not maintain that here Cicero must be interpreted as saying that reflection helps us fix on and hold in mind the content of a concept, rather than that it causes the presence of a concept in the mind. His remarks are probably too indeterminate to distinguish the two readings. This indeterminancy, however, leaves open the possibility that he only partially grasped the Stoic theory of induction and that the particular claim that prompts his remarks in this difficult passage is

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[20] For a recent statement of this interpretation, see Thomas Williams, "Two Aspects of Platonic Recollection," *Apeiron* 35 (2002): 131–52: "[I]f I see a man and judge him to be beautiful, it is the senses that tell me what I see; but the concept of beauty that I am employing comes not from the senses, but from my previous knowledge of the Form of Beauty. For ordinary folks, that knowledge will be recollected only dimly; but according to [the traditional view], it must be recollected to some extent, or there could be no judgment about the beauty of particular objects. The task of the philosopher is to bring those hazy memories into the sharpest possible focus" (132–3). "To recognize beautiful particulars as beautiful or equal particulars as equal is already to have drawn on the resources provided by our pre-natal acquaintance with the Forms. Hence, we will have concepts of beauty and equality that go beyond anything in sensible experience. The discrepancy between our concepts and the particulars that we classify under those concepts is therefore a standing invitation to turn our attention to the Forms" (149).

[21] "On the Stoic Conception of the Good," 73.

that reflection helps a person fix on the content of the concept of the good.

In this case, Frede's interpretation of Aristotle loses some of its support. Given that the Stoics thought that some natural concepts become present only after a certain amount of reflection, it would not be too surprising to learn that Aristotle thought that some concepts become present by nature only after "a great deal of often highly specialized observation and of often highly technical reflections." As matters stand, however, it is not clear that Aristotle or the Stoics should be understood as Frede has claimed. Maybe Aristotle thought that the experience of the practitioner is analogous but not the same as the experience in induction. If so, his remarks on experience in *Metaphysics* 1.1 need not be understood to be inconsistent with the epistemology and ontology of reason that makes sense of his theory of induction and naturally places him in a tradition that stems from Plato and ultimately from Socrates.

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WHAT HAPPENED TO EPISTEMOLOGY IN OUR TRADITITON?

HENRY PIETERSMA

WHY HAS CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGY apparently dropped the discipline of epistemology from the rostrum of philosophy? I find it strange in the highest degree, because the philosopher generally acknowledged as the father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, introduced it by way of emphasizing the universality of the problem of knowledge. Facing up to the latter, he argued, will lead us to phenomenology in its full philosophical significance. Here I am, of course, thinking of the lectures of 1907, later published in the collected works as *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Nowadays, however, an account of phenomenology that emphasizes the theory of knowledge of Husserl and later philosophers who declared their indebtedness to him, for example, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, encounters the charge that such an account distorts everything in the phenomenological tradition. Apparently epistemology is out, and ontology is in. Even knowledge itself is spoken of in ontological language, for example, as a mode of being (Heidegger). How did phenomenologists get from one to the other? In the light of the so-called transcendental-phenomenological reduction and the usual argumentation surrounding it, it is a bit counterintuitive to have phenomenology end up as an ontology.

The question how one gets from the one to the other is not easy to answer. One cannot simply say that he found that the former led to idealism and that, repenting of it, he turned to something dialectically opposite, namely a form of realism and became enamoured of ontology. The way I should like to address the question centers around another difficult question, that about the transcendental approach in philosophy. For there seems to be no doubt that the epistemology–ontology debate has its context in the transcendental tradition. All

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participants are in one way or another deeply indebted to Kant.[1] It was Husserl who first introduced transcendentalism into phenomenology in the above-mentioned lectures. His argument for the foundational status of the problem of knowledge is at the same time an argument for the universal scope of the transcendental method. Since all beliefs, as he saw it, are affected by the problem of knowledge, they are to be approached from a transcendental point of view. The emphasis on ontology central to the discussion of my paper goes back to Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927), but it is noteworthy that, whatever his criticism of Husserl, he explicitly stated his agreement with the latter's transcendental approach. The debate clearly takes place within the Kantian tradition. As will soon appear, my discussion of it will also have to involve the question of realism, in spite of all the asseverations to the effect that a discussion of it is rather superannuated.

I

Let us begin by asking what is meant by the term "transcendental" in that tradition, and why it is thought that philosophy should be transcendental. I think phenomenologists in general agree that the so-called transcendental turn by its very nature represents a change from a previous attitude. To put it phenomenologically, the transcendental attitude bespeaks itself as such a modification. To use well-known words from Kant, in adopting such an attitude we occupy ourselves with "the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*" rather than simply with objects.[2] On that account, reflection in the ordinary sense often stands in for the transcendental turn or serves, especially in Husserl, as a gateway to the transcendental. Transcendental-phenomenological considerations are presented as systematic, radical reflection on the part of a human being. The important question that arises here is this: what reasons can be cited for the change of

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[1] Lengthy argumentation for this thesis is offered in Henry Pietersma, *Phenomenological Epistemology* (hereafter, "*Phen. Epist.*") (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[2] *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter, "*CPR*"). trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A11–2; B25.

attitude? Why do we turn away from first-order objects, in order to approach those very same objects from a radically new, second-order point of view?

As Kant and those following him saw it, philosophy is not a science that adds to what the other sciences accomplish in their respective fields of inquiry. It does not have a general insight into the nature of things that complements, or may be compared with, what we owe to the natural and social sciences. Neither can it be put side by side with a nonempirical science like mathematics. Moreover, while philosophy stands aside from all other sciences, it calls them to a unique kind of accounting, claiming that it wants to clarify them in some important respect or solve a problem that besets them all, and therefore can be dealt with only after we change the customary direction of our cognitive inquiry. As Kant said, philosophy is a transcendental science and involves a distinctive attitude. We may therefore ask, "What is that problem to which the adoption of a transcendental attitude is the proper response?" Considerable difference of opinion seems to prevail in the answers we get.

The problem, according to Kant, is epistemic, having to do with our knowledge of things. It is the problem of skepticism. Since he wanted to demonstrate that knowledge is possible, he tried to refute the skeptic who doubts that it is. Now it is to be noticed that skepticism implies a realism according to which entities exist independently of the knower. What do I mean by that? I mean that the skeptic has a realist concept of being. He thinks that, if we did have knowledge, it would be of things that have a being in themselves, independently of human subjectivity.

He doubts that there actually are such entities or that we know that there are. The concept of such things makes sense all right, but the skeptic doubts that we know anything that exemplifies it. To refute him, Kant rejected that realist concept and offered a transcendental theory of knowledge; that is to say, a theory that shows how knowledge of objects is nevertheless possible, even if we give up the realist view that they exist independently.

We can therefore say that for Kant the transcendental turn responds to an epistemic problem and is itself epistemological. It may also have metaphysical components, but it is, at least in part, undeniably epistemological. It is of course a well known point of controversy whether Kant's talk of the thing-in-itself does not show a

residual degree of adherence to realism. Hegel and others in fact charged that he did not free himself completely of it. They claimed that, if you want to finish off realism and refute skepticism, you have to reject the idea of things existing in themselves. Yet the main features of the doctrine of the *Critique of Pure Reason* clearly imply that Kant held the view that realism stood in the way of knowledge.[3] If we accept a realist concept of being, he thought, we could not have knowledge of objects.

Other philosophers following in the tradition established by Kant had similar misgivings about realism, accusing it quite frequently of entailing or encouraging skepticism. That they actually think of realism as a source of skepticism is not always clear at first glance. Whether or not skepticism is explicitly mentioned, they think that there is something profoundly unsatisfactory about our realism in common sense and science. It therefore ought to be rejected; or better still, we should acknowledge realism but relegate it to a level of knowledge inferior to philosophy. The philosopher himself is not a realist, but he may talk about it by way of giving a critique of it, or reinterpreting it, from his own, cognitively superior, vantage point.

The question we should now ask is this: what is so unsatisfactory about realism? What do its critics give as reason for adopting the transcendental attitude in philosophy? According to a fairly frequently voiced criticism, human thought in general, whether it be everyday experience or science, is object-directed. That is to say that on certain occasions we make statements about entities, saying what properties they have or in what relations they stand to one another. For reasons not always clearly stated, the philosophers I have in mind find this object-directed thought or discourse to be profoundly unsatisfactory. Their complaints are expressed in terminology that varies a good deal. Kant and those calling themselves Kantians spoke of the objective attitude as dogmatic, as opposed to the critical attitude of transcendental philosophy.

Hegel and idealists descended from him were in the habit of saying that such thought and discourse is one-sided or abstract. They used these terms to indicate that object-talk ought to be supplemented by subject-talk, that object-directed thought has to be made concrete by including in it a reference to the subject, for example, the

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[3] *CPR*, A378.

thinker's frame of mind, perspective, and historical or cultural circumstances. What they implied here is the idea of an all-embracing totality or whole, which they called the Absolute. What they claimed was that objective thinking ignores this whole and expresses itself as if the entities toward which such thinking is directed were truly independent of the one who thinks about them. In their view, philosophy has the task of restoring all such thought to the Absolute. In fact, they said that philosophy simply is thought turning away from its exclusive object-orientation and now considering an entity and the subject thinking about it together, that is, within the whole from which objects had been artificially abstracted by nonphilosophical, object-directed thought.

Another term that used to be current, especially among Hegelians, is "positive." Nonphilosophical sciences were thus frequently called positive. All of these terms, we have to keep in mind, are applied in a spirit of criticism. That is to say, they imply that the person using them speaks from a specific point of view that is not itself questioned. Even though they may sound like purely descriptive terms, they are used to assert that, from a strictly philosophical point of view, purely objective propositions or statements are unsatisfactory and therefore call for critique.

The criticism directed at those propositions and statements does not imply, we are often told, that they are false, or that persons engaged in particular fields of inquiry are to be reproached for not having done enough to test their statements, that they were lazy or hasty or that they disregarded pertinent evidence. The criticism does not so much apply to the content as to the form of the propositions and statements in question. In short, they are unsatisfactory because they speak objectively, saying something to the effect that there is an object or entity that has certain properties and stands in a certain relation to other objects or entities. The criticism amounts to saying that such a statement really ought to be supplemented by a reference to the subjectivity of the statement-maker.[4] There is yet another adjective often used to do similar duty, "naïve," but it is a word also regularly used in ordinary language when one person judges the view

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[4] The subject may of course not be an individual person but rather an intersubjective community, a point that leads to a significant line of thought but one that I think I can ignore in the present discussion.

of somebody else as inferior. The still-current philosophical expression "naïve realism" here comes to mind as an expression of a similar attitude of philosophical superiority.

The philosopher who employs the words I highlighted draws our attention to certain very general features of common sense and science. He notes that thought directs itself to objects. He then proceeds to point out what is of course true, namely, that this implies a good deal of abstraction, of ignoring some things and looking only at others. We may look at an object, for example, but ignore its environment. We consider its permanent properties and abstract from those it has only in certain circumstances. We may focus on its essence as such, ignoring its contingent properties. But especially when speaking about something as an object, saying, for example, that it has a property or stands in a relation, we abstract from its relation to the speaker or to anyone in particular. We thus see that our mind plays a role in objective knowledge, but we feel that we do not need to pay special attention to it. Mental processes and conceptualizations are conditions without which we would not have knowledge of objects, but we take them for granted and ignore them. We look only at the object, when we want to make a so-called objective statement. I admit that I ignore all this, but I do not usually feel guilty about it. I do not think that I will be regarded by my peers as having failed to do something for which I can rightly be reproached. These matters are obviously conditions in the absence of which I would not have been able to carry out any process of objective thinking. However, to repeat, they are matters that I ignore without a bad conscience.

The philosopher in question, however, censures such objective thinking, in particular the fact that the epistemic subject engaged in such thought abstracts, so to speak, from himself. That philosopher admits that abstraction and conceptualization are necessary conditions of objective thought, but what he objects to is the (unformulated and perhaps unexpressed) realism in the mind of the thinker. The latter holds that there are entities independent of human thought and that they have certain properties and stand in relations to one another, whether or not we know what they are. Moreover, although an objective thinker holds that they are independent of us, he does not think that this means that we cannot know them. To be sure, we can be wrong about them, but in principle there is no problem about coming to know them, at least to some extent. According to this realism

their independence does not amount to an unbridgeable gap for the human mind. To the critical philosopher, however, such an external relation to mind-independent entities makes knowledge of them seriously problematic.

In other words, when that philosopher calls attention to abstraction, conceptualization, and a one-sided concentration on the object as opposed to the subject, he has his eye on what is undeniably going on in common sense and science. What he wants to make an issue is the question of whether they are epistemological problems. Is there something unsatisfactory about objective thinking that calls for transcendental inquiry? I shall want to come back to this question, but for now I simply note that a need for a transcendental philosophy is based on the assumption that there is. The terms used are used to give voice to criticism. The object of criticism is not so much objective thought as such but the realism that animates it.

It may be contended that a transcendental philosopher who also calls himself a phenomenologist brings realism to honor instead of criticizing it. Think of Husserl's well-known contention that we hear and see external objects rather than private sensations or mental pictures, or his account of essences as objects in their own right in distinction from sensible particulars. We apprehend the real thing, not just a mental stand-in for it. Heidegger's frequent rebuttals of representationalism might likewise be mentioned as favoring a kind of realism. Does that show that Husserl and Heidegger are philosophical realists rather than transcendentalists? That these philosophers bring realism to honor in their phenomenological accounts of everyday experience, or of some field of scientific inquiry, I will contend, does not mean that they endorse realism as a philosophy. Phenomenological description gives voice to first-order experience, rather than the transcendental point of view. As a description it may be quite faithful to the experience, but what is so described is also assessed or evaluated from a truly philosophical point of view, which is here a transcendental, point of view. Husserl himself clearly marks the distinction in his discussion of the dialectic between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, for example, in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Both may have the same propositional content, but only the latter presents the truly philosophical position.

In a sense, there are always at least two voices in a transcendental-phenomenological philosophy. In its phenomenology, the one

refers to the subject matter of the transcendental consideration and describes what Husserl called the natural attitude. What one refers to are, strictly speaking, meanings, that is to say, objects indexed with reference to intentional acts and their context. It is this voice that says that perceiving has the achievement sense of seeing the object in person or in the flesh and not some mental stand-in or representation of it. In short, it tells us that this is how the world is experienced. The other voice may not be heard as often, but it is the latter which the philosopher uses to express his ultimate or final convictions. I think Husserl is speaking with that voice when he notes, in §50 of his *Ideas*, that as a result of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction we have lost nothing but gained the "whole of absolute being." The philosopher's voice also sounds in the numerous exhortations to his readers to perform the reduction or *epochê*. To be sure, he may claim that the philosopher's voice is the very same as the first one. What he then wants to say is that the philosopher is not introducing an interpretation alien to first-order experience. In one passage, Husserl writes that genuine transcendental philosophy would not dream of contesting the world of experience or robbing it of the meaning it actually has in that experience, and that the independent being of the world is an undoubted fact. He adds significantly, however, that this philosophy does reserve for itself the right to say what all that really means.[5] We therefore have to distinguish, it seems to me, realism as a first-order fact of experience and realism as a philosophical position.

Let us now return to the terminological matters earlier brought into discussion. In the lectures on First Philosophy, Husserl uses the terms "abstract," "one-sided," "positive," and "naïve," as practically synonymous.[6] What is noteworthy is that the author apparently feels free to appropriate all of them, especially "positive," in characterizing his own approach. Although I think that they are originally idealist and Hegelian, he uses them for his own purpose. They all serve to indicate why a transcendental critique is needed, namely to deal with skepticism. In other words, objective thought is vulnerable to skepticism, because it is abstract, one-sided, positive, and naïve. Only transcendental clarity about the cognitive subject will refute

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[5] *Husserliana* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1959), 7:246–8.
[6] *Husserliana*, vol. 8.

skepticism, because the latter thrives on our ignorance with regard to subjectivity.

In his general philosophical account of epistemic justification, Husserl makes a great deal of use of the term *Evidenz*.[7] The German word is not easy to translate,[8] but what it designates may be characterized as an epistemic situation in which the mode of givenness of an object or state of affairs is taken by the person who finds himself in that situation to justify a specific belief which he holds or which is presented for his consideration. Now in the text of the lectures on First Philosophy, Husserl suggests that we distinguish between what is evident to a person from a "positive" point of view and the case in which we have clarity about the transcendental origins of that point of view.[9]

For example, a clear perception under standard conditions justifies a belief, because according to the way we understand ourselves and our world as percipients, sense perception is an acceptable source of knowledge of our environment. Similarly, Husserl holds, there is a certain kind of insight or *Evidenz* that justifies a mathematical belief, or a belief we have about the essence of an object in distinction from its contingent properties.

> No matter how strongly evident something may be in the positive sciences, it is surrounded by transcendental and metaphysical fog, in which scepticism and mysticism have their day. Every case of positive knowledge that is genuine has self-evidence (*Evidenz*), but it presents at the same time a puzzle that calls for transcendental illumination.[10]

Questions and doubts can arise even in the case of what is self-evident in the mathematical domain. As Husserl points out, these do not touch what was held to be evident in a certain direction of natural, that is, prephilosophical inquiry, and they do not destroy self-evidence in its "positive" character, but they do signify a cognitive imperfection that cannot be tolerated.[11] The adjectives I enumerated above are all used to characterize it. Taking them together, we can see that the

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[7] For a full account of Husserl's theory of justification, see *Phen. Epist.*, chap. 2.

[8] See my discussion in n. 5 of chap. 2 of *Phen. Epist.*

[9] The text is from the lectures on First Philosophy, published in *Husserliana*, vol. 8. The distinction in question is formulated on p. 30.

[10] *Husserliana* 8:38.

[11] *Husserliana* 8:31.

imperfection has to do precisely with its object-directedness and its striving to get beyond subjectivity. As I said earlier, not the content but the form of the beliefs is in question.

As Husserl would have it, this makes them vulnerable to skepticism, which exploits our ignorance with respect to the knowing subject, for example, by arguing the plausibility of psychologism and other forms of scientific naturalism. To make our knowledge claims safe from skeptical attack we have to become clear about all dimensions of cognitive subjectivity.[12] In the terminology Husserl uses in this text, one-sidedness (*Einseitigkeit*) has to become double-sidedness (*Doppelseitigkeit*), if we want to attain what is absolutely evident and absolutely justified. It is then no longer vulnerable to skepticism, because the knowledge of subjectivity is comprehended within that of objectivity.

In this text Husserl shows clearly in what sense the so-called transcendental turn has epistemological premises. The change in the direction of inquiry—which I have called the transcendental turn—is urged on the basis of an epistemological assessment of all pretranscendental claims to knowledge. According to that assessment, all such claims are in principle epistemically defective and therefore have to be examined, and, in a sense, corrected. Yet because the making of that correction lies outside the scope of first-order experience, a change in the direction of our inquiry is called for. The field of inquiry of the positive scientist must be approached from a radically different point of view, that is to say, the transcendental point of view. To repeat a point made earlier, the scientist is not thereby shown to be in error, but to represent an inferior point of view. Therefore, his findings need not be simply rejected and replaced by something better, but we do have to transcend that standpoint and reinterpret it from one that is superior.

II

After this exploration of the transcendental approach in its conceptual outline, I want to focus attention on the phenomenological-transcendental tradition as it turned, apparently, from epistemology

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[12] *Husserliana* 8:38

to ontology. Historically speaking, one can say that Heidegger led the way in promoting this use of the term "ontology" in his epoch-making *Being and Time* (1927).[13] What happened here? In a letter he wrote to Husserl that same year, he clearly expressed his agreement with the latter's transcendental approach in philosophy.[14] The basic characteristic of such an approach, he wrote, is that a transcendental clarification or explanation of a specific domain of entities is not rendered in terms of a particular entity lying within that same domain. For what is to be explained or clarified is precisely the assumptions or presuppositions that create or constitute the domain in question. If entities of a material kind, for example, are to be clarified transcendentally, we obviously cannot clarify them by reference to a material entity but must step outside that domain. Husserl, accordingly, proceeded to transcendental consciousness to find the clarification of the material world.

While Heidegger agreed with the principle itself, he took exception to placing the transcendental within consciousness. In fact, he wanted to extend the search for transcendental conditions beyond consciousness, to the question of the being of entities in general, a question that he construed as including within its scope the being of consciousness itself. He therefore designated the place of the transcendental in an emphatically ontological manner: it is being-in-the-world. Transcendental philosophy thus leads to ontology, and epistemology is presented in terms of a mode of being-in-the-world.

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[13] Strictly historically speaking, the term was also used by Husserl himself, who employed the concept of regional ontologies. According to him, however, ontologies of this sort are not the outcome of the transcendental turn but antecedent to it. For that reason they are themselves in need of such a turn. See *Phen. Epist.*, 76–7. The basic idea is to acknowledge that, corresponding to distinctive ways of approaching reality, there are essential distinctions to be observed on the side of what we encounter. After all, Aristotle already said that being is said in many ways. Reality therefore falls into distinctive regions, each of which has its own ontology. For Husserl's view, see Ludwig Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1963), chap. 7. Other philosophers in the early decades of the twentieth century used the term in a similar way, for example, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Roman Ingarden, and Nicolai Hartmann. The first two quite explicitly acknowledged their indebtedness to Husserl. Not one of them, however, saw ontology as arising out of the so-called transcendental turn in the manner of Heidegger.

[14] *Husserliana* 9:600 and following.

In §43 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes some observations about what he calls realism and idealism that are important for my present inquiry. He does not define these labels very precisely, as is in fact true of all phenomenologists. Neither does he attach them to any philosophers identified by name, but the way he characterizes idealists indicates that he must be thinking primarily of Husserl. He says that an idealist is one who affirms "that being cannot be explained by reference to entities." Idealists deserve high praise for having pointed this out, Heidegger says, but they went wrong by holding that being and reality are "in consciousness." He then goes on to say that idealists thus displayed an understanding for ontology altogether absent among their opponents, the realists. With regard to the latter, Heidegger is extremely dismissive. In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* we read that, while idealism in its current form—as I see it, he means the form given to it by Husserl—is not tenable, "of realism it cannot even be said that it is untenable, because it has not yet even pressed forward at all into the dimension of philosophical problems."[15] Realism, in short, is not a philosophy at all, but an inferior point of view.

There is a footnote in *The Essence of Ground* that sums up Heidegger's point of view in a manner that is revealing as well as very paradoxical:

> Ontological problems have so little to do with "realism" that precisely Kant with his transcendental questions could take the first decisive step since Plato and Aristotle in the direction of an explicit founding of an ontology. An ontological orientation demands more than to be convinced of the "reality of the external world."[16]

To those accustomed to a more traditional reading of the history of philosophy it seems outrageous to put Kant in this kind of relation to the two great founders of metaphysics. Clearly Heidegger sees a very close connection between ontology and the transcendental turn. In his view, ontology is simply not possible without that turn. If a realist philosopher declines the invitation to adopt the transcendental method, refusing to recognize as problems those that supposedly make that method necessary, Heidegger concludes that such a philos-

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[15] *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1975), 24:238. The English translation is by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 167.

[16] Ibid. 9:133 n. 14.

opher has no sense of ontology and is not a genuine philosopher. In other words, you cannot have an ontology if you do not make the transcendental turn. What are we to make of this contention?

A moment ago, I said that Heidegger's footnote will seem outrageous to some people. The main reason for such a reaction is that there is a well-known passage in Kant's *Critique* where ontology is directly confronted with the idea of a transcendental approach. Here we read that the proud title of ontology ought to make room for the modest one of analytic of the pure understanding.[17] Instead of giving us insight into the nature of being as such, as the title of ontology suggests, the discipline in question in fact only gives us insight into our understanding. That remark, however, points in an entirely different direction than Heidegger. The latter is not about to sacrifice the title of ontology. On the contrary, his aim is rather to give it the place of highest honor in philosophy. Performing the transcendental turn leads Kant to what he calls an analytic of the understanding, but Heidegger would have it that the turn is the gateway to ontology. We hear Kant say that we should abandon the use of the word "ontology," but Heidegger seems to say the exact opposite, namely, that transcendentalism is the only way to find ontology. I believe that the answer to our puzzle is somewhat like this: the ontology to which Kant bids a sad farewell in the *Critique* is not at all the ontology Heidegger joyfully greets from afar in *Being and Time*. I shall try to elaborate on this thesis in what follows.

What sense does Heidegger give to the term "ontology" in *Being and Time*? What sense *can* he give to it within the limits of his transcendentalism? I want to begin by starting from the other end, so to speak, by asking about Heidegger's understanding of what I have thus far been calling the transcendental turn. What form does it take? What would he have us turn away from? What sort of dissatisfaction is that turning away from based on? As a first approximation, we might say that, like the earlier tradition of Kant and Husserl, what we should turn away from is objective thought—*Vorhandenheit*, as he calls it. Heidegger is not very forthcoming with reasons for this view. It seems to go without saying that thinking in terms of objects is not primordial, but posterior and derivative (*abkünftig*). The preobjective from which it is derived he called readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*),

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[17] *CPR*, A247.

a broadly practical form of activity. He does make some efforts to explain the transition from the one to the other. The practical attitude is correlated with "tools" (*Zeuge*), a term designed to mark a contrast to "object" and is therefore to be taken in a very broad sense. Tools present themselves as such, namely, as suitable for specific uses. They come, as it were, carrying their interpretation on their forehead. In an activity proceeding without any hitch they never present a problem of how to understand them. Within a smoothly proceeding activity, everything is, in Heidegger's phrase, ready-to-hand. Objects, on the other hand, are correlated with a so-called theoretical attitude. Given this, it is not immediately clear what concepts may be applied to them. If what we are confronted with is taken to be a theoretical object rather than a tool, it has to be interpreted theoretically, that is to say, it has to be subsumed under a distinctively theoretical concept. To that end, modern science proceeds by projecting a general framework of concepts in the light of which any particular entity is approached scientifically. In becoming a scientific object, so Heidegger reasons, it loses its place in the practical world and gains one in a theoretical world.

What is it about objects that calls for a transcendental clarification? I do not think that there is a direct and clear answer in Heidegger's text. What he spends most of his time arguing is the more general point that an attitude of objectivity is a change or modification of tool-using. Instead of taking something as a tool or a sign for doing something, and as serving this or that practical interest, the entity that was a tool now presents itself as an object. We no longer see it in the light of a practical context or world. This marks the arrival of the so-called theoretical or objective attitude. The being of tools (readiness-to-hand) has made room for the presence of objects (*Vorhandenheit*). We now merely look at objects without manipulating or interfering with them, he says; we let them be what they are in abstraction from any practical context to which they formerly belonged. We now see them in terms of a new context, namely, the theoretical framework of science.

In this new framework, an object is believed to be independent of the mind of the cognitive subject. Whatever manipulation an experimental approach involves is not thought of as altering the object's being what it is. A scientist still hopes that the beliefs he forms about it are approximately correct. Earlier in this paper, I called this convic-

tion realism. Heidegger's transcendental approach makes the claim to correct this impression and to show that the belief in the object's independence should not, at least in the last analysis, be interpreted realistically. The claim is that, from a superior transcendental point of view, we can see that the so-called independence of the object, its so-called being-in-itself, is nothing more than an internal feature of the framework of objective presence (*Vorhandenheit*).[18] The transcendental origins of this framework, however, lie elsewhere, namely in the area of practical activities where things are ready-to-hand. According to Heidegger, a so-called mind-independent object is in last analysis, that is, from the transcendental perspective, to be interpreted as simply a thing that has been released from serving our practical desires and needs. As a result of this release, it is simply there and, so to speak, waiting for an interpretation to be put upon it. Heidegger characterizes the release as a ceasing from activity and a dwelling merely in the presence of the object.

Heidegger's transcendental approach to the so-called objective attitude might seem to be a kind of pragmatist reduction, for it clarifies that attitude transcendentally in terms of human activities of acting and interpreting. As he would have it, in spite of the realism inherent in that attitude, it is nothing but a particular change of attitude: instead of doing one thing, we do something else. Is this the ultimate position of Heidegger's transcendental philosophy? Is Heidegger in the last analysis a pragmatist? That would mean that practical activity is what ultimately constitutes being (or Being, if you prefer). As I read him, however, practical activity is itself in some sense cognitive of what is there. If cognitive, however, there must be a transcendental ground that makes that knowledge possible. I think that, in the last analysis, he wants to argue that the agent engaged in the activity does not simply by his own power become cognizant of *das Seiende*. The search for the transcendental therefore cannot end in the pragmatic domain of activities. Heidegger is not a pragmatist, because he does not take the transcendental question as one that can be fully answered by reference to activities and practices.[19] This means, I take it, that if a person's activity were not "enabled" by something which is not itself an activity, it could not be genuinely cognitive. One could perhaps

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[18] See remarks in *Phen. Epist.*, 89, 102.
[19] Compare *Phen. Epist.*, 121.

also say that, if that were the case, Heidegger would still not have an answer to the skepticism with its realist concept of being. As he puts it in the *Essence of Truth*, activities, including those that are distinctively cognitive (as in science), take place within an open space, and it is only by virtue of this space that they are appropriate responses to the environment.[20]

We saw that Heidegger's transcendental turn differs from Husserl's in that it does not seek transcendental conditions in consciousness but in being-in-the-world; not in mental activities and rules governing them, but in what he insists on characterizing ontologically as being-in-the-world. He also frequently formulates this point by way of a criticism of representationalism.[21] The turn to transcendental conditions, he wants to say, does not land us in a domain of representations or ideas (*Vorstellungen*), from which we still have to find a way to an external reality. On the contrary, by virtue of the turn we find ourselves in the presence of entities, whether ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Having performed the transcendental turn and thereby left classical realism behind him, the philosopher finds himself irradiated by the light of being. To be sure, Heidegger tells us that the temptation to fix attention on entities, rather than on being, never leaves us and that we keep forgetting the ontological difference, but that is supposed to be simply a relapse into a pretranscendental stance. We momentarily forget having made the turn and therefore fancy our realism with regard to entities to be what Plato and Aristotle had in mind. But within the bounds of the transcendental turn the only realism offered to us is not a philosophy, strictly speaking, but rather a cognitively inferior point of view.

If we follow Heidegger on this path, the absence of a proof of an external world does not suggest an idealist denial of such a world. The turn away from objects of knowledge to their transcendental conditions is thus meant to be a move toward ontology, in the first instance, an ontology of being-in-the-world. This is the manner in which his transcendental turn gives rise to an ontology. The ontology that emerges, however, is not a genuinely realist ontology. The genuine re-

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[20] For more on this, see *Phen. Epist.*, 117 and following.

[21] As noted, the criticism is found already in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900–01). It is interesting to note, however, that in this work no mention is made of the transcendental point of view. Its context is characterized by the author as phenomenological, or merely descriptive, psychology.

alist, I think, does not have to get to his ontology by way of a transcendental turn. If we want to call Heidegger's philosophy a realism, we have to make clear that it is a realism within the bounds of transcendentalism.[22]

According to Heidegger, philosophers are to abandon the kind of objective attitude characteristic of science and seek out the conditions of its possibility in a preobjective experience such as we have in practical life. The former is derivative (*abkünftig*) in relation to the latter. But the transcendental search for conditions does not end here. Heidegger does not identify the ultimate transcendental conditions with activities, as if he were a pragmatist. Further questions apparently remain, such as, "What gives ready-to-hand entities their being?" and "How can activities acquire the status of appropriate responses to such entities?" Heidegger's answer can be formulated in one word: *being*. It is precisely being (or Being) by virtue of which entities are disclosed to a human being, so that the latter can see them and react to those entities appropriately, that is to say, in a way demanded by them, rather than imposing upon them an interpretation of his own devising. In slightly different terms, what gives Dasein access to entities, if that is not a primordial power constitutive of our being human? The power of agency is a very prominent factor in the domain of the ready-to-hand, but in the last analysis it also is a power bestowed by being. It is, in Heidegger's well-known metaphorical language, the open space within which entities different from one another nonetheless come together in disclosure. What gathers things

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[22] It should be pointed out that Husserl and Heidegger—as well as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty—tend to use the term "realism" as being synonymous with "objectivism," "naturalism," or "scientism." When Heidegger accused "realism" of lacking a sense of philosophical problems, he meant first of all that it focussed primarily, if not exclusively, on problems amenable to scientific methods of inquiry. It is therefore not surprising that he displayed so little sympathy for it. Naturalism and scientific objectivism, however, are not the only versions of realism known from the history of philosophy. My own use reflects quite a different understanding (see *Phen. Epist.*, 12–17, 168–78). Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Reid were realists, but they were certainly not scientific naturalists. They held that there are mind-independent entities and that we have some knowledge of them, but they did not agree that only natural science can give us such knowledge. These philosophical realists, I take it, would also be hostile to Heidegger's philosophy and both would firmly decline an invitation to take the transcendental turn.

together as their transcendental ground is not an absolute consciousness, as Husserl would have it, but being.

He tells us with great emphasis that being is not an entity or an object but that by virtue of which entities or objects are disclosed. His concept of being is notoriously difficult to understand. Conceptually speaking, however, the ancestry of the idea of being lies in the neighborhood of phenomenological notions such as horizon and world, introduced first by Husserl and widely used since.[23] As a feature of our experience, "horizon" is the largely implicit context in which we experience entities or things, or the background of familiarity against which we see them. For a perceiving person, for example, this means that one is aware of not being confined to an entity perceived at any particular time from a certain perspective, but that one has the ability to apprehend the same thing from a different point of view as well as other entities that exist in its environment. In this sense, an awareness of horizons is associated with capacities for specific forms of inquiry. What is also implied by the idea of horizon is that a particular thing and its environment, though always already familiar to some extent, can become better known in the course of an extended experience. Husserl saw all of this as a feature of absolute consciousness. Heidegger, however, would want to see it in explicitly ontological terms. For him it is not a power of consciousness that manifests itself in this way, but rather the character of being itself. It is not the case that a conscious subject contextualizes whatever it meets with; rather, whatever it meets with is already itself contextualized. The disclosure of entities is itself an ontological event or history, which is being.

This move to ontology signifies that, in Heidegger's view, the phenomenon of horizon (that is to say, the phenomenon of the implicit contextuality of things) is not of merely subjective-phenomenological interest, fascinating but strictly nothing more than a piece of descriptive psychology that does not engage the being or reality of things. To be sure, proper awareness of it requires the transcendental turn, but as Heidegger would have it, that turn does not land us in a purely subjective realm. It does not create a situation that leaves room for a supposition to the effect that the being of things might be very different

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[23] In my book I have suggested that the idea of a conceptual framework also shows a kinship with it. See *Phen. Epist.*, 21–5.

from the way they are disclosed to us. It is not a mental state comprising representations of a supposedly external reality; rather, it is what he calls being-in-the-world. Hence his repeated warnings against representationalism, a view according to which we never get beyond representations of reality. According to Heidegger, representations are not to be construed as unavoidably coming between us and an entity supposedly appearing to us.[24] Skepticism is a position he wants to rule out as absurd from the outset. In *Being and Time*, it does not receive mention until §44, and we then read that it is not a genuine problem. That he should write this is perfectly understandable, since he has already ruled out skepticism much earlier in his book, by way of the transcendental turn and the introduction of being-in-the-world as basic.

In the same way, the realism inherent in the skeptic's position is not considered as a genuinely philosophical point of view. Once again, I would say that the transcendental turn by its very nature eliminates realism as a truly philosophical option. From the transcendental point of view there is no reality really independent of us. The only realism the transcendental philosopher has room for is that of an attitude that is not philosophical. To be sure, reality is here held to be independent, but the attitude represents a cognitively inferior point of view.[25]

III

Now what happened to epistemology in all of this? One might say that Heidegger's epistemology is disguised, because it is presented in an ontological manner, namely as a mode of being, one that is, in his terms, a "founded" mode of being-in-the-world. However, holding that knowing is such a mode of being is an epistemology, even if it is not Cartesian or, for that matter, Husserlian. Take the argument against

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[24] See, for instance, his construal of the meaning of *vorstellen* in *The Essence of Truth*, par. 2.

[25] I think that many philosophers, unwilling to be known as altogether rejecting realism, embrace the realism that is offered to them by the transcendental philosopher. If they do, it seems to me that what they do not realize is that what they embrace is, according to the transcendental philosopher, a cognitively inferior point of view, acknowledged but not asserted by that philosopher.

representationalism.[26] At first it presents itself as a fairly obvious phenomenological observation. Isn't it obvious that there are epistemic situations in which we think we confront things directly, not by the mediation of something else? Because the observation is phenomenological, however, Heidegger claims that it is also ontological. Yet even so, it should still be counted as an epistemological thesis. It may be the case that the latter finds its support in an ontological thesis, namely that entities are disclosed to us. That makes the epistemology in a sense an ontological affair, but its epistemological character remains clear, for it addresses the nature of knowledge.

The question I would particularly like to raise here, however, is this: doesn't the transcendental turn as such already embody a great deal of epistemology? Of course it does, at least if the adoption of a transcendental standpoint is to have any seriously philosophical significance. It is based on an epistemological assessment of all pretranscendental claims to knowledge. What we might call its fundamental premise is something to the effect that pretranscendental claims to knowledge are in some sense problematic. What is wrong with them? As we saw, that is not easy to say, but to put it in its most general form we can say that its basic defect is its orientation to entities or objects, or rather, its concern with objects without relating them to the subject. We already noted earlier that terms such as "abstract," "one-sided," "positive," and "naïve" are used to express much the same criticism. Merleau-Ponty, for example, sees a close link between objects and abstraction, or, as he also puts it, conceptualization. Objects, according to him, are the outcome of abstracting a determinate conceptual content from the ongoing transcendence inherent in primordial perception. The latter is by its very nature perspectival, that is, a going beyond every appearance in its pursuit of reality. Withdrawing what we perceive from that onward movement of transcendence is "a reduction of things as experienced to objects."[27] Objects are the result of an objectification of appearances, a segment of our temporal experience that has been objectified. Since an object is something withdrawn from the context in which it is supposedly at home,

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[26] See *Phen. Epist.*, 95–100.

[27] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 388. The English translation is by Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 336.

Merleau-Ponty's transcendental critique is intended to restore it to concreteness.[28]

Heidegger also holds that objects are the result of an objectification; what is not an object is somehow made into one. For him, entities are made into objects that did not function as such in practical life, but this process of objectification is not explicitly acknowledged by the objective attitude. One might say that it takes the result but ignores the process from which it emerged. It takes objects to have a mind-independent being, which, it is then alleged, raises the problem of skepticism that the transcendental turn is designed to eliminate.

Therefore, the first move in a Heideggerean transcendental critique is to give an account of how objects originate from objectification. In form, it is fairly close to the Kantian tradition—objects are analyzed in terms of what accounts for their possibility—but Heidegger does not follow Kant's story of concepts applied to a sensible manifold. Objects arise from the objectification of what is ready-to-hand, that is, from entities that already have being in their own right, a so-called preobjective being. Consequently, he thinks of objectification as involving particular acts or performances, for example, refraining from interfering or manipulating. In other words, he seems to think of objectification as a human performance. I do not find his account very satisfactory or convincing, but that is another matter. Regardless, his position is materially quite different from Kant's.

The second stage of Heidegger's transcendental critique raises the question of the transcendental origin of *Zuhandenheit*. The question now pursued seems to be: how does it come about that things present themselves as tools? The answer is given in terms of his account of the being of Dasein, in particular, its being-in-the-world. Things are tools for us, so we hear, because Dasein is in-the-world, which is to say that it understands things in terms of what can be done with them and how all that contributes to an individual's own being.

What happened to epistemology? The answer is plain. It has not disappeared, but one could perhaps say that it is disguised. It is embodied in all the theory that Heidegger packs into his transcendental critique but does not verbally articulate in the pages of *Being and Time*. The epistemology in fact has set the scene, so that ontology can enter. Once the transcendental turn has been performed, the story

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[28] See *Phen. Epist.*, 147–51.

that remains to be told can confidently be told in ontological language. The stage is set for it by the turn. Skepticism has been refuted without there being any mention of this in *Being and Time*. But let us not forget that the concern with being is not primordial. The excitement of this ontological turn of events may easily lead one to forget that the ontology we are about to develop is made possible by an epistemological argument. Without that argument, the reductive move from objective presence (*Vorhandenheit*) to tool-using (*Zuhandenheit*) seems to land us in a context of common sense and pragmatism. Without the transcendental turn one could very well present the material Heidegger presents as being-in-the-world in broadly sociological and psychological language. What such language would suggest is a subjectivist interpretation. There would be no ground for the application of the emphatically ontological label "being-in-the-world." Neither would there be reason to reduce the objective presence characteristic of science to this practical or psychological level. Heidegger, however, uses it as a launching pad for his ontology. In terms of philosophical strategy, he can do this because of the transcendental turn. For he takes it to have shown that realism cannot come up with an ontology and represents only an inferior cognitive standpoint. In other words, the turn is supposed to have taken the sting out of a realist ontology that would downgrade the practical domain in a subjectivist interpretation.

Heidegger's explicitly epistemological thesis about knowing as a founded mode of being-in-the-world presupposes that same argument.[29] He proceeds to present an epistemology in ontological terms, but that is possible only if we have ontological terms at our disposal. These we have, if and only if we perform the transcendental turn and think, as Heidegger does, that a realist ontology is impossible. As he said, a realist has no ontology. Stronger yet, realism is a cognitively inferior standpoint. Again, that skepticism is no longer a problem, as Heidegger says in §44, likewise rests on the argument in favor of the transcendental turn. It is no longer a problem, by virtue of the transcendental turn. For the latter presents object and subject, tool and Dasein, as internally related within the "open space." The relation between them is so intimate that the skeptical suggestion that one of

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[29] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), §12.

the relata might exist without the other obviously no longer makes sense.

It may well be contended that all pretranscendental forms of knowledge suffer from abstractness, positivity, and naïveté, and that the transcendental point of view alone is concrete and critical, but this cannot simply be stated without argument. A philosophical realist will counter the assertion by saying that there is, in his view, nothing wrong with the kind of abstractness characteristic of an objective attitude. There is no reason to condemn the attitude as such. Some abstractions may be objectionable, but surely others are quite proper. There are many cases in which abstraction is exactly what is called for. To begin with what is obvious, to abstract from what is merely subjective, that is, to try to disregard it and to focus on the objective is often an admirable epistemic principle, in a realist view. To be sure, an abstraction limits the scope of one's claim to knowledge and such a limitation should not be forgotten or overlooked. Even so, what is wrong with abstraction as such? Disregarding the subjective as much as possible is precisely what one expects from a person seeking, for example, scientific knowledge. More to the point, why should an account of the cognitive subject be added to an objective statement, if it is to be epistemically above reproach? Why are objective statements as such a problem? The transcendental philosopher feels that what is abstract ought to be made concrete, including what has been left out in a certain form of abstraction. The controversy is clearly dialectical. The transcendentalist argument begins by assuming that there is a problem, but the realist retorts by denying there is. How is the matter going to be settled and by whom? Who can decide the fundamental question at issue: What is, and what is not, a problem? Use of terms such as "abstract" and "concrete" (and the others mentioned above) does not decide any philosophical point. The meaning the terms bear depends on the philosophical standpoint of the user. They condemn or recommend a standpoint, but they do not argue why the one is to be rejected and the other to be embraced.

What reply do Heidegger and the other transcendental philosophers have to such remarks? They will agree that some things are acceptable within their own context. Given the fact that one is engaged in scientific research, the appropriate attitude is, of course, one of objectivity, abstracting from things that are irrelevant to the enterprise of science. When it comes to philosophy, however, one has to be

critical even of things accepted before. A critical attitude is in fact what makes one a philosopher. Now is somebody who refuses to perform the so-called transcendental turn uncritical? What if the realist cannot recognize the problem to which the turn is supposed to be a response? This might be a failure on his part, but what if there really is no problem? In that case the realist is vindicated, for there is nothing naïve or uncritical about denying a problem that does not exist. Heidegger dismisses philosophical realists by saying that they lack a sense for ontology, because they refuse to adopt the transcendental method, but does that dismissal demonstrate that they don't? Of course not. It simply expresses the assumption that an ontology has to be based on a transcendental turn, but it does not show why that is so.

As a matter of fact, the transcendentalist can hardly assume his own justification without further ado. As he himself admits, the transcendental attitude is not primordial. On the contrary, it represents a change from a preceding attitude. Therefore, it has to be shown why it is called for. The philosophical realist is not in the same situation, however. The attitude he adopts is one familiar to all of us from early childhood on. All cognitive endeavors undertaken in the broad name of science have presumed its appropriateness. It is clearly his philosophical opponent who has to show that there is a cognitive problem, the appropriate response to which requires a different attitude.[30]

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[30] I want to express thanks to Kenneth Schmitz and Tony Kostroman for discussing this paper with me. To the latter I want to add very special thanks, because the issues of this paper were the subject of a great many discussions we had over the past several years. Thank you, Tony.

ON POSSESSED INDIVIDUALISM: HEGEL, SOCRATES' DAIMON, AND THE MODERN STATE

RICHARD L. VELKLEY

> Socrates could thus very well afford to be ignorant; he had a genius, on whose science he could rely, which he loved and feared as his god, whose peace was more important to him than all the reason of the Egyptians and Greeks.
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> J. G. Hamann, *Socratic Memorabilia* (1759)

I

RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY has stressed its place in the modern tradition of reflection on autonomy and rights, thus rejecting negative assessments of Hegel as an authoritarian, post-Napoleonic "Prussian" opponent of liberalism (Karl Popper and others) as well as revising sympathetic readings of him as a "communitarian" critic of "atomistic" individualism (Charles Taylor and others). A group of eminent writers (one that includes Paul Franco, Frederick Neuhouser, Terry Pinkard, Robert Pippin, Steven B. Smith, and Allen Wood) argues that Hegel, deeply indebted to Rousseau and Kant as turning away from early modern "negative freedom," rethinks their accounts of "positive freedom" of self-determination based on the principles of the general will or moral law, and embeds those accounts in the customary and institutional framework of the modern constitutional-monarchical state. Hegel understands citizenship in this state as realizing the highest aspirations of modernity for universal recognition of the autonomous personality as secured by the rule of law, systems of impartial justice, suffrage rights (albeit limited), and freedoms of religion, publication, teaching, and so on—under the sovereignty of the patriotic (particularist but neither ethnocentric nor expansionist) state. Furthermore, this scholarly approach to Hegel regards his

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conception of politically realized freedom as the heart of his whole philosophical endeavor, and it construes the dialectical (logical or metaphysical) arguments as providing chiefly the terms for explicating the rational will's or practical reason's inherent striving to actualize itself in ethically (*sittlich*), politically, and publicly "mediated" forms of recognition.

Undoubtedly, such readings of Hegel as heir and reformer of modern liberalism are more accurate than readings of him as nostalgic for the unity and wholeness of the Greek city-state, not to mention those that would ally him with twentieth-century totalitarianism. In his discussions of Greek political life, Hegel, as early as the 1802 essay on natural law, underscores its limitations. What Hegel calls the unreflective natural morality of Greek ethical life, lacking the principle of free subjectivity, cannot be the basis for the modern state. Instead, the modern state in its most rational form realizes "subjectivity" in an ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) of a peculiarly modern character, one that crucially includes a form of "civil society" unknown to antiquity (about which more later). Yet Hegel claims that a transformed (*aufgehoben*) version of the ancient unifying bond of custom, whose purest expression was the prereflective noble and beautiful morality of the Greek city, sustains an attenuated but all the same genuine existence in the modern state.

Having said this, one must also say that the recent interpretive approach has given not enough attention to Hegel's claim that the spirit of free subjectivity and infinite personality actually first emerged in Greek antiquity, not indeed as a common Greek possession but in those individuals who called themselves variously sophists and philosophers—and above all in the person of Socrates. Due regard for this claim can correct or supplement the current scholarly tendency by leading to the following conclusions:

(1) *The focus on liberalism is too restrictive.* One observes that Hegel's account of freedom is not adequately discussed if one limits the context of discussion to modern political philosophy, or to viewing Hegel as critic and reformer of the modern liberal tradition. More precisely, one sees the need to absorb Hegel's argument that the modern principle is the fulfillment of something first apparent among the Greeks, and hence not sufficiently described as an alternative or successor to Greek prephilosophic *Sittlichkeit*. Reflection on this Greek anticipation of the modern principle does not lead to abandonment of

familiar Hegelian theses about the distinctiveness of modernity, but it does result in a deeper comprehension of these theses and of Hegel's ultimate philosophic intention concerning the history of Spirit (*Geist*), the essence of modernity and of modernity's highest product, the modern state.

(2) *The modern state has a philosophic origin and meaning.* One grasps that Hegel's account of the history of political freedom is inseparable from his account of the emergence of philosophy as a possibility of the Spirit discovered by the Greeks. Accordingly, the significance of the modern state cannot be appreciated in narrowly political terms, or even solely in terms of a broader theoretical characterization of practical reason—its internal exigencies and their achievement of full satisfaction only under the conditions of modern political life—as much recent writing on Hegel favors. To express the main issue in a formula: Hegel regards the modern state—and only the modern state—as realizing what philosophy itself has been striving to attain, at least implicitly, since Socrates.

(3) *Freedom has roots in philosophic reason.* It then follows that what Hegel has in mind in his account of freedom is not expressible only in terms of modern doctrines of rights, although the philosophic core of freedom does not reach full maturity, in Hegel's thinking, until such doctrines emerge. The Socratic origination of free or infinite personality, as Hegel understands it, is not just an anticipation of modern moral-political freedom but the disclosure of philosophy's essence as freedom—and conversely, of freedom as in some crucial way philosophic.[1]

(4) *Practical-political reason does not stand in a simple relation of priority to speculative logic.* It also follows that if Hegel conceives the modern state as fulfilling the ends of philosophy, one must be suspicious of the tendency to read the speculative logic as only a theoretical structure erected to support a practical or political account of reason's character and goals (as in a theory of publicly mediated rationality). It seems one must say that for Hegel the political,

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[1] The universal or almost universal tendency of the Hegel scholarship has been to relate the emergence of infinite personality to Christianity, thereby obscuring its philosophic origin and missing Hegel's claim that the problem of freedom in the history of Spirit revolves around the relation of philosophic reason to political life. Christianity absorbed and transformed the philosophic discovery of infinite personality in a radical and effective universalization of it.

the moral, and in general the practical, are essential to fulfilling philosophy's striving. (Certainly this correction retains the intimate relation between philosophic ends and practical or political ends—and gives greater depth to that relation.)

(5) *The problem resolved by the modern state concerns the relation of philosophy to practical life.* To state now a bit more fully the formula on the modern state introduced in point (2) above: The radical freedom of philosophic thought, which first comes fully into view in Socrates, finds itself in conflict with the realm of customary law and piety, and throughout its history philosophy strives to resolve or transcend that conflict—a goal that only the modern state adequately and finally attains. Accordingly, the modern state's significance is philosophic insofar as it reconciles a conflict inherent in the life of reason as philosophic. If one then is to call Hegel's account of the modern state his "political theory" or "political philosophy," one would have to say that his account is not just his theoretical or philosophic treatment of political life (as the disciplinary classification might convey) but also his political or practical resolution of the central problem of the philosophic life.

(6) *One must revisit historical categories commonly employed in the discussion of the modern state.* Thus it is common to say that Hegel's account of the modern state's reconciliation of religion, politics, and philosophy addresses the fractured spiritual condition of the Enlightenment, just as it is common to say that its general actualization of freedom bears only a distant relation to Greek antiquity with its customary piety, institutions of slavery, and restriction of political freedom to the few. Instead, one must note that in Hegel's thinking both the problem and the promise of the Enlightenment are already present in the Socratic challenge to the Greek state. In Hegel's view, Greek antiquity is not as naive, and modernity's spiritual disorder not as unprecedented, as much writing on him pronounces.

In what follows I investigate Hegel's claim that Socrates is the turning point of world history—a claim that strikingly resonates with the judgment of another German thinker, one who sought the overthrow of the Socratic legacy. In this investigation I will discuss how Socrates' daimonic voice has a surprisingly central role in Hegel's account of his philosophic revolution.

II

My starting point is three passages on Socrates in the main text of the *Philosophy of Right* as published by Hegel in 1820.[2] These passages[3] discuss respectively Socrates's moral subjectivism, his ironic mode of speaking, and his daimon. Two more explicit comments on Socrates[4] are in the expanded text (1833) produced by Hegel's student Eduard Gans, who worked with lecture notes of other pupils (Hotho and Griesheim). Furthermore, "the problem of Socrates" arises implicitly in other passages, especially Hegel's Preface. These passages supply a basis for moving to other discussions of Socrates: in the lectures on the Philosophy of History and in the lectures on the History of Philosophy, the second of which has Hegel's most expansive and probing statement on Socrates.

138R puts forward Socrates as an example of the spiritual stance of morality (*Moralitaet*) which Hegel familiarly distinguishes from ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). Ethical life is the customary ways of a community, or (in premodern societies) the ancestral ways of one's family, city, country, or homeland. It covers prepolitical and political forms of the customary, and it is characterized by following tradition without feeling the need for the conscious articulation and justification of principles. According to Hegel, this way prevailed in Greece until the age of Athenian democracy, at which time it underwent irreversible decay. Morality, by contrast, seeks the grounds of duty and right solely in an internal and subjective source, in the power of judging which advances its own criteria for right. In the light of these criteria, the actual world of custom appears deficient, and indeed moral judgment "evaporates" (*verfluechtigt*) all determinate aspects of unreflective custom. Assuming a stance of self-determination, morality cannot

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[2] *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, in Georg W. F. Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Baenden* (hereafter "*W*"), ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969–79), vol. 7. The English translation employed with occasional modifications is *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (hereafter "*EPR*"), ed. Allen Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet. In citations of the *Philosophy of Right* "R" designates a remark appended by Hegel to the primary text of the numbered paragraph. "A" designates additional material provided by Eduard Gans from student lecture notes. "P" designates the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, and is followed by the page number in the Wood edition.

[3] *EPR*, 138R, 140R, 279R.

[4] *EPR*, 138A, 274A.

abide the merely "given," and accepts as certain only what it can determine for itself to be true. It is "inwardly" directed, oriented toward "subjectivity." The term "subjective," however, need not have the pejorative sense of merely personal whim; in morality the subjective mind seeks to ground itself in reason. But even in its highest manifestations, morality remains a narrow form of reason. Socratic morality is not merely skeptical, for it puts forward ideas of the good to replace discredited custom. It is, however, "uncompromising," in that it allows no qualifications or dilutions of the pure rational standard in relation to actual forms of life. It has little room for prudence. Hegel's Socrates belongs to the same tribe as the Stoics.[5]

Hegel introduces Socrates here not as a philosopher seeking knowledge of the whole of things natural, human, and divine, but as the initiator of a revolution in moral thinking. In this account there is nothing inherently otherworldly about the revolution; there is no reference to a supersensible realm of ideas. On the contrary, Socratic thought is directed toward an inward power, the power of the subject. As the teacher of a new inward-orientation, Socrates is given the title "inventor of morality" in the lectures on the Philosophy of History.[6] All the same, Hegel says that the ground was prepared for Socrates by the decay of custom in Athens. The moral stance arises

> in epochs when what is recognized as right and good in actuality and custom is unable to satisfy the better will. When the existing world of freedom has become unfaithful to the better will, this will no longer find itself in the duties recognized in this world and must seek to recover in ideal inwardness alone that harmony which it has lost in actuality.[7]

The same point is elaborated in an addition of Gans:

> Only in ages when the actual world is a hollow, spiritless, and unsettled existence (*Existenz*) may the individual be permitted to flee from actuality and retreat into his inner vitality. Socrates made his appearance at the time when Athenian democracy had fallen into ruin. He evaporated the existing world and retreated into himself in search of the right and the good.[8]

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[5] *EPR*, 138R.

[6] *The Philosophy of History* (hereafter "*PH*"), trans. John Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 269; *Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Geschichte*, *W* 12:329: "Sokrates ist als moralischer Lehrer beruehmt; vielmehr aber ist er der *Erfinder* der Moral."

[7] *EPR*, 138R; *W* 7:259.

[8] *EPR*, 138A; *W* 7:260.

That the ethical life of custom has internal tensions leading to its decay is a theme much elaborated by Hegel in both the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Philosophy of Right.* Tragic conflicts of family and city (*Antigone*) and within the family itself surely precede the appearance of Socrates. In bringing to light a fundamentally new level of conflict between individual and city, Socrates embodies the inner principle of the age as a hero of world history. He exposes the new principle and in so doing becomes the sacrificial victim of the dialectical conflict he uncovers. Socrates' destructive power is the completion of a destructive process underway, and certainly for Hegel the process has a positive aspect. But observe: Socrates can be such an agent of transformation only because his stance is essentially willful. The Socrates of Hegel's account is not a purely contemplative seeker of truth.

The affinity of Hegel's Socrates with Kant is unmistakable, and Hegel's criticism of Kant is the best known locus of the contrast between *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralitaet.* Hegel ascribes "abstractness" to the moral stances of both Socrates and Kant, an abstractness arising in both cases from the same cause: the assertion of the supremacy of the subjective ground of right and duty, and disregard for the rationality inherent in existing custom, the rationality that custom is itself unable to see. Morality misses the point that the mutual dependence and recognition of humans in the social realm is the presupposition of the individual's effort to use reason independently. Separating itself from the social sphere that can give its rationality content, morality is only an abstract formalism that tries to give itself content, with arbitrariness as the result. The previously cited addition of Gans continues with a remark about the present age which refers clearly to the influence of Kantian morality:

> Even in our times it happens that reverence for the existing order is in varying degrees absent, and people seek to equate prevailing standards with their own will, with what they have recognized.[9]

This modern consciousness is, however, not confined to its Kantian version. It is evident in other forms of "conscience" (*Gewissen*) as "the absolute entitlement of subjective self-consciousness" making universalist demands on the narrow basis of "infinite formal certainty

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[9] *EPR*, 138A; *W* 7:260.

of itself."[10] Having no regard for "objective content" and thus turning away from the "substance" of ethical life, this attitude is one that "the state cannot recognize."[11] Such morality is self-contradictory in that "its appeal solely *to itself* is directly opposed to what it seeks to be," that is, "the rule for a rational and universal mode of action which is valid in and for itself." There are overtones here of Hegel's critique of "the monstrous spectacle" of the French Revolution's overthrow of all existing conditions on the basis of the "abstractions" of pure thought alone, "for the first time in our knowledge of the human species."[12] More immediately, this attitude is related to evil, the subject of the paragraph just following the first discussion of Socrates.[13] Evil is a condition of the "pure inwardness of the will" consciously preferring "arbitrariness, its own particularity" over the universal.

> Conscience, as formal subjectivity, consists simply in the possibility of turning at any moment to *evil*; for both morality and evil have their common root in that self-certainty which has being for itself and knows and resolves for itself.[14]

As already noted, Hegel says "Socrates is the inventor of morality." It would go too far to say that Socrates is also the inventor of evil, but as the inventor of morality he must be, in a special way, familiar with "the common root" of morality and evil.

Morality has as well a positive side for Hegel—just as evil does. This positive side lies precisely in the relation between the moral will and universal principle, and Kant is credited with offering the first full philosophical elaboration of it. Hegel writes, "[K]nowledge of the will first gained a firm foundation and point of departure in the philosophy of Kant, through the thought of its infinite autonomy."[15] And also, "the point of view of Kant's philosophy is sublime inasmuch as it asserts

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[10] *EPR*, 137, 137R; *W* 7:254–5.

[11] *EPR*, 137R; *W* 7:255.

[12] *EPR*, 258R; *W* 7:400–1. The same passage praises "the achievement of Rousseau to put forward the *will* as the principle of the state," wherein the will is "thinking itself," although in the imperfect form of a universal will arising out of the contractual union of individuals. Rousseau introduces the idea of the will as having the universal form of willing (the general will) as its object, whereby "thinking" offers not merely the form or means of the will, but its content or end. The connection with Kant's "infinite autonomy" is evident.

[13] *EPR*, 139.

[14] *EPR*, 139R; *W* 7:261.

[15] *EPR*, 135R; *W* 7:252.

the conformity of duty with reason," although he immediately adds, "this point of view is defective in that it lacks all articulation."[16] More generally, the inward turn of conscience is praised as "an exalted point of view, a point of view of the modern world" which by the "descent into the self" and the "deepest inner solitude within oneself" has moved beyond "more sensuous ages" which were satisfied by "the external and given, whether this be religion or right."[17] Hegel's comments on Socrates in this context make him the decisive precursor of modernity. Later in the *Philosophy of Right* one reads, "Socrates's principle of morality, of inwardness, was a necessary product of his age, but it took time for this to become universal self-consciousness."[18]

III

The most substantive comment on the positive side of the Socratic innovation in the *Philosophy of Right* occurs in the Preface, although Socrates' name does not appear there. The reference occurs in later paragraphs of the Preface which are famous for their claim that "what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational."[19] Here Hegel means not that all particulars existing at a given time can be rationally justified, but rather that the philosophic account of reason provides the basis for understanding and justifying the most essential features of a time, since the actual (*wirklich*) is that which reason itself tends to realize or "actualize." That reason tends toward actuality is for Hegel the truth of Aristotle's "concrete" account of the essence of reason.[20] However, the subject of discussion just before this maxim is Plato's *Republic*. Its central point is that Plato was moved to write his account of the "state" by the deeper tendency of his world, to which he failed all the same to perform justice. Hegel's charge against Plato is *not* that Plato put forward a merely utopian project, unrelated to

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[16] *EPR*, 135A; *W* 7:253. See also 133A.
[17] *EPR*, 136A; *W* 7:254.
[18] *EPR*, 274A; *W* 7:440.
[19] *EPR* P, 20; *W* 7:24.
[20] *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (hereafter "*LHP*"), trans. E. S. Haldane (London: Kegan Paul, 1892), 1:20–1; *Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der Philosophie*, *W* 18:39–40. The *Werke* text of the lectures and the Haldane translation are based on Karl Ludwig Michelet's 1840 edition.

actuality. Plato sought to give expression to the *ethos* of the Greeks, and especially to address "a deeper principle" that was emerging in it. The account of the "deeper principle" points clearly to Socrates as discussed later in paragraph 138. The tendency first appeared as an "unsatisfied longing" and a "corrupting force"; the "deeper drive" behind it was "free infinite personality." Plato sought to counteract this longing "with the help of the very longing itself." Who but Socrates would represent the longing for "free infinite personality"? The "infinite formal certainty of itself" characterizing morality is, as already noted, attached to Socrates' "evaporation" of custom through his turning to "inward" criteria of right. That Plato sought a corrective to the longing "by means of the longing itself" suggests that he used the figure of Socrates to correct Socrates' own thinking. Thus the *Republic* presents Socrates as (a not wholly willing) teacher of ethical life, and his philosophical longing or *eros* is put in the service of forming laws and customs to counteract the acid effect of dialectic. The outcome, Hegel says, was a "particular *external* form of Greek ethics" by whose means Plato "imagined he could overcome the corrupting force."[21] With respect to Socrates the most striking remark comes just before the famous maxim on reason and the actual:

> But he [Plato] proved he is the great spirit (*der grosse Geist*) by the fact that the very principle on which the distinctive character of his Idea turns is the pivot on which the impending world revolution turned.

Again the principle of "free infinite personality" is in question, and is said here to be the pivot (*Angel*) for the world revolution of the spirit. It is this principle, therefore, that reason seeks to actualize in the course of history, and which constitutes the inner rationality of the actual as it unfolds in history. Plato did not—and could not—fully achieve that actuality, and indeed he resisted the force striving to actualize itself even as he gave expression to it. However, in his greatness of spirit he tried to give it suitable political actualization. Insofar as Hegel sees the modern state—and the philosophic spirit of his own thought—as giving appropriate actuality in ethical life to the principle of infinite personality or morality, it is the successor to and true fulfillment of Plato's effort. Like Plato, Hegel—indeed all of history—is coming to terms with the Socratic revolution.

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[21] *EPR* P, 20; *W* 7:24.

Hegel confirms this reading of the Preface by an explicit linkage of Plato and the modern state in paragraph 185 of the *Philosophy of Right*, near the start of the discussion of civil society. (This is the subject of section two, following section one on the family, in "Ethical Life," the third large part of the *Philosophy of Right*.) First, one must note that Hegel gives the name "civil society" (*buergerliche Gesellschaft*) to the shape of spiritual life arising in the modern period based on "the system of needs," which are the ever-expanding bonds of mutual dependence forged by the efforts of individuals acting as individuals to satisfy desires that are inherently limitless. Hegel builds on insights of Rousseau, Kant, Smith, and Ricardo on this peculiar form of orderliness, which gives a lawlike character to human activities intending only personal satisfaction, such that raw passion is civilized and "universalized" insofar as it must accept the rational conditions (rules of exchange, property-holding, contract, and the like) for its satisfaction. The progress of commerce, industry, arts, and sciences tends to create new desires even as it promises satisfaction (this is the problem of limitless corruption decried by Rousseau), but nevertheless it also tends to distribute the benefits of progress and to encourage productive and responsible behavior on the part of citizens who increasingly have grounds for feeling gratitude and loyalty toward the whole system (the rejoinder to Rousseau from Kant, Smith, and the new economic science). In Hegel's view, this system is an essential condition for the modern state's great achievement: the combination of maximum individual freedom with the "substantial unity" of a law-abiding citizenry that feels itself patriotically bound to the state. Modern citizens are prepared to make the highest sacrifices for the state, even as on a daily basis they pursue private aims and cherish constitutional limits on the state's ability to interfere with those pursuits. Perhaps the following statements offer the best summation:

> The principle of modern states has this enormous strength and depth, that it allows the principle of subjectivity to attain fulfillment in the *self-sufficient extreme* of personal particularity, while at the same time *bringing it back to substantial unity* and so preserving this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.[22]

> In the states of classical antiquity, universality was indeed already present, but particularity had not yet been released and set at liberty and

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[22] *EPR*, 260; *W* 7:407.

> brought back to universality, i.e. to the universal end of the whole. The essence of the modern state is that the universal should be linked with the complete freedom of particularity and the well-being of individuals.[23]

Civil society, the modern system of needs, is the hidden mechanism that accomplishes the "releasing" of particularity and its return to "substantial unity," although the state and not civil society is the locus of the highest duties of the citizen, because the individual's will and the common will can fully actualize themselves only in the "objective spirit" of the state's laws and institutions.

Where are Plato and Socrates in all this? Hegel returns to Plato's defect in his account of the failures of ancient states in *EPR*, 185. Those states experienced an "influx of ethical corruption" which was the "ultimate reason for their downfall." Their basis in "*original* natural intuition" of a patriarchal and religious principle "could not withstand the division of the same and the infinite reflection of self-consciousness in itself." Plato in his *Republic*, Hegel says, "presents the substantial ethical life in its ideal *beauty* and *truth*; but he cannot come to terms with the principle of self-sufficient particularity, which had suddenly overtaken Greek ethical life." Plato's only response is to exclude particularity completely from the state through the laws concerning private property and the family. Although there is "substantial truth" in Plato's opposition to the new spirit, his thought and the ancient world as a whole lacked

> the truly infinite power which resides solely in that unity which allows the *opposition* within reason [*Vernunft*] *to develop to its full strength*, and has overcome it so as to preserve itself within it and *wholly contain it within itself*.[24]

Infinite self-reflection first appeared among the Greeks, Hegel remarks, but its actualization was reserved for a later age:

> The principle of the *self-sufficient and inherently infinite personality* of the individual [*des Einzelnen*], the principle of subjective freedom, which arose in an inward form in the *Christian* religion, and in an external form (which was therefore linked with abstract universality) in the *Roman* world, is denied its right in that merely substantial form of the actual spirit [in Plato's *Republic*].[25]

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[23] *EPR*, 260A; *W* 7:407.
[24] *EPR*, 185R; *W* 7:342.
[25] *EPR*, 185R; *W* 7:342.

Here one should note Hegel's view that the infinite self-opposition of reason is a feature of the will, "for the theoretical is essentially contained in the practical; the idea that the two are separate must be rejected, for one cannot have a will without intelligence. On the contrary, the will contains the theoretical within itself."[26] The will has the power of remaining identical with itself while also positing itself as the negative of itself in the willing of any determinate object. As such, will is characterized (according to logic as speculative philosophy) by "infinity as self-referring negativity, this ultimate source of all activity, life, and consciousness."[27] Now one can say that Socrates, in bringing this infinity to light, first brought to light the character of the will as infinite negativity. Only the modern state achieves its successful incorporation into ethical life.

IV

The *Philosophy of Right* also discusses two other features of Socrates, each of which links him to and separates him from modern subjectivity: his irony and his daimon. Socratic irony is different from the stance of the modern ironist, made famous by Friedrich Schlegel, in which "subjectivity regards itself as the ultimate instance," and distances itself from whatever could be regarded as objective. Modern Romantic subjectivity "knows itself as that which *wills* and *resolves in a particular way* but may *equally well* will and resolve otherwise."[28] It sees itself as beyond all law, "the master of both law and thing," and merely plays with things while enjoying itself.

> This shape [of subjectivity] is not only the *emptiness* of all ethical *content* of rights, duties, laws . . . in addition, its form is that of *subjective* emptiness [*Eitelkeit*], in that it knows itself as this emptiness of all content and, in this knowledge, knows *itself* as the absolute.[29]

Hegel observes this is very different from "the method which Socrates employed in personal dialogue to defend the Idea of truth and justice against the presumption of the uneducated consciousness and that of the sophists." Socratic irony is only a "manner of speaking

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[26] *EPR*, 4A; *W* 7:47.
[27] *EPR*, 7R; *W* 7:55.
[28] *EPR*, 140R(f); *W* 7:277–80.
[29] *EPR*, 140R(f); *W* 7:279.

in relation to *people*," in which another's consciousness is treated ironically, but not the Idea itself. For Plato, all dialectical irony is in the end submerged in the substantiality of the Idea. Elsewhere (in the lectures on the History of Philosophy) Hegel relates this moderate irony to Socrates' knowledge of ignorance and the nonscientific or nonsystematic character of his philosophy.[30] But clearly the infinite negativity disclosed by Socrates is the precondition for Romantic irony as well as the nonironic reconciliation of subjectivity and ethical life in the modern state.

The Socratic daimon enters the argument of the *Philosophy of Right* in a context that, initially seeming odd, is quite telling.[31] The modern state is a whole whose powers of decision lie completely within its own limits, Hegel claims, for the actualization of freedom in the state entails that it is a self-organizing totality. Its organic structure requires a constitutionally limited monarch who gives the personality of the state a concrete embodiment in a personal will. Yet the monarch's will only expresses the rational whole, of which he is the symbolic apex. His will is the final will to be consulted when governmental deliberations have reached their end. In contrast, in the states of antiquity the highest decisions depended on consulting a sphere beyond human powers—in oracles, the entrails of animals, the flight of birds, and so forth.[32] Hegel expressly refers back to his account of Socrates as the great turning-inward of consciousness, and now asserts:

> In the *daimon* of *Socrates* (see par. 138 above) we can see the beginning of how the will which in the past had simply projected itself *beyond* itself turned to itself and recognized itself within itself—the beginning of *self-knowing* and hence truthful freedom.

This suggests a parallel between Socrates' daimon and the constitutional monarch. In each case one has something like the voice of reason, or the rational will, embodied in a being that has a distinct existence and yet exists only for the sake of another: Socrates' philosophic life in the one case, the grand edifice of the state in the other. The daimon is thus the first step on the path toward the supremacy of the rational will in affairs of state, or so the analogy suggests. Yet the dai-

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[30] *LHP*, 397–402; *W* 18:456–61.
[31] *EPR*, 279R.
[32] *EPR*, 356.

mon is only a "beginning." How is the Socratic turn incomplete? Yet perhaps the better question is: how is the Socratic turn to "inwardly" based decision evident in the daimon at all? Is it not more evident in Socratic dialectic—or irony?[33] Also—to raise a different sort of question that cannot be pursued here—does Hegel subtly intend by his association of the monarch with the daimon to cast some doubt on the former? Is constitutional monarchy perhaps not as rational as Hegel seems, on the surface, to claim it is? (After 1819 Hegel had ample grounds for discontent with the Prussian monarchy.[34]) Nevertheless, the primary intent of the comparison is plain: Socrates begins the movement of thought whereby the divine is brought down from beyond and realized in the world, a process completed in the modern state, for "the state is the divine will as present spirit, *unfolding* itself as the actual shape and *organization of a world*"[35] and "the state consists in the march of God in the world."[36] The final paragraph of the *Philosophy of Right* presents a variant of Cicero's remark that Socrates brought philosophy down from the heavens and into the cities, but now "the state as the image and actuality of reason" replaces Socrates as the agency through which the spiritual comes earthward.[37]

This brief and thought-provoking acquaintance with the daimon in the *Philosophy of Right* suggests that the daimon is an important clue to the character of Socratic rationality as prefiguring the rationality of the modern state. More enlightenment on the subject is helpfully provided by two accounts in other lectures. In those on the Philosophy of History, Socrates enters in the middle of the story of Athenian corruption and decline.[38] Here the accents are strikingly

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[33] This is to say nothing about the fact that in the best-known account of it (Plato, *Apology* 40a–c) the daimon counsels Socrates against action, except in the case of Socrates' appearance at his trial and delivery of his self-defense, whereby, Socrates claims, it gives a sign that death is not evil. The daimon's negative function accords better with Hegel's criticism of it in the other lectures than with the point he makes in this context.

[34] See Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), on "Hegel and the Prussian Reaction: 1819–1820," 435–50.

[35] *EPR*, 270R; *W* 7:417–18. This paragraph on the relation of the state to religion is the lengthiest in the *Philosophy of Right*; its length is reflective of its philosophical weight.

[36] *EPR*, 258A; *W* 7:403. See also 260A.

[37] *EPR*, 360; *W* 7:512. See also *LHP*, 388–9; *W* 18:445–6.

[38] *PH*, 267–71; *W* 12:326–30. (I have modified the translation.)

more negative. Socrates has clear kinship with the crowd of sophists, as is suggested in the *Philosophy of Right*, and again he represents the principle of "inwardness becoming free for itself." Again, out of the background of the unreflective, concrete unity of spirit in Greek ethical life—the ethos of the beautiful—"thought" arises as the principle of decay. The conflict of ethical life and thought occurs only in the European world, Hegel says, for in Asia the dominance of "abstraction" permits neither to exist. In Greece the sophistic maxim "man is the measure" becomes the excuse for individual caprice and opens the door to all passions. Now Socrates is called "the inventor of morality" who argues with the sophists, asserts the "absolute independence of thought" in determining the right and the good, insists on the universal character of thought, and stipulates that consciousness of virtue characterizes genuine virtue. Yet Socrates is like the sophists in setting citizens against custom and the state. Here his destructive force is given a different twist: Socrates introduces a new sort of oracle through his daimon. "Socrates said that he had a *daimon* in him, that advised him what he should do, and revealed to him what is useful to his friends." Socrates' personal daimon is an oracle that competes with the sacred oracles of the city. The positive sense given to the oracle in the *Philosophy of Right*—as the beginning of the immanentizing of the divine, and of the movement toward complete rational self-reliance—is not as evident here, although it can be glimpsed. Hegel's major theme is that the daimon introduces a disturbing and disruptive form of transcendence. The life grounded in "thought," which the daimon protects, is one estranged from the world. "Through the rising inner world of subjectivity the break with reality (*Wirklichkeit*) comes on the scene." Socrates is not at home in the state and its religion, only in the thought-world (*Gedankenwelt*), although he continues to fulfill civic duties. Plato carries forward this tendency, and in the wake of these philosophers "many citizens separate themselves from political life and the affairs of state in order to live in the ideal world." The Athenians tried to remove the destructive principle by condemning Socrates, but in fact they were only condemning themselves, for they had already fallen under the spell of thinking. Hegel indicates that all was not lost: in a new way the Athenian spirit gained "satisfaction for itself" in sophisticated self-mockery, as is evident in the Athenian capacity for relishing Aristophanic satire.

The two accounts of Socrates and his daimon reveal an ambiguity. Although both show that the Socratic turn to thought has a destructive effect on ethical life, in *Philosophy of Right* the turn discloses an infinite power of self-reliant thinking pointing toward the ultimate self-sufficiency of the human world, and in the lectures on the Philosophy of History it points more toward an estrangement from the world, a lingering in the "ideal" that does not seem to hold much promise for the future. The descriptions of the daimon are the locus of the ambiguity: is the daimonic voice "immanentizing" and earthly, or is it estranging and otherwordly? Admittedly, in both cases the voice has a disruptive effect, and the new principle promoted by the voice must be reconciled with the world of ethics and politics.

V

One acquires a better view of this duality and its meaning in what is by far Hegel's fullest treatment of Socrates, in the lectures on the History of Philosophy, where the daimon has a central role.[39] The daimon reveals what is inherently problematic about the transference of the divine from external powers to infinite subjectivity, and it expresses the fundamental conflict between philosophy and the state that animates Western history since Socrates. Now it is clear that the problem is not solely the emancipation of "particularity" as destroying the unreflective unity of custom. The "negative power of thought" in Anaxagoras and the sophists is sharply distinguished from Socrates' turn to the "universal I" as the good. This "I" as transcending nature and the senses (Kantian overtones once again) provides a point of security and rest to thought, unlike the restless negativity of thought in Protagoras. Thought becomes more than the source of ideas about the good; it now *is* the good. With this insight Socrates is a turning-point in the history of thought.[40] Socrates demands that the end of all action and indeed of the world be found in thought, so that "thought is now at home with itself," and not with anything outside itself. Of custom it can only be said that "no one knew whence it came"

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[39] *LHP*, 384–448; *W* 18:441–516.
[40] *LHP*, 384–6; *W* 18:441–3.

(Sophocles); lack of grounding in thought is custom's fatal flaw. The Socratic demand lives on after him, and into the modern world.

The Socratic revolution is in a sense a revolution in the will, since it is the rational will's bid for self-grounding. Surely it has destructive consequences for the state and its religion, but it does not elevate mere particularity above custom. Socrates and Plato seek to raise thought above merely particular interests.[41] The true meaning of this achievement—wherein morality (*Moralitaet*) replaces the natural, unreflective ethos (*Sittlichkeit*)—is the new exploration of the "depths of consciousness." Socrates is the highest representative of an "inwardness" arising at the time of the Peloponnesian War and inseparable from the dissolution of Athenian political life. After him, inwardness becomes the common feature of human life.[42] Yet Socrates as individual has an extraordinary, even bizarre, character. His virtues have the quality of something self-wrought, as he formed himself like a work of art.[43] Again, he embodies an extreme form of willfulness. In a sense this is characteristic of antiquity, Hegel claims, where higher virtues are the products of the heroic will of the individual. Virtue has not yet acquired the status of a universal expression of Spirit, as in the modern world, and is instead the individual's peculiar genius. In antiquity the contrast between the ordinary virtues of ethical life and the higher virtues of heroes is greater than in the modern world. The gulf between Socrates' unique character and the world in which he lived forms the basis of his irony, which Hegel calls "tragic."[44] To overcome that separation and to annul the tragedy of philosophy constitute the destiny of Spirit. But Socrates' ironic distance should not be confused with mere delight in scoffing at the ordinary. There is a genuinely dialectical quality of his thought in his "midwifery," whereby he takes the individual soul from its concrete starting point and leads it to the universal. He thus anticipates the true sense of dialectic as the unfolding of the immanent logic of the concept, in which "consciousness creates out of itself the true."[45]

Does Hegel here give any support to his claim in the lectures on the Philosophy of History that Socrates' turn to thought involves "es-

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[41] *LHP*, 387; *W* 18:444.
[42] *LHP*, 390–1; *W* 18:448–50.
[43] *LHP*, 392–4; *W* 18:450–3.
[44] *LHP*, 398–402; *W* 18:457–61.
[45] *LHP*, 407; *W* 18:468.

trangement" from the world? If thought becomes more at home with itself, why should it not be more at home with the world? The problem, Hegel now says more helpfully, lies in the abstractness of the Socratic universal. As the end of the individual it lacks true development. It is indeed Socrates' great insight that consciousness contains the divine, but his account of thought in his "religion of the good" is narrowly moral. Although discovering that law arises from consciousness and that law's essence is not oppressive, Socrates gives no content to his account of consciousness as positing itself as the end.[46] Everyone is encouraged to find the law in himself, and this renders everyone homeless in the laws of the state. At this juncture Hegel adduces Aristotle's criticism of Socrates for neglecting habituation and for requiring that virtue be a science, to support Hegel's own view that Socratic morality lacks "heart" and has no connection with "the real spirit of the people." The Aristotelian account of the basis of virtue in the "active understanding" of character and not in perception alone, points to a defect in Socrates that Hegel, as one will see, believes to be evident in his daimon.[47] The Socratic perception of the good, or the Socratic universal, is indeterminate in that it exposes the weakness of all particularity, such as the particular laws of the Greeks, and offers no path toward a determinate end. Now Hegel puts forward the true dialectical account of determinacy. Only in relation to the whole does the universal lose its abstractness and one-sidedness and become determinate. In moral terms, the universal of the individual's inwardness must be shown wanting and must be superseded by the universal implicit in the life of a people. Universal moral claims typically come into conflict, but the coherence of the life of a people—qua people—resolves such conflict. The infinity of consciousness which Socrates uncovers remains, in his thought, only the possession of individuals.[48]

From these lectures one learns the root of the ambiguity mentioned in section 4 above. The Socratic turn to the authority of inwardness or consciousness is surely not inherently otherworldly, and marks the first great step toward "immanence." All the same, it involves some homelessness or estrangement, which is not adequately described as just the decline of the authority of ancestral custom.

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[46] *LHP*, 409; *W* 18:470.
[47] *LHP*, 410–14; *W* 18:471–6.
[48] *LHP*, 417–20; *W* 18:486–90.

Socrates does not dissolve the unity of ethical life into the chaos of self-seeking particularity, like the sophists. He stresses the supreme authority of the universal, but it is a universal lacking "determinate" relation to individuals. In Hegel's terms it is not a "concrete universal." The problematic abstractness of this universal lies not in some metaphysical characteristic, such as its belonging to a supersensible realm. Instead, this universal belongs to the turning inward of consciousness. Individuality or personality is liberated in the Socratic revolution, for the revolution consists in disclosing the infinite power of thought as immanent within the individual. Yet this universal discovered in "free infinite personality" also leaves something crucial in the life of the individual wholly indeterminate.

VI

What is this unfulfilled aspect? Hegel approaches this by pointing to the limited effectiveness of Socratic teaching. He claims that Socrates' thought acquires its power through contingent, personal attributes of his mind, or the impressive force of his character. From that source also come Socrates' notable failures as a teacher—Hegel mentions Critias and Alcibiades—since force of character can have particular effects contrary to the philosophic and intellectual intent of the teacher. Hegel now states that "the characteristic form" of Socratic subjectivity, or the characteristic way that thought becomes the deciding factor in the life of Socrates, is the daimon, "the personal mind (*Geist*) that appears to him to be *his* mind."[49] The daimon expresses the revolution wherein thought turns to itself, away from external powers. Yet it also discloses how this turn, in the case of Socrates, is infected with arbitrariness. The daimon cares for that individual side of Socrates' consciousness not covered by insight into the universal, and accordingly it is related to somnambulism, magnetic states, and unconscious impulses. It is not the seat of opinions and convictions, but a new sort of oracle (internal rather than external) addressing contingent affairs demanding decisions. One can ask why an internal oracle is necessary, if reason grasps the authority of the universal and at the same time the contingency of all oracles? It is

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[49] *LHP*, 421; *W* 18:490.

because the universal still lacks a certain effectiveness and leaves a void that must be filled by something radically particular and divorced from reason. One recalls that the collapse of the authority of custom, of publicly recognized common law, produces a void, and that the problem of the Socratic way of thought is its uncovering a gulf between the requirements of self-grounding reason and those of public, social, and political authority and law. The Socratic teaching of a higher universal morality cannot be effectively translated by Socrates himself into a new form of political authority. Such was Plato's critique of Socrates, in Hegel's account. But this still leaves unexplained why Socrates would have need of a daimonic voice. After all, this does not assist with making rational insight generally effective. The voice has no popular or public authority.

Although Socrates as compared to the public of his time is remarkably self-reliant in his thinking, his is not a wholly modern form of autonomy. He is a divided being, in Hegel's view, seeking the ground of life in thought and at the same time relying on a subjective oracle in his personal affairs, as the latter are not addressed by his thought.[50] The oracle mediates between Socrates' inwardness and his external affairs, and is separate from his will although not separate from his being altogether. In a sense, Socrates as a practical being—with personal interests—does not possess his own will, or his will is possessed by another will. For the ordinary Greek, such a personal oracle is an absurdity, for the divine addresses matters of state and public affairs, not trivial personal concerns. Socrates offends the public with proposing not just new gods but a personal alternative to the public oracles and gods.[51] How could a private citizen presume to have his own oracle, and therefore to be a kind of oracle? Yet however offensive this may be to the ordinary citizen, Hegel says it is something that the ordinary citizen also intuits as having truth: Socrates brings to light the truth that every self-conscious being can replace the external powers of the public oracles. Indeed, Socrates' reputation for wisdom has the sanction of the Pythian oracle itself. The Greeks themselves are moving beyond their old oracles toward new ones, toward the private insight of the individual as the ultimate instance. Again Hegel states that they justly accuse Socrates of undermining the state, but in accusing him they only accuse themselves.[52]

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[50] *LHP*, 422–4; *W* 18:492–5.
[51] *LHP*, 431–5; *W* 18:498–503.
[52] *LHP*, 441–6; *W* 18:509–14.

This means that they are not yet capable of being responsible for themselves, and not yet disposed to accept the freedom of consciousness they are discovering. In this they show that their will is not their own will or that it is still possessed by external powers. Hence Socrates' daimon reflects the Athenian condition in exemplary fashion, and in discomfiting dialectical encounters with Socrates the Athenian citizen must face the psychic reality of *eros* without satisfaction. "Socrates had the formal effect of bringing about a discord in the individual."[53]

In other terms, the conflict between the subjective freedom of rational self-grounding and ethical life makes its first appearance as the conflict between Socrates and the state, but it also emerges as a conflict within Socrates himself. The conflict first appears in Socrates, and not in the sophists, since the sophists simply would abandon the gods and the oracles. Socrates' need for a daimon discloses his need for the divine, but his thinking allows for only a distorted and incomplete satisfaction of the need. The problem lies not in the project of rational self-grounding as such, but in the first form that this project assumes in the history of spirit—the Socratic form. In ethical life the divine is not simply the authority behind law, or the constraint on individual passion and whim. It addresses the problem of contingency or the human interest in providential order. The indeterminate universal found in reason's first efforts to find the truth in itself necessarily lacks the power to give meaning to the contingent, and hence Socrates' need for a personal supplement to reason, the daimonic voice that responds to contingency. Yet this might only trivialize the need for the divine, which in its highest and noblest form supports and sanctions the state. The real meaning of the conflict of Socrates and the state, therefore, concerns not whether there is a necessary place for the divine—Socrates readily admits this—but the nature and role of the divine. If the highest way of life is rational self-grounding, then perhaps the highest manifestation of the divine consists in its support of that life—as an individual's endeavor. But this would be the case only if rational self-grounding can achieve merely a limited kind of universality, one that lacks the power to comprehend and endow the contingent particulars of life with meaning, or with something like providential order. The universal in this indeterminate form

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[53] *LHP*, 449; *W* 18:519.

is inherently "estranged" and "homeless." Hegel argues that Greek philosophy, and indeed all philosophy before its culmination in his thought and age, could have only a limited view of the universal or reason in the decisive respect. It could not grasp that infinite inwardness has the *dynamis* to realize itself concretely insofar as reason's negative power of "releasing" the particular also necessarily "returns" the particular to the whole.

Hegel concludes that Socrates' life reveals the principle whose "development is the whole of subsequent history." This content, or the dialectical basis of history, is the truth that the principle of self-grounding thought, which at first must spell the ruin of the people and the state, will ultimately become the constitution or the "substance" of a people. The modern state fulfills this destiny.[54] Indeed, the modern state discloses itself as the true meaning of the human concern with destiny or providence.[55] Hegel, perhaps with greater clarity and depth than recent interpreters and advocates—whether of liberal, communitarian, or postmodern persuasion—sees the problem inherent in the coexistence of the infinity of philosophic reason and the finitude of ethical and political life. Whether his account of the modern state provides the solution eluding Socrates' daimon is surely one of the most thought-worthy and engaging questions posed by Hegel's work.[56]

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[54] *LHP*, 447–8; *W* 18:515–16.

[55] *EPR*, 360.

[56] An earlier version of this paper was delivered to the Philadelphia Area Political Theory Colloquium at the University of Pennsylvania, March 2004.

THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE MANIFOLD SENSES OF SELF-EVIDENCE

M. V. DOUGHERTY

IT IS CUSTOMARY TO CREDIT Aristotle with the discovery, or at least the first extant formulation, of the concept of self-evidence.[1] Recent work in the history of science has suggested that Aristotle was indebted in this respect to earlier Greek geometrical models of demonstration, but these earlier texts no longer survive.[2] However, in our present day, the merits of the ancient discovery suffer from neglect, and the very concept is met with suspicion. One finds, for instance, influential textbooks of the history of logic enjoining readers to acquire a "healthy skepticism of the concept of self-evidence."[3] Further, it is not

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[1] J. Moltmann explains, "Der geschichtliche Ausgangspunkt dieser Lehre findet sich in aristotelischen organon, in der Lehre von den Prinzipien, die als nicht bewiesene und nicht beweisbare, sondern in sich selbst ohne fremde Vermittlung einsichtige Sätze letzte Grundlage allen Beweisens sind"; "Per Se Notum," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 7, ed. Joachim Ritter and Kalfried Gründer (Basel: Schwabe, 1989), 262. See also Leo J. Elders, *The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 145; Anthony Quinton, "The Foundations of Knowledge," in *British Analytical Philosophy*, ed. Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore (New York: The Humanities Press, 1966), 55. For a history of the concept of self-evidence from Aristotle through the medieval period, see Moltmann, "Per Se Notum," 262–8; Luca F. Tuninetti, *Per Se Notum: Die logische Beschaffenheit des Selbsverstandlichen in Denken des Thomas von Aquin* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 11–123; G. R. Evans, "*Communis Animi Conceptio*: The Self-Evident Statement," *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 41 (1979): 123–6; and G. R. Evans, *Getting it Wrong: The Medieval Epistemology of Error* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. 1998), 133–42.

[2] Richard D. McKirahan, Jr., *Principles and Proofs: Aristotle's Theory of Demonstrative Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 5–20; Elders, *The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 147; Quinton, "The Foundations of Knowledge," 55.

[3] Susan Haack, *Philosophy of Logics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 10. See also 235. Another alternative is to leave the concept entirely unmentioned—a procedure followed even in the most magisterial treatments of the history of logic. See William Kneale and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

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uncommon for contemporary philosophers to reduce the concept of self-evidence to some kind of subjective feeling of certainty or even personal preference.[4] The abandonment of the notion of self-evidence among contemporary philosophers is not a procedure limited to practitioners of logic, as representative views can be found among those who practice metaphysics,[5] ethics,[6] philosophy of science,[7] legal philosophy,[8] political philosophy,[9] and epistemology.[10] This demise of the concept of self-evidence among contemporary philosophers, although widespread, has not gone entirely unlamented, however.[11]

The waning interest in the concept of self-evidence in the present day seems far removed from an earlier time when appeals to self-evidence were more numerous than they were warranted. In the late thirteenth century, there was a concern that appeals to self-evidence were becoming too frequent in theoretical disciplines. The famous condemnations in the year 1277 by the Parisian bishop Etienne Tempier served as a corrective to those whose appeals to self-evidence

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[4] One might consider the report of C. A. Campbell, who writes, "Almost all philosophers, when they raise in a formal way the question of rival criteria of truth, dismiss the claims of self-evidence with decision – not seldom, indeed, with derision. 'Self-evidence', they tell us, signifies no more than a subjective feeling of assurance, and is worthless as a test of objective truth"; C. A. Campbell, "Self-Evidence" in *In Defense of Free Will with Other Philosophical Essays* (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), 173.

[5] Ch. Perelman, "On Self-Evidence in Metaphysics," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 4 (1964): 5–19.

[6] See R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 44: "no moral system which claims to be based on principles which are self-evident can fulfill this function [of regulating our conduct]"; W. V. O. Quine and J. S. Ullian, *The Web of Belief* (New York: Random House, 1970), 31; Kai Nelson, "An Examination of the Thomistic Theory of Natural Moral Law," *Natural Law Forum* 4 (1959): 51–2; Pamela M. Hall, *Narrative and the Natural Law: An Interpretation of Thomistic Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 19.

[7] See Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), 37 and following; Henry Margenau, *The New Faith of Science* (Northfield: Carleton College Press, 1953), 9–10.

[8] See Ch. Perelman, "Self-Evidence and Proof," in *The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument*, ed. H. L. A. Hart (New York: The Humanities Press, 1963), 109–24, and in another essay in the same volume, "The Arbitrary in Justice," 57.

[9] See John E. Smith, "Philosophical Ideas Behind the 'Declaration of Independence,'" *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 31 (1977): 364; George L. McHan, "The Self-Evident Truths of the Declaration of Independence," *The Journal of Thought* 13 (1978): 168–75.

would extend the use of reason beyond its rightful domain. Among the various philosophical, theological, and dogmatic articles condemned by Tempier was counted one that dealt with this issue of self-evidence, for the bishop proscribed the position "[t]hat nothing is to be held that is not either self-evident or able to be proven from what is self-evident" (*quod nihil est credendum, nisi per se notum vel ex per se notis posit declari*).[12] One should not infer that the need to protect faith from an ever expanding use of natural reason, as may be inferred to be at work in the condemnation of this proposition, was a new occurrence in the thirteenth century, for medieval historians have generally located the beginnings of such an usurpation at an earlier period.[13]

The present paper is an examination of the various definitions or descriptions of self-evidence that occur in the writings of the thirteenth-century thinker Thomas Aquinas. The Angelic Doctor appears

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[10] See A. J. Ayer, "Self-Evidence," in *Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding*, ed. Edo Pivèeviæ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 79–92; Harold H. Joachim, *Logical Studies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 163–7; and Harold H. Joachim, *The Nature of Truth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), 70–3. One might also consider the work of Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, *Problems of Belief* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1924), 114–15: "'self-evidence' is an appeal to a psychical fact, and there is no coercing one who does not see or feel the self-evidence; if he doesn't, he doesn't, and that is all. . . . The feeling in itself cannot be regarded as valid. It is primarily a psychic fact about the person who feels it, and its value varies indefinitely in different cases." Similar views are set forth in the same author's *Logic for Use: An Introduction to the Voluntarist Theory of Knowledge* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1929), 271 and following. See also John Dewey, *Logic the Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938), 10, 139–44, 155–7; and Charles S. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," in *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, vol. 3, ed. J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 257–76.

[11] See Campbell, "Self-Evidence," 173–95; N. M. L. Nathan, *Evidence and Assurance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 42–9; and, more recently, Robert Audi, "Self-Evidence," in *Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology*, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 205–28.

[12] Proposition 37 (4). The Latin text and citation numbers are taken from David Piché, *La Condemnation Parisienne de 1277* (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1999), 90.

[13] Some historians look to the eleventh century and the writings of St. Anselm to find what appear to be the beginnings of an encroachment by reason into matters that are properly the province of faith. See Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), starting at 129; and Joseph Pieper, *Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960), 55–76.

to defend a number of definitions of self-evidence, and it is not clear that all of these definitions take the same object as the *definiendum*. Although Aquinas never approaches the concept of self-evidence as a direct subject of inquiry in any work—no article of the *Summa Theologiae* is presented on the notion of self-evidence as such—discussions of self-evidence in the Thomistic corpus arise in the context of other inquiries.[14] As is widely recognized, Aquinas regularly broaches the notion of self-evidence when treating certain issues, such as the question of the existence of God, the role of synderesis in moral reasoning, natural law principles, the conditions of demonstration, and the articles of faith. Indeed, some commentators have approached Aquinas's doctrine of self-evidence by privileging the remarks in one of these contexts and using such remarks to explain Aquinas's appeals to self-evidence in other contexts.[15] However, since such a method conceals the possibility that self-evidence may be an equivocal expression in the writings of Aquinas, no particular context will be privileged in the present investigation into Aquinas's notion of self-evidence.

To the end of examining the various definitions of self-evidence given by Aquinas in his writings, the present paper is divided into four

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[14] The best candidate for an *ex professo* treatment of self-evidence in the writings of Aquinas may be a short passage found at *In I Post. An.*, lect. 5, §50. References to this text will be made below. Unless otherwise indicated, texts for Thomas Aquinas are taken from: *Scriptum Super Libros sententiarum* (hereafter, "Mand."), vols. 1 and 2, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929); *Scriptum Super Sententiis* (hereafter, "Moos"), vols. 3 and 4, ed. P. Maria Fabianus Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1933–47); *Summa Theologiae*, 5 vols., ed. Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis (Ottawa: Commissio Piana, 1953); *Summa Contra Gentiles* (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1934); *In Aristotelis Libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticum Exposito*, ed. Raymundus M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1955); *In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium*, ed. Angelus M. Pirotta, 3d ed. (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1948); *In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Exposito*, ed. M. Maggiòlo (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1954); *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Exposito*, ed. M.-R. Cathala and Raymundus M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1950); *In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Ad Nicomachum Exposito*, ed. Raymundus M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1949); *Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura*, ed. Raphaelus Cai, 2 vols., 8th rev. ed. (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1953); *Exposito in Psalmas Davidis*, vol. 18 of *Opera Omnia*, ed. Stanislaus Fretté (Paris: Vivès, 1876); *Quaestiones Disputates*, ed. Raymundus M. Spiazzi et al., 2 vols., 9th rev. ed. (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1949); *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, ed. Raymundus M. Spiazzi, 9th ed. (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1956); *Opuscula Theologica*, ed. Raymundus M. Spiazzi et al., 2 vols. (Rome: Marietti Editori, 1954).

[15] Luca Tuninetti privileges the discussions of self-evidence that occur in discussions of whether the existence of God is self-evident. See Tuninetti, *Per Se Notum: Die logische Beschaffenheit des Selbsverständlichen*, 12.

parts. First, I shall give a detailed reading of the most often-cited definition of self-evidence present in the *corpus thomisticum* and place this definition in the context of Aquinas's account of the intellect as essentially productive in its cognitional acts. Second, I shall explore some of the reasons Aquinas sets forth for the primacy of this definition and examine this definition in light of some of the examples of self-evident propositions explicitly identified by Aquinas. Third, I shall set forth the various ways Aquinas proposes for dividing the self-evident propositions into classes. Finally, a conclusion will complete the present paper.

I

In a number of passages, Aquinas describes self-evident propositions as propositions whose ability to be known is reducible to knowledge of the terms of the propositions themselves. With such a claim we have one of the most often cited definitions of self-evidence from the Thomistic corpus:

> (T1) Self-evident propositions are those that are known as soon as their terms are known (*propositiones per se notae sunt quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur*).[16]

This definition occurs in numerous works of Aquinas and appears in passages from the various stages of his writing career.[17] At times he locates its origin in the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle, but no text there, either in the Greek or Latin editions, precisely matches the wording given by Aquinas.[18] This definition bears some examination,

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[16] *In IV Met.*, lect. 5, §595.

[17] For instance, see: *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 11; *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 5, §1179; *In I Post. An.*, lect. 7, §67; *ST* I, q. 17, a. 3, ad 2; *In II Sent.*, q. 2, a. 4, c. (Mand., 610); *De Veritate*, q. 1 a. 12, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 1, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 15, a. 3, ad 1, *ST* I, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 2; *SCG* I, cap. 10, and so on.

[18] *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, c. (Mand., 94), Aquinas cites Aristotle as "*principia cognoscimus dum terminus cognoscimus.*" Aquinas credits Aristotle with this definition in several texts, including *In IV Met.*, lect. 5, § 595; *In II Sent.* q. 2, a. 4, c. (Mand., 610). See also *ST* I q. 2, a. 1, obj. 2. Modern editors have suggested the referent to be *Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b18.

for its parts admit of several senses, not all of which are intended by Aquinas.

To begin, it should be noted that what Aquinas means by a proposition, in T1 and parallel texts, is limited to a judgment comprised of two and only two terms; that is, a judgment consisting of one subject and one predicate. The formulation given in T1 is restricted to a subject/predicate proposition and is not meant to include those other kinds of propositions that may deviate from this form.[19] These subject and predicate terms are the basic units or constitutive components of a proposition, or that into which a proposition can be resolved.[20] At times, Aquinas will speak of the relationship of subject and predicate terms in a proposition as the relation of a material to a formal principle, where the subject is the material principle and the predicate is the determining formal principle.[21] As substantial form determines prime matter to be a definite kind of thing, or an accidental form determines the substance in which it inheres, so too, by analogy, a predicate determines a (propositional) subject in a particular way. Thus, in a proposition, the subject is viewed under the formality of the predicate. In this way Aquinas presents the proposition as a composite unity of material and formal elements.

Upon closer examination of T1, we find that two distinct kinds of cognition are identified. Self-evident propositions are those that are known (*notis*) as soon as the subject and predicate are known (*cognoscuntur*). We would do well to distinguish these two kinds of cog-

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[19] One might consider that a valid Aristotelian syllogism consists of one proposition and is true in virtue of its terms alone, though Aquinas does not intend to include such propositions under the description given in T1. For the argument that an Aristotelian syllogism consists of one proposition, see Jan Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Formal Logic*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 20–1, and W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy VI, Aristotle: An Encounter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 160–2. An example cited by Lukasiewicz is from Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* 2.16.98b5–10: "If all broad-leaved plants are deciduous and all vines are broad-leaved plants, then all vines are deciduous."

[20] In addition to being the basic irreducible units of a proposition, terms are also the irreducible unities of a Thomistic science. See *ST* I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 3.

[21] For example, see *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 11, §1898.

nition, for T1 asserts that cognition in the one sense is dependent upon cognition in the other sense. For ease, these two kinds of cognition can be identified as cognition$_1$ and cognition$_2$, where cognition$_1$ refers to the apprehension of a subject or predicate term, and cognition$_2$ refers to the apprehension of a proposition as a whole. It is important to distinguish these two kinds of cognition, because T1 contends that cognition$_2$ is founded upon cognition$_1$. Thus, we are led to ask, in virtue of what, precisely, does cognition$_1$ differ from cognition$_2$? It is to this important question that we now turn.

To begin our account, it should be noted that Aquinas considers both terms and propositions to be productions of the intellect. Both are intelligible objects (*intelligibiles*) produced, conceived, or formed by the intellect. Aquinas identifies the two operations of the intellect responsible for the production of terms and propositions. These two operations are referred to by a number of expressions, but most often the first is called simple apprehension or the understanding of indivisibles, and the second is called judgment or, more specifically, division or composition.[22] One must be careful, for at times Aquinas refers to both the term and the proposition produced by the intellect as a concept (*conceptio*, *conceptus*, or *conceptum*). On other occasions he calls this concept an inner word (*verbum interius*) or mental word (*verbum intellectus*, *verbum mentis*). In the Thomistic commentary tradition, a concept or word is regularly designated as the expressed

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[22] On the Aristotelian origin of this twofold division of intellectual acts, see Enrico Berti, "The Intellection of 'Indivisibles' According to Aristotle," in *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum*, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 141–2. On the medieval Islamic appropriation of Aristotle on this issue, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Terms *TASAWWUR* and *TASDÎQ* in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents" in *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 478–92. For Thomistic texts in which the twofold division of intellectual acts appears, see: *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7 (Mand., 489); *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, c. (Mand., 903); *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 (Mand., 724); *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 1, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 3, c.; *De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3, c.; *De Spir. Crea.*, a. 9, ad 6; *De Spir. Crea.*, a. 11, ad 7; *In I Post. An.*, Pro., §4; *In III De An.*, lect. 11, §746–64; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 6, §605; *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1232; *In IX Metaph.*, lect. 11, §1904–16; *In I Peri Herm.*, lect. 3, §24–8; *ST* I, q. 17, a. 3, c.; *Super Evang. S. Ioannis Lect.*, lect. 1, §25.

species, though only hints of this particular designation are present in Aquinas's writings.[23] There are a number of texts, however, that argue for the existence of the concept or word. As is well known, Aquinas identifies cognition with the cognitional or intentional existence of the thing known in the knower.[24] For Aquinas, form as such is existentially neutral, capable of existing or being realized in different ways, be it materially or cognitionally.[25] The form of the known sensible object determines both the sensible object and possible intellect of the one who knows. The form of the known sensible object, as it exists in the possible intellect, is called a species (or by Thomistic commentators, the impressed species).[26] What concerns us here, however, is the production that occurs by the intellect once this (impressed) species exists in the intellect. In other words, at issue here is intellect as productive of a concept, word, or expressed species. Aquinas maintains that intellectual cognition does not consist merely in the existence of the species in the possible intellect, but rather that cognition requires that the intellect be productive on the basis of the

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[23] On impressed and expressed species in Aquinas, see John Frederick Peifer, *The Concept in Thomism* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952); Joseph Owens, "Faith, Ideas, Illumination, and Experience," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 452–3; Edward P. Mahoney, "Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 608–10; Sister Mary Anastasia Coady, *The Phantasm According to the Teaching of St. Thomas* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1932), 36–44, 65–7. It should be noted that the use of the term "species" in this context is not the logical term "species" which is subordinate to a genus.

[24] Classic presentations of this view include Peifer, *The Concept in Thomism*, 49–62; Joseph Owens, *Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992), 39–46; Joseph Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985), 29–42, 224–30; and Coady, *The Phantasm According to the Teaching of St. Thomas*, 32–4. For the medieval Islamic appropriation of this Aristotelian doctrine, see Deborah L. Black, "Conjunction and the Identity of Knower and Known in Averroes," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 73 (1999): 159–84.

[25] For the Avicennian background to this view, see John F. Wippel, "The Latin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 37 (1990): 51–70; Deborah L. Black, "Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna," *Mediaeval Studies* 61 (1999): 45–79.

received species in the possible intellect. This reception occurs at the conclusion of a process beginning with sensation, where the abstraction of the universal content of sensation preserved in the imagination has been placed in the possible intellect by the agent intellect; or, in the language of the commentators, an expressed species is produced by the intellect only after the impressed species exists in or informs the possible intellect.

Aquinas is very clear that the concept or word that is produced, conceived, or formed by the intellect is not the species in the possible intellect; rather, it presupposes the prior existence of the species in the possible intellect.[27] He is careful to distinguish the species that is in the possible intellect from the species that is produced by the intellect. In the language of the commentators, Aquinas distinguishes the impressed species, on the one hand, from the expressed species, on the other.[28]

The strongest evidence in the Thomistic corpus for dividing the species in the possible intellect from the concept or word lies in Aquinas's frequent claim that the species in the possible intellect is not that which is understood (*id quod intelligit*) but that by means of

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[26] Aquinas often refers to the species that comes to exist in the possible intellect as a *similitudo*. An important hint regarding how this term in the works of Aquinas is to be understood is given by Dominik Perler: "Note that the technical term '*similitudo*' does not simply mean 'likeness' or 'similitude' in the modern sense. It was rather used to designate the process of assimilation: in receiving a *similitudo*, the perceiver assimilates himself to the perceived thing"; Dominik Perler, "Things in the Mind: Fourteenth-Century Controversies over 'Intelligible Species,'" *Vivarium* 34 (1996): 232. For similar accounts of *similitudo*, see Dominik Perler, "Essentialism and Direct Realism: Some Late Medieval Perspectives," *Topoi* 19 (2000): 115; Peifer, *The Concept in Thomism*, 72; and Eleonore Stump, "Aquinas's Account of the Mechanisms of Intellective Cognition," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 204 (1998): 289–90. For a different view, where Aquinas is presented as a representationalist, see Claude Panaccio, "Aquinas on Intellectual Representation," in *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, ed. Dominik Perler (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 185–201; Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[27] *ST* I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3; *Super Evang. S. Ioannis Lect*, lect. 1, §25; *SCG* I, cap. 53; *Quaest. Quod.* 5, q. 5, a. 2, c.; *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 1, c.; *De Spirit. Creat.*, q. 9, ad 6.

[28] There are hints of this nomenclature in some Thomistic texts. For example, see *De Ver.*, q. 11, a. 1, ad 16; *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 10. See also *De Ver.*, q. 12, a. 7, sed cont. 1 and 3; *ST* I, q. 56, a. 2, c.; *ST* I, q. 105, a. 3, c.; *ST* II-II, q. 173, a. 2, obj. 1 and ad 1; *ST* II-II, q. 173, a. 2, sed cont. and c.; *ST* III, q. 9, a. 3, c.

which one understands (*id quo intelligitur*).[29] Aquinas consistently denies that the species in the possible intellect is that which one understands.[30] Regarding the concept or word or expressed species, however, Aquinas is willing to state that it is both that by which the intellect understands as well as that which the intellect understands. This point is often overlooked by commentators.[31] We find:

> (T2) The intellectual concept is a medium between the intellect and the thing understood, because through its mediation the intellectual operation reaches the thing. And, for this reason, the intellectual concept not only is that which is the thing understood, but also that by which the thing is understood. Consequently, that which is understood can be said of both the thing itself as well as the intellectual concept (*conceptio intellectus est media inter intellectum et rem intellectam, quia ea mediante operatio intellectus pertingit ad rem. Et ideo conceptio intellectus non solum est id quod intellectum est, sed etiam id quo res intelligitur; ut sic id quod intelligitur, possit dici et res ipsa, et conceptio intellectus*).[32]

This text is important, for it raises the issue of the status of the object of cognition. Aquinas indicates in many texts that the species possessed in the possible intellect cannot be the object of cognition or that which one understands (*id quod intelligit*); rather, it is that by

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[29] Representative texts include: *Quaest. de Anima*, q. 2, ad 5; *ST* I, q. 85, a. 2, sed cont. and c.; *In III De Anima*, lect. 8, §718; *De Unit. Intell.*, chap. 5, §110; *SCG* II, cap. 75; *De Spirit. Creat.*, q. 9, ad 6.

[30] However, the species in the possible intellect can become objects of understanding indirectly through an act of reflection, where the intellect reflects upon itself. Compare *Quaest. de Anima*, q. 2, ad 5; *ST* I, q. 85, a. 2, c.

[31] The following remark is representative: "Aquinas is clear that the intelligible species, and the concept . . . are not themselves the objects of cognition but serve rather as the means by which one knows." See Mahoney, "Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger," 608. Compare Jacques Maritain, *Distinguish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), 390. Lawrence Dewan suggests that Aquinas's thought evolves on the question of whether the concept is the object of cognition by arguing that in early Thomistic texts Aquinas confuses the concept and the intelligible species, while in middle texts the two are distinguished, and finally in later texts the concept is abandoned altogether. See Lawrence Dewan, "St. Thomas and Pre-Conceptual Intellection," *Études Maritainiennes* 11 (1995): 222. In his developmental account, however, Dewan does not treat of texts occurring in the *De anima* and the *Metaphysics* commentaries to be cited below. He does indicate that Aquinas discusses the concept at *ST* I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3, though he does not assign much importance to this reference.

[32] *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3. Emphasis mine. The identification with the concept with that which is known occurs also at *De Spirit. Creat.*, q. 9, ad 6.

which cognition occurs or that by which one understands (*id quo intelligit*). As such, this species is merely the means by which something is known, and it serves an instrumental role in the act of cognition. If one were to assert that species in the possible intellect were in fact the objects of cognition, rather than the means of cognition, then according to Aquinas, such a position would be equivalent to a version of Platonism in which it is not the world that is known, but rather one's ideas.[33] Indeed, Aquinas often describes the instrumental character of the species in the possible intellect to the knower by saying that the former knows through (*per*) the latter.[34] Having thus rejected the impressed species or species in the possible intellect as the object of cognition, and having assigned to these species an instrumental role in cognition, one may inquire further regarding the status of the *id quod intelligitur*. On most occasions Aquinas contends that those things that are understood are material things first encountered in sensation, and thus the entities of the material world itself are the *id quod intelligitur*. However, on other occasions, such as T2 above, Aquinas is more detailed in his account, proposing that concepts or expressed species are the objects of cognition. Elsewhere, he will repeat this doctrine by stating that the objects of cognition are the universals (*universalia*) of science, which are known by means of the intelligible species received in the possible intellect.[35] By suggesting that a universal or a concept is the "that which one understands" or *id quod intelligitur*, Aquinas presumably does not consider himself to fall under his own critique of the Platonic position, for expressed species or concepts concern objects rooted in the material world.

In short, it can be said that, although Aquinas does not use the nomenclature of impressed and expressed species that permeates much of later commentary tradition on the subject of cognition, it is the case

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[33] Compare *ST* I, q. 85, a. 2. Aquinas's doctrine of the species received in the possible intellect would become, for later medievals such as John Olivi, a cause for concern when such species were interpreted to be intermediate representations between the known and the knower. Compare Mahony, "Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger," 609; Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Volume One: Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1994), 13–19; Perler, "Essentialism and Direct Realism," 117–19; Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages*, 195–219.

[34] For example, *De Unit. Intell.*, chap. 3, §66; *ST* I, q. 84, a. 1, ad 1.

[35] *Quaest. de Anima*, q. 2, ad 5.

that Aquinas considers the intellect to be receptive with respect to the species that comes to exist in the possible intellect, as well as productive with respect to the species that is the concept or word. Indeed, he uses such terms as *passio* to refer to the reception of the species in the possible intellect and describes the coming to be of the word or concept with such verbs as *formare, concipere,* and *constituere.*[36] The intellect, as productive of concepts, produces two kinds of intelligible object that correspond to the two operations of the intellect. It is important to note that both terms and propositions are themselves concepts.[37] First, there are those concepts that are the productions of the first operation of the intellect and correspond to the essences or quiddities of things. In a discussion appearing in the *De Potentia Dei,* Aquinas cites *homo* or "human being" as a linguistic formulation that represents the simple concept of the first operation of the intellect.[38] Second, there are those concepts that are the objects of the second operation of the intellect. They consist not of a simple quiddity or essence but of a joining or dividing of quiddities or essences in the act of judgment. As an example of the second act of the intellect, Aquinas offers in the same text from *De Potentia Dei* the two-termed linguistic formulation of *homo est animal* or "human being is an animal." It is important to keep in mind that, according to Aquinas, written or oral linguistic formulations of single terms or propositions are representations or significations of inner concepts and not representations or significations of the intelligible species.[39] Aquinas is clear that the conceptual unities—be they terms or propositions—formed by the intellect are produced unities. Their existence as cognitionally manufactured entities is underscored when he suggests that a concept is not a work of nature (*opus naturae*) but a work of reason and intellect (*opus rationis et intellectus*).[40]

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[36] *De Spirit. Creat.*, q. 9, ad 6.; *Quaest. Quod.* 5, q. 5, a. 2, c.; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5, c.

[37] For a discussion, see Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. David B. Burrell (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1967), 4; and Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1973), 194.

[38] *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5, c.

[39] See *ST* I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2; *Super Evang. S. Ioannis Lect*, lect. 1, §25; *Comp. Theo.* I, chap. 37.

[40] *In III De Anima*, lect. 11, §751. See also *ST* I, q. 79, a. 3, ad 3; *Quaest. De Anima* 4, c. and ad 1.

Of key importance to our account here is Aquinas's claim that the intellect produces terms and propositions as actual unities in the act of understanding, though these actual unities are in many cases potentially divisible. As we shall see, Aquinas speaks of both terms and propositions as actual indivisibles, unities, or simples that are only potentially divisible.[41] In doing so, Aquinas appropriates and extends the insight from Aristotelian epistemology that "that which produces a unity in each case is the intellect."[42] All concepts, be they terms or propositions, are each potentially divisible, and each is an actual unity in the act of understanding. Aquinas is not parsimonious with examples when it comes to explaining this difficult doctrine. Let us turn to Aquinas's account of the production of a term and then turn to the account of the production of a proposition.

As was suggested above, cognition according to Aquinas consists in the abstraction of the potentially intelligible content from the material phantasm by the agent intellect to produce an actual intelligible (the species) in the possible intellect. On the basis of this species, the intellect produces concepts, and the first kind of concept examined above was that of a simple term. The simple concept or term, Aquinas contends, is an actual unity or indivisible in the act of understanding, and Aquinas provides such examples as human being, ox, house, or army. At times he will refer to each of these intelligibles as a simple concept (*conceptio simplex*).[43] When each of these intelligibles is cognized by the intellect, it is cognized as an actual unity at an indivisible time.[44] However, each of these actual unities or indivisibles cognized at an indivisible time is in fact potentially divisible. As Aquinas explains, the unity of a human being can be divided into flesh and bones, a house can be divided into walls, foundation, and roof, and so forth.[45] The term or simple concept is actually intelligible in the

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[41] For species as an actual indivisible, see *In III De anima*, lect. 11, §755; *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1229. For a proposition as an actual unity, see *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §§1241 and 1229; *In III De Anima*, lect. 11, §747; *In III De anima*, lect. 11, §749.

[42] Aristotle, *De Anima* 3.6.430b6: "Unum autem faciens unumquodque, hoc intellectus est." For a discussion of the importance of this principle in Aristotelian cognition, see Kurt Pritzl, "The Cognition of Indivisibles and the Argument of *De Anima* 3.4–8," *American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings* 58 (1984): 143–5.

[43] See *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1229.

[44] *In III De Anima*, lect. 11, §755. Compare *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1229; *Quaest. De Anima*, q. 3, c.

[45] See *In III De Anima*, lect. 11, §755; *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1229.

singular, temporally indivisible act of cognition, but it is potentially divisible such that its parts can be distinctly cognized in other discrete, temporally distinct acts of the intellect. To put it in other words, according to Aquinas the intellect can only understand one thing at one time. The intellect can understand many things as one in the act of understanding, but never understand many things as many in an indivisible time.[46]

The simple concepts or terms produced by the intellect are actual intelligible unities, each cognized at an indivisible time, that are potentially but not actually divisible. It is important to see not only that terms are cognized as actual unities in indivisible time, but also that propositions are cognized by the intellect as actual unities in an indivisible time. A proposition, it will be recalled, consists of two terms, and these two terms are compounded into an actual unity by the intellect in the act of understanding. The proposition is nothing other than an actual unity of the two terms produced by the intellect in an indivisible time; this act is the second operation of the intellect known as judgment. Aquinas contends that the intellect produces actual conceptual unities in indivisible time both in the operation of forming simple concepts and in the operation of forming propositions. He explains:

> (T3) For if the intellect understands a man and an animal as they are in themselves, as two distinct things, it understands them successively by two simple concepts without forming an affirmation or a negation from them. But when it combines or separates them, it understands them both as one, that is, according as some one thing is constituted from them; just as the intellect also understands the parts of a whole as one by understanding the whole itself (*Si enim intellectus intelligat hominem et animal unumquodque secundum se, ut sunt duo quaedam, intelligit ea consequenter duabus conceptionibus simplicibus, non formans ex eis affirmationem neque negationem. Cum autem ex eis format compositionem vel divisionem, intelligit ambo ut unum, inquantum scilicet ex eis aliquod unum fit: sicut etiam partes cuiuslibet totius intelligit intellectus ut unum, intelligendo ipsum totum*).[47]

Nearly identical formulations appear elsewhere in the Thomistic corpus.[48] In these texts Aquinas argues that both terms and propositions are constituted as actual yet potentially divisible unities by the

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[46] Compare *ST* I, q. 85, a. 4, c.; *ST* I, q. 12, a. 10, c.; *SCG* I, cap. 55; *ST* I, q. 58, a. 2, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 14, c.

[47] *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1229.

[48] *In III De Anima*, lect. 11, §747 and §751; *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1241.

intellect in an indivisible time. Both are intelligibles that are potentially divisible, but in the act of understanding the intellect is productive of an actual unity that is understood in indivisible time. The cognition of the actual unity of a proposition does not take place successively, for the proposition is only potentially divisible into its two constitutive subject and predicate terms. As cognized, the proposition is an actual unity. The reference to wholes and parts in T3 here is not without consequence, for the part/whole analysis undergirds Aquinas's theoretical treatment of the intellect's production of actual unities. Aquinas uses the theoretical division of wholes and parts in his analysis of the actual yet potentially divisible unities of both terms[49] as well as propositions.[50] A proposition is an actual whole in the act of the intellect. With such an act a division into the parts is only potential. To consider the actual unity of either a term or a proposition in terms of potential divisions requires additional distinct acts of the intellect. That is, in the case of a proposition, two other temporally discrete acts of the intellect are required in order to cognize the actual intelligible proposition in terms of its potential parts, namely, the subject term and the predicate term.[51]

One may ask: why is it the case that the cognition of the self-evident proposition requires that one cognize the terms? Or, better still, why does T1 identify the cognition of terms as the sufficient and necessary condition for the cognition of a self-evident proposition as self-evident? The solution to this question lies in Aquinas's notion of the potential divisibility of a proposition. Although both terms and propositions are actual unities produced by the intellect that are only potentially divisible, terms and propositions are divisible in different ways. We will recall that the term "human being" was seen to be potentially divisible into flesh and bones, a house was potentially divisible into walls, foundation, and roof, while propositions were presented as potentially divisible into subject and predicate. The notion of the potential divisibility of propositions is most important to our subject here. In short, Aquinas holds that propositions produced by the intellect as actual unities can admit of different kinds of potential divisibility. That is, propositions are potentially divisible in several senses. Let us

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[49] *In III De Anima*, lect. 11, §756.

[50] *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1229.

[51] Aquinas offers other examples at *In III De Anima*, lect. 11, §749; and *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §1229.

put the thesis of this section in another way: Aquinas holds that a self-evident proposition is one whose potential divisibility is only a divisibility into the subject and predicate, while propositions that are not self-evident are not only potentially divisible into subject and predicate but also divisible in other ways. The issue can be put more precisely: the potential divisibility of an actual unity of a self-evident proposition is exhausted by a division into subject and predicate terms, whereas there are other potencies or potential divisibilities that belong to the class of non-self-evident propositions. Or, to frame the issue as a question, one may ask: how is it the case that a non-self-evident proposition is potentially divisible in more ways than a self-evident proposition?

In answering this question, we should recall that for Aquinas all propositions falling within a science are subject–predicate propositions whose truth is either demonstrable or self-evident. Every proposition of a science falls into one of these two classes, and no proposition is in both.[52] Non-self-evident propositions within a science are related to self-evident ones as conclusions derived either from self-evident propositions or from derived conclusions that are themselves derived from self-evident propositions. Thus, there are two kinds of propositions within a science—those that are demonstrable, and those that are indemonstrable or self-evident.[53] Let us call propositions that are derived from others P2 propositions, and underived self-evident propositions P1 propositions. In every science S, there are two kinds of propositions—P1s and P2s. P1s are self-evidently true in virtue of themselves. P2s are true in virtue of P1s, that is, they are derived, ultimately, from P1s. As is well known, Aquinas inherits the Aristotelian view that the propositions of a science can be organized syllogistically, where premises, some of which are P1 propositions,

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[52] See *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, sed cont. 2 (Mand., 93); *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3 (Mand., 98); *De Virt. in Comm.*, q. 1, a. 12, c.; *ST* I-II, q. 57, a. 2, c.

[53] It should be noted that having the feature of indemonstrablity is not a sufficient condition for self-evidence, for many propositions are indemonstrable without being self-evident, as is the case with contingent propositions and false propositions. However, within the class of scientific propositions, the class of indemonstrable propositions is identical with the class of self-evident propositions.

cause conclusions or P2 propositions. When self-evident P1 propositions serve this role in a science, Aquinas designates them as first principles (*principia prima*) in virtue of this efficient causal role they serve in producing conclusions in the organized syllogistic body of propositions of a science.[54]

The difference between P1s and P2s in a science can be approached by examining the way that the subject and predicate terms respectively belong to one another. In P2s, because they are demonstrated conclusions, the subject belongs to the predicate in virtue of a third term—the scientific middle term of the syllogism. That is, even though a P2 proposition—a conclusion—is an actual unity constituted by the intellect in indivisible time in the act of understanding, as a P2 proposition it is potentially divisible into the propositions (that is, premises) that generate it. In contrast, the predicate in a self-evident proposition belongs to the subject in virtue of no other term. The relationship of the subject and predicate of a self-evident proposition simply cannot be shown to obtain scientifically in virtue of other propositions of the science. Aquinas, following Aristotle, will often call self-evident propositions immediate propositions (*propositiones immediatae*) in order to highlight the fact that the unity of subject and predicate does not obtain in virtue of some other term.[55] In other words, Aquinas contends that all conclusions within a science are actual unities that are potentially divisible into subject and predicate and potentially divisible into the prior premises that generate the conclusion. In contrast, all self-evident propositions are only potentially divisible into subject and predicate, and they are not potentially divisible into other propositions of that science.

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[54] At times Aquinas is more detailed in his account of when self-evident principles are designated as *principia prima*. He identifies two senses in which the principles are first, by stating that these principles are known in two ways. They are known as that from which other things follow, as well as that which does not exist through another. See *ST* I, q. 33, a. 4, c.

[55] A comment from John of St. Thomas is helpful in this regard: "Since every self-evident proposition is immediate, its nature is explained negatively by saying that it is immediate [that is, free from dependence upon any middle term], and positively by saying that it is self-evident"; *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas: Basic Treatises*, trans. Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), 461.

That a self-evident proposition does not have the potencies of a conclusion within a science is explained by Aquinas in an important text from his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*:

> (T4) A proposition is one not only actually, but potentially, when it is immediate. For if it is mediate, then although it is actually one, because one thing is predicated of one thing, nevertheless it is many things in potency, because when a middle is taken, two propositions are formed. In the same way, a line that is actually one, inasmuch as it is continuous, is several in potency, inasmuch as it is divisible at an intermediate point (*est una propositio non solum actu, sed etiam potentia, quando est immediata. Si enim sit mediata, quamvis sit una in actu, quia unum praedicatur de uno, tamen est multa in potentia, quia accepto medio formantur duae propositiones. Sicut etiam linea, quae est una in actu in quantum est continua, est tamen multa in potentia, in quantum est divisibilis per punctum medium*).[56]

The claim that a self-evident proposition is both actually and potentially one, in contrast to a non-self-evident or demonstrable proposition that is actually one yet potentially two propositions, is an important one for our present investigation, for we have suggested above that all propositions are actually unities, but that the different kinds of potencies of the actual unity of the proposition allow us to distinguish between self-evident and non-self-evident propositions of a science. A non-self-evident proposition has more potencies than a self-evident one, for the former is potentially two propositions in light of the scientific middle term. In contrast, the potential divisibility of a P1 self-evident proposition in a science cannot consist in being divided into two propositions; rather, its potential divisibility is exhausted in the division or reduction into subject and predicate.[57]

The fact that a self-evident principle's potential divisibility is exhausted by the analysis into subject and predicate, in contrast to the analysis of a P2 proposition into other propositions, leads Aquinas to

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[56] *In I Post. An.*, lect. 36, §317. Emphasis mine.

[57] The potencies belonging to an individual P1 proposition within a science should be distinguished from the potencies belonging to the self-evident P1 propositions taken as a whole within that science. That is, Aquinas will often state that self-evident propositions of a science, taken together, potentially contain all of the conclusions of that science. The conclusions of a science are contained "implicitly, and in a certain way, potentially (*implicite, et quodammodo in potentia*)" in the first principles of a science. See *De Ver.*, q. 11, a. 3, c. See also *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 11, c.; *SCG* I , cap. 57.

speak of the self-evident proposition at times as a simple indivisible (*simplex indivisibilis*)[58] and indivisible unity (*unum indivisibile*).[59] Additionally, the potential divisibility of a self-evident proposition is at issue when Aquinas speaks of such a proposition as an indivisible proposition (*propositio individua*)[60] and a most simple proposition (*propositio simplicissima*).[61] The actual unity of the self-evident proposition and its restricted divisibility to subject and predicate is reflected by Aquinas in epistemic discussions as well, for he describes the cognition of self-evident propositions as an act of simple reception (*simplicem acceptationem*)[62] and absolute and simple acceptance (*absoluta et simplex acceptio*).[63]

Other key expressions complete Aquinas's account, for he will contend that a self-evident proposition is known immediately (*statim*) upon the cognition of its terms.[64] The term *statim* here should not be taken in a temporal sense; rather, it serves to indicate the unity of subject and predicate is achieved without the presence of another term or proposition. Often Aquinas underscores this point by describing the cognition of self-evident principles as a cognition that is brought about without comparison (*sine collatione*),[65] without examination (*sine inquisitione*),[66] or without investigation (*absque investigatione*).[67] One is mistaken if one takes these expressions to suggest that self-evident principles must be those comprehended with facility, or that the apprehension of the terms of self-evident propositions is an easy task. Rather, expressions such as *sine collatione* and *sine inquisitione* indicate merely that the cognition of self-evident principles as self-evident does not require that one gather or examine other premises or terms, but that the terms of the self-evident proposition itself

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[58] *In I Post. An.*, lect. 36, §317.
[59] *In I Post. An.*, lect. 36, §318.
[60] *In II Metaph.*, lect. 4, §325.
[61] *In I Post. An.*, lect. 36, §318.
[62] *ST* I, q. 83, a. 4, c.
[63] *In I Post. An.*, lect. 36, §318.
[64] See T1 above and its parallels.
[65] *ST* I, q. 83, a. 4, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 1, c.; *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2 (Mand., 105).
[66] *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, c. (Mand., 94); *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, ad 2 (see vol. 8 of *Opera Omnia*, ed. Stanislaus Fretté and Paulus Maré [Paris: Vivès, 1873], 56); *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2 (Mand., 105); *In II Sent.*, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, c. (Mand., 996); *De Ver.*, q. 16, a. 1, c.
[67] *ST* I, q. 79, a. 12, c.

suffice for its cognition.[68] Aquinas emphasizes that a self-evident proposition has no foundation in other propositions or terms and that the proposition is certified by the intellect alone (*et solu intellectu certificantur*).[69] In other words, the unity of the self-evident principle and its lack of potency apart from the possible divisibility into subject and predicate preclude its demonstration by other scientific premises. The actual unity of a self-evident proposition as cognized by an intellect is underscored as well by Aquinas's contention that self-evident propositions are cognized "by simple intuition (*simplici intuitu*)."[70]

We find evidence for our account here in the insight of a commentator who suggests briefly that conclusions in a science can be said to have a privation. The commentator writes: "To be demonstrable entails a privation. Because they are evident in themselves, self-evident propositions do not have this privation."[71] Elsewhere, the same commentator remarks, "If something is demonstrable it suffers privation, since it lacks evidence and must find such evidence in premises. Self-evident propositions do not suffer this privation, since they are evident in themselves."[72] While such a claim is not contrary to the position outlined here, the present account is arguably more faithful to the text of Aquinas. By speaking of the potencies of all propositions falling under a science, rather than simply identifying a privation that belongs to demonstrated propositions of a science, we have shown that Aquinas's discussions of the kinds of potencies possessed by the demonstrable and indemonstrable or self-evident propositions of a Thomistic science should be seen in light of Aquinas's account of the human intellect's production of potentially divisible

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[68] No discursion is required in the apprehension of a self-evident proposition, since is no need to turn to other premises. Aquinas highlights this feature of the cognition of self-evident propositions by stating that "we apprehend first principles without motion" (*immobiliter apprehendimus prima principia*). See *ST* I, q. 64, a. 2, c. The contrast is with the cognition of conclusions through premises, which is a cognition *mobiliter*.

[69] *In I Metaph.*, lect. 16, §247.

[70] Texts include: *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, c. (Mand., 122); *In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, c. (Moos, 1178); *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 15, c.; *ST* I, q. 59, a. 1, ad 1; *ST* II-II, q. 180, a. 6, ad 2.

[71] Edward D. Simmons, "Demonstration and Self-Evidence," *The Thomist* 24 (1961): 150.

[72] Edward D. Simmons, *The Scientific Art of Logic: An Introduction to the Principles of Formal and Material Logic* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1961), 283.

unities in the act of understanding. Knowledge of the subject and predicate terms is the necessary and sufficient condition of understanding a self-evident proposition because a self-evident proposition is not potentially divisible into anything other than its subject and predicate terms.

II

We have seen above that Aquinas identifies knowledge of the terms of a self-evident proposition as the sufficient and necessary condition for knowing that a self-evident proposition is true. In the service of explicating the T1 definition, we identified some distinctions upon which Aquinas divides knowledge of terms from knowledge of propositions. In the present section, several additional explicit reasons offered in defense of the T1 definition of self-evidence will be examined.

To begin with, one of the most often-cited reasons for the definition of T1 in the Thomistic corpus is the following:

> (T5) Self-evident principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, because the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject (*principia per se nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti*).[73]

With the first part of this text, we have the familiar articulation found in T1 above, where it was suggested that cognition_2 is founded upon cognition_1 in the apprehension of self-evident propositions. However, the evidence furnished for the veracity of this definition is significant, for the T1 account is held to be the case from the fact that in a self-evident proposition the predicate is contained in the definition (*definitio*) of the subject. This explanation, which forms the second part of T5, is a frequent description of self-evidence found in the writings of Aquinas, and for this reason deserves some examination.[74] The condition that the predicate of a self-evident proposition is part of the definition of the subject term suggests that self-evident propositions are propositions articulating at least part of a definition in

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[73] *ST* I, q. 17, a. 3, ad 2.

[74] See, for instance, *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 5, §595. Compare also *SCG* I, cap. 10; *ST* I, q. 19, a. 3, c.; *In Psalmas*, 13.1.

propositional form. Aquinas appears to accept the traditional understanding of scientific definitions as composed of genus and specific difference. Thus, Aquinas's examples of self-evident propositions are often statements in which the predicate identifies either the genus or the specific difference of a subject:

(A) A human being is an animal (*homo est animal*).[75]

(B) A triangle is a figure (*triangulus est figura*).[76]

(C) An isosceles is a triangle (*isosceles est triangulus*).[77]

(D) A human being is rational (*homo est rationale*).[78]

(E) All right angles are equal (*omnis recti anguli sunt aequales*).[79]

With these five examples of explicit self-evident propositions offered by Aquinas, we have propositions falling into two classes, for the predicate in each proposition identifies part of the definition—either the genus (cases A–C) or the specific difference (cases D and E) of the nature that is represented by the subject term. We must ask, however, whether all of Aquinas's examples of self-evidence neatly fall into these two classes. Do predications of genus and species of a subject exhaust the types of self-evident or *per se nota* propositions identified by Aquinas? Perhaps one should pay heed to a variation that Aquinas gives of the T5 definition. The following description of self-evidence, as it appears throughout the Thomistic corpus, closely parallels T5 with the substitution of one word:

> (T6) Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the *ratio* of the subject (*quaelibet propositio dicitur per se nota, cuius praedicatum est de ratione subiecti*).[80]

We see that T6 differs from T5 insofar as the term *ratio* or intelligibility stands in for the term *definitio*. Indeed, this formulation, with

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[75] *ST* I, q. 2, a. 1, c.; *In I Post. An.*, lect. 36, §314; *In I Post. An.*, lect. 43, §392. Compare *De Ver.*, q. 23, a. 4, ad 1; *SCG* I, cap. 10.

[76] *In I Post. An.*, lect. 43, §392.

[77] *In I Post. An.*, lect. 36, §314.

[78] *ST* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.

[79] *In I Post. An.*, lect. 5, §50.

[80] *ST* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.

ratio instead of *definitio*, is quite common in the Thomistic corpus.[81] In this text and others, Aquinas contends that self-evident propositions are those in which the predicate is part of the intelligibility of the subject. Perhaps the term *ratio* is used instead of *definitio* to expand the types of basic, essential predications beyond those involving genus and species, and thus to enlarge the criterion by which propositions are classified as self-evident. The expression *ratio* may indicate that a broader class of essential predicates—beyond mere articulations of genera or species—can form self-evident propositions. Indeed, Aquinas will explicitly identify as self-evident certain propositions that do not easily fall under the description of articulations of genera or species. For example, we find:

> (F) A given line can be cut in two halves (*lineam datam contingit secari in duo media*).[82]
>
> (G) Obedience is to be given to God (*Deo esse obediendum*).[83]
>
> (H) No quantity is a substance (*nulla quantitas est substantia*).[84]
>
> (I) There is not yet any mutation when that which is to change is wholly and in all its parts still in the terminus from which it changes (*illud quod mutatur, quando est secundum totum et partes in termino a quo mutatur nondum mutatur secundum illam mutationem*).[85]
>
> (J) Something is not being changed, but already has been changed, when it is in the terminus to which (*quod quando est in termino ad quem, non mutatur mutatum est*).[86]
>
> (K) The whole cannot be in both the termini nor in either of them (*non potest esse nec in utroque totum, nec in neutro*).[87]
>
> (L) The nature of the rational soul is to be incorruptible (*naturam animae rationalis non esse orruptibilem*).[88]

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[81] *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 11; *In XI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §2210; *In I Post. An.*, lect. 5, §50; *In I Post. An.*, lect. 7, §67; *ST* I, q. 1, a. 2, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 12, c.; *De Hebd.*, lect. 1, §15; *De Hebd.*, lect. 1, §18.

[82] *In I De Cael. et Mund.*, lec. 9, §97.

[83] *De Ver.*, q. 16, a. 1, ad 9.

[84] *SCG* I, cap. 71; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 4, ad. 11. Compare *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 2, obj. 1, ad 1.

[85] *In VI Phys.*, lect. 5, §800.

[86] *In VI Phys.*, lect. 5, §800.

[87] *In VI Phys.*, lect. 5, §800.

[88] *De Pot.*, q. 5, a. 3, ad 7.

(M) Each thing is indivisible in relation to itself (*unumquodque est indivisibile ad seipsum*).[89]

With these examples, we find predicates that do not seem to be parts of the definition of the subject, at least when articulations of the definition are restricted to predications of genus or species. However, it can be argued that the predicates in these examples indicate essential features of the subject, or even further, that there are different kinds of definitions.

III

Among the several ways proposed by Aquinas for dividing the entire class of self-evident propositions, arguably the most controversial is the twofold division into self-evident propositions that are known in themselves and to us (*per se nota secundum se et quoad nos*) and those that are known in themselves yet not to us (*per se nota secundum se et non quoad nos*). At times Aquinas refers to this distinction as a division between a proposition that is *per se nota secundum se* and one that is *per se nota quoad nos*.[90] This division is perhaps best known in the context of Aquinas's natural theology, for in analysis of the proposition *Deus est*, Aquinas contends that such a proposition is indeed self-evident in itself, but it is not knowable as self-evident to human beings on earth because they do not know the essence of God in such a way as to form its definition or cognize that the divine essence is identical to divine existence.[91] The apprehension of the self-evidence of the proposition is reserved to the divine mind itself as well as to the blessed in heaven who enjoy a supernatural expansion of their intellectual powers.[92] Thus, those on earth, depending on

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[89] *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 17, §1654.

[90] Synonymous expressions used by Aquinas for a *per se nota secundum se* proposition are *per se nota simpliciter* (*SCG* I, cap. 11), *per se nota in se* (*De Trin.*, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6), *per se nota de se* (*De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 11).

[91] Representative texts include: *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, c. (Mand., 94); *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 12, c.; *De Trin.*, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6; *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 11; *SCG* I, cap. 11; *ST* I, q. 2, a. 1, c. One scholar has argued persuasively that these texts from the Thomistic corpus are more felicitously understood when approached as defenses of the proposition *Deus est* as *per se nota secundum se*, rather than as dismissals of *Deus est* as *per se nota quoad nos*. See Herwi Rikhof, "Aquinas and the *Ratio Anselmi*: A Theo-Logical Analysis of Aquinas' Criticism," *Archivio di Filosofia* 58 (1990): 137–59.

[92] Compare *De Trin.*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5; *De Trin.*, q. 2, a. 2, c.

their natural cognitive powers alone, must resort to proving the existence of God by means of *quia* or imperfectly scientific proofs that take their origin from an analysis of divine effects. There is, however, some controversy regarding this distinction between propositions self-evident in themselves and propositions self-evident to us. To begin, there are some interpreters who consider the distinction to be an original theoretical achievement with Aquinas, while other scholars locate the distinction in Aristotelian texts.[93] Aquinas's alleged paternity over the distinction at least should not be taken to mean that the distinction has no intellectual ancestry, for, as we shall see, Aquinas often credits Boethius for this manner of dividing the class of self-evident propositions. A larger controversy, however, consists in the fact that the legitimacy of Aquinas's very distinction between propositions that are self-evident in themselves and those self-evident to us would be questioned in the fourteenth century by such figures as Duns Scotus and his followers.[94] Furthermore, in the seventeenth century the Thomistic commentator John of St. Thomas could report of "more recent individuals" who find Aquinas's distinction to be without merit.[95] It is to this distinction that we presently turn.

To begin, it should be noted that Aquinas appears to shift regularly between two senses of "self-evident to us" in his distinction between the proposition *per se nota secundum se* and the proposition *per se nota quoad nos*. I suspect that not enough attention has been paid to the two ways in which Aquinas uses the expression *per se nota quoad nos*. In short, the expression "to us" or *quoad nos* can have two distinct references. On the one hand, often the expression "to us" of *per se nota quoad nos* can refer to a subset or portion of the whole

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[93] For the former, see Tuninetti, *Per Se Notum: Die logische Beschaffenheit des Selbsverständlichen*, 18–9. For the latter, see Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 211–2; Moltmann, "Per Se Notum," 264; and Matthew R. Cosgrove, "Thomas Aquinas on Anselm's Argument," *Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1974): 516.

[94] See Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 2, §23 (*Opera Omnia*, vol. 2, ed. P. Carolus Balic [Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950], 136; E. P. Bos, "A Scotistic Discussion of *Deus Est* as a *Propositio Per Se Nota*. Edition with Introduction," *Vivarium* 33 (1995): 197–234; E. P. Bos, "*Deus* Est. A Scotistic Discussion of *Deus Est* as a Self-Evident Proposition," in *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth–XIVth Century)*, ed. Constantino Marmo (Brussels: Brepols, 1997), 409–25.

[95] John of St. Thomas, *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas*, 463.

class of human beings. In this way, a proposition is self-evident to those individuals who possess some intellectual habituation that allows them to know the terms of a particular self-evident proposition. In other words, those unfamiliar with the subject matter of a particular science lack the intellectual habits to allow them to know the self-evident propositions of that science. Borrowing an example from Boethius, Aquinas suggests that some human beings who do not possess training in metaphysics do not know what angels are, and for them the propositions "an angel is not by extension in place (*angelus . . . non est circumscriptive in loco*),"[96] or "incorporeal substances are not in place (*incorporalia in loco non esse*)"[97] are not cognized by them as self-evident.[98] However, one trained in metaphysics cognizes the proposition as self-evident, for one can see that the meaning of incorporeal is to lack place, or that an angel is by definition an incorporeal being.[99] Thus, with these examples, we see that the first sense of *quoad nos* designates a special subclass of human beings, namely, those who have particular scientific habits that allow them to know

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[96] *ST* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.

[97] *ST* I, q. 2, a. 1, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 12, c.; *De Hebd.*, lect. 1, §18.

[98] Boethius identifies the proposition "those things incorporeal are not in place (*quae incorporalia in loco non esse*)" as a common conception of the soul (*conceptio communis animi*) in his theological tractate *De Hebdomadibus / Quomodo Substantiae* I. See Boethuis, *The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universtity Press, 1997), 40. In other texts, Boethius uses the expression *propositio per se nota* to refer to self-evident propositions. Compare *De Topicis Differentiis* 1.1176c. Aquinas will often cite other examples of Boethius, including, "If from two equals you subtract equals, equals remain (*si duobus equalibus equalia auferas quae relinquntur equalia esse*)." See Boethius, *De Hebdomadibus/Quomodo Substantiae*, 1; *De Topicis Differentiis* 1.1176d. For Thomistic appeals to Boethius, see *ST* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.; *De Hebd.*, lect. 1, §17; *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 5, §595. The proposition concerning equals may be inherited from Euclidean tradition. See Kevin L. Flannery, *Acts Amid Precepts: The Aristotelian Logical Structure of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 36. Aquinas explicitly identifies the geometrical origin of this principle at *In XI Metaph.*, lect. 4, §2208–10.

[99] It should be noted that the designation of the proposition "an angel is not by extension in place" as self-evident does not serve as a prohibition for giving reasons for the truth of the proposition. It is true that self-evident propositions do not admit of scientific demonstration, but a dialectical explanation of the terms can be of assistance in learning the self-evidence of the proposition. For instance, evidence for the self-evidence of this proposition is offered by Aquinas when he suggests that an angel is not a body. Compare *ST* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.

the terms of the propositions of a given science. Thus, in this first use of *quoad nos*, Aquinas merely distinguishes between two classes of human intellects on the basis of intellectual habituation; that is, the classes that can be distinguished of that of the wise (*sapientes*), on the one hand, and that of the unwise (*rudes*, *vulga*), on the other.[100] To those of us who belong to the latter class with respect to a science, the self-evident propositions of that discipline will not be self-evident. Thus, this first sense of *quoad nos* is used by Aquinas to designate particular individuals who happen not to have certain natural intellectual perfections whose absence prevents them from cognizing certain self-evident propositions precisely as self-evident.

However, Aquinas uses the expression *quoad nos* in another sense. In this second way he is not trying to distinguish between human knowers who have certain natural intellectual habits and those who lack them; rather, he makes certain claims about human nature as such. In this second sense, *quoad nos* is taken to refer to human nature or, at least, to human beings taken collectively. Thus, when Aquinas says that the proposition *Deus est* is self-evident in itself yet not to us, he is arguing that the intelligibility of the proposition is not available to the natural cognitive grasp of human beings taken as a species. He is precisely not subdividing the human class of knowers on the basis of the accidental quality of possessing particular scientific habits, like that of metaphysics; rather, he is identifying propositions whose intelligibility must be grasped in some way other than as self-evident in this life, as occurs in the case of the cognition of *quia* scientific proofs for the existence of God. This is not to say that the proposition *Deus est* cannot be grasped by intellects that are not bound by the restrictions of human natural capacities; the divine intellect and human beings who have been supernaturally transformed in the afterlife may cognize the proposition *Deus est* as self-evident.

Thus we see that the expression *quoad nos* admits of two senses. Aquinas uses the first sense when he intends the expression *per se nota secundum se et quoad nos* to refer to self-evident propositions that are cognized by a subset of human intellects who have actuated

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[100] *ST* I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.; *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 12, c.; *De Concordantiis Suiipsius*, cap. 1. A modern writer formulates this doctrine as, "What is self-evident need not be evident at once, or to everybody; the intelligible is intelligible only to the intelligent." See H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 193.

certain natural scientific habits, and thus cognize propositions such as "an angel is not by extension in place." It is in this first sense of *quoad nos* that Aquinas appears to be an heir to the Boethian doctrine. The second sense is operative when Aquinas uses the expression *per se nota secundum se et non quod nos* to make claims about the limitations of the natural cognitive powers of human nature or the human species.

We may ask, therefore, wherein lies the advantage of Aquinas's distinction between *per se nota secundum se et quoad nos* and *per se nota secundum se et non quoad nos*, and further, wherein lies the advantage of the two senses of *quoad nos*? We can begin by agreeing with one commentator that a proposition that is self-evident in the first sense of *secundum se* is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being self-evident in the second sense of self-evident *quoad nos*.[101] Further, in the first sense of *quoad nos*, Aquinas's distinction cannot be controversial, for at a minimum it asserts the fact that some have knowledge while others do not. The second sense of *quoad nos* is perhaps more interesting, for it includes a claim about the cognitive limitations of human beings considered in light of a specific nature. Thus, this second sense of *quoad nos* is used to argue for a class of self-evident propositions that are not cognizable as self-evident in this life. Indeed, there appear to be some clearly identifiable benefits to this distinction. First, appeals to both senses of *quoad nos* serve to underscore very directly Aquinas's definition of self-evidence examined above, for as was seen, Aquinas contends that the necessary and sufficient condition for the cognition of a proposition as self-evident is a cognition of the subject and predicate terms. The cognition of the subject and predicate terms of the propositions of a particular science presupposes the existence of the cognitive habit of that science in the cognizer. Second, the *secundum se/quoad nos* distinction serves as one part of Aquinas's larger schema, in which self-evident propositions are classified according to what kinds of habits are required for their cognition by human agents. In the context of his natural theology, the Angelic Doctor uses the *secundum se/quoad nos* distinction to identify a class of self-evident propositions that are not cognizable by human beings in virtue of their natural cognitive powers. Such a distinction, in addition to underscoring his definition of self-evidence asserting the requirement of the cognition of terms, serves as the ba-

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[101] See Tuninetti, *Per Se Notum: Die logische Beschaffenheit des Selbstverständlichen*, 16–17.

sis upon which to divide theoretical sciences. Aquinas's theory of divisions of the demonstrative theoretical sciences requires that sciences be demarcated not only by the differences of subject matter but also by the cognitive acts or intellectual habits required to understand the subject matter. Thus, by classifying propositions into the divisions of *per se nota secundum se et quoad nos* and *per se nota secundum se et non quoad nos*, Aquinas lays the theoretical foundation for a distinction between theological and philosophical sciences, which is required for dividing natural theology from sacred theology, or, arguably, moral theology from philosophical ethics. Indeed, in addition to being a claim about the limits of human knowledge, the *secundum se/quoad nos* distinction provides a key claim concerning the divisions of the sciences.

IV

The present paper has examined a number of descriptions of self-evidence set forth by Aquinas. A self-evident proposition is an actual unity produced by the intellect in indivisible time whose potential divisibility is exhausted by the separation into subject and object. The propositions of a science that are not self-evident have potencies not possessed by self-evident propositions, for conclusions within a science are potentially the premises that generate them. Aquinas defends an account of self-evident propositions where knowledge of the subject and predicate terms (cognition_1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for cognition of the proposition as a whole (cognition_2). The veracity of cognition_2 is an extension of the veracity of cognition_1, and without cognition_1, no apprehension of self-evident propositions as self-evident is possible. The Thomistic division of the class of self-evident propositions into those that are self-evident in themselves and those that are self-evident in themselves and to us hinges on the ability to secure cognition_1 of the terms of self-evident propositions. However, the achievement of this cognition presupposes the presence of particular intellectual habits on the part of the cognizer, without which the proposition cannot be grasped precisely as self-evident.

Given Aquinas's requirement that a variety of intellectual habits is required to achieve cognition_1 in various contexts, I propose that the designation self-evident (*per se nota*) itself should be viewed as an incomplete expression. That is, every designation of a proposition as self-evident must always be supplemented with a reference to the

precise intellectual habit required to attain the act of cognition$_1$. Indeed, the designation of "*Deus est*" as self-evident is complete only when it supplemented with an account of the particular intellectual habit that is added to the human intellect in the afterlife. This instance of a declaration of a proposition's self-evidence, and the identification of a specific intellectual habit required for the achievement of cognition$_1$ to grasp the terms of the self-evident proposition, should not be treated as a unique procedure in Aquinas's presentation of self-evidence. When Aquinas designates a proposition as *per se nota secundum se et quoad nos*, the *quoad nos* indicates a wide variety of possibilities that must be narrowed down for a particular proposition, and doing so requires an examination of the particular intellectual perfection whose possession is required for the cognizer to achieve cognition$_1$ of terms that leads to cognition$_2$ of the proposition. It should be seen that the designation *quoad nos* in Aquinas's account is at best a generic designation that admits of a more precise specification according to the habits by which the proposition is in fact capable of being cognized as self-evident. Aquinas can give different accounts of the class of self-evident propositions in different contexts, when different sets of intellectual habits are presupposed for the discussion, and in this sense there are manifold senses of self-evidence for Aquinas.[102]

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[102] I would like to thank John Jones, Richard Taylor, James South, Owen Goldin, Thomas Prendergast, Michelle Ruggaber, Larry Masek, and John Simmons for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF

BONDELI, Martin. *Kantianismus und Fichteanismus in Bern: Zur philosophischen Geistesgeschichte der Helvetik sowie zur Entstehung des nachkantischen Idealismus.* Basel: Schwabe and Co., 2001. 419 pp. Cloth, €47.50—On the background of this book on essence and development of Swiss philosophy lie the universalistic ideas of the "République des lettres" in its capacity of an ideal, nonofficial institution charged with the task of running philosophical endeavors and reconstructing its history. Such a general goal, which is supernational, is bent according to national, particular needs; that is, according to issues that are related to the specific "nature" of a certain nation, or to specific cultural heritages or traditions of teaching. For instance, the Swiss remake of Diderot and d'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*, edited by Fortunato Barolomeo De Felice between 1770 and 1780, tried to adapt the original work to the context of Protestant Switzerland, thus taking considerable distance from the cosmopolitan approach of the French editors. Bondeli's book is concerned with a Europe-wide dimension on which the variety of national traditions interact with a set of background tendencies, whose more or less explicit aim during the nineteenth century was to direct the workings of the historians of philosophy toward opening up, defending, and reevaluating a country's specific national identity by means of a massive institutionalization of historic-philosophical studies. France and Germany, facing each other alongside the Rhine, took a center-stage position in this process, which had nonetheless a bearing also in England and in countries, such as Spain and Switzerland, that were more at the margins of philosophical geography. Bondeli presents as the oldest document testifying to Kant's reception in Switzerland a reference to the so-called Kantian scope of the kinds of representation (*Kantischer Stufenleiter der Vorstellungsarten*) sketched by Christian Gottfried Schütz (1761–1800) in his famous review in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* of 12 and 30 July 1785 of Johann Schultz's *Erläuterungen.* The quote appears on the margin of a student transcript from the course on *Logica theoretica* given by the Bernese philosopher Johann Ith (1747–1813) starting with 1783. One should notice that Ith's logic course is still completely Leibnizian in both method and content,

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*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

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only the quote is Kantian. The hand that wrote it was that of Abraham Friedrich von Mutach (1765–1831), a student of Ith's at Bern, who then switched to Göttingen, where he received his degree in 1789. Bondeli does not have any supporting evidence to provide a closer dating of this quote. However, he suggests 1785, the publication year of Schütz's review, as *terminus a quo*, and the end of Mutach's student years in 1789, as *terminus ad quem*.

Bondeli delves into Ith's philosophic production with great detail (pp. 23–52). Ith delivers a psychologistical interpretation of Kant. In fact, he places the contents of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* before the exposition of the logic itself. He considers Kant's critical philosophy as a prodeutic (*Präliminarlehre*), because cognition comes before thinking. As a matter of fact, Ith follows very closely post-Kantian logicians such as Carl Leonhard Reinhold, Johann Heinrich Abicht, and Johann Gottfried Carl Christian Kiesewetter. Ith is also the author of an anthropology that shows Kantian influences. Bondeli then considers Ith's direct disciple and fellow disseminator of Kantian doctrines, Philipp Albert Stapfer (1766–1840), who was the author of a philosophy of history occasioned by the rebirth of the Helvetian Republic in 1797 (pp. 155–255). Connected to Ith and Stapfer is also the question of the contacts that the young Hegel might have had during his stay at Berna and Tschugg in 1793 and 1794. While the question regarding Hegel's contacts is still open, we know much more about Fichte's stay in Zürich in the Spring of 1794, when he delivered the lectures of the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo* in the house of Johann Kasper Lavater. In Bern, Fichte was welcomed by his German friend, Jens Baggesen (1764–1826), a Fichtean in philosophy (pp. 259–82), and from his disciple, Johann Rudolf Steck (1772–1805), also a Fichtean (pp. 283–369). This is a very learned book. Bondeli provides a very instructive contribution to the understanding of the essence and development of Swiss philosophy.—Riccardo Pozzo, *University of Verona*.

Bos, E. P., Editor. *Logica Modernorum in Prague about 1400: The* Sophistria *Disputation* "Quoniam Quatuor". Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 82. Boston: Brill, 2004. xvi + 488 pp. Cloth, $167.00—This is a reproduction of an anonymous tract preserved in Kracow's Jagiellonian Library. Written sometime after 1396, the tract is a specimen of the art of *sophistria*, or sophistic arguments, and it covers the following main topics: *sophistria* as a science, signification, syncategorematic terms, supposition, ampliation, restriction, complex significables, the significate of a proposition, mediate and immediate terms, propositions with a comparative or superlative term, and exceptive, exclusive and reduplicative propositions. The tract is divided into two uneven parts, the first of which consists of 100 questions, the second consisting of eighteen questions. Also included is a partial reconstruction of the *Logica* by *Thomas of Cleves* as appendix I. What follows is a brief summary of the main sections as provided by the editor (p. 27).

In the first section (bk. 1, qq. 1–13), our anonymous author discusses *sophistria* as an art. Like other authors who wrote *sophistria*, the author first shows that *sophistria* is a demonstrative science, not indeed in the sense that one is taught how to make sophistical arguments, but a science in the sense that knowledge about sophistical arguments is taught through demonstrations (qq. 1–3). In the subsequent questions on this topic, he makes a number of distinctions, for example, between a new and an old division of *sophistrie* (q. 5), between *sophistria utens* and *docens* (q. 6), and between *scientia realis* and *scientia rationis* (q. 10), ultimately identifying the science in question as a *scientia rationis*. He ends this section by identifying the ways in which the four causes pertain to this science (q. 13). Unfortunately, a number of lines are missing in these questions, making it impossible to identify some of the author's arguments which lead him to some of his positions. For example, in question 5, which asks whether the division of *sophistrie* into an older part and a newer part is suitable, only two arguments to the opposite are given; in question 6, which asks about the distinction between *utens* and *docens*, nothing but the question has survived, while in question 7, which asks whether the new logic of *sophistria* is distinct from the other parts, only one opposing argument is given.

The second main section (bk. 1, qq. 14–37) covers signification and is heavily indebted to Peter of Spain's *Tractatus*. Distinctions include divisions into universal and specific signification (q. 15), natural and conventional signification (q. 16), first and second imposition (q. 17), essential and accidental signification (q. 21), univocal and equivocal signification (q. 22), absolute and relative signification (q. 23), material and formal signification (q. 24), concrete and abstract signification (q. 25), complex and simple signification (q. 27), signs that can be placed in a proposition and signs that can not be so placed, such as extramental things (q. 29), and divisions into categorical and syncategorematic terms (q. 32). As in the first section, though, a number of missing lines occasionally make it impossible to follow the arguments. To take just two examples, in question 14, only the initial arguments to the opposite survive, and in question 18, only one counterargument is preserved.

The third main section (bk. 1, qq. 38–84) treats the properties of terms. In the first three questions, our author first demonstrates the way in which supposition is the subject of a science (qq. 38–40). He then focuses on the definition of supposition (q. 41) and the difference between supposition and signification (qq. 42–8). Drawing on Thomas Manlevelt, he then treats each of the traditional divisions of supposition, namely material supposition (qq. 49–54), simple supposition (qq. 55–6) and personal supposition (qq. 57–66). After supposition, our author turns to the science of ampliation (qq. 68–72), restriction (qq. 73–8) and ends with a discussion of appellation (qq. 79–84).

The fourth and shortest section (bk. 1, qq. 85–8) covers complex significables and the significate of a proposition. Unfortunately, however, as in many other questions in this work, a sizeable number of missing lines make it difficult to follow our author's arguments (altogether, over forty-six lines are missing from these four questions alone).

The fifth main section (bk. 1, q. 89 to bk. 2, q. 16) is actually a commentary on Richard Billingham's *Mirror* (*Speculum puerorum*). As a prolegomena to question 89, our author identifies the subject of Billingham's work, the definition of a term, and whether terms are mediate or immediate. He then focuses on immediate substantive verbs (qq. 89–94). He ends book 1 with a treatment of expository syllogisms and exponible terms. In the second book, he covers demonstrative propositions which are immediately proven (bk. 2, q. 1), indefinite propositions (q. 2–8), particular affirmative propositions (q. 9), indefinite negative propositions (qq. 10–11), universal affirmative propositions (qq. 12–14) and universal negative propositions (qq. 15–16).

The last main section (bk. 2, qq. 16–17) is on consequences and is one of the shortest of the whole work. These two questions are most likely a commentary on either Manlevelt or Willaim of Suttons's work on consequences. Once again, though, a substantial number of lines are missing, making it difficult to follow all of our author's arguments.

In spite of all the missing lines, this work has a number of important features. To take just a few examples, when it comes to the proof of a proposition, following Billingham before him, he concentrates on singular propositions, as opposed to Aristotle's logic, which concentrates on universal propositions. Secondly, he distinguishes between essential and connotative signification and between univocal and synonymical signification, the former belonging to a single sign, the latter belonging to two or more signs that signify the same concept. Finally, he makes room for propositions with fictional terms.—Lloyd A. Newton, *Benedictine College.*

DE GROOT, Jean, Editor. *Nature in American Philosophy.* Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 42. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004. xx + 204 pp. Cloth, $54.95—This exceptional monograph, comprised of ten essays (which were presented originally by an international contingent of scholars in the Fall 2000 lecture series at The Catholic University of America) investigates the theme of nature in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American philosophy. Whereas the concept of nature is based in an illustrious tradition which can be traced to classical Greek philosophy, this work is unique in its examination of nature from a particularly American perspective. The essays emphasize the innovations of American philosophers in their keen awareness of the communal dimensions of nature, whereby society is understood to be a mediator between the whole of nature and the particular individuals within. Stimulated both by their inherited European tradition and by their personal experiences in the frontier, American thinkers envisioned nature in terms of common human goals. The work unfolds kaleidoscopically with some essays illuminating the intellectual background which inspired the American philosophers and other articles focusing upon their specific theoretic insights and contributions.

The first essay, Russell B. Goodman's "The Colors of the Spirit: Emerson and Thoreau on Nature and the Self," illustrates the manner in which American philosophy incorporated German idealism and emphasizes the transcendental aspect of nature, which for Emerson and Thoreau, continually is both mediated by and immersed with the human person.

In the second essay, "The World Beyond Our Mountains: Nature in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce," John Clendenning contends that Royce's desire to comprehend a reality which is transcendent of materialism results in his understanding of each person as being a part of the community of the cosmos wherein one's knowledge of nature is dependent upon social consciousness.

In the third essay, "Sense-Critical Realism: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Interpretation of C. S. Peirce's Theory of Reality and Truth," Karl-Otto Apel elucidates Peirce's unique philosophical contribution that emphasizes the need of a consensus of a scientific community which functions as the final determinant of the truth of propositions; such an "ultimate opinion" has the possibility of retaining a theory of truth without resorting to noumenal realities.

In the fourth essay, "Homegrown Positivism: Charles Darwin and Chauncey Wright," the author and editor of the book as a whole, Jean De Groot, explores the twin factors of Darwinism and scientific positivism which eventually succeeded idealism in American thought, particularly in the work of Wright, who following the European principles of scientific positivism and utilitarianism, vigorously affirmed the import of minimalist scientific accounts while retaining certain aspects of Aristotelian induction and teleology.

The fifth essay, "William James and German Naturalism" by Stefano Poggi, discloses James's contributions in developing the burgeoning field of modern psychology in terms of the reciprocal tensions existing between the scientific empiricism and the romantic idealism which were latent within German ideology.

In the sixth essay, "C. S. Peirce's Reclamation of Teleology," Vincent Colapietro demonstrates Peirce's objective to refute scientific materialism by attempting to reconcile elements of idealism and evolution. Pierce recognized evolutionary growth, conjectured the existence of temporally developing natural forms, and considered Nature itself to be an ordered whole which came into being from chaos.

The seventh essay, Harvey C. Mansfield's "Nature and Fact in Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*," contrasts the Tocquevillian conception of nature, which is grounded in spontaneity, with the classical Aristotelian view of nature as a teleological principle of motion. While not necessarily ideal, democracy is deemed to be "providential fact" which aims at an impossibly realized state of tranquility.

In the eighth essay, "Holmes on Natural Law," Robert P. George discusses the philosophic deficiencies of Oliver Wendell Holmes's moral skepticism, which regarded ethical values as being the product of psychological and sociological conventions, by contrasting the former Supreme Court Justice's potentially self-refuting account with the far more cogent position of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The ninth essay, Joseph Margolis's "Dewey's Metaphysics of Existence," asserts that Dewey's philosophy represents the authoritative form of pragmatism, which recognizes biological aspects of experience and maintains that all knowledge is relative to human purposes; Dewey's pragmatism maintains that nature is in a continuous state of fluxion and that all metaphysical and epistemological issues must be relativized accordingly.

In the tenth and final essay, "Perspectives on Nature in American Thought" (which is illustrated with examples of American art), Nicholas Rescher categorizes divergent American conceptions of nature, delineating the relationships of nature to both technology and the soul, and he advances the possibility of a pragmatically based, spiritual perspective in which nature and art coalesce into a harmonic unity.

In its illumination of the strengths and deficiencies of the metaphysical foundations which underlie the conception of nature and human nature in Anglo-American philosophy, this remarkable anthology helps remedy a conspicuous void in the continuing research of classical American philosophy and, with its comprehensive listing of bibliographic resources, invites further investigation concerning the contemporary understanding of the role of nature and its relationship to human community.—Douglas Commodore Fortner, *Xavier University.*

EPPERSON, Michael. *Quantum Mechanics and the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.* New York: Fordham University Press, 2004. xiv + 261 pp. Cloth, $55.00—The central claims of this book are that the philosophy of Whitehead and quantum mechanics are intimately linked, especially in their incompatibility with "materialism," and that each of these can illuminate the other. The first half of the book mainly summarizes aspects of quantum mechanics and gives brief accounts of opposing positions in current controversies. A short "interlude" between the main sections discusses basic features of Whitehead's cosmology. The second major part of the book considers a number of more or less technical aspects of Whitehead's mature system and explores their relationships to quantum theory. "The book was written for readers with varying familiarity with quantum mechanics and with Whitehead's philosophy—including no familiarity with either." Background needed to understand technical aspects of either physics or of Whitehead's philosophy are concisely reviewed in the text where needed. Needless to say, readers who have prior familiarity with one or both of these complex technical areas will find the present volume easier to read than will those who lack that advantage.

The author approves "a decidedly nonclassical concept, suggested by Heisenberg (and resurrected from Aristotle), that actuality and potentiality constitute two fundamental species of reality" (p. 8). "Potentialities of definiteness," designated "potentia," which are closely related to (if not identical with) Whitehead's "eternal objects," are central to this discussion.

Both physicists and philosophers have written much on "the measurement problem" of quantum mechanics. Adequate quantum-mechanical description of any system requires specification of several alternative potentia, along with probabilities associated with each of these. Schrödinger's famous cat, while concealed in its box, must be described as both alive and dead. However, any interaction of the system of interest with the rest of the world ("measurement") yields only one result. Opening the box produces either a live cat or a feline corpse. How can this be understood?

Several candidate resolutions of this conundrum now compete for supporters. Successor versions of Niels Bohr's "Copenhagen" interpretation and of David Bohm's "hidden variable" approach now vie with Stephen Adler's notion that quantum mechanics is itself an emergent phenomenon—an approximation that derives from an underlying dynamic level that has characteristics quite different from those of the quantum level. Another interpretation that has many adherents (including the author of this book) is "decoherence theory." This holds that only the universe as a whole may properly be considered as a "closed system"—the only sort of system to which (strictly speaking) quantum mechanics may be applied. Any and every portion of the universe (including each system usually treated by quantum mechanics) necessarily interacts with other portions. Such interactions "play a crucial conceptual and mechanical role in the elimination of superpositions of nonsensical interfering potentia (and potential histories) via negative selection and the resulting decoherence effect" (pp. 9–10). "The advantage of the decoherence-based interpretations of quantum mechanics is . . . that the process of negative selection entails the necessary integration of noninterfering potentia into sets of mutually exclusive and exhaustive, probability-valuated potential outcomes" (p. 95).

During his long academic career in England, Whitehead had been a frequent university lecturer on mathematical physics. He clearly was quite familiar with progress in physics during the first quarter of the twentieth century—statistical mechanics, relativity, and "the old quantum theory." It is less clear how closely he had followed developments in "the new quantum theory"—Schrödinger's wave mechanics, Heisenberg's matrix mechanics, and so forth. These fields mainly developed while Whitehead was at Harvard, and had been principally concerned with philosophical questions. This book interprets a number of passages from Whitehead's writings as indicating that he had close familiarity with then current developments at the frontier of physics, although he did not make explicit reference to specific names or achievements. In several cases the passages quoted may indicate convergent evolution of ideas rather than transfer of concepts. Either of these interpretations is consistent with a close relationship of Whiteheadian cosmology and quantum theory.

Whitehead's rejection of "scientific materialism" is warmly endorsed by this book. Whitehead is clear about the specific nature of the "scientific materialism" that he rejects. This book seems to apply the word "materialism" in a somewhat wider and less precise sense. Problems in the interpretation of quantum phenomena are ascribed to "materialistic"

presuppositions that may have been appropriate for classical systems but do not apply to quantum phenomena. This may be true as far as it goes, but some interpretations of "materialism" might also apply to points this book makes regarding relationships between actualities and potentia.

The last third of this book explores relationships between Whiteheadian philosophy and quantum mechanics in quite significant detail (including discussion of all nine Categorial Obligations!). Those who wish to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the author's positions will just have to get the book; no short review can do the discussion justice.—Joseph E. Earley, Sr., *Georgetown University.*

FLEW, Anthony. *Social Life and Moral Judgment.* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003. ix + 179 pp. Cloth $34.95—*Social Life and Moral Judgment* is not so much a single, sustained argument as a series of complaints against the welfare state, and especially the British welfare state. Its disparate character may derive from the fact that it brings together essays and articles originally published elsewhere. In any case, it combines both philosophical and empirical arguments against the welfare state and its supporters. At times those complaints are founded on a violation of the integrity of individual choice and responsibility, and at others on the consequences for society of welfare state policies.

The first two chapters of the book are largely a defense of individual freedom (and therefore responsibility) against those who would speak in the name of some sort of determinism. Professor Flew sees the urgency of this task to lie in the "general moral decline widely perceived to have been in progress for many years in both the UK and the USA" (p. 13), a claim for which he cites Robert Bork as providing evidence, at least in the United States. In particular, Professor Flew is concerned about sociobiologists, social scientists, and others who would remove individual responsibility by ascribing causal mechanisms to behavior. He distinguishes between physical and moral causality, arguing that the former may necessitate but the latter only incline behavior in one direction or another. His defense of this distinction relies on Locke's distinction between personal power of choice and physical power possessed by inanimate or unthinking objects.

Most of the following chapters are concerned with more specific social issues. In the third chapter, Professor Flew cites an overgenerous welfare assistance program as contributing to the demoralization of workers who have to pay for others to live as well as the rise in single motherhood and the decline of the family. He relies here, as elsewhere in the book, on the work of Charles Murray, and in particular on Murray's Law of Unintended Rewards, which posits, "Any social transfer increases the net value of being in the condition that prompted the transfer" (p. 31). Some may find this principle controversial, and indeed Murray is no stranger to controversy. He is the coauthor, it will be re-

called, of *The Bell Curve*, a book that suggests that there may be a hereditary basis for the failure of people of African descent to perform as well as those of European descent on intelligence tests.

The fourth chapter argues for more individual and less social responsibility regarding schooling and health care, a theme Professor Flew returns to in the last chapter, where he claims that a lack of moral education and of holding people responsible for their actions (for example, through lower incarceration rates) has helped raise the crime rate in Britain. I am not familiar with British incarceration rates, although in the United States the rate of incarceration has risen steadily over the past thirty years regardless of the ebb and flow of crime rates.

The fifth chapter argues against affirmative action and against animal rights. This might seem like an unlikely combination; however, the point that brings them together is that the moral community owes each of its members nondiscriminatory treatment. In the first case, he claims that affirmative action violates the principle of nondiscrimination. In the latter case, since what he calls "brutes" are not members of the moral community, although they might be accorded compassion, they do not possess any rights against discrimination.

The sixth chapter charges many who support the welfare state with insincerity, since sincerity requires minimally that one attend to the success of one's policies, be willing to change, and be efficient with resources. He cites several cases where he claims these criteria were not met. The seventh chapter argues that the charge that capitalism reduces all motives to selfishness neglects the complexity of motives of those who participate in capitalist enterprises. The eighth chapter is an argument against Rawls and his influence. Professor Flew claims that Rawls fails to define the concept of social justice for which he seeks the principles. One might reply here that Rawls's concept of social justice is defined as a matter of how the benefits and burdens of a society should be distributed, but this will not do. For Professor Flew, the term justice must be connected to the Platonic idea of everyone's getting their due, and he seems to think that there is no path from Rawls's definition to Plato's. Perhaps this is because Rawls provides no account of desert.

For those who find Robert Bork to be an acute observer of the contemporary scene, and Charles Murray a subtle statistician, this book will provide sustenance.—Todd May, *Clemson University*.

GINSBERG, Robert. *The Aesthetics of Ruins*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004. xx + 538 pp. Cloth, $144.00—Bibliographically, this book is outstanding. Ginsberg knows much and tells it all. The generous last chapter (pp. 449–538) contains solid commentaries on books, besides ample indexes of names, titles, and other clues. The illustrations are numerous, diverse in their cultural and geographic choice, and capably selected for their suggestiveness. More generally, the book is encyclopedically conceived: I can hardly remember a work in which sections on "cinema and

television as ruin," on music, literature, even nature as ruin coexist side-by-side with philosophical and aesthetic chapters, as well as with more predictable considerations on ruins in the narrower traditional sense: buildings, architecture, and the like.

Ginsberg's style is self-indulgent and usually amusing: it bursts every now and then in verse, is full of puns, playful, often witty, more than once irritating. The reader is certainly not faced with the habitual grave and heavy analytical style of professional aestheticians.

The reverse side of this procedure is soon noticed. The encyclopedic approach limits the systematic. Ginsberg's book cannot be praised for congruence and logic. Brilliant ideas are followed up to a point, and thereafter abandoned for other ideas, sometimes brilliant, sometimes not. One chapter (pp. 355–86) actually collapses into a series of shorter sections, paragraphs and cogitations.

Probably the most valuable philosophical contribution comes in the first few chapters (pp. 1–76). Ginsberg comes up with the rarely, if ever, produced theory that the importance of ruins is constituted by their expressiveness. A full, living, and active building allows us, only with great difficulty, to understand its own full meaning and aesthetic structure. By contrast, only its depletion and decline into ruination liberates the essential in the forms and in the intentions imposed upon the building by human utilitarianism. There is in ruins, Ginsberg argues, something of the creativity of being, a certain independent utterance of the material, and the observer gains the right and the ability to enter into an intimate contact with it, in a way that resembles the lines of a Diltheyan *Einfühlung*. At the same time, Ginsberg continues, form obtains an independence from function which in the fully active structure it never has. "The ruin celebrates matter, form, and function. It concentrates on the free life that each may lead. The ruin also insists on the interaction of each, the fulfilling of one by the others" (p. 47); and a little above, even more ambitiously, "The ruin teaches us the art of attending to the foundations of Being that lie beneath the accepted world. The ruin gives us practice for the pause in the midst of imperfection" (p. 47). Observations on the dialectical connection with death and with culture as a whole also follow.

This standpoint is certainly quite stimulating and well worth further meditation, particularly as it expands evermore into almost any area of human activity. However, one cannot help feeling that something is missing here. It may be banal or frequently observed and mentioned, but this does not make it less true and genuine. The foundation for ruins and our interest in them is memory, and along with it, matters or affects such as continuity, stability, nostalgia, desire. Ginsberg is obviously aware of this, and there are occasional references to the family of issues connected with memory and with continuity in his book. Nevertheless, the relative neglect of authors such as Goethe (in his "Italian Voyage" at least), and even Chateaubriand—a giant of nostalgic memory—are significant. So passionate is the author for his comprehensive, almost cosmically ambitious grasp of the concept of ruin, that he seems to lose his contact with its solid and firm, albeit more banal, foundations.

Perhaps it is overly exigent on the part of the reviewer to expect seamless unity and total completeness from any book of this kind.

There is no doubt that Ginsberg offers us here a learned and original contribution to an ever-interesting subject, one that will be of no less value for our grandchildren than it was for our grandparents, one that was and is able to stimulate in equal measure people of quite different levels of education. As such, it requires and deserves approaches from various angles, and each of these should be welcomed appropriately.—Virgil Nemoianu, *The Catholic University of America.*

HAROLD, James A. *An Introduction to the Love of Wisdom: An Essential and Existential Approach to Philosophy.* Lanham: University Press of America, 2004. 370 pp. Paper, $49.00—This introduction to philosophy offers a serious alternative to current introductory textbooks both in purpose and method, and it suggests an effective pedagogy for today's student or general reader. Harold aims to "explain and justify philosophical claims to truth," especially "those that are worthy to be foundational for a person's life," and to explain and "apply them in an existential way to our lives" (back cover and p. 11). To this end, he successfully employs essential and existentialist approaches and demonstrates philosophy as a science of theoretical and practical wisdom, an "intellectual pursuit . . . that also involves the will and the heart" (p. 12).

Harold sustains a coherent argument throughout the book's eleven chapters, eliminating extraneous elements. First-hand experience with this well-developed argument may provide beginners with the philosophical foundation they need to go further. A generous use of literary examples and insights of notable psychologists supports the author's existentialist approach, as does the progressive way he explains basic concepts and builds upon transcendental themes, for example, truth, beauty, and goodness. This helps the reader to understand abstract concepts in the light of familiar themes. Key terms are set in boxes within the text; a glossary and an essay on how to write a philosophy paper complete the text.

Harold's reference to philosophy as an "*a priori* science" that studies "primarily strictly necessary truths" (p. 19), suggests a Platonic metaphysics and Cartesian emphasis, though it would be unfair to pigeonhole his thought. He applies the concept of substance and property from Plato's *Phaedo* and "defends the thesis that the [human] soul is substantially distinct from the body" and immaterial, this based on its possession of active powers of intellect and will (pp. 87, 89). Similarly (chapter 5), he reasons that philosophy requires a different method from that of empirical science, because it has essences as its object.

The first two chapters wonderfully illustrate the relation between prephilosophical experience of reality and philosophy, and the intimate connection between theoretical and practical wisdom. Thus, "philosophical wisdom cannot contradict the perceptions of the connaturally wise person" (p. 39); a historian attuned to justice can make a more

adequate critique of history and become more wise (p. 41); and, reminiscent of Descartes and C. S. Peirce, conscious experience offers experiential evidence for the existence of God.

In chapters 3–10, Harold treats metaphysics (chapter 3), epistemology (chapter 5), and ethics (chapters 7–8), the major areas of philosophy, as well aspects of the human person (chapters 4, 11), God (chapter 6), and psychology (chapter 10). Harold points to Hume's admission that skeptical reflections drove him repeatedly to distracting pursuits, to illustrate how the most abstract ideas have existential consequences (p. 75). He also shows how the "principle of contradiction" applies to relations of ideas across disciplines, and to the important task of integrating thinking, choice, and action.

To the traditional arguments for the existence of God, Harold adds another on the basis of ideal truth, and he adapts the ontological proof to show that God is love.

Harold grounds morality in a philosophy of value following Dietrich von Hildebrand, another essentialist approach. His analysis of appearances, illusions, and realities (chapter 9) presents the existential claims that philosophical truth makes on a person, "receptivity to truth" being "the most important virtue for a philosopher" (p. 268). The discussion of psychology focuses on types of unity and disunity possible in human life. The final chapter presents a powerful "philosophy of conversion" beginning with Plato's Allegory of the Cave. Essential and existential dimensions of the book come together here. Relying on his arguments for the existence of God, Harold proposes spiritual affectivity as a third primary power of the soul and traces the process of religious conversion of intellect, will, and heart along with a penetrating analysis of addiction and suffering, which even in its negativity reveals the call to a wholeness which is holiness.

The beginner is likely to leave this study without an explicitly historical knowledge of philosophy, but with an integrated outlook on life. Others will judge for themselves which needs priority for today's student. This book engaged and inspired me.

For the second printing, the book needs a further editing to clear up a notable misuse of prepositions and omission of "were" in the subjunctive; a few grammatical errors, for example, "lays" instead of "lies" (p. 212); and two errors of fact: Plato's Allegory is from *Republic* 7 (not 6), and the Glossary on "relativism, general" cites Parmenides instead of Protagoras, although the latter is correctly named in the text and note. Surprisingly, these oversights detract neither from the author's argument nor its existential import.—Madonna R. Adams, *Caldwell College.*

HINTIKKA, Jaakko. *Analyses of Aristotle.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. xii + 238 pp. Cloth, $165.00—These fourteen studies comprise the sixth and final collection in the *Jaakko Hintikka Selected Papers.* Composed during three decades by this renowned scholar, they

are presented in the "hope that these essays will inspire others to explore further the possibilities that they open" (p. xi).

The first two chapters examine Aristotle's notion of existence and the allegation that he understood *is* to intrinsically involve ambiguity. Hintikka insists "that Aristotle may have been the only early philosopher who consciously considered the ambiguity thesis," yet "he, too, rejected it" (pp. 3, 27, 131, 155, 167, 172). Moreover, uncritical acceptance of the Frege-Russell view, which emphasizes inherent ambiguity in the *is* of predication, identity, existence, and class-inclusion in natural and most philosophical discourse, not only was unanticipated in any interesting manner by Kant, but has led prominent scholars toward unhistorical interpretations of Plato and Aristotle. Hintikka's engagement with analytic approaches lends authority to his judgment that "there is no simple way of expressing Aristotelian existential assumptions in a modern logical notation," and that "ambiguity is relative to a semantical framework" (pp. 11, 35).

Parallel precisions are offered in challenges to oft-accepted interpretations of past scholars. H. Bonitz (*Index Aristotelicus*, p. 38A) failed to distinguish broad and narrow applications of *amesos* as referring to, respectively, immediate syllogistic premises that do not allow for interpolation, and to basic immediate assumptions not obtained by further arguments (p. 91). D. Ross, in his commentary on the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* (p. 678), erred in claiming that *atoma* applies to the highest universals in *Metaphysics* (994b21). Hintikka argues, however, that if compared with *Posterior Analytics* (A22, 83b32–84a6), one sees that such applies to immediate syllogistic premises "and not other types of unproven assumptions (such as are involved in the introduction of the highest universals)" (p. 92).

Moreover, Ross assumed *Prior Analytics* (B23) to pertain only to so called complete induction, which establishes a species in regard to a finite number of subspecies. Hintikka insists that "Aristotle's real problem is quite different from that of modern inductivists" in that "he is dealing with how to get hold of the concepts, the 'forms', which will give us a foothold for the operative inductive steps" (pp. 113, 116). Finally, G. Ryle (*Collected Papers*, vol. 1, p. 90), misunderstood Aristotle's interrogative procedure, since "restricting oneself to yes-or-no questions does not exclude us from any particular type of inquiry be it factual or mathematical," and such explains "why Socrates was able to operate by means of yes-or-no questions, as he typically did, even though he was interested in questions which are most appropriately queried by a wh-question" (p. 220).

Chapter 3 on "Aristotle's Theory of Thinking," the sole previously unpublished essay, examines Aristotle on cognition. Hintikka insists that "for Aristotle the realizations of forms in the soul are in all respects as authentic instances of the forms in question as their realizations outside the soul," and thus "alleged psychological necessity of valid logical inferences is a straightforward consequence of Aristotle's theory of thinking" (pp. 50, 58). This supports a sympathetic portrayal of "the search for definitions [as] an integral part of doing science" and "general syllogistic

premises figuring in syllogistic explanation [as] conditions which cannot by any stretch of the imagination always be interpreted as specifying states of affairs that any agent could bring about" (pp. 132–3).

Having argued there can be no "failure to draw the right conclusion from fully actual premises," chapters 4 and 5 shift the focus to "the role of modality in Aristotle's metaphysics" and the "ingredients of an Aristotelian science" (p. 60). Aristotle's notions of *dynamis* and *energeia* are remarked to designate not only potentiality–actuality, but also "two different kinds of potentiality" (p. 82). Other potentially ambivalent notions concerning demonstrative reasoning are distinguished: "thesis" as immediate indemonstrable first principle that need not be grasped for acquiring certain kinds of knowledge; "axiom" as that which must be grasped for any knowledge acquisition; "hypothesis" as a thesis which assumes one or another part of a proposition; "definition" as not assuming either; and "first principles" as facts that cannot be shown (pp. 98–9).

Chapters 6–10 focus on axiomatics, induction, explanation, syllogism, and demonstrative method. Apparent discrepancies in terminology reflect the fact that "all primary premises of an axiomatic science can be thought of as definitions," and thus Aristotle's treatment of "common axioms" is "essentially tantamount" to that of Euclid's (p. 109). While induction is insisted to contrast from a simplistically depicted empiricist view centering on certainty, "the gist of Aristotelian induction lies precisely in the discovery that a suitable term does capture the right class" (pp. 116–17). Nonetheless, he "ought to have treated syllogistic arguments in the same way as geometrical ones," for if "we take *ekthesis* (instantiation) seriously as a proof procedure," such purportedly renders the distinction between perfect and imperfect syllogisms irrelevant (pp. 147, 151). Thus, "the search for definitions was not for Aristotle a preliminary ground-clearing operation preceding the actual development of the science in question," and in regard to presuppositions, "existential assumptions trickle from the top down in a sequence of syllogisms" (pp. 132–3, 169–70). Finally, *archai*, "first principles," or *ta prota*, "primary premises," refer not to "temporary priority in an actual scientific process" but rather to "priority in the syllogistic structure of science" (p. 163).

Chapters 11–14 concern the roles of early logical treatises in developing a theory of "questioning games," the tentative comprehension of Aristotle's procedure by certain medieval speculators, how his doctrine on fallacies is often misconstrued, and Aristotle's completion, in his logic and rhetoric, of Socratic questioning. Portrayals of *Topics* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* as "handbooks of the Socratic questioning games" that are "an important part of the scientific method," along with depictions of the "interrogative model as the general theory of ampliative reasoning," are presented as markedly distinct from the "Atomistic Postulate" presupposed in an inductivist and hypothetico-deductive model (pp. 175, 178, 185). Questions that lead to *archai* of science may be addressed to established *endoxa* of witnesses, predecessors, or nature, in terms of a "long spectrum of different logics of questions" (pp. 198–9). True interrogative games, thus, are not diversions, but "realistic models of knowledge-seeking processes" which cannot be violated without "try-

ing to do the impossible," and such is evidenced in the unity of dialectical exploration, syllogistic demonstration, and rhetorical persuasion (pp. 212, 226–35).

While one might wish the author had responsed to occasional criticisms that he tended to "insinuate a rather substantial interpretational thesis of strict syllogisticism into Aristotle's text in the guise of innocent translation" and related matters (see M. T. Ferejohn, "Definition and Aristotelian Demonstration," *The Review of Metaphysics* 36 [1982]: 382; P. H. Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997], 245 n. 8, 253 n. 76), these rich reflections will likely long inspire continued explorations of Aristotle's doctrines.—Michael Ewbank, *Seminary of the Fraternity of St. Peter.*

HUTTON, Sarah. *Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. viii + 271 pp. Cloth, $75.00—In the last twenty years Lady Anne Conway, née Finch (1631–79), has gained scholarly attention, as shown by recent encyclopedia entries on her. A Cambridge Platonist, Lady Conway critiqued Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza, as well as her former tutor and lifelong correspondent, Henry More. Leibniz mentions her posthumous work positively, albeit briefly. With an impressive command of documentary and philosophical sources, Sarah Hutton contextualizes the Viscountess's thought and meets the stated goal of showing that Conway's *Principia philosophiae antiquissimae and recentissimae* expresses "the philosophical concerns of a lifetime" (p. 12).

In an age when women were not formally admitted to Cambridge, Conway was tutored by mail by Henry More, who had also taught her half-brother John Finch. Her notebooks, now lost, were published posthumously in 1690 in Latin translation by men who respected her and who with self-effacement introduced her work without mentioning their own names. Conway proposed replacing the doctrine of the Trinity with a metaphysical metaphor in which God is the Creator, Christ is mediating "Middle Nature," and the third element is Creation. Hobbes and Spinoza she critiques for failing to distinguish between Creator and creation. She also criticized the dualism of Descartes and of More, developing instead a "vitalistic monism" (p. 87). More himself had written of "Monad or Unite" in 1653 (p. 159).

Professor Hutton does an exemplary job of documenting the influences upon Conway. One was pain. From the age of twelve, Conway suffered, often enduring violent headaches lasting for days, even months. This brought her into contact with numerous physicians and gave her an interest in science, which in turn influenced her thought. For instance, she derived her theory of change from Francis Mercury van Helmont and studied the works of Robert Boyle. Her "ecumenical Deism" led at last to her becoming a Quaker.

The volume lacks a chronological table of Conway's philosophical letters, both the extant ones and those reliably attested, with identification of the correspondents, including More, Finch, Knorr, possibly Elizabeth of Bohemia, but not Leibniz or Margaret Cavendish. Such a table would also have clarified just how many letters there are. Similarly, although perceptive comments about Conway's *Principia* are offered *passim* throughout the monograph, nowhere are the work's full contents, structure, or length recounted. (In the1690 *duodecimo* publication, Van Helmont's anonymous introduction was six pages and the Latin text 144).

In her "reconstructive archaeology" of Conway's thought (p. 10), Hutton gives a generally judicious presentation of what may be reliably inferred from the evidence (for example, pp. 18, 93 n. 58, 138–9, 199). An admirable index gives access to the thematically arranged contents. The final chapter discreetly corrects erroneous assessments of Conway. It is disconcerting, however, that More's dedicatory letter for *Antidote against Atheism* is cited both to show that More presents Conway as an acceptably stereotypical woman (p. 29) but also as evidence that he admired her particular intellectual gifts (p. 39).

Unfortunately, Hutton's assessment of Conway's influence is exaggerated. For instance, her influence upon More's philosophy is said to be "significant, possibly formative" (p. 78), and she is credited with "a far-reaching impact" on the thought of Van Helmont (pp. 140, 152). The evidence offered, however, shows only moderate influence. Conway is also credited with taking the lead, "setting the agenda" of philosophical subjects in epistolary exchanges with More and Finch (p. 9). Yet More, as Conway's tutor (and social inferior?) asked Conway to propose questions and subjects (pp. 73–4). Finch made the same request (pp. 99–100). That is, it has not been shown that on her own initiative she "set the agenda."

More seriously, Conway is repeatedly treated as collaborator or author of works published by men (for example, p. 9). George Keith, More, and Van Helmont were gathered with her at Ragley for philosophical discussion, but this does not justify deeming her "the director" of the debates or "co-author" of their works. The fact that these men wrote dialogues does not certify that they record her thought (pp. 203–6). A very few parallels in wording between Conway and Van Helmont's *Two Hundred Queries* do not make her his collaborator (p. 210).

It is instructive to reverse the sexes of the persons involved: Had a man hosted philosophical dialogues involving three women and then each woman had published treatises, the scholarly world would cry "Foul!" if a modern critic were to assert that probably the man was the author of these texts. Moreover, as Hutton makes clear, More and Van Helmont edited Conway's *Principia*, annotated it, translated it into Latin, wrote an introduction to it, and had it published. Appropriately, she does not from these facts conclude that the men were coauthors of Conway's *Principia*. Likewise it is inappropriate to aggrandize Conway's work by deeming her the author of their publications.—Catherine Brown Tkacz, *Gonzaga University*.

HYLAND, Drew. *Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of Plato*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. ix + 202 pp. Cloth, $44.00—This book's subject matter is important for all scholars of Plato's dialogues, no matter where they locate themselves on the Continental/analytic landscape. Hyland accomplishes much here, integrating three projects: an exposition of seminal figures and texts in continental philosophy that examine Plato's dialogues, a critique of these texts and figures, and an explanation and defense of Hyland's own hermeneutic principles.

For Plato scholars who work within the Anglo-American or analytic tradition, Hyland's book provides an accessible exposition and a balanced assessment of major texts. So, if one is not familiar, for example, with what Heidegger or Derrida say about Plato's dialogues, this is an excellent starting place. For scholars who already work in the "continental" tradition, Hyland's book provides incisive criticism of the major texts and a constructive argument for why these figures's interpretations of Plato are in tension with their own hermeneutic principles.

The introduction lays out Hyland's interpretive approach, which he illustrates throughout the book with brief interpretations of various dialogues. Plato took great pains to provide a lived human context for each dialogue through setting, characterization, dramatic action, and so forth, argues Hyland, and Plato's reason for constructing dialogues in this manner was to highlight the existential nature of philosophy. "[T]he dialogues, by their very form, do seem to suggest that the situation out of which a given position arises must be considered in any adequate understanding of it. . . . [P]hilosophical thinking must always begin out of a concrete existential situation" (p. 9). Hyland argues that the dialogues, qua dialogues—not philosophical treatises—are open, indeterminate, and reflect a distinctly human finitude. Plato "never abandons the conviction of Socrates his teacher that philosophy is not fundamentally an assertive but an interrogative activity, that the fundamental speech act of philosophy is not the assertion but the *question*" (p. 6, Hyland's emphasis). Even though an affinity with the indeterminate, the nonassertoric, and the poetic characterizes Continental philosophers, they nevertheless interpret Plato's dialogues in a manner inconsistent with that affinity. They assume, for example, that Plato's dialogues contain determinate, metaphysical doctrines and that whatever Socrates or any other "major" interlocutor states is what Plato straightforwardly believes.

Each succeeding chapter focuses on a single figure and, while deepening and strengthening Hyland's own hermeneutic position, lays out the arguments of these figures and present Hyland's criticisms of them. The figures treated in successive chapters are Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray, Adriana Cavarero, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The chapter on Heidegger, nearly a third of the book, presents clearly several decades of his writing on Plato, demonstrating that throughout and in various capacities, Heidegger—whether in his early project steeped in the "science" of phenomenology or his work on truth as *aletheia*, or his later attempt to write dialogues himself—fails to appreciate the kind of philosophical project Plato was engaged in. The chapters on Derrida and Irigaray persuasively critique some of the

fundamental tenets of the deconstruction project, namely, the notion of *differance* and whether multivocity and ambiguity emerge only from deconstructive readings of the dialogues or were put there by Plato himself for philosophical purposes. (We get in these chapters, too, Hyland's interesting effort to rescue the baby of authorial intent from the bath water of traditional literary criticism). The chapter on Cavarero, who is perhaps the least known to Anglo-American readers among those discussed, could have presented more detail about the text on which it is primarily based (*In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. Serena Anderlini-D'Onofrio and Aine O'Healy [New York: Routledge, 1995]), but it is tantalizing and inviting enough to encourage readers to pursue Cavarero's work. The final chapter on Gadamer, while still critical, presents Gadamer as an "object lesson" for attentive readings of Platonic dialogues (p. 165).

Throughout, Hyland wants to underscore the distinction between Plato's dialogues and what later comes to be called "Platonism," hence the book's title. Hyland's book becomes a defense against the charge that in Plato's dialogues we find the origins of Western metaphysics and all the problems these Continental theorists find there: human transcendence, dualism, essentialism, logocentrism, phallogocentrism. Hyland hopes to "lead continental philosophers . . . to call into question their characterization of Plato—and their criticism of him—as founder of a metaphysical tradition they want to leave behind" (p. 13). Instead, Hyland argues, one finds in Plato's dialogues a "source of engagement" compatible with Continental philosophers' own commitment to "the never ending and uncompleteable task of philosophic thinking" (p. 183). Hyland's book is an excellent choice for anyone wanting lucid exposition of these Continental texts, an incisive critique of them, and/or a well reasoned argument for how Plato's dialogues are most fruitfully read.—Jill Gordon, *Colby College.*

JOHN of St. Thomas (John Poinsot). *Introduction to the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas.* Translation and introduction by Ralph McInerny. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2004. x + 182 pp. Cloth, $27.00—As any reader of Thomas Aquinas knows, each article and question, each treatise and part of the *Summa*, bears a dynamic connection one to another; the very idea of the *Summa*, the systematic ordering of knowledge, requires as much. Yet it is not a simple matter to obtain the synthetic view of the knowledge proposed by St. Thomas for beginners because of the work's imposing bulk and its technical virtuosity. This little work by John Poinsot (John of St. Thomas), written in 1637, serves the same function today that it did for the student of Thomas Aquinas hundreds of years ago, providing just such an overview and orientation to the terms and arguments of the *Summa.*

As a preface to his own theological work, thoroughly Thomistic in orientation, John of St. Thomas, O.P., wrote three essays, including this one entitled *Isagoge ad D. Thomae theologiae. Explicatio connexionis*

et ordinis totius Summae Theologiae D. Thomae, per omnes ejus material. A brilliant philosopher in his own right and confessor to King Philip IV of Spain, Poinsot was the last major figure in the revival of scholasticism in the sixteenth century. This work is neither a commentary nor a work of analysis, according to McInerny, but rather a "bearing of its infrastructure, displaying the ordering principles that brought together the vast treasury of Christian theology in as economical and perspicuous manner as possible" (p. x). Or as the author himself states his plan, "we will try to lay out in a general way the marvelous order of the whole *Summa of Theology* and the interconnection of treatises and topics that St. Thomas himself discovered and perfected, as well as the questions making up the treatises, briefly showing the object of each and the place they occupy in the whole work" (p. 3).

The book includes schematic outlines of the *Summa* and is comprised of two main sections. The first section presents an overview of the three parts of the *Summa* as a whole. The second section, much longer than the first, provides a detailed outline or schema of each of the three parts of the *Summa*. In the overview of section 1, Poinsot treats the question "why are there three parts of the *Summa*," and he explores the connection of the treatises in each of its parts. The account of the *Summa* as a whole relies upon a schema different from Chenu's "exitus-reditus" or other more theological accounts in favor of a simple causal proposal: part 1 is devoted to God as efficient cause, part 2 to God as final cause, and part 3 to God in Christ as the redeeming cause. The author shows how each of the three parts is further comprised of various treatises and the rationale for each treatise. In the second section of this Introduction to the *Summa*, John of St. Thomas goes into greater detail of its content. In order to complete the task in the span of 155 pages (in this translation) he keeps to the main contours but does provide an outline to each part, summaries of the major arguments, and explanations of key distinctions. These do prove helpful for a synoptic overview, for seeing the connections, and as a map to areas of the *Summa* that may be obscure or unexplored for many readers. For example, the philosopher often comes to the *Summa* with a special focus, such as philosophy of law, or philosophy of religion, and he may neglect the context in which these arguments and definitions are found. It is helpful to see the juxtaposition of law and grace as external helps to moral agency. Or it may prove useful for philosophical readers simply to see the theological culminating point for the entire effort in part 3 of the *Summa*, unfinished as it is. The many philosophical distinctions and complex arguments of metaphysics and ethics are brought to bear on key points of Christian doctrine such as the Incarnation, the Passion and Death of Christ, and the nature of Sacraments. The sections well-known and read by philosophers, such as those pertaining to metaphysics, ethics, and law, also are open to a greater clarification and refinement by being viewed in terms of the infrastructure and by being placed in the intricate array of arguments and distinctions provided by St. Thomas. After reading through this *Introduction* by John of St. Thomas, the reader is impelled to return to the *Summa* to savor the full articulation of each argument, objection, and reply. As McInerny says,

"there are enormous advantages to being acquainted with the skeleton of the *Summa* before examining the flesh that covers it." As usual, McInerny's sure translation and fine style make this an eminently readable book to have at hand as one attempts to explore the depths of Thomistic wisdom. One would like to see this book available in an inexpensive paperback version for student use.—John Hittinger, *Sacred Heart Major Seminary.*

JOHNSON, Wayne G. *Morality; Does "God" Make a Difference?* Lanham: University Press of America, 2005. ix + 238 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $35.00—In some philosophical circles, ontology (or metaphysics) is considered public enemy number one when it comes to ethics. Hilary Putnam, for example, argues that ontology is as extraneous to ethics as it is to mathematics. In his recent book, Wayne Johnson takes the opposite position, arguing persuasively that ethics requires an ontology, a broad metaphysical framework that accounts for the normative force of ethics. *Morality; Does "God" Make a Difference?* is written with clarity and would make an accessible guide to classical and contemporary moral theory.

Chapter 1, "A Theory About Moral Theories," sets forth Johnson's central theme: "Normative ethical systems are best understood as attempts to seek out and justify ways of living a fulfilled human life in terms of the kind of fulfillment one believes to be possible given one's beliefs about human nature and the ultimate nature of all things. Furthermore, any normative ethical system must also indicate just how one's own quest for fulfillment is related to the experiences of other people and sentient beings, given, again, one's view of human nature and the ultimate nature of all things" (p. 8). Chapter 2, "The Point of Morality," makes the case that morality is an unavoidable enterprise as persons seek to adjudicate competing wants, needs, and desires. The search for fulfillment inevitably raises concern for fair-minded reflection on appropriate and inappropriate modes of fulfillment.

Chapter 3 provides a useful, reliable guide to major moral theories and worldviews. This would be highly useful for undergraduates in their first or second course in philosophy. Chapter 4 offers a balanced overview of religion-based ethics. While chapters 3 and 4 are largely descriptive, chapter 5 argues that theism does make a difference ethically. Here and elsewhere, Johnson remains neutral in arguing for or against theism. His principle aim is to argue for the relevance of a theistic, naturalistic, or some other type of ontology. I find this section entirely successful. As Johnson points out, ethics comes to be profoundly shaped by whether or not you believe that the cosmos has a loving, good creator, or that there is an afterlife, or that there is a unity between God (Brahman) and nature, and so on.

Chapter 6 considers how different ontologies offer competing accounts of moral obligations and rights. This chapter and the next are especially concerned with the relationship between persons and their

communities, and then the relationship between different communities. Johnson opposes ethical relativism. In chapter 8, Johnson exhibits the way in which different ontologies give rise to different accounts of moral psychology. In chapter 9, Johnson offers a subtle analysis of the virtues and vices of grounding ethics in evolutionary biology. True to the spirit of this remarkable book, Johnson's principle aim is to elucidate the connection between ontology and ethics while remaining neutral in terms of his declared ontological preference. The final chapter invites readers to the broader field of philosophy of religion, where one may weigh the reasons and values behind religion-based moralities.

This is a fine book that would work well for an introduction to ethics. Lest that seem like a faint praise, I must add that I believe this book also mounts a powerful case against books like *Ethics without Ontology* by Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). Although Johnson does not mention Putnam (who is widely considered one of the most distinguished living American philosophers), I believe Johnson's arguments and exposition of the philosophical landscape present a formidable challenge to Putnam and his followers.—Charles Taliaferro, *St. Olaf College.*

KENAAN, Hagi. *The Present Personal: Philosophy and the Hidden Face of Language.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 208 pp. Cloth, $35.00—"How is the speaking individual present in language?" asks Kenaan. "How do you inhabit your language? . . . In what sense are you there 'in' the words you utter?" How can we hear the individual's presence, not just public abstractions that we construe language as "meaning"—and how understand language so that such hearing is possible?

This problem is pressing; surely, public meaning is already an abstraction from personal and uniquely situated expression of a person's presence, to some hearer in context. Even judging from the impersonal, abstracted philosophical perspective, this problem obviously must be taken seriously.

Kenaan shows that this kind of language analysis is both similar to and different from musical expression: in music, we are not tempted to reduce meaning to an abstraction. The composer needn't worry whether we hear what was "really" meant. Philosophy, however, seeks the truth of something—not necessarily "truth" defined in logic or linguistics textbooks, but the truth of the speaker's situation, words as expressions of being, partially revealed through words.

Consider the way an Israeli might hear a Palestinian's statements. Hearing claims of rights to own land, to be treated in such-and-such ways, and so on, is not to hear the actual presence of Palestinians in their situatedness. The rights-claims may not make sense judged by standards of academic moral/legal philosophy, but the claims are

expressions of what it is like for the speakers. Kenaan's approach to those claims would yield an entirely different level of meaning from those usually considered in analytic or Continental philosophy.

Kenaan does not mean mere subjective privacy. There is a truth to be revealed by interpreting speech in this way. He suggests an analogy between this peculiar subjective/objective nexus and Kant's analysis of aesthetic meanings. Judgment of beauty is not merely subjective, but neither is it objective; we can listen in a realm where subjective and objective have not yet split. The truth of the speaker is not independent of the subjective intentions of his speech, but neither is it reducible to that. Palestinians' claims about justice may be subjectively intended as moral/legal claims, whereas the truth expressed has more to do with the Palestinians' human condition. "Being treated with respect" may objectively be an "emotional preference"—almost a triviality compared with the interests of nations and armies—but such assertions reveal the human condition that our public, propositional mode of speech misses.

For Kenaan, Kant's analysis of beauty—apprehension of a truth, but not a propositional, empirically verifiable, or logically definable one—offers a model for hearing the person as expressed through speech. "Our human responsiveness to beauty is unique, according to Kant, because it constitutes a form of human relationship to the world that precedes the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity" (p. 136). Because the statement "this is beautiful" expresses a truth, not just a psychological preference, there is temptation to interpret it through objective denotations of words and syntax. But this would lose its meaning; the same is true in nonaesthetic contexts.

For example, the meaning of temporal relations includes a sense of "still possible," "could have been possible," "no longer possible" relative to a context. Possibility is not merely a logical abstraction. Conversely, the temporal is defined in terms of concrete contextualizations: "A language of facts is typically a language of repressed temporality" (p. 155).

Similarly, "take, for example, the case in which you say to a friend that you are simply unable to do what you want so much to do, what you know you can and should do. In saying that, you speak to her in a way she could not understand . . . unless she manages to bracket and, at the same time, listen through the general (in this case contradictory) informational patterns exhibited in your speech" (p. 145). Clearly, "the meaning of your speech is so dependent on you being the individual you are—and on my singularity as the person you spoke to—that it cannot retain its significance when abstracted from our presence as singular individuals, when transposed onto a global space of logical possibilities" (p. 143).

Reviewing such a book is difficult. Usually, we expect authors to make statements, clarifying their meaning in public ways presupposed by most philosophical discourse (which already excludes Kenaan's "personal"); then we evaluate the arguments according to public rules of verification. However, these rules are already distorted by the interpretation of linguistic meaning in which only static, public meanings are real. This point is obvious for analytic philosophy, but Kenaan also applies it to Continental philosophy, given its public way of defining intentionality.

Part of my response is by way of reassurance. There are some who do believe in the importance of context-specific meanings, and agree that the public and objective are derivative from the personal and situated, which is both subjective and objective. Yes, epistemologies tend to exclude other possible epistemologies—setting up "us-versus-them" oppositions that remain unavailable to the personal meanings of language. But there are resonant voices among some whom I would characterize as "coherentists" in epistemological approach.

Briefly, two examples: Eugene Gendlin (*Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning* [Toronto: Collier-Macmillan, 1962/1998]) works in the phenomenological style yet wants to "incorporate the demands of empiricism"; Natika Newton (*Foundations of Understanding* [Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1996]) is an analytic philosopher, but he also greatly respects Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Both discuss language in ways congruent with Kenaan's project. For Newton, a fundamental way of understanding the world is by acting in relation to it; after repeated action, we learn to imagine various ways we could act relative to it. Consequently, we understand what a person is because we can empathize with the way that person could act relative to his environment. We first understand language as a tool, and learn to understand others' language as a tool for them, imagining ourselves in their place. For Newton, this personal level of understanding is, in the actual maturation of a person, the original basis of the public, objectified language system.

At the other end of the philosophical spectrum ("other" in the usual "us-versus-them" opposition between "analytic" and "Continental" philosophy), Gendlin views language as meaningful in its ipseity for a specific speaker in a situation, not as static, public, unambiguous. Like Newton, he views it as a tool usable in trying to bring experience "into focus." We may express the felt sense of a situation as "like a statue": then, uttering the expression, it dawns on us that we feel "frozen" and "stuck"; a statue cannot move. This felt meaning cannot be captured in publicly definable, static definitions. Moreover, the meaning changes and unfolds as used in this way.

Since I believe coherentism is, or should be, receptive to the project in which Kenaan is engaged, I highly recommend this book. It takes seriously the task of hearing language as first of all a manifestation of the speaker's situated presence—a meaning incomprehensible without hearing the specificity of that presence, in each given case.—Ralph D. Ellis, *Clark Atlanta University.*

LOMBARDO, Mario. *La mente affettiva di Spinoza. Teoria delle idee adeguate.* Padua: il Poligrafo, 2004. 189 pp. Paper, €18.00—In this book on Spinoza and the trilemma of spiritualism, functionalism, and materialism, Lombardo takes the perspective of a philosophical psychologist. More exactly, he proposes to read the *Ethics* as a "psychology of self-interpretation" on the basis of the following argument in three steps: (a)

mental causality reduces itself to the act of constituting interpretative positions that are bearing sense insofar as they organize perception in accordance with an end; (b) such an operation is intentional, for it has an end, and it produces actual effects on the subject that carries it out; (c) in absence of affects that are contrary to its best functioning, the mind's operations are carried out in accordance with a most general rule, which defines pragmatic competences in analogy to the competences that the determinations of natural laws can produce within the cognitive domain of physical science. For these reasons, concludes Lombardo, the mind reduces itself to the act of constituting interpretative processes; it is always implying psycho-physical causality—however, at times in accordance with its most adequate form, at times against it (p. 9). In other words, the doctrine of adequate ideas becomes the benchmark for verifying the mind's interpretative competence, the interpretation's intentionality, and its expected effectiveness. "Mental causality," says Lombardo, can be traced back to two passages of the *Ethics* (E5P10): "As long as we are not harassed by emotions which are contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and interconnecting the affections of the body in accordance with the order of the intellect"; (E5P23S): "Nevertheless we sense and experience that we are eternal." The task of a psychology that has sprung out of the intersection of a philosophy of interpretation with a connectivist view of the mind is the investigation of mental causality (in its counterfactual significance) with the goal of validating regulative ideas of the good, which are presupposed as reflexive foundations for the understanding of life (p. 37–8).

Spinoza's *Ethics* has traditionally been the parterre on which philosophers and physiologists have disputed each other's theories. Such has obviously been the case for Donald Davidson's *Mental Events*, whose first edition dates back as far as 1970 and has found a supplement in Davidson's paper, "Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Affects" (*Desire and Affect: Spinoza as a Protagonist*, ed. Yeremiahu Yovel [New York: Little Room, 1999], 95–111). Lombardo mentions Davidson's hypothesis of an "anomalous monism" that considers mental events identical with physical events, whereby, however, mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, because the domain of intentional phenomena cannot be described as a closed system within which one can be certain (provided one had a perfect science) that to a given mental event a physical event will necessary follow, for instance a behavioral response (p. 44–5). Lombardo agrees with Davidson that a perfect science ought to avoid causality; he disagrees with him, though, by rejecting any reference to psycho-physical parallelism. The reason he adduces is quite elegant. It simply is not correct, he suggests, to consider the *Ethics* as a homogeneous work. Instead, E3P58 cuts clean between two parts. The first part deals with the field of psychology that was contemporary to Spinoza and was homologous to the description of the physical world of that time. But the second part presents a psychology of a completely different kind, a psychology which is truly "dianoethic" insofar as it generates intellectual procedures toward achieving the most desirable good (p. 50). The goal of this second part, says Lombardo by way of returning to his preceding argument, is nothing else than interpreting the world.—Riccardo Pozzo, *University of Verona.*

MARTINDALE, Brian, Anthony BATEMAN, Michael CROWE, and Frank MARGISON, Editors. *Psychosis: Psychological Approaches and Their Effectiveness.* London: Gaskell, 2002. xiii + 306 pp. Paper, £25.00—Mental illnesses, particularly psychoses, are a mystery; nevertheless, they have to be treated. The practice of treating badly understood diseases is a form of laboratory showing the dominant preferences, if not prejudices, of a whole profession. Thus, in the U.S., there is a PORT report on schizophrenia, a major form of psychosis, funded by N.I.M.H. That PORT report recommends medication as the first line of treatment. If medication fails, the PORT report recommends that within a year electroshock treatment commence (Recommendation 19). The PORT report recommends against psychoanalysis and psychodynamically inspired therapies (Recommendation 22). It also rejects family therapies based on the idea that schizophrenia could be caused by family interactions (Recommendation 26). The research presented in the book edited by Martindale et alia challenges much of the basic beliefs of the PORT report.

The anthology under review includes an insightful introduction and five sections. The first section has two chapters on Cognitive Approaches. In both chapters we learn that the therapeutic relationship is very important. The writer of the introduction suggests that these findings could be used to make a connection between the cognitive approach and the psychoanalytic approach by testing the hypothesis that cognitive distortions in persons suffering from schizophrenia are related to the presence of unmanageable affects.

The second section is called "Family, Group and Psychosocial Approaches." The section contains two chapters on family interventions, one chapter on group therapy, and two chapters dealing with the problem of what to do with schizophrenic patients in a time of downsizing the large public mental health hospitals. In the chapters on family interventions, we learn that there is great resistance to work with families of schizophrenics, even though there has already existed, for two decades, evidence available that such work reduces relapse and admission rates (p. 9). We would like to know why proven interventions are avoided. Here we see ideologies at work. First, there is the conviction that schizophrenia is a biological disease. Second, work with families of schizophrenics is associated with the psychoanalytic theory which is rejected as a competing theory. Furthermore, it is argued that work with families of schizophrenics inevitably puts unjustifiable blame on those families. However, the research of Tienari has demonstrated that certain families (defined in Tienari's research as psychologically healthy families) have the effect of preventing the outbreak of schizophrenia in biologically vulnerable children. One factor that seems particularly helpful is low communications deviance. Furthermore, raising healthy children is an infinitely difficult task. Hence, in dealing with a mentally ill child, families deserve professional help, even if the national PORT report questions this approach.

New is the report that psychoeducation in multifamily groups leads to fewer relapses, and slight increased employment compared with single family treatment (pp. 92–3). The authors of the article on multifamily

treatment attribute the success of this form of treatment to the fact "that it allows the family and the patient to move this devastating illness off to a corner of their lives and proceed to live a bit more as their neighbors and friends do" (p. 93).

The chapter on "Preventing Relapse and Readmission" reports on several conceptual changes about relapse and readmission. First, the less costly day hospital/crisis respite program was found to be equally effective as the more costly in-patient program. Second, the objective criteria approach for diminishing relapse and readmission proved inadequate. One of the subjective factors successfully used in multifamily treatment reappeared in this research as a potent predictor of readmission: social isolation (p. 154).

The chapter on "Crisis Residential Care" reports on a non-hospital-based treatment of schizophrenic persons during their crisis, which is less costly. Part of the setting consists in "continued participation in ongoing community-based treatment, rehabilitation, school, work or other activities . . . to the extent allowed by patients's symptoms" (p. 160). This model based on Soteria and Crossing Place (p. 160) has elements that are similar in spirit to the multifamily treatment model: social integration, not social isolation, should be promoted with psychotic patients, even in crisis.

Section 3 has one chapter and deals with the use of psychoanalysis, particularly the use of self-psychology. The study shows that psychotropic drugs alone do not modify the stable traits of personality (p. 195), but a treatment based on a modified self-psychology model improves significantly interpersonal relationships of psychotic patients (p. 196).

The last section of the book has four chapters discussing "Early Interventions using need-adapted psychological treatment models." The chapters discuss practices in Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Australia. The Swedish pilot study was created on the basis of a review article summarizing "that in many cases intensive psychosocial support can considerably reduce or make neuroleptic medication unnecessary with no increased risk of adversive effect. If, however, neuroleptic treatment is completely removed from schiazophrenia treatment, the results are worse" (p. 200). A three-year follow-up study shows that the integrated approach including early intervention, intensive psychosocial therapy and low-dose neuroleptic treatment led to fewer in-patient days than normal. (p. 207). The Norwegian study demonstrates that targeted information campaigns have led to a major reduction in DUR (time interval between onset of psychotic symptoms and hospitalization for psychosis or initiation of adequate treatment) (pp. 218, 232). The Finnish study reports on an effort in Finland where psychosis teams are trying to find the best treatment for each patient. A number of findings are reported. First, "the use of neuroleptic medication is not as mandatory in the treatment of psychoses as has been suggested and . . . there are cases where neuroleptics should be avoided (identity crises type of psychoses; malignant isolation group) (p. 262). Second, it is beneficial to include a wider network than just the family (p. 262). Third, family-focused treatment and long-term psychodynamic individual therapy should not be underestimated (p. 263).

The last chapter is not so much about Australia as an overview of the history and current practice of treating psychotic and schizophrenic patients. The author points to a revival in interest in psychological approaches. He points to the fact that "it is genuinely difficult to achieve comfortable integration at the theoretical level (of the different treatment methods) (p. 267). He points to two movements with convergent interests: the early psychosis intervention movement and the humanistic movement. In this latter movement people see that psychotic patients are more like us than they are different, and thus they need to be treated like equals, like people. Here the author opposes Kraepelin and Jaspers to Sullivan. Finally, the author points to the great intellectual and financial challenges to do the work of integration and finding the funding for doing research about psychosocial interventions (p. 289).

The book provides research and statistics about a variety of problems in the treatment of schizophrenia and psychosis. The introduction provides a very good overview. Without being antibiological or antipharmaceutical, the authors of the book stress the beneficial effects of psychosocial treatments of different kinds. This is a well done anthology, very worthwhile reading. The anthology undermines a complete materialist understanding of mental illness.—Wilfried Ver Eecke, *Georgetown University.*

MAXWELL, Nicholas. *Is Science Neurotic?* London: Imperial College Press, 2005. xv + 240 pp. Cloth, $48.00—In this new work, the well-known philosopher of science, Nicholas Maxwell, dons the hat of a psychiatrist in his diagnosis of a methodological malaise he calls "rationalistic neurosis" for the whole enterprise of science. It is admittedly a bizarre suggestion, but the author argues for it in a clear and convincing manner. From the outset, he recognizes the problematic nature of the claim that science is neurotic. As with other such characterizations of institutions or corporations, however, he shows that all is required is "that the thing in question pursues aims, represents the aims that it pursues, and hence on occasion misrepresents its aims" (p. 2).

The argument of this book is the culmination of the author's work that has been under way since the 1970s, and it brings together a wealth of ideas from his earlier books, *What's Wrong with Science?* (1976), *From Knowledge to Wisdom* (1984), *The Comprehensibility of the Universe* (1998), and *The Human World and the Physical Universe* (2001). There are fine tunings of points and discussion of cutting-edge developments in physics that provide an excellent update to his views. Maxwell also explains the basic principles of the theory he espouses, namely, "aim-oriented empiricism."

The main neurosis of science is methodological. Science claims to pursue one official aim but in fact does something altogether different. The official aim, according to Maxwell, is to discover factual truths about the universe, nothing being presupposed about the nature of the

universe independent of evidence. The real aim is to discover in what way the universe is comprehensible, presupposing that it is comprehensible. This means that science presupposes that the universe has an underlying unity that forbids consideration of grotesquely *ad hoc* or disunified theories that might be just as empirically successful as the ones we currently embrace.

Standard empiricism is what Maxwell calls the official, "declared" view "that in science claims to knowledge, laws and theories are accepted and rejected impartially on the basis of evidence, *no thesis about the nature of the universe being accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independently of empirical considerations*" (p. 6). This fails mainly because simplicity, unity, and explanatory power do in fact play important roles in the choice of theories, yet standard empiricism cannot account for this. One consequence of rejecting standard empiricism is that the sharp but artificial boundary between science and metaphysics is eliminated; science is liberated from a sort of positivistic shackle. This reopens the discussion of fundamental aims and methods. While such a suggestion might seem to put science on a backward course to something like natural philosophy, Maxwell openly embraces it because it is what the great scientists have been doing all along, including Galileo, Descartes, Kepler, Newton, Maxwell, Einstein, and Bohr.

If science says one thing about its activity, and yet does another (and in an astonishingly successful manner, Maxwell emphasizes), then why does it matter as long as the real job is done? Maxwell argues that the neurosis has damaging consequences in that it allows this activity to continue in a way in which it fails to pursue what he calls "wisdom-inquiry" rather than "knowledge-inquiry." The neurosis of science does not involve just the "repression" of problematic metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility of the universe; it also involves the repression of problematic assumptions concerning values and politics. More generally, academic inquiry as a whole represses problematic assumptions about what our aims ought to be in seeking social progress and civilization. What we need most is a science, and a kind of rational inquiry more generally, that is devoted to articulating and helping to solve the real problems of humanity rather than merely adding to our stock of scientific facts. We have made extraordinary strides in solutions to what Maxwell calls the "first great problem of learning," namely, the acquisition of reliable knowledge of the world, but we have utterly failed to solve the second problem of global wisdom and civilization. The dogma of standard empiricism coupled with specialization instilled throughout the natural and social sciences and in our institutions of academic inquiry has the effect of preventing us from developing our aims and methods of problem-solving in such a way that humanity realizes that which is of fundamental importance. Such a criticism is not to be confused with postmodern relativism or a romantic reaction to the rise of modern science. Maxwell places the utmost value on scientific rationalism. He merely suggests that we take it to a higher level of consistency.

As for philosophy of science, Maxwell agrees with the leading physicists' views on this rather insignificant and sterile activity that contributes little or nothing to our actual understanding of science. This is because, for the most part, it has devoted itself to justification of the mistaken view of standard empiricism and therefore sustains rather than cures the neurosis of science. While Popper is treated with a special reverence as a philosopher who was deeply committed to solving real problems of science rather than treating philosophy of science as a sort of self-contained, conceptual meta-activity, even he is guilty of a version of standard empiricism.

Maxwell's work suffers from the fact that it does not fit into any recognizable paradigm of philosophy of science and therefore fails to find its way into current circles of discussion. This, however, only confirms his point that philosophy of science labors under a misconception of the true aims of science and is desperately in need of reform. Remaining as he does, on the outside of the circle for a quarter of a century, has its obvious drawback of neglect and isolation, but in the opinion of this reviewer, the real intellectual advances are not gained by conservative and conformist views within the status quo. Maxwell's fundamental idea is so obvious that it has escaped notice. But acceptance of the idea requires nothing short of a complete revolution for the disciplines. Science should become more intellectually honest about its metaphysical presuppositions and its involvement in contributing to human value. Following this first step, it cures itself of its irrational, repressed aims and is empowered to progress to a more civilized world.

In his final chapter, "What Is to Be Done?", Maxwell identifies nine major problems of global concern and ten solutions including a democratic world government. The problems are obvious and include environmental deterioration, war, poverty, tyranny, terrorism, and so on. While one might debate his solutions, the real difficulty is the enormous and rather implausible task of the global effort needed to realize the global wisdom he has in mind. It would be analogous to the effort involved in reorganizing our political and economic systems on the model of Plato's ideal state in *Republic*. Maxwell, in a section entitled "Apathy," addresses such a concern that his proposal could never be more than a blueprint, but he remains undaunted given the importance of the problems and the consequences for humanity.—Leemon B. McHenry, *California State University, Northridge.*

MAYHEW, Robert. *The Female in Aristotle's Biology: Reason or Rationalization.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. x + 136 pp. Cloth, $28.00—Negative perceptions of Aristotle's view of women are well known. Maryanne Cline Horowitz, *Aristotle and Women,* connects what she calls "Aristotle's biological" with his "political sexism." According to Horowitz, not only do his remarks on women represent "sex prejudice," but they are dangerous as well, and she claims that they are

the source of "many of the standard Western arguments for the inferiority of womankind and for the political subordination of women to men in home and in society" (p. 1).

Mayhew wants to rescue Aristotle from charges of misogynic ideology. Although there are residues of traditional Greek assumptions in the biological works, Mayhew holds Aristotle was not rationalizing from these ideas (p. 6). Rationalization involves self-deception, evasion of truth, and the "desire to support some outlook, agenda, or position" (p. 6 n. 7). Mayhew will argue that Aristotle generalized from insufficient and flawed evidence, but that it was an honest attempt at scientific reasoning and not an attempt to show that women are inferior.

The provision of extensive texts about females and the feminine from the *History of Animals* (*HA*), *Parts of Animals* (*PA*), and *Generation of Animals* (*GA*) is a service to the history of science as well as women's studies. The scope of inquiry can be seen in a survey of textual chapter titles: "Entomology," "Embryology," "Eunuchs and Women," "Anatomy," and "The Softer and Less Spirited Sex." The first chapter, "Aristotle and 'Ideology'," frames the problem, while the last chapter summarizes it, "Aristotle on Females: An Assessment of the Biology." In addition to a General Index, there are very helpful indices of citations (seven pages) and names.

Quoting from Aristotle's treatment of insects, Mayhew affirms the priority given to observation and the desire for reliable observation, "So, this seems to be the way things are concerning the generation of bees, judging from theory and from what are thought to be the facts about them. The facts, however, have not yet been sufficiently grasped; but if they are ever grasped, then we must rely on sense perception more than on theories and on theories only if what they set forth agrees with what has been observed" (*GA* 3.10.760b27–33).

A sample of the extensive textual study Mayhew provides can be seen in his response to Lesley Ann Dean-Jones. She held that in *GA*, Aristotle did away with the notion of female seed and asserted that the woman does not contribute more than her menses to the conception of the new individual (p. 31). Mayhew provides passages from the *GA* referring to male and female seed (1.2.716a8–10), passages referring to seed as male contribution (1.4.717a29–31, 1.5.717b23–26, and 1.13.719b30–33), and passages where Aristotle uses seed and semen interchangeably (1.6.718a2–14 and 1.12.719a35–b4). He then provides Aristotle's analytic, his outline for inquiry into male and female contribution: "whether all males emit seed or not all, and if not all, why some do while others do not; and whether the females contribute any seed or not, and if not seed, whether they contribute nothing at all, or whether they contribute something, but not seed. We must further consider . . . what is the nature of the seed and of the fluid called menses in those animals that emit this" (*GA* 1.17.721a32–b6). Mayhew accepts that Aristotle "clearly believes that the male and female contributions are both residues and that they are similar" (*GA* 1.18.725b31–34, 726a2–6; p. 33). Mayhew challenges whether Aristotle might be saying that the female does not emit seed like the male rather than denying that the female contributes any kind of

seed. "In GA 4.5, he (Aristotle) writes that 'in females, the discharge of menses is the emission of seed, for menses is unconcocted seed'" (773b35–774a3).

In Aristotle's careful analysis, there is no apparent rush to judgment based on preconceived ideas. Mayhew clearly makes the point that the reader must not jump to conclusions but be discerning and patiently read the whole rather than grasping phrases and passages.

Among other topics of interest are Aristotle's discussion that the male contribution of form is active and the female contribution, matter, is passive (*GA* 3.11.762b2–6; p. 42), and "[t]he most notorious line in his corpus, [where] Aristotle writes that 'the female is as it were a mutilated male'" (2.3.737a27–28; p. 54). According to Mayhew, "Aristotle, in calling the female 'as it were' a mutilated male, is not saying that she is literally mutilated or deformed; nor is he saying that females are deformed with respect to how they perform their functions" (p. 55). Although it is true that males were the standard, castrated males were more common in Aristotle's day and, in somewhat of an explanatory stretch, Mayhew thinks the analogy would have been helpful and taken as a way of explaining function and how change in a small body part can affect function of the whole.

Mayhew concludes, "Aristotle came to conclusions about living things in the context of his philosophy (and his culture). But this does not change the fact that he had confidence in, and was motivated by, the ability of reason based on the evidence of the senses to discover truths about the natural world. For the most part, what he concluded about females was based on the strength of the evidence available to him. At times, he may not have pursued an issue vigorously enough because of ideological assumptions, but generally, his observations of the world were central to his biology" (p. 118).—Beverly J. B. Whelton, *Wheeling Jesuit University.*

MELNYK, Andrew. *A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xii + 328 pp. Cloth, $70.00—Physicalism is a widely accepted commitment among philosophers with scientific persuasions. However, there is little agreement on what exactly physicalism is, how it should be defined and distinguished from antiphysicalism, and which form of it is the most plausible one. As manifested, for instance, by a recent collection, *Physicalism and Its Discontents* (ed. Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer, Cambridge University Press, 2001), contemporary physicalists hold quite different views, and their critics find different aspects of physicalism problematic.

Andrew Melnyk's book is great news to both physicalists and antiphysicalists, as it is, to the best of my knowledge, the clearest, most comprehensive, and most systematic treatment of physicalism up to now. In this volume, a distinctively physicalist thesis is formulated and distinguished from both antiphysicalism and the physicalisms Melnyk

finds less promising; some of the key commitments and consequences of this thesis are investigated; finally, its empirical standing is assessed by examining the actual evidence there is for and against it. Melnyk argues not merely for a research program, but for the truth (or rational acceptability) of a genuinely empirical, contingent hypothesis which should be evaluated a posteriori. Moreover, he does not appeal to an imagined "completed" future physics but bases his defense of physicalism on the consensus of current physics.

A question that immediately arises is how exactly Melnyk construes the division of labor between philosophy and empirical science. His case for physicalism is naturalized in a Quinean sense (though, curiously, Quine is not discussed, despite his enormous influence on the rise of physicalism during the second half of the twentieth century). Armchair arguments cannot decide the fate of physicalism a priori; the philosopher's task, apparently, is to do some analytic groundwork of clarification and systematization in order eventually to subordinate the thesis to empirical scrutiny. Melnyk obviously succeeds here: the book is a paradigm of the virtues of careful conceptual analysis and rigorous argumentation.

Melnyk's physicalism (defined in chapter 1), "realization physicalism" (henceforth, "RP"), is not classifiable in terms of the standard distinctions among eliminative, type-identity, token-identity, and supervenience physicalisms. RP claims, roughly, that every actually existing token (object, event, property instance) is either physical or physically realized. The notion of "realization" is explicated in terms of the token's being a token of a "functional type" meeting a specific condition (a role, for example); accordingly, RP can be understood as a generalization of functionalism. Chapter 2 shows why RP should be preferred to supervenience-based physicalisms, while chapter 3 argues that RP is, in a crucial sense, reductive but that this is not damaging. Melnyk convincingly challenges "nonreductive physicalism." In chapter 4, he seeks to show, however, that special-scientific (nonphysically formulated) causal and explanatory claims are not eliminated by RP.

Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to the empirical evaluation of RP. Relying on inferences to the best explanation and enumerative induction, Melnyk claims that there is little evidence against and a lot of evidence for RP, including the controversial thesis that mental phenomena are physically realized.

A problem of the book is that it primarily speaks to those already converted (if not to physicalism, at least to materialism of some sort). One alternative to RP is presumably (strong) emergentism, but Melnyk fails to consider in detail the literature on emergence that has significantly expanded over the last few years. Among antiphysicalist views, he argues against dualism and other positions few people find plausible. He says nothing about the more interesting rivals that reject his strongly (metaphysically) realist assumptions (compare section 5.4), such as neo-Kantian constructivism or pragmatism. It is a general problem in recent debates over physicalism, emergence, and related issues that strong scientific (metaphysical) realism is simply taken for granted.

Of course, it would be impossible to refute, say, transcendental idealism in a book defending RP. The relevance of rivals depends on underlying philosophical assumptions. However, Melnyk should have defended his conviction that it is only science whose ontological commitments deserve attention. Nonscientific perspectives on reality and the antiphysicalist ontologies they potentially yield are not taken seriously, except for what he calls the "honorary sciences," for example, folk psychology. The problem that these "sciences" may *not* be comparable to actual sciences in the relevant respects (for instance, regarding causal explanations) is not considered. Melnyk is unmoved by nonscientific, merely philosophical (for example, conceivability) arguments against physicalism, but this attitude is itself an expression of a philosophically controversial privileging of the scientific perspective. Melnyk's arguments for the unity of science he sees RP as saving do not start from a philosophically neutral ground.

One might, therefore, accuse Melnyk of scientism. The results he achieves might even be employed as parts of a *modus tollens* against strong scientific realism: *if* such a realism is assumed, the arguments Melnyk offers do show that RP is plausible; therefore, in order to reject physicalism, the realism grounding it should be disputed. Still, the book is a must for anyone working on physicalism, or seeking alternatives to it—Sami Pihlström, *University of Tampere, Finland.*

MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice. *Nature, Course Notes from the Collège de France.* Edited by Dominique Séglard. Translated by Robert Vallier. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003. xx + 313 pp. Cloth, $89.95; paper, $25.95—For decades there has been a rumor that out of all the courses Merleau-Ponty taught at the Collège de France during the 1950s, the courses on nature give us the clearest insight into his final thought. With the publication of these courses in English (they appeared in France in 1995), we in the Anglophone world can confirm the veracity of the rumor. While the publication of Heidegger's lecture course called *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* gave us a sense of what part 2 of *Being and Time* would have looked like, the publication of *Nature* gives us a sense of what "the propaedeutic" for *The Visible and the Invisible* would have looked like (p. 204). Indeed, the nature lectures provide us with an "archeology" of the idea of nature (p. 268). Like Foucault's archeology, Merleau-Ponty's questions back across the "constructions" of historical systems of thought. Therefore the first course, dating from the academic year 1956–57, investigates how the philosophical concept of nature evolved during the modern period, from Descartes to Husserl by way of Kant, Schelling, and Bergson. But this course also aims to undo the constructions of modern science, especially the then contemporary physics (such as quantum mechanics), in order to help us think about and conceive the idea of nature below the artifices. Insofar as it questions back, Merleau-Ponty's archeology aims to remember an *arche*,

origin, source, or principle of nature. The principle to which we are returning is the principle of nature as dynamism in the literal sense of the word, as potency. For Merleau-Ponty, nature is the power to invent the visible (p. 190), and, continuing in the same direction as the visible, the power to invent the invisible, to invent what we can call an idea. In other words, nature is the power to invent "sense" (*sens*, with its double sense of meaning and direction) (p. 84). The archeological retrieval of sense then allows Merleau-Ponty to lay out a genesis that goes from the dynamic source to symbolic forms, to language. So, in the second course, dating from the academic year 1957–58, Merleau-Ponty investigates the then contemporary trends in biology; these trends, such as those found in von Uexkull, indicate that animal behavior cannot be reduced to mere concerns for survival. In particular, as Hardouin and Portmann show, for Merleau-Ponty, animals mimic each other and copy their environment even when no advantage can be gained. For Merleau-Ponty, this nonuseful production makes animals our kin (p. 214). There is no rupture between animals and humans (p. 267). So, finally, dating from 1959–60, the third course tries to understand how the human body, continuing the symbolic behavior of the animal body, forms language. The first two courses are taken from notes that students in Merleau-Ponty's audience took; they are written as prose and are quite easy to follow. The third course comes from Merleau-Ponty's own course notes; they are quite fragmentary and at times very obscure. Nevertheless, all three courses are of philosophical interest: they prepare us to remember, as Merleau-Ponty says in *The Visible and the Invisible*, the originary sense of being as the "jointure" of the visible and the invisible.

But for us who are fifty years removed from these courses, they present in the clearest way possible what requirements we must still follow in order to determine what an origin or principle (an *arche*) is. Indeed, "principle" (*principe*) is a word that Merleau-Ponty uses repeatedly in the courses (see p. 152 especially). For Merleau-Ponty, the principle must be conceived neither as positive nor negative, neither as infinite nor finite, neither as internal nor external, neither as objective nor subjective; it can be thought neither through idealism nor realism, neither through finalism (teleology) nor mechanism, neither through determinism nor indeterminism, neither through humanism nor naturalism. What makes this principle so problematic for Merleau-Ponty is that none of these concepts and modes of thought can grasp the "residue," or in more accessible terms, the "contingency" in which nature consists. Nature is contingent insofar as it is not a "reservoir" of possibilities. Instead, nature is hollowed out, a hollow that nevertheless presents in relief what is necessary for nature to be filled in. Even more, nature is, for Merleau-Ponty, eternally hollowed out, which gives it the sense of inertia, solidity, obstinancy, a sense of life as eternally self-regenerating, even a sense of "eternal return" (p. 4). Here, however, we would have to raise a question: Does this conception of nature or life truly take account of finitude understood through the phenomenon of death? Unlike Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, it seems, has no answer to this question.—Leonard Lawlor, *The University of Memphis*.

MORRIS, David. *The Sense of Space.* SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. xi + 220 pp. Cloth, $45.00—This book gives a phenomenological account of the dynamic perceptual integration which constructs our sense of space from the fundamental interdependence which constantly exists between our bodies and our world. If such a description seems to beg metaphysical assumptions of reference, you are entirely correct, and Morris takes pains to try to settle such discrepancies. But the reader who hopes for, or anticipates, a book that deals with a scientific conception of space on the order of those by Graham Nerlich or Max Jammer should be forewarned. Unlike the old adage, however, in which to be forewarned is to be forearmed, there is no need for the unsuspecting reader to be put on the defensive. Morris writes in a precise and accessible style, which pushes past the frontiers of the work on the perception of space begun by Henri Bergson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, J. J. Gibson, and others. In doing so he has produced a work that should prove enjoyable and instructive to the phenomenologically enlightened reader. To the philosophical novice I would give the advice: *caveat lector.*

The book consists of two major parts of three chapters apiece which are framed between: an introduction, which succinctly explains the primacy of the phenomenological dimension of depth, which concerns the distance between ourselves and things prior to any quantitative or inferential objectivization of experience; and a conclusion, which deals with some of the ethical implications stemming from our phenomenological construction of space. The focus of part 1 is to present the sense of the body as consisting of an expressive topology based upon features such as mobility and other developmental factors, while part 2 demonstrates how our concept of place contributes to our sense of depth and orientation within a social environment. Forging such a sense of space in our dynamic relation to the world requires, according to Morris, that we eschew approaches which trade upon inferences drawn from a reduction of experience to an underlying order that exists prior to perception, and that we realize that it is we ourselves who actively constitute our sense of space (p. 6). What this means, says Morris, following the example of ecological psychology, is that the emergence of perception is analogous to other phenomena that spontaneously arise from processes of self-organization (p. 15). Morris cites Berkeley, whose dismantlement of dualism led the way to a better appreciation of the complete coordination of previously segregated facets of experience, as the forerunner of the intrinsic approach to the ordering of experience.

The book is replete with fascinating, often well known, perceptual illusions bent on corroborating the phenomenological interpretation of our experience. I am not so sanguine that those who are not already phenomenologically equipped will be convinced by the arguments and interpretations advanced by Morris, despite his clarity of presentation. In the case of the classic double marble phenomenon, for example, one marble felt at two points on its surface by crossed fingers can be perceived differently, as either one marble or two, depending upon different contextual factors. While the misperception that there are two marbles is explained away as owing to the illusion generated by an

expectation based upon an erroneous model of perception and representation, Merleau-Ponty comes to the rescue with the insight that disturbances, such as the crossing of fingers which inhibit our digital movements, may outweigh any mere spatial displacement between two fingers in explanatory importance. My intent here is not so much to be critical of Morris but to remind the reader that determinations of what is explanatorily relevant, especially in cases where relevant factors may have been previously overlooked, do not in and of themselves decide the issue of exactly how much weight ought to be granted to each such factor.

Morris considers the proper phenomenological apprehension of the sense of space to touch upon ethical concerns. The dynamic entanglement of the moving body in the world is not limited to energetic and kinetic considerations alone, for our sense of space is rooted in a social context. Morris draws a contrast between a phenomenological ethics, in which the self is both constituted by others and open to the horizon of new possibilities owing to otherness, and the ethics of the liberal tradition which sees individuals as self-contained subjects. This is an oversimplification of the liberal tradition, which is in part a distillation of a Judao-Christian ethical culture which cannot be correctly characterized as solipsistic. Despite this quibble, I would recommend this book to any properly trained reader willing to invest the time to learn more about the sense of space.—Glenn Statile, *St. John's University.*

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions.* Translated and introduced by Michael W. Grenke. William of Moerbeke Series. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine Press, 2004. ix + 182 pp. Paper, $24.00—This close translation of Nietzsche's five public lectures at Basel, *Uber die Zukunft unserer Bildunsanstalten* (January–March 1872), is accompanied by Nietzsche's introduction to the series, a preface to them as a possible book, as well as notes, plans, and passages from his letters at the time, and an excellent essay he wrote at Schulpforta on Shakespeare's Cassius.

The translation of the lectures is closer than the flowing but inexact one by J. M. Kennedy (1910). Throughout Dr. Grenke supplements his translation by including German words, such as *Erziehung* and *Bildung*, in brackets, and by suggesting alternate, more literal translations. Even apart from a few English infelicities ("like" for "as," "this" without a referent, and mistakes in prepositional idiom), mistaken literalisms ("monstrous moment" for Nietzsche's "ungeheuer Moment" when Nietzsche is speaking of the missed "great moment" [Middleton] to make the captured Strasbourg University great), and one slip that might escape detection because it is almost plausible (p. 81: "lie" should be "live"), the result is sometimes awkward, as if one were listening to a German immigrant in whose English the contour of a German idiom

shows, as still in parts of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Texas, but students of Nietzsche with some German will be grateful for such a wet-suit fidelity to the German.

The result also brings out something else. In a letter Nietzsche calls these lectures "durchaus exhortative" and in comparison with the just then published *Die Geburt der Tragödie* "populär oder exoterisch." These lectures are not in the gay, incisive, and flexible prose through which Nietzsche later reached both solitary individuals and whole publics; I count only three candidate aphorisms. Here Nietzsche seems a bit muscle bound; he knows he could say so much more and yet succeeds in restraining himself, but not easily. He begins by assuring his Basel audience that his criticisms of the educational institutions of the German-speaking world do not include Basel; he will only be reporting conversations he heard in his youth, between a philosophic genius and his former student; these consist in exhortations to solitary philosophic study and comprehensive criticisms of, first, the German Gymnasium and then the University, for their failure to teach good German prose, their encouragement of student freedom (when they should require disciplined obedience), for their democratic spread (instead of exacting elitism), for their leveling of culture (even unto journalism!), for their subservience to the State's need of bureaucrats, for their philological not philosophic relation to antiquity, and above all for their failure to follow the natural order of rank, institute the pyramidal order of rule, and emulate the Romans and Hellenes, who somehow accord with the German spirit. Conspicuously unmentioned is Christianity and in the final simile, the unnamed Wagner. Central in these dramatic conversations is whether a young teacher should go into solitude to become a philosophic genius, or remain in these bad institutions to seek out the few students apt for nobility.

Would these hundred pages of Nietzsche's reported dialogue repay line by line study, as a dialogue by Plato does? Are the speakers substantial enough to matter? Do these speeches fit the speakers? And do the arguments in the dialogue fit the actions, including shots from pistols and barks and bites from a dog? Dr. Grenke seems to have translated these lectures with such in mind, but only a long interpretive essay might show such a reading worthwhile, or an intensive seminar test it. Helpful would be Nietzsche's course, *Einführung in das Studium der platonischen Dialogue*; how Nietzsche read Plato might tell how his own dialogues are to be read.

Another hypothesis is possible, and the materials Dr. Grenke translates allow the student to begin work. The large attendance and approving reception of the early lectures pleased Nietzsche. He intended to publish them as his second book. Yet he never gave the sixth lecture, left thirsty auditors parched, and began criticisms to correspondents; he described them to Malwida von Mesenbug as "nicht genug in die Tiefe," as "in eine farce eingekleidet, deren Erfindung recht gering ist." First he said they needed more work, then that they should never appear. Nietzsche's authority on the matter is unique, but since he also wrote Malwida about being cautious about regaling, or not regaling, Basel with "Wahrheiten meines Lebens," perhaps he merely regretted how much

they had already revealed. Although he wavered, even mentioning a possible seventh lecture to complete the book, Nietzsche never published them, used one passage for *Schopenhauer als Erzieher*, and never again attempted public lectures.

Are these lectures just leftovers (*Nachlass*), more coherent and continuous than most, but not equal to any writings Nietzsche published, and, judging from *Ecce Homo*, would have us pay far more attention to? Probably. Still, even the abandoned struggles of such a thinker, being richer than the perfected, finished, and published works of most others, deserve attention, especially these lectures, because they are about something central to Nietzsche's life and to his thought, namely teaching and learning, especially such learning as constitutes a noble life, which, if a hundred lived it, would constitute a noble culture (*Bildung*). After all, the work Nietzsche came to regard as the greatest gift ever given to mankind, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, tells the life of a teacher, who must give up lecturing others—not give that sixth lecture—go into solitude and learn the lesson he has been evasively exhorting others to learn, for only then will he become the surpassing man (*Übermensch*) he really is. That Nietzsche looked forward to a future educational institution at which there would be chairs devoted to the interpretation of his *Zarathustra* also shows he also never ceased thinking about the institutions he exhorted others to think about in those lectures in Basel in the winter of 1872—Michael Platt, *George Wythe College* and *College of Thomas More*.

NIGHTINGALE, Andrea Wilson. *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy:* Theoria *in Its Cultural Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. x + 311 pp. Cloth, $75.00—If one were to miss the subtitle, one might expect this to be a superficial summary of the thought of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, et alia, intended for a popular audience. However, as a good subtitle should, this one explains the title—specifically "spectacles"—and further, the word *theoria* draws the eye of the academic. Further, (if my own experience is any indication) one might study Greek philosophy for some time and never learn that before Plato and Aristotle extended, and to some extent restricted, *theoria*'s meaning to the contemplation of eternal truths, the word originally named a common pilgrimage to and participation in, usually, religious festivals in which the gods, in some mystical sense, were revealed to the participant. The pregnancy of this bit of etymology is obvious, and Nightingale's work delivers.

In spite of the subject matter, however, Nightingale takes pains to explain that she does not intend to be doing philosophy per se. She is not offering a "philosophical analysis" (p. 7; see also pp. 35 and 73) of the epistemology of Plato and Aristotle, but rather (again, as the subtitle suggests) an investigation of "the foundational construction of theoretical philosophy in its intellectual and its cultural context" (ibid). Likewise, although she admits to exploring "the philosophical and historical

ramifications" (ibid) of Plato and Aristotle's appropriation of *theoria*, Nightingale's emphasis is more sociological and political than (speculatively—no pun intended) philosophical—witness her recurrent theme of Plato and Aristotle's trying to package and sell their version(s) of *theoria* to the aristocratic segment of Greece.

Nightingale's work begins with a substantial introduction that presents (sometimes in surprising detail) many of the theses of the subsequent five chapters, principal among which is that none of the Presocratics or sages of antiquity had a "spectator theory of knowledge," nor did anyone "practice a contemplative mode of life" (p. 32), in spite of Aristotle and Plato's "revisionist history" (p. 228; see also p. 22) to the contrary. In the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., philosophical *theoria* was not a practice, nor even a vain dream; it had to be "invented" (p. 72) and "constructed" (p. 7) by the first ones to call themselves "philosophers," Socrates and Plato (and then somewhat remodeled by Aristotle).

The first two chapters explain in detail *theoria* as a cultural and religious practice divided into three parts: first, the journey (usually abroad) to an oracle, sanctuary, or sacred festival, whether made as a private citizen or as an official representative of one's polis; second, the observing of the games associated with the festival, and/or participating in sacrifices and rituals, such as initiation in the Eleusinian Mysteries, in which one experiences a "theoric gaze" (p. 54) at the divine; and third, the return journey to one's city, where a report is made of all that has been seen. Such a threefold division and the accompanying imagery, Nightingale convincingly shows, lie at the heart of Plato's attempt in the so-called middle dialogues to "describe the new discipline of theoretical philosophy" (p. 73). Plato especially models his *theoria* after the *theoria* of the Mysteries, as he sees the philosopher's contemplation of the forms as "a sort of religious revelation" (p. 87).

Although this in a way has already begun in chapter 2, the remaining chapters dilate on the appropriation(s) of *theoria* by Plato and Aristotle (with a few pages in between on Philip of Opus as a transitional figure). Nightingale's focus is Plato-centric, as Plato's *theoria* (chapters 2–4) is defined via likeness to and in distinction from traditional *theoria*, whereas Aristotle's *theoria* (chapter 5) is defined principally in contrast to that of Plato. Although in the *Protrepticus*, she argues, it is clear that Aristotle's *theoria* is described via traditional *theoria*, nevertheless Aristotle dispenses with the first and third parts of traditional *theoria*. The theoric gaze is itself the goal, and not in any way the journey, much less the subsequent reporting (or teaching?) of what is learned from the gaze. Thus, for Plato *philosophia* was the goal: the life of wonder-laden yearning and seeking, punctuated with occasional glimpses of the beloved, followed by conversation and group assessment of what has been glimpsed and, ideally, practical application by the philosopher king. For Aristotle, on the other hand, *sophia* is the only real interest and, Nightingale insists, social interaction is despised as at most a necessary evil, the rule of the city left to the *phronimos* while the *sophos* remains undisturbed in his ivory tower contemplating the First Mover. Likewise, whereas Plato rejects the claim that philosophy is useless to society, answering that the city merely does not (know how to) make use of

philosophers, Aristotle rejects Plato's answer and boldly declares that philosophy is indeed useless (*achreston*), so useless that it is the contrary of worthless—it is the only study worthy in and of itself, for it is the only study that is liberal, that is, productive of true freedom. Indeed, one of Nightingale's principal theses is that Aristotle denies even that *theoria* "can also be useful (and serve as the basis for 'producing' virtuous actions)" (p. 197), while admitting that Aristotle sometimes explicitly says the opposite. Thus, Nightingale's underlying point seems to be that the view of *theoria* that the Western world has attributed to the Greeks in general—namely, knowledge that is just seeing, not doing, knowledge desirable for its own sake—is neither generically Greek, nor particularly Platonic. Rather, it is the legacy of Aristotle and the "elitist, antidemocratic aspect of theoretical philosophy" (p. 16) that he envisions.

Which brings me to a relatively minor criticism: There is much repetition in the work, so much so, that the reader might become hostile to otherwise plausible (if not compelling) points that are bludgeoned to death. Similarly, certain ubiquitous expressions and borderline name-calling—for example, dozens of times Aristotle is accused of using the doubly-charged "aristocratic rhetoric"—sometimes feel like substitutes for argument. But I say this of an otherwise stimulating work of, if not philosophy, then history of philosophy and culture.—Christopher A. Decaen, *Thomas Aquinas College.*

PIPES, Richard. *Russian Conservatism and Its Critics: A Study in Political Culture.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. 240 pp. Cloth, $30.00—One does not normally study Russian history to understand Western identity, but given that any identity can often be described in the light of its opposite, this book may be useful in answering the timely question raised by Samuel P. Huntington in his book, *Who are We?* Richard Pipes, Baird Professor of History Emeritus, Harvard University, presents this volume as an essay in intellectual history. "My notion of intellectual history," he writes, "is that it concerns itself with ideas which, however unrealistic, influence public opinion and in some degree affect the public's behavior." Given the magnitude of an emerging global economy, the importance, let alone the distinctiveness, of a nation's culture tends to be blurred. Although some welcome the advent of a cosmopolitan, multicultural, global society that suppresses national differences in the interest of material progress, Pipes clearly shows that culture is specific and is tied to property and tradition.

About seventy-five years ago, philosophers and literary intellectuals as diverse as Edmund Husserl, George Santayana, and Paul Valéry, aware of the declining influence of Christianity on Western culture, spoke of "the crisis of Western civilization." Santayana observed: "The present age is a critical one and interesting to live in. The civilization characteristic of Christendom has not disappeared, yet another civilization has begun to take its place. We still understand the value of reli-

gious faith. . . . On the other hand, the shell of Christendom is broken." All three pinned their hopes for the future of the West, not so much on a revived influence of a divided Christendom, but on the revival of the classical sources of Western culture, and Valéry insisted on an acknowledgment of the West's debt to Roman law and Roman Catholicism.

In studying the medieval origins of Russian statehood Russia, Pipes notices a major difference in the political cultures of East and West: "European monarchies," he writes, "were shaped by the fusion of three elements: the heritage of the Roman Empire, the culture of the barbaric tribes which had conquered it, and the Catholic Church." By contrast, for a variety of reasons—geographic, in the first place but also cultural—the political evolution of Russia proceeded in a direction opposite that of the West. The Russian monarchy did not emerge as a sovereign power until the second half of the fifteenth century. Until then, Russian rulers had been vassals of Byzantium and the Mongol Golden Horde. With the capture of Constantinople in 1453 by the Turks, the Byzantine tie was severed. Shortly thereafter, the Golden Horde fell apart. By 1480, under the reign of Ivan III, Russia could claim sovereignty. The subsequent understanding of the power and function of the monarch developed in the light of Orthodox Byzantine theology. The Orthodox Church saw its mission as the salvation of souls, not bodies; it regarded the latter as the province of the state. Committed to keeping out of politics, the Church provided no moral norms that would assist in defining a "good" king and hence developed no standard by which the sovereign could be held accountable as did the Western Church fathers. The good king ruled justly, it was thought, and devoted himself to the well-being of his subjects. A bad or unjust ruler, in this view, was God's way of punishing men for their sins.

These cultural factors certainly contributed to the emergence in Russia of a form of absolute monarchy that in its powers exceeded anything known in the West. To the extent that the ruler bore responsibility for his actions, he was accountable only to God, not to man. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the age of Bodin, Hobbes, and Locke, Russia still had no secular political theory and no familiarity with the concept of the common good or the concept of natural law or, alternatively, the political contract. Russian sovereigns did not share authority but ruled on their own. To its subjects the state could not be conceived apart from the person of the monarch. The notion of the state as an institution separate from the person of the ruler, an idea taken for granted in the West since Roman times, was foreign to the Russian mentality. There was nothing comparable to the Estates General of the West for there were no estates. Private property did not exist. Thus, when Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible), who in 1547 was crowned as Tsar (the Russian word for Caesar), proposed marriage to Queen Elizabeth of England and was rejected, he subsequently taunted her for sharing power with commoners, including merchants, whom he called "trading boors." It was not until 1702 and the reforms of Peter I (Peter the Great) that Western secular political doctrine first came to Russia. Peter spoke of "the fatherland's good," and for the first time the Western notion of common good entered political discourse. Among Peter's reforms was the

abolition of the Office of Patriarch. In 1721 he created a College (ministry) of Spiritual Affairs, also known as the Holy Synod, a body that was to survive until the 1917 Revolution. Having decreed the expropriation of church and monastic lands, Peter offered to the clergy and monks who put up no resistance a state salary, thus securing state control of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The right to private property, unknown in the East but taken for granted in the West, constituted the single most effective barrier to unlimited royal authority. Given this right, the king is compelled to turn to his subjects for financial support and, in the process, forced to concede a share of political power. The sanctity of private property, an axiom of European political thought and practice from Roman times, was vigorously defended by philosophers and theologians in the Latin Middle Ages. Pipes quotes an influential medieval theologian, John of Paris (1255–1306), who declared that neither king nor pope could take a subject's goods without his consent. He finds a similar sentiment expressed by Palacios Rubios, a Spanish jurist writing in the fifteenth century, "To the king is confided solely the administration of the kingdom and not dominion over things, for the property and rights of the state are public, and cannot be the private patrimony of anyone."

Given Pipes's historical account of Russia's past embrace of unlimited autocracy, one can understand Russia's vulnerability to Marxist doctrine and to the assumption of absolute power by its rulers after the 1917 Revolution. The culture had prepared a people for the growth and assertiveness of autocratic principles. Pipes's cultural review ends in the early twentieth century. Elsewhere he has published extensive studies of the Russian Revolution and of the formation of the Soviet Union, and in a volume entitled *Property and Freedom* (1992) he demonstrates the connection between the two. Although Pipes is primarily a historian, he writes always with an eye for what the present can learn from the past. His present work and his many others are timely reminders of the distinctiveness of Western culture and are worth reading for that purpose alone.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America.*

REID, Thomas *On Logic, Rhetoric And The Fine Arts: Papers On The Culture Of The Mind.* Edited and introduced by Alexander Broadie. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005. i + 350 pp. Cloth $85.00—This is the fifth of a planned ten-volume series under the general heading of the Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid. Readers of the previous volumes are well acquainted with the high quality of the production and of the scholarship devoted to the works of Reid. The present volume is no exception. Alexander Broadie's fifty-page introduction clearly establishes the importance of Reid in bringing the inductive logic of Bacon to the forefront of natural philosophy. In these pages and in the richly informing notes to the separate chapters, Broadie conducts a veritable seminar in the intellectual and institutional dimensions of the Scottish Enlightenment and Reid's place within it.

The sources for this volume are the unpublished papers of Reid contained in the Birkwood Colletion. As the title of the volume indicates, Reid's teaching as a Regent included Logic, Rhetoric, and the Fine Arts. The regenting system assigned cadres of students to a specific teacher who would pace them through the entire curriculum of study. Broadie cites Reid's own defenses of this system and the important educational and civic aims achieved by it, at the relatively slight cost of unavoidable superficiality. Today's academic world might benefit from a consideration of current practices as informed by Reid's ideas on just this point.

Under the headings, "The Culture of the Mind," "Logic and Rhetoric," and "The Fine Arts," Broadie arranges and annotates manuscripts from the Birkwood Collection in which Reid outlines his understanding of these subjects and their place within that overall intellectual mission of higher education—the cultivation of the mind. Readers benefit from the editor's tracing of the division of subjects as far back as the Scholastic arrangement of the Trivium and Quadrivium, noting the interrelation of rhetoric and logic and those judgments that comprise aesthetics.

Perhaps the most relevant pages in this valuable text are those devoted to Reid as a defender of the new logic; the inductive logic of such practical importance to experimental science and in this so superior to a syllogistic logic as flawless as it is empty. Reid's recognition of the importance of Bacon's *Novum Organum* and its complementary relation to Newton's natural philosophy was influential in a movement of thought that would come to neglect Reid's contributions to its development. But there is a more subtle lesson taught by this volume and, in the end, the one that Reid himself might have regarded as the chief lesson. As one reads Reid's notes to himself, the order and organization of his thoughts as these will enter into his lectures, one is nearly stunned by the breadth of classical, scientific, literary, and philosophical knowledge, all integrated with coherence and with expressed aims in view. It is Reid the teacher who stands forth in these pages, less as a scold than as a worthy model.

The price of this the other volumes will unavoidably limit sales, though it would be only the odd or bankrupt academic library that would fail to obtain the entire series. Knud Haakonssen, as General Editor, has presided over a signal contribution to philosophy in providing still another generation of philosophers with the reason and the means to study Reid not as a figure from the past but as a thinker of power and originality. Alexander Broadie, as Editor of this volume, leaves nothing to be desired either in his selections or his illuminating reflections on them.—Daniel N. Robinson, *Oxford University.*

RESCHER, Nicholas. *Reason and Reality: Realism and Idealism in Pragmatic Perspective.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. ix + 169 pp. Cloth, $60.00—At the very beginning the author himself tells us: "This book sets out the theoretical underpinnings of the idealistic approach to

metaphysical realism that its author has developed over several decades" (p. ix). It brings to a focus and constitutes a powerful argument for his "functional pragmatism" which is the outcome of what he calls a "hermeneutical realism."

The central idea is that, since we have no substantial evidence for arguing from personal experience to a mind-independent reality, we must yet suppose such a reality if we are to pursue science or even to engage in interpersonal communication. Hence we quite reasonably assume or postulate such a reality. Such an assumption is not only rational, since it is the best we can do, it is retrojustified by its evident success. It enables us to communicate; it enables us to pursue science; it accounts for our occasional errors in existential judgments, inasmuch as it posits a much richer reality than we can ever hope adequately to comprehend or describe in language.

This kind of objective realism is pragmatically functional both in its inspiration and in its justification. Thus it is inherently teleological: it aims at rendering experience intelligible, and it authenticates itself insofar as it succeeds in this aim. (This teleological dimension is especially apparent in chapter 8).

A similar line of thinking underlies our adoption of methods in science just as it did in assuming an extramental reality. There are no a priori norms eternally engraved in nature; we invent them ourselves, more or less fallibly, and we judge them by their success.

In all this Rescher is well aware, as was Aristotle, that "being" can be meant in many ways (chapter 1), and that there is a natural gulf between linguistic truth and objective fact (chapter 2). In chapter 3 he argues that our passage from personal experience to objective fact, making interpersonal communication possible, is not evidential but functional. The ontological component of realism is not discovered but is rather "an *enabling assumption* that undergirds our view of the nature of inquiry" (p. 39). In chapter 4 Rescher gives a detailed analysis of the role of presumptions and of "evidentially transcendent concepts." Chapter 5, "Pragmatic Realism: A Practicalistic Perspective on Philosophical Realism," and the final, eighth chapter, "Pragmatism and Practical Rationality," constitute a good summary of his whole position.

All in all, the book makes a strong case for pragmatism in general and for Rescher's particular form of it in particular. In assessing the acceptability of this view, readers may perhaps wish to consider the following two questions.

(1) Is it in fact the case that, as Rescher claims, "there is no logically compelling transit from personal experience to objective fact" (p. 3)? Of course, if by "logically compelling" he means strict logical entailment, then of course there is none, but it would be a philosophic mistake to demand it. What Rescher pretty clearly means to deny is that there is convincing evidence for such a reality. As he puts it, the justification for postulating realism is not evidential at all but functional (p. 37). Now he has already noted that the standard picture of our relation to the world takes the world to be exercising causal influence upon us and thus to be the causal source of our sensible experience (p. 36), but he simply dismisses the possibility that this interpretation of experience might be authentic, hence evidential.

(2) In his form of pragmatism, does Rescher implicitly contradict in practice what he affirms in theory? He has argued throughout, and especially in chapter 3, that there is no evidential basis leading us from personal experience to the affirmation of a mind-independent reality, so that we can only postulate such a reality, and that such a postulation is a necessary condition for interpersonal communication and for science. But underneath this argument he seems to take quite for granted, and repeatedly, that there in fact exists a mind-independent nature that makes its own demands, a world that has to be understood on its own terms, and that there exist other persons with whom he needs to communicate. If it is the case that there can be no evidence within his own personal experiencing for the objective existence of such realities, why bother postulating them? Who are these persons with whom Rescher feels the need to communicate yet thinks he must also postulate? Does he perhaps implicitly acknowledge the objective reality of a natural world and these other persons prior to explicitly postulating their existence?

This book is erudite and contains much wisdom; the writing is clear and succinct. Regrettably there is no subject index, and the text deserved better manuscript editing than it received.—James W. Felt, *Santa Clara University.*

RICOEUR, Paul. *Memory, History, Forgetting.* Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. xvii + 642 pp. Cloth, $ 40.00—The last English translation to appear during the life of the late Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), *Memory, History, Forgetting* (*MHF*) is perhaps the capstone work of his distinguished career and a seminal philosophy of history and ethics. The subject of critical acclaim in France in 2000, *MHF* significantly should interest and impact the debates of Anglo-American philosophers, historians, theologians, psychologists, sociologists, and cultural and literary theorists.

Ricoeur's text divides into three parts corresponding to its title: the phenomenology of memory; the epistemology of history; and the hermeneutics of the human historical condition, its "emblem of vulnerability" being "forgetting" (pp. xvi, 284). That the words "memory" and "history" appear in the title proves unsurprising. But what of the title's final word, "forgetting"? The putative "duty of memory" (pp. 285, 347) to "not forget" (pp. 30, 90, 413, 418) relegates forgetting to a *via negativa*, the "reverse side of memory" (p. 443). Ricoeur, however, raises the prospect of a "right of forgetting" (p. 92), "a positive meaning" (p. 443) for forgetting that entails the "spirit of forgiveness" (p. 459) and "reconciliation" (p. 495). By reconsidering forgetting, Ricoeur (1) moves toward the praxis of forgiveness beyond epistemological reflections—including the phenomenology of memory (pp. 91, 135, 493) and totalizing, Hegelian philosophies of history (pp. 91, 159, 291)—and utilitarian ethico-politics (pp. 91, 456), and (2) redresses lacunae in *Time and Narrative* and *Oneself as Another* (p. xv).

MHF begins with its "common problematic," the "representation of the past" (p. xvii). The paradox of the past—it "is abolished" yet "no one can make it be that [it] should not have been" (pp. 280, 442)—combined with the ever looming "threat" forgetting poses to the duty of memory to represent the past (as) faithfully and exhaustively (as possible) (p. 412), reveals the following enigma in the notion of the *eikon* used in philosophical accounts of memory: the "entanglement of memory and imagination" (p. 7). In the spirit of Husserlian phenomenology (p. 3), Ricoeur critically surveys the traditional philosophical accounts of memory. With impressive range, he reviews Plato's, Aristotle's, Augustine's, Locke's, Kant's, Bergson's, and Husserl's various answers to the questions—for example: What distinguishes memory from perception, imagination, recognition, and recollections? What are the distinctions and relations between memory's pairs (for example, *mnême* and *anamnêsis*, cognitive and pragmatic memory, declarative and habitual memory)? And how does one account for self-identity over time and one's faithfulness to one's past?—tied to the aporias of the icon's representing of "an absent something that once happened" (p. 136).

Ricoeur's intentionally moralizing language of "faithfulness" specifies memory's duty: "to do justice, through memories, to an other than the self" (p. 89), an insight that takes him"beyond a simple phenomenology of memory" (p. 86). Sections 2 and 3 of part 1, then, confront "the idealist prejudice" in the phenomenology of individual memory with the collective memory of sociology (p. 128). While complimenting the constraints imposed by perceptual/cognitive approaches to "the phenomena of representation" (p. 131), collective (socio-political) memory carries the threat of "thwarted, manipulated memory" (pp. 129, 87). To mediate "between . . . individual . . . collective memory" (p. 131), Ricoeur suggests in part 2 a critical understanding of history, rejecting facile understandings of history's intention to "represent the past just as it happened" (p. 136) in favor of Michel de Certeau's three-phase "historiographical" epistemology: testimony/documentary, explanation/understanding, and writing/representation (p. 136).

History's documentary phase, notes Ricoeur, begins with witness testimony (pp. 147, 180). "Discordant testimonies," however, produce a "crisis of belief," the veracity of which historical criticism purports to "reinforce" by putting "competing" testimonies in dialogue (p. 181). Yet, Ricoeur claims, the problem of credulity remains after written history. Against the pernicious impunity of the historian's objectivity, which renders dubious "history's own self-awareness" (p. 135), Ricoeur maintains that written history is a narrative, an "icon" (p. 280) that selectively represents the past, thereby revealing history's entanglement with "Plato's *pharamakon*." The case of "history-writing [as] a remedy or poison" remaining open (pp. 135, 145), history "repeats" the aporia that afflicted "the phenomenology of memory" (p. 238). While philosophy must critique and dispense with aspects of history's epistemology, it "cannot abstract from the historical conditions in which the duty of memory is required, namely, those of Western Europe . . . after the horrible events of the mid-twentieth century" (p. 86).

Part 3 advances a provocative thesis based on the paradox of the past, arguing that the "authority" to determine what legitimately "stands for the past" belongs to neither the historian's insistence on faithful representation, nor a particular political body's edict, but to the human historical condition. Developing Bergson's ontology of the past, Ricoeur submits that "the positivity of the [past's] 'having been' intended across the negativity of [its] 'being no longer'" enjoys the final authority of "standing in for," representing, the past (pp. 274–80). On the one hand, the past "is abolished"; the equivalent to forgetting occurs with the passing of witnesses and the "destruction of archives, of museums, of cities" (p. 284). On the other hand, "no one can make it be that the past should not have been" (pp. 280, 442); forms of forgetting exist only where "there had been a trace" (p. 284). Ricoeur thus argues that the past exists just as unperceived objects in space exist and forgetting positively denotes "the *unperceived* character of the perseverance of memories [removed] from the vigilance of consciousness" (p. 440). The expired past absent from our grasp "underscores . . . an anteriority that preserves" and "makes forgetting the immemorial resource offered to the work of remembering" (pp. 432–443). Reinterpreting Heidegger's theory that *Dasein*'s temporality makes it historical and allows it to construct histories, Ricoeur founds a positive meaning of forgetting upon this ontology of the past that benefits memory and history rather than leaving it speechless (p. 350).

Against forced forms of forgetting (for example, amnesty, political edicts) and excessive commemorations (pp. 91, 452–4), the "duty to forget," Ricoeur concludes, must not command into oblivion past events and deem them reconciled in the name of "social therapy . . . [and] utility" (p. 456). The "right of forgetting" entails not the citizen's obligation to remember to forget evil, but a "wish in the optative mood to . . . state [evil] in a pacified mode, without anger" (p. 456). This pacified mode translates into the work of mourning by which the victim may separate agent from act (p. 460) and create space for reconciliation (p. 495) by offering "to the unforgivable" the gift of "forgiveness" in Derrida's sense (p. 468).

With this suggestion, the thesis of the work "to which [Ricoeur is] most attached" comes into relief: "There . . . exists a reserve of forgetting which can be a resource for memory and for history" (p. 284). And what Ricoeur has left behind, philosophers shall not soon forget.—Michael R. Kelly, *Boston College.*

RUDD, Anthony. *Expressing the World: Skepticism, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger.* Chicago: Open Court, 2003. ix + 262 pp. Paper, $29.95—We are used to thinking of the skeptic as an epistemological stalking horse. In refreshing contrast, *Expressing the World* treats modern skepticism as a serious dialectical position. Experience as such, the familiar thought goes, is compatible with many and varied rival explanatory

hypotheses—perpetual dreaming, evil scientists, the work of the creative imagination, the causal power of things in themselves and so on. But since we can get no perspective on our experience from the outside, no "view from nowhere," any attempt to demonstrate a given member of this set is *eo ipso* objectionable. Like his ancient counterpart, the modern skeptic therefore suspends judgment. Rudd calls this stance "global metaphysical scepticism" (GMS).

According to Rudd, GMS leaves our prephilosophical beliefs in tact—for it bites only against second-order accounts of experience as a whole. It is not, however, to be confused with merely doubting that our ordinary beliefs satisfy certain ideal requirements, while conceding that they meet more relaxed, contextually sensitive standards. On the contrary, Rudd's skeptic doubts that there is any compelling general theory of what counts as knowledge in any sense.

Now it is increasingly commonplace to present Heidegger and Wittgenstein as offering parallel responses to skepticism. Rather than meet the Cartesian challenge directly, these thinkers aim, in their diverse idioms, to undermine the assumptions on which it rests—notably, the picture of an inner realm of private experience. Once we get shot of this sort of thing, the hope seems to be, our skeptical worries will simply dissolve.

Under the rubric of "Kantian externalism," Rudd offers a crisp outline of how this plays out in the later Wittgenstein and the earlier Heidegger. What Rudd wants to emphasize, however, is the extent to which this antiskeptical approach is itself a radical form of GMS. For both thinkers explicitly oppose, for example, idealist and realist explanatory frameworks and repudiate the "view from nowhere." And both generally seek to bring us back from speculative theory to the ordinary, the everyday, the familiar. But all this is just what we should expect from a modern skeptic.

Rudd then flags up a curious asymmetry in Wittgenstein's thought. For his apparent skepticism about such items as things-in-themselves is not carried over to other minds. To emphasise this asymmetry, Rudd draws out the antibehaviorist elements of Wittgenstein's thought, to the effect that although inner states are typically expressed in outer behavior, the former cannot be reduced to the latter. But can this commitment to the reality of other minds withstand the skeptical challenge?

The skeptic is right, Rudd argues, that we can't prove the reality of other minds but wrong insofar as he assumes that proofs, hypotheses, and the like are needed here to vindicate our ordinary beliefs. It is rational to relate to others as minded not by way of an inference to the best explanation—nor for that matter because ascriptions of mental content are somehow immune to error through misidentification—but because we spontaneously experience human behavior as immediately expressive of mental states. Such states are expressed in and through our experience of the behavior.

None of this is obviously true of taking experience of nonhuman things as of mind-independent denizens of an external world. On the contrary, the very terms suggest an explanatory hypothesis. In the final

and most adventurous part of the book, however, Rudd explores the possibility that the appeal to expression might nonetheless be extended to external-world skepticism.

Drawing on romanticism, phenomenology and especially the later Heidegger, Rudd develops the view that we (sometimes) experience the world precisely as transcending our experience of it. In this mode, things appear to us as continually outstripping our awareness of them, emerging out of a realm that remains hidden from view. The independent reality of things can thus become expressed in and through the very ways in which they appear. Moreover, these expressive aspects are modulated by various ways in which we can be aware of things: whether in anxiety, boredom, disgust, awe, or joy. In this way, Rudd pursues the analogy with the way mental states are disclosed through various forms of spontaneous attunement to expressive behavior.

Expressing the World reconfigures the debates in exciting ways, ranging as it does from enigmatic late Heideggerian texts to recent analytic philosophy. The writing is honest, incisive, and engaging throughout, though the breadth of scope sometimes militates against detailed analysis. The conclusions are tentative, as befits a book purporting to take skepticism seriously. But that the book is a serious response to modern skepticism—rather than another attempt to "refute" some place-holder for an interlocutor or "dissolve" some alleged pseudo-problem—is surely reason enough to read it thoughtfully.—Daniel Watts, *Trinity College Dublin.*

RUNDLE, Bede. *Why there is Something rather than Nothing.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. xii + 204 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $27.50—This is a tightly reasoned, ordinary-language treatment of the subject of its title, and of the arguments by those who maintain that the reason for what there is lies in God's creative action. Rundel disposes of the issue quickly: there could never have been nothing because if there had been there would be nothing now. It follows then that our universe need not have begun nor need it end: it is permanent. The Greeks thought as much, but about a different universe. Rundel asserts that "if anything exists, matter exists on the grounds that it is only in matter that the necessary independent existence is to be found" (p. 166).

This does not directly answer the "why" question, but the fact that it doesn't allows for this volume's central point: the question itself is meaningless. Meaning is found in our dealings with the physical universe and takes the form of language. It is the use of language—grammar—which provides the philosophical standard for ruling a question meaningful or meaningless. Language cannot, then, be meaningful if extended beyond the physical universe: to God, for example, or even to the material world itself taken as a whole. Hence the "why" question is misconceived as is its demand for an answer. There is nothing to explain.

Wittgenstein is the primary historical reference here, followed by Hume, the latter particularly on the issue of cause and necessity. Aquinas is the philosopher whose formulations are most frequently challenged. However, the volume also addresses positions taken by most of those who figure in the contemporary discussion of these matters. The list extends from Malcolm and Swinburne, at one end of the spectrum, to Flew and Smart, at the other, with Geach, Kenny, Kretzmann, Mackie, Polkinghorne, Plantinga, and Anscomb all receiving attention.

Rundel's thinking implies a quite robust picture of the physical universe. Like this universe as a whole, the causal chains within it offer nothing to explain. What would require an explanation for a causal chain would be how its action began. But if the action never began, for example, if elementary particles were always in motion (a plausible and even familiar position), the search for a first would make no sense. It is also interesting, in connection with the picture of physical reality offered, that Rundle rehabilitates the notion of substance, something badly needed in today's philosophy. Not surprisingly, on a scene where matter is the ultimate reality and the locus of independent existence, mind does not emerge in a way that might allow it to be considered a substance. "Ghost in the machine" concerns linger.—J. F. Bannan, *Loyola University Chicago.*

SCHROEDER, Timothy. *Three Faces of Desire.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. viii + 213 pp. Cloth, $35.00—Admirably clear in its focus and organization, this work sets out to examine desire as a single, complex phenomenon that comprises more than erotic yearning, but less than the whole set of positive attitudes. Schroeder uses the word "desire" to signify the entire psychological category which includes what are often called wishes, wants, and so forth. The "three faces" of desire are motivation, pleasure, and reward: that is, desires move us to act; they are dispositions to feel pleasure or displeasure; and, most importantly, they "determine what counts as a reward and what counts as a punishment" (p. 15). The major thesis of *Three Faces of Desire* is that this last aspect of desire is the primary one. It follows that motivation and pleasure are best explained in terms of the reward function.

Drawing upon neuroscientific research, Schroeder argues that there is biological evidence in favor of his philosophical conclusions. Specifically, the brain areas that show activity correlated with feelings of pleasure are distinguishable from those that seem to be associated with the consciousness of possible reward; and, in theory, these latter areas "could exist" in an organic being that lacked the capacity for behavior (p. 58). At this point, the partly theoretical basis of Schroeder's scientific claims might worry a reader who has doubts about the whole program of neurophilosophy: after all, to what degree can empirical findings help us to understand a complex mental phenomenon such as desire? This question, which begs to be asked, is given an oblique an-

swer in *Three Faces of Desire* when the reader is assured that what Schroeder is advocating is neither an identity theory, in which desire would be equated with certain neuronal events, nor a reductive project which aims to replace philosophical discussion of desire and other mental phenomena with the language of quantitative measurement. Like many other contemporary philosophers of mind, Schroeder accepts that mental functions are "multiply realizable" (p. 61): that is, no matter how a process may be realized in the embodied human mind, it still could be instantiated differently, in another kind of living organism.

It is a mark of the author's good sense that he rejects the scientistic positions defended by some of the more notorious authors in the tradition he regards himself as part of, and which—by his own count—includes Dennett and the Churchlands, among others. Schroeder shows the potential to succeed where others have failed, by giving a balanced and illuminating philosophical interpretation of experimental data. In *Three Faces of Desire*, however, his attempt at developing a scientifically informed philosophy of mind is no more than a limited success. Too often, rather than connecting neuroscience with everyday knowledge, Schroeder provides scientific information on the one hand and commonsense remarks on the other. Regarding the latter, Schroeder spends quite a bit of time recording banal commonplaces, such as that people tend to dislike punishment (p. 40), or that we are apt to smile when pleased (p. 75). On the biological side, although *Three Faces of Desire* displays a wealth of empirical detail about the motor striatum and the anterior cingulate cortex, it does not always demonstrate the relevance of this information. While the anatomy of the brain may be fascinating in itself, Schroeder's stated goal is to give "a full account of the nature of desire" (p. 4), which means that it is fair to expect that he should limit his inventory of scientific results to those which reveal something of philosophical interest about the phenomenon under investigation. And once he has endorsed the functionalist thesis that mental states are multiply realizable, it would seem that all he can hope to learn from the physiologists is how these states happen to be instantiated in human beings.

Schroeder notes early on that a naturalistic account of desire ought to build upon "new facts" gleaned from scientific research (p. 6), and later he adds that a theory of desire should also offer "new insight" (p. 162). *Three Faces of Desire* contains shrewd philosophical insight into the intentionality of desire, showing that emotional valence enables us to perceive how things are going in our world of concern. But does this insight essentially depend upon the empirical findings that are reported here? Or would the author have been well advised to reduce the amount of space devoted to factual data, and increase his engagement with philosophical texts that might provide resources for the development of new insight? Schroeder unwittingly echoes Heidegger's discussion of mood when he describes our affective awareness of "how things stand in the world" with respect to our desires (p. 129); elsewhere, he uses the word "care" in referring to desires for certain states of affairs (pp. 101, 138). One might wonder, then, whether he rejects the notion that caring is conceptually distinct from having desires. Or, if he makes this distinc-

tion, does he regard either care or desire as more basic? It would be rewarding to hear what Schroeder thinks about these issues, but unfortunately there is no room to explore them any further in this particular work.—Rick Anthony Furtak, *Colorado College.*

SEIGEL, Jerrold. *The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. viiii + 724 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $27.00—Using a series of provocative images, philosopher Phillip Cary outlines the history of the idea of the private inner self in a striking manner. He begins with Plato's Allegory of the Cave, wherein the soul or self is an eye that has escaped the lower darkness to gaze upward away from itself toward the sun, thereby achieving intellectual vision. This idea is developed by Plotinus for whom the soul is like a sphere revolving around the inner source of intelligibility at the center of things. The soul can look outward toward the darkness or inward toward the intelligible light. In a further development, Augustine pictures the self as an inner palace with large courtyards open to the intelligible light of the sun such that the eye of the soul must turn inward and then upward to be enlightened. The modern development is represented by Locke's picture of the self as a dark room where nothing but images are projected within through windows out of which the self cannot see, the intelligible light of the sun being kept out.

Among the striking elements of this description is the way in which Locke's analogy, so bereft of an outward orientation, is employed to represent the modernist notion of self. This sharp contrast of classical and modern conceptions of the self is alone enough to justify Jerrold Seigel's comprehensive study. There can be no doubt that something new regarding the concepts of soul, self, and personhood came into prominence with the advent of that Copernican Revolution in philosophy, the Cartesian turn. Indeed, every major Western European philosopher since the time of Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke has in some way confronted the problem of the self, and Seigel sets out to catalogue and place into context the various responses to this central problem of modern philosophy.

In an introductory section, Seigel opens his discussion with general remarks on the various approaches to the self as relational, egocentric, narrative, constructive, and so on. Attention is given, not only to ontological and epistemological foundations to such approaches, but also to the broader social and political contexts as well. The author also provides a summary treatment of contrasting and analogous premodern conceptions of the self as further background. Part 2 is devoted to the self in modern British thought, beginning with the seminal contributions of Locke. The egocentric and self-constructive notions of the self are discussed in the work of Hume, Adam Smith, and others. Reactions to Cartesianism among eighteenth-century French *philosophes* such as Condillac, Diderot, and others are discussed along with the focus on

self-awareness of Rousseau. The longest of the sections on early modern philosophy is devoted to German idealism. Kantian autonomy, homological views of the self in Herder, Humboldt, and Goethe, as well as the self-modeled foundationalism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all come in for extended discussion.

The final section of the book investigates more recent thought on the self, bringing the discussion from a consideration of the views of Coleridge, Mill, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson to the transcendent selfhood of Heidegger. The author here achieves a kind of synthesis, bringing together his historical treatment with an effort to determine how far modern thinkers, despite their differences, have been able to achieve a coherent and consistent understanding of the self. The question is at least partly resolved through a consideration of postmodern accounts of the self. Drawing largely on the thought of Derrida and Foucault, the author argues that the egocentric and isomorphic idea of the self, so characteristic of modern thought, has been superseded through a postmodern critique of autonomy and subjectivity.

There is something rather sweeping about this study, not only in its historical scope, but also in its philosophical analysis. Historians of philosophy will appreciate the usefully drawn taxonomy of modern notions of the self. The text is both information-rich as well as clear, avoiding the sort of excessive density often characteristic of such studies. The author also shows some care in exposition, achieving a sympathetic treatment of a variety of philosophical positions. The overarching structure of the book, beginning with the theoretical account of early modern views and ending with the postmodern critique, results in a helpfully directed presentation of the subject. Whether this critique provides the open-ended and persuasive alternative to modern conceptions of the self remains a matter for philosophical discussion. Nonetheless, Seigel has provided a history of the self that can serve as a profoundly useful starting point for such a discussion.—Michael W. Tkacz, *Gonzaga University.*

TALBOTT, William J. *Which Rights Should Be Universal?* New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. viii + 222 pp. Cloth, $35.00—In this clear and engaging book, William J. Talbott tackles two significant projects. First, he articulates a consequentialist justification of basic human rights; and second, he defends an "epistemically modest" form of moral realism.

Basic human rights are "necessary for a government to be relied upon to make itself more just over time" (p. 13). Ultimately, Talbott grounds basic human rights in our "capacity for autonomy" (p. 172). While he is prepared to grant that autonomy may be intrinsically valuable (pp. 113, 133), his primary focus is showing how societies that protect autonomy by respecting basic human rights better promote their citizens' well-being.

Most basic human rights are autonomy rights—rights that are necessary for individuals to employ their judgment in crafting and carrying out their life plans. They include the right to security, subsistence, privacy, education; freedoms of the press, association, and speech; and the right to the requirements for normal development. Talbott adopts and extends Mill's classic argument from *On Liberty*. The key premise is that individuals are better than governments at making—and then adjusting—decisions about their own lives (pp. 123, 127). So autonomy rights improve our well-being directly. But they also improve our well-being indirectly by providing the government with reliable feedback about the effectiveness of its policies and (if necessary) information about how to improve those policies (pp. 114–15).

But how to justify democratic rights? Talbott argues that rights-respecting democracies are best able to solve collective action problems in which almost everyone can benefit from a coercive solution—for example, the use of taxes to provide a criminal justice system or the enforcement of antipollution laws (pp. 141–5). Rights-respecting democracies can also take effective advantage of the fact that most people are willing to incur a small cost to promote fairness even when they do not benefit (pp. 151–5). Amartya Sen has argued that "famines do not occur in countries with a free press and a democratic government with an active opposition" (p. 150). The press makes famines public, and the threat of being tossed from power is the best incentive for a government to work effectively to prevent famine (p. 151). Democratic governments promote well-being because voters are influenced, at least to some degree, by issues of fairness. For this consequentialist argument to work, however, people must make reasonably reliable moral judgments. So our basic human rights include the right to the resources necessary for our moral development (pp. 163–4).

Talbott's defense of basic human rights is framed within the context of moral realism. Fundamental moral principles are metaphysically necessary—they "apply to all morally responsible beings in all possible worlds" (p. 32). Although Talbott admits he cannot identify any fundamental moral principles (p. 33), he identifies particular moral judgments we have good reason to think are metaphysically necessary (for example, an instance of feeding a baby to hungry dogs is wrong). Talbott is careful to note that moral realism does not imply moral imperialism: Moral realists can admit that their moral judgments are fallible, and they can build a case against paternalism more effectively than moral relativists.

Moral realists face tough epistemological problems: how can we know moral truths? Talbott rejects the "proof paradigm" which holds that morality is derived from self-evident truths via demonstrative proofs. This "paradigm has been an almost unmitigated disaster in Western moral philosophy" (p. 23), setting such a high standard that it has inevitably led to moral skepticism. In its place, Talbott offers two different, though not inconsistent, epistemological views: (a) an equilibrium model, which holds that the justification of moral beliefs involves a social-historical process of getting into equilibrium our particular moral judgments and our moral principles (p. 30); and (b) a universal moral standpoint, which involves coming to judgments "from the point of view

of any morally responsible being" (p. 50). Talbott marries these two perspectives: As our moral understanding becomes less biased and more empathetic, our moral views in equilibrium view will lead us naturally, over time, toward a universal moral standpoint.

Given this book's ambitions, one is bound to have worries. For example, I don't think Talbott needs to exhibit quite so much epistemological modesty. As a realist who (at least partially) grounds morality in facts about human well-being, he has an impressive epistemological resource he might have appealed to more often—science. Psychologists are learning about the conditions that promote well-being; and the "affective forecasting" literature suggests that we're less reliable about these matters than we think. Closer attention to relevant psychological findings might strengthen the consequentialist's case for human rights, although it might also somewhat deflate Talbott's claim that we are generally reliable about what is good for us (pp. 123–7).

Talbott often describes moral theorizing as "an ongoing historical-social process of moral discovery" (34). Despite my quibbles, this book makes an important contribution to that process by making a compelling consequentialist case for basic human rights.—Michael A. Bishop, *Northern Illinois University.*

THEUNISSEN, Michael. *Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair.* Translated by Barbara Harshav and Helmut Illbruck. Princeton Monographs in Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. Cloth, $35.00—Michael Theunissen's new volume, *Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair*, might best be initially described in terms of what it is not. It is not a commentary on *The Sickness unto Death* meant to contribute to Kierkegaard scholarship per se, nor is it an engagement with past commentators on Kierkegaard's work. It is, as Theunissen puts it, "a reconstruction that reveals the argumentative structure of fundamental texts and presents the ideas expressed in them more comprehensibly."

On occasion, Theunissen admits that his method is at variance with Kierkegaard's self-understanding. "Such an approach not only contradicts Kierkegaard's self-conception. It also collides with the currently prevalent way of dealing with him," which is more attentive to Kierkegaard's form of communication. The second most significant departure (and one that is not unrelated to the first but much more crucial for the value of Theunissen's project) is his refusal to deal with faith. Theunissen's book must be judged in part by the extent to which it suffers because of its attempt to abstract the Kierkegaardian account of despair from its theological context.

The book is divided into three parts, the first of which is an explanation of Theunissen's method and an articulation of what he takes to be Kierkegaard's operating assumptions. The second part is a detailed

analytic reading of the text of *The Sickness unto Death* focused almost exclusively on part 1, and the third is a very brief discussion of Kierkegaard's dialectic.

The first study presents an interpretation of the text's unity, one that is anchored on a reasonably defensible assessment of Kierkegaard's basic premises. Regrettably, on a first read-through of this study it is often quite difficult to tell whether Theunissen is presenting his own view or what he takes to be Kierkegaard's. Furthermore, in the absence of any reference to other commentators, any reader passingly familiar with other reconstructions of the text cannot help but wonder how Theunissen would respond to previously established perspectives on the text's conceptual unity.

Throughout the first and second studies, Theunissen seems inclined to read *The Sickness unto Death* for its internal tensions and difficulties. His reading, especially in the second study, is detailed and attentive, and he provides a critical, sometimes even jaundiced, assessment. His reading can only be limited, however, by his inattention to part 2. Theunissen is clearly not interested in the theological elements of Kierkegaard's work, but one wonders whether even an analytical reading can afford to ignore the Christian dimension of Kierkegaard's writing.

In the case of *The Sickness unto Death* in particular, it could be argued that the specifically Christian exposition of the concept under examination is at the same time the fullest exposition of that concept, which concludes the book but is assumed as its destination from the very beginning. Kierkegaard is clear that he has allowed the definition of faith to guide his analysis throughout, which implies that the apparently nontheological exposition in part 1 is in fact only a derivation of the obviously theologically significant material in part 2. Without a full appreciation of how parts 1 and 2 interrelate, Theunissen's reconstruction cannot capture the full meaning of the text.

Theunissen's avoidance of the theological dimension of Kierkegaard's thought causes oversights elsewhere as well. He argues, contrary to Kierkegaard's own claim, that the first form of authentic despair not only is the basis of but also displaces the second form, a reading that cannot be sustained if one takes seriously Kierkegaard's observation that the second form, wanting to be one's self, is testimony to the self's establishment by a transcendent power. Greater attentiveness to the theological aspect of the book would also clarify Theunissen's confusion over the despair of defiance, which seems to have as its object not only God but also existence itself. That this thesis is a product of Kierkegaard's specifically theological anthropology has been expertly explained by Charles Bellinger.

Finally, whether due to translation or difficulty in the original German, much of this book required repeated readings. A frustrating sample: "If the study that was concerned primarily with the initial approach was able—for the sake of the fundamental premise of the theory—to pursue its further steps on the line on which they secure the territory initially seized, now what is of interest is what is not on that line; and if the focus on the progress loyal to the line concerned only the external view that was granted by the edifice constructed on the foundation, now

the orientation is guided by the deviant tendencies within the internal space of the later sections." One would hope Theunissen's thought could be presented more transparently.—Jeffrey Hanson, *Boston College*

TYE, Michael. *Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.* Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2003. xv + 203 pp. Cloth, $35.00—Michael Tye apologizes for writing a "third book . . . at least partly on consciousness" by recounting an "epiphany" regarding the unity of consciousness (pp. xi–xii). Sitting in his garden, he noticed that experience has phenomenal unity: he experienced sights, sounds, odors, tastes (of his drink), and the feel of the air together as one unified experience. He found something that he had not previously considered: the phenomenal unity of all types of sensory (and other) experiences at a time, and across time. The book seeks a "theory" of this unity.

The Introduction distinguishes kinds of consciousness (introspective, discriminatory, responsive, and phenomenal) and kinds of unity (object, neurophysiological, spatial, higher-order subject, introspective, Gestalt, and phenomenal). This book is about phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal unity. In chapter 1, Tye solves the "problem of unity" for perceptual experience with "the one experience view": in everyday cases, all experiences come as one (unified) experience; our descriptions of visual, auditory, olfactory, and so forth, experiences arose from focusing on one or another dimension of our "single, multimodal experience" (p. 28). Chapter 2 tackles body image and bodily feeling and finds a single, unified experience of the body with its feelings and pains in their locations. Chapter 3 extends the unity to encompass perceptual and bodily experiences at once, as well as occurrent thoughts and moods. Each chapter addresses objections and develops pertinent metaphysical apparatus, all with Tye's usual clear and engaging style.

These chapters argue that phenomenal unity is not created by combining separately existing experiences into a unity. Our experience comes as one experience, though of course we can descriptively isolate larger or smaller aspects of it at any time. Tye allows that in imaginary counterfactual circumstances one might produce a visual experience by itself, but he rightly contends that this does not entail that ordinary conscious experience is made up of independent conscious elements (visual, auditory, olfactory, and so forth) that must somehow be unified. He rightly observes that our perceptual (and bodily, and cognitive, and emotional) experience is phenomenally given as a unity—whatever the underlying causal mechanisms may be, and however they may be related physiologically. Disappointingly, he provides little support for the premise that motivates these chapters and the book as a whole: his claim that it is "widely supposed in both philosophy and psychology" that we normally undergo "five different simultaneous perceptual experiences at a time" (coinciding with "the" five senses) that exist as

distinct phenomenal experiences requiring unification (p. 17). It would be difficult to find any modern philosopher who denies the phenomenal unity of experience, though some (including Hume) argue that this phenomenology is metaphysically constituted by distinct impressions and ideas that are bundled together (a position that Tye does not actually refute). The relation of Tye's claim to psychological theories is unclear. His concern is with phenomenal unity, not neurophysiological or psychological unity in the mechanisms and processes that underlie our unified experience. Although focused on mechanisms, psychologists have discussed phenomenal unity and have sought to ascertain relations among its various dimensions. Tye does not mention such literature, either to support his sweeping claim or to acknowledge exceptions to it.

The first three chapters concerned the unity of experience at a time (synchronic unity). Chapter 4 concerns the unity of experience through time. Tye supports the theory that "consciousness forms a stream" (p. 108) without constituent parts. The contents of the stream (experientially represented qualities) have "direct phenomenal unity" if and only if "the qualities experienced in one specious present are experienced as succeeding or continuing on from the qualities experienced in the immediately prior specious present" (p. 100). Tye finds historical precedent in Rudolf Carnap's *The Logical Structure of the World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). Oddly, he suggests that William James held a different view, according to which a "stream of consciousness" is composed of constituent elements (p. 102): the exact opposite of James's actual view.

Chapter 5 discusses split-brain patients, rejecting other positions on how many persons (if any determinate number) arise from the surgical procedure for the view that "split-brain subjects are single persons whose phenomenal consciousness is briefly split into two under certain special experimental conditions, but whose consciousness is at other times unified" (p. 113). Chapter 6 rejects two previous conceptions of personal identity: Cartesian ego (the person as a conscious immaterial substance) and Humean bundle (the person as a sufficiently complex bundle of mental states). It argues instead that a person is the subject of a sufficiently complex "psychological framework," where the latter is composed of token streams of consciousness as well as beliefs, desires, and memories (pp. 140–2).

The Appendix discusses varieties of "representationalism," including Tye's previously endorsed view on the "transparency" of phenomenal qualities, which he invokes in this book. Although suggesting that representationalism naturally accommodates his insights on unity, he rightly avoids claiming that his arguments on unity either depend on or serve to establish that position (p. xiv).—Gary Hatfield, *University of Pennsylvania.*

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 42, No. 4, October 2005

A Strawsonian Defense of Corporate Moral Responsibility, DAVID SILVER

It has been argued that corporations are not morally responsible because they lack free wills, bodies, conscious mental states, and/or intentional states. This paper argues that even supposing that corporations lack all these things, they would still bear a kind of moral responsibility for what they do. The argument is modeled on Strawson's defense of human moral responsibility against the charge that individuals would not be responsible for anything if it turned out that the thesis of determinism were true. Strawson responds to this charge by directing our attention to the reactive attitudes. This paper extends Strawson's argument by focusing on the corporate reactive attitudes, that is, those reactive attitudes we direct toward corporations themselves. It maintains that the corporate reactive attitudes are no more rationally undermined by a corporation's presumed deficiencies than would be the reactive attitudes as a whole by the truth of determinism.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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No Objects, No Problem? MATTHEW McGRATH

One familiar form of argument for rejecting entities of a certain kind is that, by rejecting them, we avoid certain difficult problems associated with them. Such problem-avoidance arguments backfire if the problems cited "survive" the elimination of the rejected entities. In particular, this paper examines one way problems can survive: a question for the realist about which

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*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

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of a set of inconsistent statements is false may give way to an equally difficult question for the eliminativist about which of a set of inconsistent statements fail to be "factual." Much of the first half of the paper is devoted to explaining a notion of factuality that does not imply truth but still consists in "getting the world right." The second half of the paper is a case study. Some "compositional nihilists" have argued that, by rejecting composite objects (and so by denying the composition ever takes place), one avoids the notorious puzzles of coincidence, for example, the statue/lump and the ship of Theseus puzzles. Using the apparatus developed in the first half of the paper, the question of whether these puzzles survive the elimination of composite objects is then explored.

The Problem of Defective Desires, CHRIS HEATHWOOOD

The desire-satisfaction theory of welfare says, roughly, that one's life goes well to the extent that one's desires are satisfied. On standard "actualist" versions of the theory, it doesn't matter what you desire; as long as you are getting what you actually want—whatever it is—things are going well for you. There is widespread agreement that these standard versions are incorrect, because we can desire things that are bad for us—in other words, because there are "defective desires." The goal of this paper is to defend the actualist desire-satisfaction theory against the problem of defective desires. It aims to show how the theory can accommodate the obvious fact that we can desire things that are bad for us. Admittedly, there are kinds of allegedly defective desire that the theory cannot accommodate, but these desires turn out not to be defective in the relevant way.

Transmission of Warrant-Failure and the Notion of Epistemic Analyticity, PHILIP A. EBERT

In this paper Ebert argues that Boghossian's explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical principles through implicit definitions commits a transmission of warrant-failure. To this end, a brief outline of Boghossian's account is given, followed by an explanation of what transmission of warrant-failure consists in. This paper also shows that the charge is independent of the worry of rule-circularity which has been raised concerning the justification of logical principles and of which Boghossian is fully aware. The argument comes in two steps: first, Ebert argues for the insufficiency of Boghossian's template which is meant to explain how a subject can acquire a warrant for logical principles. He shows, however, that this insufficiency of his template can be remedied by adopting what Ebert calls the "Disquotational Step." Second, Ebert argues that incorporating this further step makes Boghossian's template subject to a transmission of warrant-failure, assuming that certain rather basic and individually motivated principles hold. Thus, Boghossian's account faces a dilemma: either he adopts the Disquotational Step and subjects his account to the charge of a transmission of warrant-failure, or he drops this additional step leaving the account confronted with explaining the gap that has previously been highlighted. Ebert goes on to suggest various rejoinders that Boghossian might adopt but none of which can resolve the dilemma. Last, the author raises and briefly discusses the

question of whether this worry generalizes to other accounts, such as Hale and Wright's that aim to explain our knowledge of logic and/or mathematics in virtue of implicit definitions.

On Vagueness, 4d and Diachronic Universalism, YURI BALASHOV

Balashov offers a new criticism of the argument from vagueness to four-dimensionalism (Sider 2001). The argument is modelled after an older argument for mereological universalism (Lewis 1986), and may be looked upon as a tightened up and extended version of the latter. While Balashov agrees with other critics (Koslicki 2003; Markosian 2004) that the argument from vagueness fails precisely because of this affinity, his recipe for dealing with it is different. He rejects the assumption, shared by Sider with his opponents, that synchronic composition and "minimal diachronic fusion" are sufficiently similar to use considerations inspired by the analysis of the former to bear on the latter. Balashov's objection to a crucial premise of the argument from vagueness turns on the relevant aspect of dissimilarity between these two cases.

Unexpected A Posteriori Necessary Laws of Nature, ALEXANDER BIRD

In this paper Bird argues that it is not a priori that all the laws of nature are contingent. He assumes that the fundamental laws are contingent, and shows that some nontrivial, a posteriori, nonbasic laws may nonetheless be necessary in the sense of having no counterinstances in any possible world. Bird considers a law *LS* (such as "salt dissolves in water") that concerns a substance *S*. Kripke's arguments concerning constitution show that the existence of *S* requires that a certain deeper level law or variants thereof hold. At the same time, that law and its variants may each entail the truth of *LS*. Thus, the existence of *S* entails *LS*. Consequently, there is no world in which *S* exists and fails to obey *LS*. Bird considers the conditions concerning the fundamental laws that would make this phenomenon ubiquitous. He concludes with some consequences for metaphysics.

Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence, BARRY DAINTON and TIM BAYNE

Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper the authors develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. They begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and they extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, and second, that so far as personal identity is concerned, it is phenomenal rather than psychological continuity that matters. The authors then consider different ways in which the phenomenal approach may be developed, and they respond to a number of objections.

Lewis on Fallible Knowledge, IGOR DOUVEN

Lewis has offered a contextualist epistemology that he claims is nonfallibilist. The present note aims to show that, while there seems to be a simple argument for Lewis's claim, the argument is fallacious, and Lewis's epistemology is fallibilist after all.

Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on Essentialism, Laws, and Counterfactuals, MARC LANGE

In Lange (2004a), the author argued that "scientific essentialism" (Ellis 2001) cannot account for the characteristic relation between laws and counterfactuals without undergoing considerable ad hoc tinkering. In recent papers, Brian Ellis (2005) and Toby Handfield (2005) have defended essentialism against the author's charge. Here, Lange argues that Ellis's and Handfield's replies fail. Even in ordinary counterfactual reasoning, the "closest possible world" where the electron's electric charge is 5% greater may have less overlap with the actual world in its fundamental natural kinds than a "more distant possible world" where the electron's charge is 5% greater. More importantly, however, essentialism's flexibility in being able to accommodate virtually any relation between laws and counterfactuals is a symptom of essentialism's explanatory impotence, as far as that relation is concerned.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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Nietzsche on Truth, Illusion, and Redemption, R. LANIER ANDERSON

Nietzsche's views on truth have provoked controversy: some commentators emphasize texts attacking the possibility and/or desirability of truth, while others highlight Nietzsche's praise for honesty, truth, and science. This paper reconciles tensions between these two strands within Nietzsche by showing: (1) how apparently conflicting claims about the existence of truth can be understood within a consistent epistemology, and (2) how Nietzsche's remarks (pro and con) about truth's value arise because the best sort of life requires both rigorous honesty and "saving illusions." The paper explains Nietzsche's conception of the good life by appeal to eternal recurrence, and argues that both honesty and illusion can consistently play roles in affirming recurrence, as merely regulative ideals. For Nietzsche, we need "saving illusions" to achieve redemption in his sense, which is sharply distinguished from Christian redemption, and the result illuminates Nietzsche's doctrine of "creation of values."

Foucault, Butler, and the Body, DAVID DUDRICK

Judith Butler presents an incisive criticism of Michel Foucault's understanding of the body. She argues, first, that Foucault asserts but must also deny that the body is a construction. Second, she claims that Foucault's description of construction as "inscription" is "logocentric" and so problematic. In this paper, David Dudrick argues against both claims. The bodies Foucault takes to be constructed are not, as Butler assumes, physiological bodies, but what results when these bodies are "directly involved in a political field." Further, Foucault is right to call this construction "inscription" since through it the physiological body is made to bear certain intentional relationships to its environment. Foucault calls this body made intentional "the soul." Zarathustra claimed that the soul is something about the body; Foucault holds that the soul is the body about something. Dudrick uses Daniel Dennett's work and that of contemporary social psychologists to explain and defend Foucault's position.

Kant and Nonconceptual Content, ROBERT HANNA

Perhaps the most famous and widely quoted (but perhaps also the most generally misunderstood) line in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is this pithy slogan: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (CPR A51/B76). Leaving aside empty thoughts, is Kant saying that intuitions without concepts simply do not exist, or that they exist but are meaningless? Or is he saying that intuitions without concepts do exist and are meaningful, but in a way that is sharply different from that of concepts? The aim of this paper is to relate Kant's distinction between intuitions and concepts to the contemporary debate about nonconceptual mental content. The main thesis of the paper is that Kant not only defends the existence and meaningfulness of nonconceptual content, but that he also offers a fundamental explanation of nonconceptual content that can be directly transferred to the contemporary debate and significantly advance it.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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Habermas's Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach Challenge, JAMES GORDON FINLAYSON

This article levels a challenge at Habermas's discourse ethics which is more usually directed to theories denying that moral discourse is truth-bearing. James Gordon Finlayson argues here that the same challenge applies to discourse ethics, because Habermas denies that moral utterances are truth-apt, and claims that they are only analogous to truth. Part 1 shows that Habermas's view that there is only an analogy between truth and rightness rests on an unjustified worry that metaethical cognitivism implies moral realism. It concludes that Habermas simply assumes moral discourse is syntactically

disciplined exactly like theoretical discourse but cannot explain why this is. Part 2 argues that the only tenable responses open to Habermas are either (1) to combine deflationism about truth with the acceptance that moral utterances can be true, or (2) to refrain from offering any theory of truth and to prescind entirely from the metaethical question of cognitivism versus noncognitvism.

Killing Civilians, GERHARD ØVERLAND

In the paper, Gerhard Overland investigates the permissibility of killing nonthreatening people in war. He proposes that although civilians are neither combatants nor a threat to the defending party, there might be relations between civilians and the soldiers making it permissible to kill the former to impede the aggression of the latter. The upshot is that killing civilians may be permissible if they are (1) culpable causes, (2) innocent causes, (3) legitimate innocent shields, and, perhaps, (4) in situations of supreme emergency. Moreover, when civilians are morally responsible for the war while the soldiers in the particular situation are innocent aggressors, it might be preferable to kill the civilians rather than the soldiers. However, when there are no morally relevant relations between civilians and the aggressing soldiers, civilians do enjoy immunity, and should not be victims of war, intended or otherwise.

Deflationary Truthmaking, GERALD VISION

Consider deflationary truth theorists. Most refuse to acknowledge that a truth theory must include a statement of what it is that makes a proposition (or sentence) true. Yet several recent deflationsts have actually proposed what they consider deflationary-friendly truthmakers for propositions, truthmakers that don't violate either the tenets or spirit of their theory. This essay examines two such proposals—from McGrath and Künne—and finds both the arguments for their truthmakers and the conclusions that they reach unsatisfactory. The end result is that deflationary theorists are still confronted by the questions "What makes true propositions true?" and "What distinguishes true from the false propositions?" In lieu of a different deflationary answer, they must either finds grounds to reject such questions or argue that the miscellany of truthmakers do not form a coherent whole. It is unclear that they can discharge this task.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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A Taxonomy of Technics, RICHARD COMBES

Even as philosophers increasingly apply their analytical acumen to other subjects of intellectual study, technology is one area relegated to the sidelines. To help dispel such prejudice, this exercise in applied ontolgy explains why technology invites critical examination, enumerates the generic needs and perceived wants that it fulfills, and then supplies a taxonomy of technological devices individuated in terms of the functional roles that their designers or consumers intend for them. In light of the classificatory scheme developed, the author concludes that everything in space and time may be used to realize technological goals, necessitating a more inclusive understanding of technology and thereby a heightened awareness of its pervasive character.

Aquinas, Marion, Analogy, and Esse: A Phenomenology of the Divine Names? DEREK J. MORROW

The recent translation into English of Jean-Luc Marion's essay "Saint Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy" provides an opportunity to reexamine the significance of Marion's earlier criticisms of Aquinas (set forth, as is well known, in God without Being) in the light of his most current position on Aquinas. Toward this end, Derek J. Moorow discusses the role that the doctrine of analogy plays in Marion's reassessment, and partial retraction, of the controversial indictment of Aquinas that was presented in *God without Being*. Marion's claim that the Thomistic conception of God as *ipsum esse* should be understood by "starting from the distance of God" is highlighted in order to elucidate how, for Aquinas (at least as Marion reads him), the doctrine of analogy functions phenomenologically, as do the divine names generally, to manifest the character of God as infinite goodness and excessive givenness.

Hume and Husserl: The Problem of the Continuity or Temporalization of Consciousness, LOUIS N. SANDOWSKY

This paper examines Husserl's fascination with the issues raised by Hume's critique of the philosophy of the ego and the continuity of consciousness. The path taken here follows a continental and phenomenological approach. Husserl's 1905 lecture course on the temporalization of immanent time-consciousness is a phenomenological-eidetic examination of how the continuity of consciousness and the consciousness of continuity are possible. It was by way of Husserl's reading of Hume's discussion of "flux" or "flow" that his discourse on temporal phenomena led to the classification of a

pointlike now as a "fiction" and opened up a horizonal approach to the present that Hume's introspective analyses presuppose but that escaped the limitations of the language that was available to him. In order to demonstrate the radicality of Husserl's temporal investigations and his inspiration in the work of Hume, the author shows how his phenomenological discourse on the living temporal flow of consciousness resolves the latter's concern about the problem of continuity by rethinking how, in the absence of an abiding impression of self, experience is continuous throughout the flux of its impressions.

Pascal's First Wager Reconsidered: A Virtue Theoretic View, PATRICK TONER and CHRISTOPHER TONER

There are at least two versions of the famous "wager argument" to be found in Pascal's *Pensées*. In contemporary work on the wager, attention is almost always focussed on the second. In this paper, the authors take a look at the first, which is often quickly dismissed as a failure. Indeed, it seems to be generally believed that Pascal himself quickly dismissed it as a failure. The authors first argue that Pascal himself accepted the argument. They then argue (more importantly) that those who accept a virtue theoretic account of human flourishing ought to agree with Pascal in accepting the argument.

Nietzsche's Perspectivism and Problems of Self-Refutation, NICK TRAKAKIS

Nietzsche's perspectivism has aroused the perplexity of many a recent commentator, not least because of the doctrine's apparent self-refuting character. If, as Nietzsche holds, there are no facts but only interpretations, then how are we to understand this claim itself? Nietzsche's perspectivism must be construed either as a fact or as one further interpretation—but in the former case the doctrine is clearly self-refuting, while in the latter case any reasons or arguments one may have in support of one's perspective are rendered both impotent and superfluous. The unpalatable consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism are further highlighted by considering its effects on Nietzsche's treatment of the fundamental laws of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, Nietzsche's perspectivism, if not self-refuting, at least seems to be refuted by his own writings, where he confidently puts forward various doctrines and critiques, thus indicating that he does not think of his own beliefs as being true merely in a perspectival sense. There is every reason, the author concludes, to be perplexed about Nietzsche's perspectivism.

Reason, Intuition and Choice: Pascal's Augustinian Voluntarism, BERNARD WILLS

Pascal is well known to be an early modern disciple of Augustine, but it has not always been sufficiently emphasized that Pascal's Augustinianism differs profoundly from its source in many ways. The following essay examines his reordering of Augustine's psychology and its implications for philosophy

and religion in the modern period. For Augustine, intellect and will are equal moments in the activity of *mens*, but Pascal is radically voluntarist. For him, the will's relation to the good radically transcends intellect's relation to being. This moves Pascal to a position closer in some respects to neo-Platonism. It also prevents him from appropriating Augustine's claim that the triadic human *mens* is a created analogue of the Trinity. Pascal drops Augustine's teaching on this point, with profound consequences for his conception of humanity's relation to God.

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Platonic Recollection and Mental Pregnancy, GLENN RAWSON

Plato's founding position in the tradition of epistemological nativism has been underestimated. In addition to his notorious, naively nondispositional model of learning as recollection, Plato offers several neglected dispositional models of innate ideas, including Diotima's model of mental pregnancy in the *Symposium*, in which maturing mental embryos begin not with the actual content of the knowledge to be acquired, but with a specific potentiality that must be actualized through series of specific kinds of experience and mental activity. A survey of dialogues from *Meno* to *Phaedrus* shows that Plato typically favors such dispositional models, and that he raises doubts about the nondispositional details of the recollection model where it occurs.

Augustine, Epicurus, and External World Skepticism, CHARLES BOLYARD

In *Contra Academicos* 3.11.24, Augustine responds to skepticism about the existence of the external world by arguing that what appears to be the world—as he terms things, the "quasi-earth" and "quasi-sky"—cannot be doubted. While some (for example, M. Burnyeat and G. Matthews) interpret this passage as a subjectivist response to global skepticism, it is here argued that Augustine's debt to Epicurean epistemology and theology, especially as presented in Ciceros' *De Natura Deorum* 1.25.69–1.26.74, provides the basis for a much more plausible, realist interpretation of Augustine's argument.

Maimonides' God and Spinoza's Deus sive Natura, CARLOS FRAENKEL

In this paper Carlos Fraenkel explains how Spinoza's ontological monism is related to the monotheism of a distinct tradition in medieval Aristotelianism exemplified by Maimonides. The author's main contention is that Maimonides's God, conceived as intellectual activity, has the same structure as Spinoza's *Deus sive natura*. The main difference between them is that Maimonides's God is confined to cognitive activity, whereas Spinoza's God is

extensive activity as well. Fraenkel traces the impact of the medieval doctrine of God on Spinoza's thought from the *Cogitata metaphysica* to the *Ethics*, establishing conceptual parallels, literary links, and an explanation of the steps leading from the former to the latter.

Leibniz on Final Causes, LAURENCE CARLIN

In this paper, Laurence Carlin investigates Leibniz's conception of final causation. He focuses especially on the role that Leibnizian final causes play in intentional action, and he argues that for Leibniz, final causes are a species of efficient causation. It is the intentional nature of final causation that distinguishes it from mechanical efficient causation. Carlin concludes by highlighting some of the implications of Leibniz's conception of final causation for his views on human freedom, and on the unconscious activity of substances.

Hegel's Doppelsatz: A Neutral Reading, ROBERT STERN

This paper offers a distinctive interpretation of Hegel's Doppelsatz from the *Preface to the Philosophy of Right*: "What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational." This has usually been interpreted either conservatively (as claiming that everything that is, is right or good) or progressively (that if the world were actual, it would be right or good, but that there is a distinction that can be drawn between existence and actuality). Stern's aim in this paper is to argue against both interpretations, so that the position he offers is neutral between the two. Stern's claim is that when Hegel identifies what is actual with what is rational in the Doppelsatz, his intention is not to offer a normative assessment of what is actual; rather, it is to suggest that genuine philosophy must be committed to reason in its methods of inquiry, if it is properly to undertake an investigation into the "spiritual universe" as well as the "natural" one. The Doppelsatz is thus a defence of philosophical rationalism, rather than a normative claim about "*was ist wirklich.*"

Russell's Reasons for Logicism, IAN PROOPS

What is at stake philosophically for Russell in espousing logicism? Peter Hylton has argued that Russell has a narrowly metaphysical motive for defending logicism. He maintains that for Russell in the early years of the twentieth-century, "logicism was the basis for a complex argument against idealism, of both the Kantian and the non-Kantian varieties." In particular, Russell was interested in refuting certain idealist views on the nature of truth, by showing that mathematics could be true in an unqualified sense. By contrast, Ian Proops argues here that the purposes for which Russell intends to use logicism are chiefly epistemological and mathematical in nature, and that the refutation of post-Kantian idealism is not among them. Russell uses logicism to give an account of the character of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge that is compatible with what he takes to be the uncontroversial status of this science as true, certain, and exact. The unqualified truth of mathematics is a starting point for Russell, not a destination.

John Dewey's "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" and the Exigencies of War, JAMES GOOD

From 1882 to 1903, Dewey explicitly espoused a Hegelian philosophy. Until recently, scholars agreed that he broke from Hegel no later than 1903, but never adequately accounted for what he called the "permanent deposit" that Hegel left in his mature thought. Here, James Good argues that Dewey never made a clean break from Hegel. Instead, he drew on the work of the St. Louis Hegelians to fashion a nonmetaphysical reading of Hegel, similar to that championed by Klaus Hartmann and other Hegel scholars since the 1970s. This reading of Hegel is remarkably consistent with Dewey's mature philosophy. Although Dewey abruptly repudiated Hegel during World War I, Good contends that this reflected the exigencies of war rather than philosophical concerns.

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On the Process of Coming into Existence, ANTHONY GALTON

If something is in the process of coming into existence, it does not yet exist; so how can it be referred to? In this paper, several cases of coming into existence are examined, focusing on the temporal relationship between the process by which an object comes into existence and the time at which it first exists. This relates the problem of coming into existence to an array of modal concepts underlying the application of the imperfective aspect to telic verbs; and also to the well-known Vendler categories of state, activity, accomplishment, and achievement. It emerges that the problem of when an object first exists is separate from that of what it is for it to be in the process of coming into existence. An object may first exist at the beginning, middle, or end of the process by which it comes into existence, depending on the identity criteria for the type of object involved.

Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality, LYNNE RUDDER BAKER

This paper takes a nonreductive approach to the world as encountered. In it, the author contrasts ontological and semantic features of eliminativism, reductionism, and nonreductionism with respect to everyday concepts (like "chair"). She next sketches an ontology of ordinary objects, according to which all concrete ordinary objects are constituted objects, and she considers some objections to such a view. Finally, the author takes a new look at two old issues: ontological vagueness and the distinction between what is mind-dependent and what is mind-independent.

Disassembly and Destruction, ALLAN HAZLETT

In ontology it is common to endorse some version of the Locality Thesis (LT): Whether $p_1 \ldots p_n$ compose something supervenes only on the spatial and causal relations obtaining between $p_1 \ldots p_n$. This paper argues that LT is false, because whether an object that has been disassembled has also been destroyed supervenes on whether it will be reassembled at some point in the future. Furthermore, the intuitions that are usually offered in defense of LT are better captured by a principle that says that composition is not response dependent; such a principle is here proposed and motivated.

Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity, ROSE KOCH

During the first sixteen days after fertilization, the developing embryo has the capacity to separate into two or more genetically identical embryos, or monozygotic multiples. Because of this, philosophers typically argue that the pre-sixteen-day embryo is not a human being. On a Biological Account of Personal Identity (BAPI), which considers human beings as essentially organisms, the embryo's development into an organism at sixteen (or twenty-one) days marks our origins. The development of an embryo into an organism is also said to mark the point at which the embryo loses its potential to give rise to monozygotic twins. This is considered a strength of the BAPI. In this paper it is argued that it is the BAPI's own criteria that will have to allow cases of twinning occurring even after sixteen days, and in virtue of this BAPI's face-twinning puzzles usually reserved for pre-sixteen-day accounts of our origins.

The Organism View Defended, S. MATTHEW LIAO

What are you and I essentially? When do you and I come into and go out of existence? A common response is that we are essentially organisms, that is, we come into existence as organisms and go out of existence when we cease to be organisms. Jeff McMahan has put forward two arguments against the Organism View: the case of dicephalus and a special case of hemispheric commissurotomy. This paper defends the Organism View against these two cases. Because it is possible to devise more McMahanian-type cases, this paper also provides a more general solution to these kinds of cases.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Conventionalism and Realism-Imitating Counterfactuals, CRAWFORD L. ELDER

Historically, opponents of realism have managed to slip beneath a key objection which realists raise against them. The opponents say that some element of the world is constructed by our cognitive practices; realists retort that the element would have existed unaltered, had our practices differed; the opponents sometimes agree, contending that we construct in just such a way as to render the counterfactual true. The contemporary installment of this debate starts with conventionalism about modality, which holds that the borders of the world's kinds and the careers of individuals in those kinds obtain only relative to our conventions of individuation. Realists object that the kinds and careers in nature would still have obtained, had our conventions been different, but conventionalists claim to be able to agree. This paper argues that this claim is false, and that conventionalism contradicts itself.

How to Predict Future Duration from Present Age, BRADLEY MONTON and BRIAN KIERLAND

The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. The authors show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but they defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration.

By Leibniz's Law: Remarks on a Fallacy, BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER

In this paper Benjamin Schnieder investigates a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where "Leibniz's law" is understood as the thesis that if $x = y$, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, for example, a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. The author shows that there can be deficient arguments of this form, and why. He then argues that the interesting philosophical cases of this argument form are unconvincing, since they cannot be seen as clear cases of its unproblematic variety.

A New Problem for Ontological Emergence, DANIEL HEARD

It is becoming increasingly common to find phenomena described as emergent. There are two sorts of philosophical analysis of emergence. Ontological analyses ground emergence in real, distinct, emergent properties. Epistemological analyses deny emergent properties and stress instead facts about our epistemic status. In this paper, Daniel Heard reviews a standard worry for ontological analyses of emergence, namely, that they entail a surfeit of metaphysics, and he finds that it can easily be sidestepped. The author goes on to present a new worry, that ontological emergentism entails a highly implausible ontology, which is harder for the ontological emergentist to avoid.

Intentions and Trolleys, JOSEPH SHAW

The series of "trolley" examples issue a challenge to moral principles based on intentions, since it seems that these give the wrong answers in two important cases: "Fat Man," where they seem to say that it is permissible to push someone in front of a trolley to save others, and "Loop," where they seem to say that it is wrong to divert a trolley toward a single person whose body will stop it and save others. Joseph Shaw replies, first, that there is a parallel between the wrongful intention to mutilate in "Transplant," where one person's vital organs are removed to save others' lives, and the intention to assault in "Fat Man." Second, Shaw defends Frances Kamm's view that in "Loop" one can divert the trolley toward the one without an intention to kill or assault, since good potential side-effects can be taken into account in deciding what to do, without their becoming intentions.

Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential? PETER J. GRAHAM

Antireductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are noninferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. In this paper, Peter J. Graham discusses Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if antireductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such plays no active role, and is superseded by inferential warrant. Graham shows that Fricker's argument begs important questions. Inferential and noninferential support combine to over-determine the justification of comprehension-based beliefs.

On the Dual Referent Approach to Colour Theory, DEREK H. BROWN

A dual referent approach to color theory maintains that color names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that "red" refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. Here Derek H. Brown argues that normal cases of perceptual relativ-

ity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of color whose natural extension includes abnormal cases of perceptual relativity. This contrasts with Peacocke's multireferent view, according to which such abnormal cases force us to introduce a wholly distinct kind of color experience. Brown also argues that the two uses of color names, arising from their two referents, have different extensions, even in normal perceptual circumstances, a consequence which conflicts with the heart of Rosenthal's dual referent view.

Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons, WLODEK RABINOWIGZ and TONI RONNOW-RASMUSSEN

The "buck-passing" account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favor it. As the authors argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the "wrong kind of reasons" problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes toward worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favor an object is of the right kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. The authors argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. They go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble.

Soames' History of Analytic Philosophy, P. M. S. HACKER

PHILOSOPHY
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What, if Aything, are Colours Relative To? JOHN HYMAN

The questions considered are whether colors are relative to systems of color concepts, to the conditions in which they are observed, or to observers or communities of observers; and whether the relativity of colors, such as it is, implies that they are less real than shapes or intervals in time. The argument is based on the thought that Special Relativity provides the best available intellectual framework for thinking about the supposed relativity of qualities of physical things.

Internationalism and Democracy, MARK F. PLATTNER

The current trans-Atlantic debate over multilateralism reveals that the traditional understanding of liberal internationalism is being transcended in favor of "globalism." The latter is a doctrine that goes well beyond favoring international cooperation among states; in fact, the new globalism is

intrinsically hostile to the sovereignty of the nation-state. Thus it runs counter to the basic liberal understanding of the nature of the political order, as reflected in the American *Declaration of Independence* and, on a more philosophical level, in the political teaching of John Locke. The *Declaration* and the Lockean teaching proclaim universal principles but hold that the implementation of these principles should be the business not of some international authority but of democratically elected and accountable national governments.

Wittgenstein and the Conditions of Musical Communication, HANNE AHONEN

If Wittgenstein's later account of language is applied to music, what seems to follow is a version of musical formalism. This is to say that the meaning of music is constituted by the rules of a given system of music, and the understanding of music is the ability to follow these rules. Hanne Ahonen argues that, while this view may seem unattractive at the outset, Wittgenstein actually held this view. Moreover, his later notion of a rule gives us resources to answer some of the traditional criticisms directed against formalism.

Tossing the Rotten Thing Out: Eliminating Bad Reasons not to Solve the Problem of Moral Luck, DARREN DOMSKY

Solving the problem of moral luck—the problem of dealing with conflicting intuitions about whether moral blameworthiness varies with luck in cases of negligence—is like repairing a dented fender in front of two kinds of critic. The one keeps telling you that there is no dent, and the other sees the dent but keeps warning you that repairing it will do more harm than good. It is time to straighten things out. As the author has argued elsewhere, the solution to the problem of moral luck is finally revealed. Our task now is twofold: to hold a magnifying glass up to the initial problem, so that all might finally see it, and to dismiss unfounded fears about solving that problem, so that all might finally stop grinning and bearing it.

A Pascal-Type Justification of Faith in a Scientific Age, ARTHUR FALK

The author argues that faith survives as a rational option, despite science's rendering improbable distinctively theological claims about the world and history. After rejecting justifications of faith from natural theology and natural law, he defends a seemingly weaker strategy, a corrected version of Pascal's wager argument. The wager lets one's desires count toward showing one's faith to be rational, and the faith requires that one's desires undergo radical transformation to protect the faith, making the wager argument really quite strong. As Nietzsche insisted, to be an atheist in the face of this challenge, one would have to become superhuman and transform one's values radically in the opposite direction.

Freedom from a Mainly Logical Perspective, ANTHONY DeJASAY

This paper criticizes a number of accounts of freedom, including those which analyze freedom in terms of affording individuals ever widening opportunities, those which mistake liberties for rights, and those which identify freedoms with duties imposed on others. All these inflated notions of freedom are liable to produce a shrinkage of of freedom in its basic sense of referring to areas of life in which there are rules preventing others from interfering with individuals or groups in doing things which are feasible for them.

Einstein and Kant, FRIEDEL WEINERT

The paper aims to explain and illustrate why Einstein and Kant, relativity and transcendental idealism, came to be discussed in one breath after the Special theory of relativity emerged in 1905. There are essentially three points of contact between the theory of relativity and Kant's objective idealism. The Special theory makes contact with Kantian views of time; the General theory requires a non-Kantian view of geometry; but both relativity theories endorse a quasi-Kantian view of the nature of scientific knowledge. This paper shows that Einstein is a Kantian in his insistence on the synthesis of rationalism and empiricism, but not in the details of his physics.

PHRONESIS
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Euthyphro's Thesis Revisited, PANOS DIMAS

It has been an interpretative dogma to condemn Euthyphro's attempt to account for piety in terms of the gods' wishes as one totally repudiated by Socrates, and in itself untenable. Still at 15c8–9 Socrates expresses some skepticism about whether his refutation of Euthyphro's original account of piety in terms of what the gods love has established that it must be abandoned altogether. He then goes on to say that he and Euthyphro ought to investigate again, from the beginning, what piety is (15c11–12), which may be taken to imply that Euthyphro's original account should be revisited. Interpreting Socrates' refutation of that account as having shown that it is one he rejects completely implies that no weight should be attached to Socrates' later reservations, even though he exhibits considerable care in expressing them. Unfortunately, as this paper argues, this interpretative stand has not brought us any closer to understanding the conception of piety Plato may be attributing to Socrates. If only for the purpose of interpretative completeness, we owe it to Plato actually to do as Socrates suggests at the end of the dialogue that one ought to, and to revisit Euthyphro's thesis. In this paper, Dimas proposes to break ranks with the dogma. Instead, he follows Socrates' recommendation at 15c11 that we should look into what piety is from the beginning, simply to examine whether there are any insights that might be uncovered by doing so.

Ethical and Political Justice, THORNTON C. LOCKWOOD

The purpose of Aristotle's discussion of political justice in *Ethica Nicomachea* 5.6–7 has been a matter of dispute. Although the notion of political justice which Aristotle seeks to elucidate is relatively clear, namely, the notion of justice which obtains between free and equal citizens living within a community aiming at self-sufficiency under the rule of law, confusion arises when one asks how political justice relates to the other kinds of justice examined in EN 5. Is political justice a highly determinate subdivision of justice which Aristotle examines alongside the other varieties of particular justice analyzed in EN 5.2–5? Or is political justice related to the analysis of ethical agency which follows in EN 5.8–11? The question is complicated by the fact that the passage in question—EN 5 1134a17–1135a15—has occasioned much speculation about textual dislocations and has been incorporated into chapter divisions differently according to the two prevalent modern editorial divisions of the *Ethics*. To resolve these problems, the author argues that Aristotle's account of political justice is situated within an extended aporetic analysis which begins in EN 5.6 and extends through EN 5.8. Aristotle introduces the notion of political justice within the extended analysis concerning the ascription of character states because calling someone just or unjust presupposes that the person is a fully mature ethical agent, but anyone capable of political justice possesses such agency. Once the extended argument in the second half of EN 5 is properly understood, it appears that the received text is not in need of emendation. To lend further support to his claim that Aristotle's account of political justice introduces a new inquiry which is not analogous to the analyses of particular justice in the first half of EN 5, the author compares political justice to the other species of justice.

The Stoic Argument Ex Gradibus Entium, LUKE GELINAS

In this paper Luke Gelinas offers an interpretation of the Stoic argumentum *ex gradibus entium* as it appears in book 2 of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*. In addition to displaying certain similarities to later formulations of the so-called ontological argument, particularly Anselm's, Gelinas argues that the argument *ex gradibus entium* was a versatile feature of Stoic philosophical theology, capable of employment in relation to two distinct topics: the existence of god and the identification of god's essential nature with the world. Gelinas claims that the instance of the argument *ex gradibus entium* at ND II 18-21 is a token of this latter type, and he shows that there are no textual reasons precluding this interpretation. In light of the fact that the argument can be analyzed more effectively in this role, the author suggests that this particular instance of the argument is best thought of as an attempt on the part of the Stoics to identify the world with god rather than as a strict proof for god's bare existence. He concludes with some reflections on the general type of the Stoic argument as precursor to two of Anselm's ontological proofs. Although Gelinas thinks it is a mistake to call the Stoic argument "ontological" in a strict sense, it may, he suggests, have shared a similar conceptual underpinning with at least one of Anselm's famous formulations.

Patterns and Perfection in Damascius' Life of Isidore, DOMINIC J. O'MEARA

In this article, it is shown that, following the precedent set in particular by Marinus' *Life of Proclus*, Damascius, in his *Life of Isidore*, uses biography so as to illustrate philosophical progress through the Neoplatonic scale of virtues. Damascius applies this scale, however, to a wide range of figures belonging to pagan philosophical circles of the fifth century A.D.: they show different degrees and forms of progress in this scale and thus provide an edificatory panorama of patterns of philosophical perfection. Each level of the scale of virtues is shown to be exemplified in Damascius' biographies. It is suggested that few, in Damascius' opinion, reached the highest levels of virtue and that philosophical decline is intimated in his descriptions of his contemporaries.

RATIO
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Physical Realism, BRIAN ELLIS

Physical realism is the thesis that the world is more or less as present-day physical theory says it is, that is, a mind-independent reality that consists fundamentally of physical objects that have causal powers, are located in space and time, belong to natural kinds, and interact causally with each other in various natural kinds of ways. It is thus a modern form of physicalism that takes due account of the natural kinds structure of the world. This is a thesis that many present-day scientific realists would surely accept. Indeed, some might say that physical realism is simply scientific realism, but under another name. However, the argument that is presented for physical realism is not the standard one for scientific realism. It is not a two-stage argument from the success of science to the truth of scientific theories, to the reality of the entities postulated in these theories. It is more powerful than this, because it is more direct, and its premises are more secure. It is more direct because it develops what is basically a physicalist ontology as the only plausible metaphysical explanation of the new scientific image of the world. It is more secure in that it does not depend, as the standard argument does, on any doubtful generalisations about the nature or role of scientific theory.

Scientific Realism and Metaphysics, STATHIS PSILLOS

The tendency to take scientific realism to be a richer metaphysical view than it ought to be stems from the fact that there are two ways in which we can conceive of reality. The first is to conceive of reality as comprising all facts and the other is to conceive of it as comprising all and only fundamental facts. In this paper, Stathis Psillos argues that scientific realism should be committed to the factualist view of reality and not, in the first instance, to the fundamentalist. An antifundamentalist conception of reality acts as a

constraint on scientific realism, but it is a further and (conceptually) separate issue whether or not a scientific realist should come to adopt a fundamentalist view of reality. He further argues that scientific realism is independent of physicalism and non-Humeanism, and that the concept of truth is required for a sensible understanding of the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism.

Kinds and Essences, JOHN HEIL

Brian Ellis advances a robust species of realism he calls "physical realism." Physical realism includes an ontology comprising three kinds of universal and three kinds of particular: a six-category ontology. After comparing physical realism to a modest two-category ontology inspired by Locke, the author of this paper mentions two apparent difficulties a proponent of a six-category ontology might address.

Kinds, Essences, Powers, STEPHEN MUMFORD

What is the new essentialist asking us to accept? Not that there are natural kinds, nor that there are intrinsic causal powers. These things could be accepted without a commitment to essentialism. They are asking us to accept something akin to the Kripke-Putnam position: a metaphysical theory about kind-membership in virtue of essential properties. But Salmon has shown that there is no valid argument for the Kripke-Putnam position: no valid inference that gets us from reference to essence. Why then should we accept essentialism? A remaining reason is Ellis's argument by display: we should buy essentialism because of the benefits it will bring. But are these benefits real? The problem is that the putative benefits of essentialism—that the laws of nature are necessary, that the problem of induction is solved, and so on—look actually to be the assumptions of Ellis's theory. If this is the case, there is no real benefit to be gained from adopting the theory. The argument for essentialism is therefore underdetermined, and it remains possible to accept natural kinds into one's ontology without accepting their corresponding essences.

Laws and Essences, ALEXANDER BIRD

Those who favor an ontology based on dispositions are thereby able to provide a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature. In part 1 of this paper, Alexander Bird sketches the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and the concomitant account of laws. In part 2, he characterizes various claims about the modal character of properties that fall under the heading "quidditism" and are consequences of the categoricalist view of properties, which is the alternative to the dispositional essentialist view. Bird argues that quidditism should be rejected. In part 3, he addresses a criticism of a strong dispositional essentialist view, namely, that "structural" (that is, geometrical, numerical, spatial, and temporal) properties must be regarded as categorical.

Universals, the Essential Problem and Categorical Properties, BRIAN ELLIS

There are three outstanding issues raised by Brain Ellis's critics in this volume. The first concerns the nature and status of universals (John Heil). The second is "the essential problem," which is the issue of how to distinguish the essential properties of natural kinds from their accidental ones, and the related question of whether we really need to believe in the essences of natural kinds (Stephen Mumford). The third is that of strong versus weak dispositional essentialism (Alexander Bird), or equivalently, whether there is any place for categorical properties in an essentialist metaphysic (John Heil). This paper addresses these three issues.

IN MEMORIAM

RAYMOND KLIBANSKY (1905–2005)

On 5 August 2005, Raymond Klibansky passed away in Montreal, just a few weeks before his hundredth birthday—he was born in Paris on 15 October 1905. A true cosmopolitan, Klibansly divided his time among McGill (whose faculty he had joined in 1946 as the John Frothingam Professor of Logic and Metaphysics), Oxford, and Wolfenbüttel (he was fellow of Wolfson College and every summer the guest of the director of the Herzog August Bibliothek). Together with Ernst Jünger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Klibansky belonged to the exclusive circle of those great intellectuals who had the chance of living the twentieth century in its entirety and in all its forms. Born in Paris but raised in Frankfurt, Klibansky went first to the quite progressive Odenwald Schule in Eppenheim; he then studied at Heidelberg under the direction of Karl Jaspers, who provided him with funding to attend courses of Ferdinand Tönnies at Kiel and of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf at Berlino. In 1926, Ernst Cassirer invited him to Hamburg to meet Aby Warburg and the scholars of the Warburg-Bibliotek für Kulturwissenschaft, especially Fritz Saxl and Erwin Panofsky, with whom he would bring to completion forty years later the work on *Saturn and Melancholy*, which Saxl and Panofsky had initiated in 1923.

Klibansky was first and foremost a historian of philosophy; however, he was also a philologist, a disciple of Friedrich Gundolf. The critical edition of the *Liber de sapiente* by Charles de Bouelles was his first publication. It appeared as an appendix to Ernst Cassirer's monograph *Individuum und Kosmos in der Renaissance*. He obtained his doctoral degree at Heidelberg in 1929 and his *Habilitation* in 1931. At the end of 1933, with great peril and urgency Klibansky arranged, with the head of the Warburg family, the banker Max Warburg, and the British Academic Assistance Council, the salvage of the Warburg library, which became the Warburg Institute at the University of London. From 1933 to 1939, Klibansky was at Oxford. Together with Herbert J. Paton he edited the miscellany *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer*. In 1938 he became a British citizen. During World War II, he served first in the Political Intelligence section that was located at Bletchley Park. He then accompanied the British troops during the Italian campaign, and he was finally deployed in Germany in the months that preceded and followed victory. As rumor has it, it was Klibansky that managed to convince Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris to save from bombings Cusa, the birthplace of Nicholas of Cusa.

Although Klibansky used to deny it, the rumor seemed not untrue given the great stress Klibansky had put on the tradition of medieval Platonism, *in primis* on authors such as Meister Eckhart and Cusa. His essay *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition* called into question a vision of medieval philosophy anchored on the presupposed primacy of Aristotelianism. In 1940 appeared the first volume of the *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi*, the project

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that Klibansky had started at the Warburg Institute, and which ought to have included sections on *Platus latinus*, *Platus arabus*, *Platus syrus*, and *Platus hebraicus*. Only parts of the first two sections saw the light. After moving to McGill in 1946, Klibansky put into work a number of important initiatives for peace and justice. Among them were the translations into most languages of Locke's epistle on tolerance, the rebirth of the Institut International de Philosophie in 1953 (it had been founded first in Paris during the Descartes conference of 1937), the series *Philosophie et communauté mondiale*, aimed at keeping alive the dialogue between the Blocks during the Cold War, the *Bibliographie internationale de la philosophie*, and the two doxographic works dedicated to twentieth-century philosophy in its entirety, *Contemporary Philosophy—La philosophie contemporaine* and *La philosophie en Europe* (together with David Pears). Klibansky's engagement was effective. One remembers the great passion with which he led a movement in support of the Czech philosopher Jan Patoèka, who eventually was beaten to death by the police in Prague in 1977.

An eminent scholar, Klibansky recognized *d'emblée* the efforts of scholars who dedicated themselves to the investigation of the traditions that are at the basis of our identity and of our cultures. He was especially very encouraging with young scholars.—Riccardo Pozzo, *University of Verona*

JOSEPH OWENS, CSSR (1908–2005)

Joseph Owens died in Toronto, on 30 October 2005, after a long illness. A native of New Brunswick, he chose to serve the Church as a pastor, and he was ordained in 1933 and sent to obtain a Licentiate in philosophy in 1946 and a Ph.D. in 1951. He was encouraged to pursue advanced studies so that he could contribute to the intellectual formation of members of his institute, the Redemptorists. His doctoral dissertation, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought*, proved to be a controversial, enduringly valuable investigation. It was to be the first of many major publications, eventually meriting three revisions of its preface to respond to ongoing criticisms and misinterpretations of his exposition throughout its four subsequent printings. Yet, after his brilliant defense to secure his doctorate, Owens humbly returned to his pastoral work. He was persuaded to pursue what would be a long, illustrious academic career only by the personal intervention of Etienne Gilson.

A highly respected scholar who evidenced profundity and subtlety in numerous published works concerning philosophy's history, whether about pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus, Suarez, or later figures, as well as topics pertaining to metaphysics and ethics, Owens was renowned for the catholicity of his erudition and concerns. His profound reflections on cognition, the reciprocity of conceptualization and judgment, and the synthesizing character of being, will likely suggest further paths of exploration to future speculators inspired by Aquinas's doctrines.

He taught at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto from 1954 until retirement at the age of seventy-five. Colleagues often confirmed their high regard for his professional and personal integrity. Early on he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and subsequently he was chosen to be president not only of the Canadian Philosophical Association, but also the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, the Metaphysical Society of America, and the American Catholic Philosophical Association, which awarded him its esteemed Aquinas Medal.

A complete bibliography of Owens's publications up until 1982 appeared in an important *Festschrift* on the occasion of his retirement, *Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*. He continued to write, teach, and direct dissertations for approximately eight more years. Overall, his meticulous scholarship and creative speculation are woven into nine important published books, as well as approximately 150 scholarly articles along with reviews of forty important philosophical works in authoritative journals. Apart from the work on Aristotle already mentioned, one should note: *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics*, *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy*, *An Interpretation of Existence*, *St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics*, *Towards a Christian Philosophy*, *Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry*, and *Human Destiny*. There remains one important work in typescript that Owens completed before his powers declined, *Aristotle's Gradations of Being in Metaphysics E–Z*, which will eventually appear under the editorial guidance of Lloyd Gerson.

Memorial tributes to unique, integrative, creative contributors to the philosophical enterprise can easily bring to mind Pericles' words in his eloquent funeral oration concerning departed great predecessors: "it is difficult to say neither too little nor too much; and even moderation is apt not to give

the impression of truthfulness." Joseph Owens is now among that illustrious company of recently deceased *philosophi et magistri* appropriately acknowledged in this journal that encourages inquiries into fundamental questions from all philosophical approaches, and to which he so often contributed.—Michael Ewbank, *Seminary of the Fraternity of St. Peter*

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Call for Papers

Metaphysics, first philosophy, was described by Aristotle as the quest for ultimates, *archai*, as he put it. Its subject: Being qua being. Its core question: *What is it for a thing to be?* Metaphysics considers not just living things, like biology, or thinking, or the weather, but whatever exists. It holds itself open to consider all claims about reality at large. It is perhaps its generality that has given metaphysics a bad name in some quarters. The interest in ultimates ensnared it in popular imagination with the arcana of the occult. For many philosophers, metaphysics has seemed to be hopelessly entangled with irresoluble quandaries. For how could one have the effrontery to try to characterize reality at large? Some have taken refuge from such big questions by turning to an analysis of language or some other meta-critique, parasitic on other modes of discourse. Others have substituted historical disquisitions on texts and the circumstances of their composition. Or they have sublimated, if not creatively, in poetic or artistic expression, the cloaking their metaphysical interests in the opacity of oblique discourse or the armor of technical jargon. And yet the big questions do not disappear. They remain robust as long as human curiosity flourishes. And efforts to address them persist, varying in quality with the insights or insightfulness of those who make the attempt.

Our question, then, is the ancient one: What is it for a thing to be? Do minds exist? If so, what is their relation to bodies? What is it to be a person, or a living being? What connections are there between being and knowing, fact and value, reality and truth? Do ideas exist, and if so, how? Does God exist? What about probabilities and possibilities? What is the ontic status of causes? All these questions are opened up by the inquiry into being. The topic is chosen for its openness to a wide variety of perspectives. Papers are invited that seek to grapple with such questions, drawing on the work of past and present philosophers but not avoiding active engagement with the core questions in their own right.

Papers, with a reading time of 30 minutes, or 500 word abstracts, should be submitted by 1 June 2006 to Professor Lenn E. Goodman, Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240. Completed papers will receive priority in consideration. Those whose abstracts are selected by the program committee must submit completed papers by 15 January 2007, in order to give commentators time to prepare.

ARISTOTLE PRIZE: Papers on the above theme submitted by people who have yet to complete a Ph.D., or who have completed a Ph.D. no more than 5 years prior to submission, will be considered for the Aristotle Prize if the program committee is alerted to eligibility. This prize carries with it a cash award of $500 and inclusion in the program.

To be entered for the Aristotle Prize, papers must be complete, submitted by 1 June 2005, and should be clearly designated as Aristotle Prize

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candidates on submission, with a statement of grounds for eligibility. Like other program papers, these should have a reading time of 30 minutes. Those not selected for the Aristotle Prize (of which there is just one) may still be accepted for the program.

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

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

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

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LIFE AS "SELF-MOTION": DESCARTES AND "THE ARISTOTELIANS" ON THE SOUL AS THE LIFE OF THE BODY

SARAH BYERS

DESCARTES'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE BODY can be considered a self-propelled machine rely on a misuse of the Aristotelian concept of "self-motion." They depend upon the premise that life is self-motion, the Aristotelian definition which Descartes learned from Latin handbooks at La Flèche. By retaining this premise, Descartes believed he was defeating the Aristotelians on their own turf when he argued that soul is unnecessary for explaining life functions (self-motion). However, his arguments fail to establish what he intended them to, because whereas Aristotle meant the capacity for self-induced alteration (qualitative motion), Descartes interpreted "self-motion" as a reference to the local motions of the constitutive parts of a body. That this was a misunderstanding, and not simply a disagreement with Aristotle's meaning, can be demonstrated from the *Meditations*, the *Discourse*, the *Treatise on Man*, the *Passions of the Soul*, *The World*, and the letters. Owing to this misinterpretation, Descartes never actually addressed the Aristotelian theory, and so his physics leaves unresolved a problem that Aristotle is able to solve by positing the soul as the life of the body, namely: Why do some things metabolize, but others do not?

Surprisingly, these points have not yet been made. Though Des Chene has recently drawn attention to the question of "life" in Descartes, he has not noticed this.[1] Michael Frede has noted that from

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[1] See Dennis Des Chene, *Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), esp. 15–31; *Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), esp. 55–63, 112–13; and *Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also earlier, Ann W. MacKenzie, "A Word About Descartes' Mechanistic Conceptions of Life," *Journal of the History of Biology* 8 (1975): 1–13.

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Aristotle's point of view, Descartes's conception of the mind is "fundamentally mistaken because it does not even try to explain the life of an organism, since it rests on the assumption that the ordinary life functions can be, and have to be, explained in terms of matter and its properties,"[2] though without observing that Descartes actually relies upon Aristotle's definition of life when he makes this assumption about matter. The other secondary literature has focused on questions of body–soul dualism and immortality rather than the definition of life.[3] It is true that in his own day, Descartes was accused of "withholding life" from animals,[4] and it was objected that the "movements" of animals were too complex to be explained without reference to a soul;[5] yet the precise problem with his account was never pinpointed. As I shall demonstrate, his misuse of "self-motion" was overlooked or shared by all of his contemporary objectors on record: Gassendi, Mersenne, Bourdin, More, and Fromondus. This latter fact indicates a serious weakness at least in the pedagogy, and perhaps also in the actual understanding of Aristotle, in the faculties of western Europe at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

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[2] Michael Frede, "On Aristotle's Conception of the Soul," in *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amélie Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 94.

[3] For recent discussion of these topics and references to the previous work, see Lilli Alanen, *Descartes's Concept of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 44–77; Joseph Almog, *What Am I?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Dennis Des Chene, "Life and Health in Cartesian Natural Philosophy," in *Descartes' Natural Philosophy*, ed. Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton (London: Routledge, 2000), 723–35; C. F. Fowler, *Descartes on the Human Soul* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999); and Roger Ariew, *Descartes and the Last Scholastics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

[4] Henry More, Letter to Descartes, 11 December 1648, in *Oeuvres de Descartes* (hereafter, "AT"), ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, rev. ed. (Paris: Vrin/C.N.R.S., 1964–76), 5:243 and following. For translation and discussion, see Louise D. Cohen, "Descartes and Henry More on the Beast-Machine—A Translation of their Correspondence Pertaining to Animal Automatism," *Annals of Science* 1, no. 1 (1936): 48–61. This letter from More is treated below.

[5] Mersenne to Huygens, September 1646, in *Correspondance du P. Marin Mersenne, religieux minime*, ed. P... Tannery et al., vols. 1–2 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932); vols. 3–4 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1945); vol. 5–17 (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1960), 14:496–7. This passage is treated below.

I

Self-Motion in the Texts of the Aristotelian Commentaries and of Descartes. In a letter to Mersenne in 1640, Descartes mentioned that from among the philosophical texts he studied at La Flèche, he especially remembered those of the Jesuits of Coimbra (hereafter referred to as the Conimbricenses), and of the Spanish Jesuit Toletus.[6] The Conimbricenses' texts were first published in 1592 and 1602; those of Toletus were first published in 1572. These were commentaries on the works of Aristotle, as the philosophy curriculum of the Jesuit schools focused almost exclusively on Aristotle[7]—though the commentaries made reference to others (for example, Plato, Albert the Great, Aquinas, Averroes, Cajetan).[8] Natural philosophy was taught in the second year.[9] Thus we can confidently conclude that the definition of life which Descartes learned was Aristotle's—as it was presented in the commentaries—and that he learned it in his second year.

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[6] 30 September 1640; AT 3:185; *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (hereafter, "CSM" for vols. 1–2 and "CSMK" for vol. 3), ed. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985–91), 3:153–4. On the question of when Descartes read Eustachius a Sancto Paulo's *Summa Philosophiae*, see recently Fowler (*Descartes on the Human Soul*, 196), who argues that he did not know it until late 1640. Des Chene notes that on some points Eustachius (in his *Summa Quadripartita*) draws upon the Conimbricenses to the point of verbatim repitition ("Descartes and the Natural Philosophy of the Coimbra Commentaries," in *Descartes' Natural Philosophy*, 30). For discussion of the commentary as one of a number of genres in natural philosophy in this period, see Margaret Osler, "Gassendi and the Aristotelian Origin of Physics," in *Renaissance and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Peter French and Howard Wettstein (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002), 172 and following.

[7] See Georg M. Pachtler, *Ratio Studiorum et Institutiones Scholasticae Societatis Iesu* (Berlin: A. Hoffman and Co., 1887–94), esp. 2:332 and following.

[8] For discussion of "non-Thomist" elements in Descartes's scholastic training, see Marjorie Grene, *Descartes Among the Scholastics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991), 11 and following; her treatment should be balanced, however, by Des Chene, "Coimbra Commentaries," 30, 31, 40; and Alan Gabbey, "New Doctrines of Motion," in *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1:671.

[9] See Pachtler, *Ratio Studiorum*, 332 and following; Ariew, *Descartes and the Last Scholastics*, 9; and Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, *Descartes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 15.

If we turn now to the commentaries themselves, we find that the Conimbricenses' commentary on the *Physics* defines life as follows: "to move oneself immediately and as the principal cause of one's own motion is the proper office of life" (*movere se simpliciter et ut principalem sui motus causam est proprium munus vitae*).[10] In the same passage, a shorthand way of referring to this characteristic of living things is given, namely "self-motion," *sese movere*.[11] In addition to book 8, chapter 4 of Aristotle's *Physics*, the authorities given for this definition include book 10 of Plato's *Laws*, and the *Phaedrus*, which are summarized as follows: "that thing whose movement is from the outside, is inanimate, but that to which it is intrinsic to itself to be moved by itself, is alive" (*cui forinsecus est moveri, id inanimatum est, cui vero intrinsecus sibi ex se, animatum*).[12] This summary is accompanied by the Greek of *Phaedrus* 245e, in which the key phrase is "a body which has its motion from itself" (*sôma . . . hô de endothen autô ex hautou to kineisthai*).[13] The commentary concludes that philosophers hold it as axiomatic that to have the principle of motion inside oneself (*moveri ab intrinseco*) is the defining characteristic of living things. They include Aquinas in this company by mentioning *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 18, a. 1.

Similarly, in Toletus' commentary on the *Physics* we read: "To live is nothing other than a certain self-motion (*se movere*), and movement of one's own (*motus sui*) is a kind of life: and all things which by some motion move on account of themselves (*per se*), and by an essential principle . . . live . . . Life consists in this, that something essentially has an active principle . . . of some motion within itself."[14]

It is plain from what he says in a number of places that Descartes knew this definition of life, and had learned that the soul (*anima*) was the principle of life in any animate thing. Thus in the Second Medita-

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[10] *Commentarii Conimbricenses in Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis* bk. 8, chap. 3, q. 1, a. 2. Translations of the Conimbricenses and of Toletus are my own.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Plato here gives this as the definition of an ensouled body; motion (*kinêsis*) is identified with life just before, at 245c.

[14] *In Octo Libros Aristotelis de Physica*, bk. 2, chap. 2, text 15, q. 2: "Vivere non aliud est quam quoddam se movere, et vita quaedam motus sui: et omnia quae se aliquo motu per se, et a principio essentiali . . . movent, vivunt . . . . Vita consistat in hoc quod aliquid habeat essentiale principium . . . activum alicuius motus in se."

tion, when recounting what he used to think before he began to doubt his scholastic education, he recalls:

> What then did I used to think I was? A man. But what is a man? Might I not say a 'rational animal'? . . . [I]t occurred to me that I took in food (*me nutriri, me nourissois*), that I walked about, and that I sensed and thought various things. These actions I used to attribute to the soul (*anima, l'âme*). . . . For it was my view that the power of self-motion (*vim seipsum movendi, la puissance de se mouvoir*), and likewise of sensing and thinking, in no way belonged to the nature of the body. Indeed I used rather to marvel that such faculties were to be found in certain bodies.[15]

Moreover, in the *Discourse*, when Descartes rejects the traditional claim that the soul is the principle of life, he retains the definition of life and depends on it as the main premise of his argument. He argues by positing causes for the "movements" of live bodies. The words *mouvement* and *mouvoir* occur six times during the course of the argument.[16] He thus believes himself to have beaten the Aristotelians on their own turf, and announces:

> I want to put them [the Aristotelians] on notice that this *mouvement* which I have just been explaining follows just as easily from the mere disposition of the organs that can be seen in the heart by the naked eye, and from the heat that can be felt with the fingers, and from the nature of blood, which can be known from observation, as does the *mouvement* of a clock from the force, placement, and shape of its counterweights and wheels.[17]

We notice, moreover, that the movements to which Descartes appeals in this part of the *Discourse* are all local motions: the expansion and contraction of the heart, the passage of the blood from the heart cavity into the lungs, the opening and closing of the ventricles of the heart, the traveling of the "animal spirits" to the brain.[18] The same examples of motion recur when he argues against the Aristotelians in

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[15] Meditation Two; AT 7:25–6; AT 9.1:20–21; CSM 2:17–18. Regarding the use of both French and Latin in this quotation: the *Meditations* were published in Latin in 1641, but a second Latin edition with minor corrections was published in 1642 (becoming the "definitive" one, for example, in AT); a French translation with Descartes's approval was published in 1647.

[16] *Discourse*; AT 6:46–50, 54; CSM 1:134–6.

[17] *Discourse*; AT 6:50; CSM 1:136.

[18] *Discourse*; AT 6:46–50, 54; CSM 1:134–6. On Descartes's use of Harvey, Vesalius, and Bauhin on circulation (but disagreement on conceptual framework), see recently Annie Bitbol-Hespéries, "Cartesian Physiology," in *Descartes' Natural Philosophy*, 349–82.

other texts; we find them in his treatise *On Man*,[19] his Letter to Elizabeth of March 1647,[20] and his *Passions of the Soul*.[21]

Thus the preceding argument against the Aristotelians can be schematized as follows. The Aristotelians believe that the changing positions of organs and fluids in the body are mysterious and therefore in need of *anima* to explain them. Contemporary biology and mechanics have dispelled any such mystique; therefore, a vegetative soul is an unnecessary hypothesis.

Descartes's argument that heat is the ultimate source of motion in live bodies also relies on the traditional definition of life as self-motion, and interprets it as local motion. In a letter to Henry More in 1649, Descartes says he holds that life "consists in nothing other than the heat of the heart."[22] In *The World*, he defines heat as the velocity or agitation of tiny component particles (*petites parties qui se remuent*).[23] So Descartes understands the movement of the constitutive parts of a live body to be the result of heat,[24] which is itself the movement of particles of matter. Thus, in the *Treatise on Man* the "principle of movement and life" (*principe de mouvement et de vie*) is the blood and spirits agitated (*agitez*) by the heat of the heart,[25] where heat is to be understood as the local motions of particles.

In the texts I have cited thus far, Descartes has retained the definition of life as self-motion and limited "self-motion" to live bodies. There is, however, no reason for him to limit it if motion simply means local motion. For all material objects are composed of particles that move in that sense—their constitutive particles, which we call mole-

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[19] AT 9:130 and 201–2; CSM 1:100 and 107–8.

[20] Letter 180; AT 4:625–7; CSMK 3:314–15.

[21] AT 11:330; CSM 1:329.

[22] AT 5:267; CSMK 3:360.

[23] AT 11:7–10; CSM 1:83–4. Actually it is flame that is first identified as agitation/movement of particles (AT 11:7–9); then heat is said to be another name for this motion (AT 11:9).

[24] See *Passions*; AT 11:330; CSM 1:329.

[25] AT 11:202; CSM 1:108: literally, agitated by the heat of the fire which continually burns in the heart; but see n. 23 above. On this passage compare Marie B. Hall, "Matter in Seventeenth Century Science," in *The Concept of Matter in Modern Philosophy*, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 9–15. On Harvey's association of spontaneous motion with life, where the motion is understood as the local motion of blood, of which heat is the presupposition, see Thomas Fuchs, *The Mechanization of the Heart: Harvey and Descartes* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001), 48–9, 58–9.

cules,[26] continually collide with one another and change direction, as Descartes had supposed in chapter 7 of *The World.*[27] When "intrinsecus motus" is interpreted as the local motion of tiny parts, then anything material has self-motion; and this is precisely what Descartes claims in *The World*: the local motions of particles are instances of self-motion (*se mouvoir*).[28] God set particles in motion when he created them, but from that instant they move without any extrinsic cause of their agitation.[29] The creation of matter, and inertia,[30] are sufficient to explain the heat of a live body.

Here, then, is another and more fundamental argument that it is not necessary to invoke soul in order to account for life. (a) Life is heat, (b) heat is the local motion of molecules, (c) molecules are self-moving, therefore (d) heat requires no cause outside itself. Thus "it is an error to believe that the soul imparts motion and heat to the body."[31]

If all material objects have self-motion at the micro-level because of the changing positions of their molecules (and, as we now know, of their subatomic particles), then live bodies and automata have this same type of internal motion of parts on the macro-level. Thus Descartes asserts that artefacts have self-motion: "clocks, artificial fountains, mills and other such things are not without the power of self-motion (*ne laissent pas d'avoir la force de se mouvoir d'elles-mesmes*)."[32] And he famously states that there is no difference between the internal motions of automata and live bodies:

> I should like you to consider . . . all the functions I have ascribed to this machine—such as the digestion of food, the beating of the heart and the

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[26] Hereafter I shall use "molecule" for Descartes's "bodies so small that we cannot perceive them and of which every body is composed" (a paraphrase of *Principles of Philosophy*; AT 8A:325; CSM 1:287). I consider this acceptable, despite the fact that Descartes does not use it in these texts (and despite the fact that the English word "molecule" was not coined until 1678) since Descartes is clearly talking about what we call molecules. Gassendi uses *moleculas* in 1658; see *Syntagma*, pt. 2, sec. 1, bk. 4, chap. 8, in *Opera Omnia in sex tomos divisa* (Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Anisson et Ioan. Bapt., Devenet, 1658–75), 337, left col.

[27] AT 11:37; CSM 1:92.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] For inertia see *The World*; AT 11:38; CSM 1:93.

[31] *Passions*; AT 11:330; CSM 1:329.

[32] *Treatise on Man*; AT 11:120; CSM 1:99.

> arteries, the nourishment and growth of the limbs, respiration . . . I should like you to consider that these functions follow from the mere arrangements of the machine's organs every bit as naturally as the *mouvements* of a clock or other automaton follow from the arrangements of its counterweights and wheels. In order to explain these functions, then, it is not necessary to conceive of this machine as having any vegetative or sensate soul or other principle of *mouvement* and life, apart from its blood and its spirits, which are agitated by the heat of the fire burning continuously in its heart—a fire which has the same nature as all the fires that occur in inanimate bodies.[33]

As I hope is now clear, Descartes has gotten into this position by retaining and relying on the Aristotelians' definition of life as self-motion, while interpreting it as internal local motion.

II

Aristotle's Actual Position and the Relative Philosophical Merits of the Aristotelian and Cartesian Positions. Consistent though Descartes's application of the notion of "self-motion" may be, it prevents him from actually engaging the Aristotelian argument that there must be a soul which is the cause of life in a body. Aristotle used the phrase "self-motion" for internally initiated activity[34] in the sense of self-induced alteration, that is, self-induced qualitative change. The qualitative change referred to was change of the constitutive matter of

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[33] *Treatise on Man*; AT 11:202, CSM 1:108.

[34] So also Jennifer Whiting, "Living Bodies," in *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima, 75–91 ("living bodies . . . have their own internal efficient causes of motion and rest," 91) and S. Sauvé Meyer, "Self-Movement and External Causation," in *Self-Motion from Aristotle to Newton*, ed. Mary L. Gill and James G. Lennox (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 65–80. Sauvé Meyer holds that a self-mover is an efficient cause of its motion in the sense of "being the origin [*archê*] of an action." This interpretation is closer to the texts and explains a larger number of texts (see esp. 65–6, 73 n. 12, 78–80) than Gill's in the same volume ("Aristotle on Self-Motion," 15–64). Gill interprets *archê* to mean that the soul merely regulates (determines the order, timing, and "extent" of) motions going on in the simple materials of the body; she denies that the soul initiates the activity of self-nutrition (21–3). That requires downplaying or overlooking Aristotle's words in the *Physics* (cited below), and the *di hautou* of *On the Soul* 2.1 (412a14), cited by Sauvé Meyer ("Self-Movement," 73 n. 12). Elsewhere in this volume, David Furley ("Self-Movers," 3–14) suggests that Aristotle cannot consistently maintain that the self-mover is unmoved by external objects (14); for an interesting discussion of this, see Sauvé Meyer, "Self-Movement," 71 and following.

a body. He was referring to what we call metabolism—which is, at the most basic level, as we now know, the constantly newly initiated changes by which protoplasm is built up and destroyed. To establish this, we must turn to texts which illustrate the senses of "motion" in use at the time of Aristotle and those used by Aristotle himself.

In classical philosophical Greek, *kineisthai* and *kinêsis* mean both to change place and more generally to change. Plato had made the distinction in the *Theaetetus*:

> when a thing changes from one place to another or turns round in the same place . . . here is one form of motion (*kinêsis*). Then supposing a thing remains in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes any other alteration; isn't it right to say that here we have motion (*kinêsis*) in another form? . . . Then I now have two forms of *kinêsis*: alteration (*alloiôsis*) and spatial movement (*phora*).[35]

In Aristotle's texts, too, "motion" (*kinêsis*) means change (*metabolê*) generally,[36] and has four distinct senses, two of which are locomotion and alteration. Thus we find: "It is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes."[37] In other words, something may "move" by coming into or passing out of existence (movement/change with regard to substance), by diminishing or increasing in overall size (movement/change with regard to quantity), by altering its state (movement/change with regard to quality), or by changing its location (movement/change with regard to place).[38]

We may easily infer that Aristotle intends motion-as-alteration when he elsewhere defines life as "self-motion," for he treats "self-nourishment" as a synonym for both "self-motion" and "alteration."

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[35] *Theaetetus* 181c–d. Slightly adapted from the M. J. Levett and Myles Burnyeat translation (*Theaetetus*, ed. Bernard Williams [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992]).

[36] Thus he treats the terms "change" (*metabolê*) and "motion" (*kinêsis*) as synonyms when defining motion in *Physics* 3.1, sometimes replacing one word with the other, and repeatedly pairing the two, as in the phrases *kinêsis oude metabolê*, *kinêseôs kai metabolês*.

[37] *Physics* 3.1.200b33–4: "metaballei gar aei to metaballon ê kat'ousian ê kata poson ê kata poion ê kata topon" (trans. Robert P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984].

[38] See *Physics* 3.1.201a2–9.

Thus in his discussions of living things, he refers to three of the four senses of "motion" just given: diminution or growth (quantity), alteration (quality), and locomotion (place).[39] *Self*-motion is identified as the differentiating characteristic of living things in *Physics* 8.2 (*to zôon auto phamen heauto kinein*, 252b22–23), 8.4 (*to auto huph'hautou kinoumenon*, 254b14–15), and 8.6 (*ha kinei auta heauta*, 259b2–3).[40] When we look for further explanation of this self-motion, it becomes clear that Aristotle considers self-nourishment to be its only requirement; this is said to be the most basic function, found in all living things, at *On the Soul* 413a–b and 415b23 and following.[41] Moreover, growth and diminution are said to presuppose self-nourishment.[42] Thus when he says that either locomotion, growth/diminution, or nourishment is sufficient to distinguish something as alive, the meaning is that locomotion and growth/diminution are always signs of the power of self-nourishment, which is the more basic power.[43]

Since Aristotle explains two of the three relevant senses of motion (quantity and place) as signs of life itself, which he identifies with self-nutrition, by process of elimination we conclude that of the senses of motion possible for life/self-motion/self-nutrition, "alter-

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[39] See *On the Soul* 1.3.406a12–14 and *Physics* 2.1.192b14–15.

[40] Note that the definition "life is self-motion" pertains to life in the sublunar mutable substances only; an all-encompassing definition of life would be "self-dependent actuality." Actuality, *energeia*, is the name of a genus which includes both motion from potentiality to actuality (*kinêsis*), and simple actuality (the state of being actualized, also called *energeia*), on which see Whiting, "Living Bodies," 89. The immutable First Mover, for instance, is said to be alive because it has the self-dependent actuality of thought: that is, it contemplates itself (rather than an object outside itself, which would make it dependent on another); see *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b20–30, *hê nou energeia zôe . . . energeia hê kath'hautên*. Again, the indestructible bodies of the heavens have souls by which they move locally (in orbit), but do not alter (see *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b5, 1073a30). G. Matthews does not raise the foregoing possibility as Aristotle's intended definition of life when he suggests that life ought to be defined as possession of the power to act so as to preserve one's species (see "*De Anima 2.2–4* and the Meaning of Life," in *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima, 185–93).

[41] *Kinêsis hê kata trophên, lambanein trophên, to threptikon, trophêi chrêsthai*. A tendency toward reproduction is concomitant; self-maintenance is accomplished "for the sake of" it (*On the Soul* 2.4.415a26 and following).

[42] *On the Soul* 2.4.415b26–9. Thus growth is distinguishable from the "growth" of, say, crystals, which do not increase quantitatively as a result of the qualitative change which is metabolism.

ation" must be the one intended. Indeed, he interchanges "alteration" with "self-nourishment" when he gives synonymous lists of the characteristic motions of living things: "alteration, growth, decay" is interchanged with "self-nourishment, growth, decay."[44] Thus "life is self-motion" is equivalent to "life is self-alteration in the form of self-nourishment," an alteration of the constitutive matter of a body by means of assimilation and elimination. In more contemporary and colloquial language, by "life is self-motion," Aristotle means that life is self-induced change, in the sense of metabolism.

Aristotle, then, thinks we must posit a soul for living things because not all material objects alter themselves by assimilating elements from the outside, as he says:

> Of natural bodies [that is, three-dimensional objects that are not artifacts] some have life within them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth and decay. *It follows that* every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite [that is, is composed of both matter and life] . . . for the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it [namely, life] . . . thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized [namely, potentially having life in it].[45]

Soul, Aristotle specifies elsewhere, uses heat and cold as instruments (*organa*) when it thus assimilates matter.[46]

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[43] See *On the Soul* 2.2.413a23–31, and compare 415a for the hierarchy of types of souls and the inclusion of more primitive functions at the more sophisticated levels. For a useful summary of Aristotle's account of soul generally, see Philip van der Eijk, "Aristotle's Psycho-Physiological Account of the Soul–Body Relationship," in *Psyche and Soma*, ed. John Wright and Paul Potter (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 55–77.

[44] Sometimes locomotion is included in these lists, at other times not; this is because locomotion is found only in some sensate beings and in humans, not in all living things (see for example, *On the Soul* 2.3.415a6–7). For the interchanging of "alteration" and "nutrition," compare *On the Soul* 1.3.406a12–14 (*phoras alloiôseôs phthiseôs auxêseôs*) and *Physics* 2.1.192b14–15 (*archên echei kinêseôs . . . kata topon, ta de kat'auxêsin kai phthisin, ta de kat'alloiôsin*) with *On the Soul* 2.1.412a14–15 (*zôên de legomen tên di' autou trophên te kai auxçsin kai phthisin*), and *On the Soul* 2.2.413a25 (*kinêsis hê kata trophên kai phthisis te kai auxêsis*).

[45] *On the Soul* 2.1.412a14–20 (trans. Hardie and Gaye, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*).

[46] *Generation of Animals* 2.4.740b32–3. For useful discussion of this and related passages, see R. A. H. King, *Aristotle on Life and Death* (London: Duckworth, 2001), 20–1, 42–3, 50–1, 52–3, and Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, "Aspects of the Relation between Aristotle's Psychology and Zoology," in *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima, 153.

Given Aristotle's intent that self-nutrition be understood as equivalent to motion as alteration, Descartes's arguments that the soul is not needed for the life of the body simply miss the mark altogether. By interpreting the phrase "self-motion" to mean the local motions of parts, and then arguing against "the Aristotelians" that even soulless bodies are comprised of moving parts or particles, he is attacking a straw man.

Descartes will not so easily admit defeat, however. Even were his misuse of the phrase "self-motion" in the arguments cited above brought to his attention, he would presumably say that it does not matter, since in his opinion self-nutrition is reducible to, in the sense that it is merely a name for, the inertial local motions of particles.[47] Hence we must ask: What would the Aristotelian response be in this case?

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[47] Note that neither Aristotle's *Physics* 8.7 nor his *On the Movement of Animals* 5 ought to be interpreted as saying that each qualitative change is reducible to local motion or that "local motion is the only genuine self-motion in animals," *pace* Martha Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 327 (compare 328). Compare Roger Ariew and Alan Gabbey, "The Scholastic Background," in *Cambridge History* 1:440; Alan Gabbey, "New Doctrine of Motion," in ibid., 649 (referring to *Physics* 8.7 through the intermediary texts of de la Rochepozay, Magirus, and Keckerman).

In *Physics* 8.7, Aristotle's argument that local motion is the primary sort of motion in the sense that it is the kind on which the other sorts depend, does not mean that each qualitative change is reducible to local motion. He asserts merely that there must be local motion in the universe in order for qualitative change to occur in the universe. His argument is: whatever is altered (by another) is altered by the presence of something else; therefore locomotion (approach of one object to another) is implied (260b3–6).

The argument of *De Motu* 5 may be summarized as follows: Is it the case that the animal qua self-nurturer (and not only qua the cause of its own local motions) requires something at rest outside itself? (700a27–8; compare chap. 4). Yes it is. For every animal (self-nurturer) is begotten of parents, which begetting is dependent on the prior local motion(s) of the parent organism(s) (700a29–33). And every local motion requires something unmoved (in relation to the one moving), against which the moving one "supports itself" (compare 698a15–20). Thus self-induced alteration and growth require something at rest outside themselves (700a34–b2). The key phrase is in 700a31–2: "this [namely, local motion] is the primary motion in the completed creature" (trans. Nussbaum, 36). Aristotle's meaning is that once an organism has been generated, it (of course) remains true that the local motion of the parents was the *sine qua non* (primary motion) of its generation, and therefore of its subsequent self-nutrition and growth.

The response would be to point out that there is an observable difference between living and nonliving things, which remains regardless of the presence of heat (rapid locomotion of the particles). Heat is not in fact sufficient for metabolism. Automata and rocks do not convert and assimilate matter even when we agitate their constitutive particles with microwaves. Raising the heat content of an object to the point where its particles are moving at the same velocity as those of a living, warm body does not result in self-nourishment.

It is interesting to note that Aristotle himself, as if distinguishing his position from that of Descartes far in advance, clearly indicates that he would not accept the suggestion that self-motion is reducible to the inertial local motion of bodily parts set in motion by, say, the First Mover. In *Physics* 8.4, he makes it explicit that "self-motion" requires being an efficient cause of one's own movement, rather than simply undergoing movement or change. He insists that only living things have motion that is derived from themselves (*huph' hautôn*),[48] and goes on to contrast self-motion with the sort of local motion that Descartes later ascribes to molecules. The text runs as follows: "the real cause of the motion of a ball rebounding from a wall is . . . the thrower. So it is clear that . . . the thing does not move itself (*ouden . . . auto kinei heauto*), but it contains within itself the source of motion not [in the sense] of moving something or of causing motion (*ou tou kinein oude tou poiein*), but of suffering it (*tou paschein*)."[49] Clearly when Descartes describes material particles that have been set in motion by God and afterward allegedly "move themselves (*se mouvoir*)," he is talking about suffering motion, not causing self-motion.

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[48] *Physics* 8.4.255a5–7. Aristotle here raises the question: "From whence are the natural motions of non-living things (for example, heavy things moving downward) derived?" He immediately rules out the possibility that these are derived from the things themselves: "It is impossible to say that their motion is derived from themselves. For this is a characteristic of life and peculiar to ensouled things" (translation adapted from *The Complete Works of Aristotle. To te gar auta huph'hautôn phanai adunaton. Zôtikon te gar touto kai tôn empsuchôn idion*).

[49] *Physics* 8.4.255b27–31. I here use the version of Hardie and Gaye's translation in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), rather than the version of the same in *The Complete Works of Aristotle.*

III

The State of the Aristotelian Account of Life in Descartes's Day. We may now briefly consider the sixteenth-/seventeenth-century reception of Aristotle's explanations of self-motion, so as to answer the question: What historical factors, if any, prevented Descartes from actually engaging this concept? We begin with a hypothesis. Perhaps the Aristotelian commentaries were misleading on the meaning of the term "self-motion."

Moveri, se movere, and *motus,* the Latin translations of the words *kineisthai* and *kinêsis* that were used in the Middle Ages and in the commentaries known to Descartes, can, like their Greek ancestors, mean change generally, in addition to locomotion. Was this made clear in the commentaries of Aristotle which Descartes knew at La Flèche? Yes it was. The commentaries on the *On the Soul* and the *Physics* do state that among the meanings of "motion" (*motus*) is change (*alteratio, mutatio*).[50] Moreover, in the *On the Soul* commentaries, "activity" (*operatio*) is offered as a synonym for "life" (*vita*), claiming Aristotle's authority: "life is activity (*operatio*), and about this Aristotle was speaking";[51] "The definition of substantial life is explained as a doing [something] and engaging in activity of one's own self."[52]

However, the commentaries can be faulted for requiring too much synthesis on the part of the reader. When they give the defini-

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[50] Conimbricenses, *In Libros De Anima,* lib. 1, cap. 3, text 38: "Igitur quattuor sint motus, latio, alteratio, acretio, atque discretio." At Conimbricenses, *In Physic.,* lib. 2, cap. 2, q. 1, *motus* is identified with *mutatio, fluxus, successiva et continua alicuius formae acquisitio, ad formam tendere, actus,* and *paulatim progrediens.*

[51] Toletus, *In Libros De Anima,* lib. 1, cap. 5, text 95: "operatio vita est, et de hoc loquitur Aristoteles."

[52] Conimbricenses, *In Libros De Anima,* lib. 2, cap. 2, exp.: "Explicatur ratio vitae substantialis per ipsius effectum, et operationem."

Moreover, when listing the life functions in their commentaries on the *On the Soul,* they associate these functions with "internal" activity and activity "from oneself," which is reminiscent of their definitions of life as self-motion in the *Physics* commentaries. Thus, in Toletus we find: "from the inside, they [plants] are caused to grow and are nourished" (Toletus, *In Aristotelis Libros De Anima,* in lib. 2, cap. 2, text 14); and in the Conimbricenses: "But by life we mean nutrition [and] growth . . . which truly comes about through that thing itself, which is said to live." Conimbricenses, *In Libros De Anima,* lib. 2, cap. 1, text 3: "vitam autem dicimus nutritionem, accretionem, atque decretionem, quae quidem per id idem fit, quod vivere dicitur."

tion of life as self-motion it is in the *Physics* commentaries,[53] and they do not state there which sense of motion is intended for "self-motion." Aquinas, who is alluded to but not quoted in the Conimbricenses' commentary,[54] may serve as a foil here. When defining life in *ST* I, q. 18, a. 2, he uses the terms *se movere* and *movere seipsum*, and then immediately explicitly gives "self-induced activity" (*agere se ad operationem*) as a synonym for these, apparently taking pains to indicate the sense of *movere* because he knows it will not be immediately obvious.

An additional hypothesis is thus suggested. Perhaps Descartes's education at La Flèche was to blame for not having elucidated the definition of life as *se movere*. For the expositors there were responsible for providing synthesis of the commentaries whenever needed.

Evidence for this hypothesis lies in two areas. The first area comprises Descartes's own texts and includes the French terminology he uses for the Latin words of the Conimbricenses and Toletus commentaries, his own description of nutrition, and his statements about the various Aristotelian senses of "motion."

It seems clear from Descartes's statements that he was trained in Aristotle by expositors who had the pedagogical fault of excessive reverence for technical terminology. As we have seen, he exclusively uses (self-) *mouvement* and *mouvoir* for "life" when describing the Aristotelian position. Since Descartes himself did not have a personal liking for arcane terminology, his usage indicates that he had learned Aristotle from people who simply transliterated the Latin *motus* into "motion" rather than translating it as "change."

Moreover, Descartes's discussion of nutrition in the *Description of the Human Body* is so similar to the Aristotelian explanation that it must be based on it; yet Descartes fails to identify nutrition with alteration, suggesting that the Aristotelian explanation on which it is based was faulty. Descartes says that "we should bear in mind that the parts of all living bodies which require nutrition to sustain them (that is, animals and plants) are continually in a state of change (*sont en continuel changement*)."[55] Notice, however, that although this comes close

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[53] See passages cited above.

[54] See passages cited above.

[55] Part Three ("Nutrition"); AT 247; CSM 1:319. The translation of *sont en continuel changement* is mine, replacing CSM's "are continually undergoing change."

to identifying nutrition with self-induced change (alteration), it falls short of doing so, insofar as "being in a state of change" is an insufficiently specific description of Aristotle's idea of nutrition, which, we have observed, is "being the efficient cause of" change in oneself. This certainly suggests that Descartes's Aristotelian masters did not make, or at least did not emphasize, a simple identity claim between "self-motion," self-nutrition, and self-induced change. Predictably, Descartes goes on to explain this *changement* as the local motions of fluid and solid particles in the body.[56]

Also of importance are Descartes's statements about the senses of "motion." Clearly he knew that scholastic philosophers asserted that *motus* had multiple meanings. In *The World*, he says that the scholastics had "a thousand" meanings for the term *mouvement*. But in this passage, he nevertheless asserts that "the only one he knows" is local motion: "I am not acquainted with any motion except . . . the motion which makes bodies pass from one place to another and successively occupy all the spaces which exist in between."[57] In the same passage he says that the scholastic statement of Aristotle's definition of motion from *Physics* 3.1, which uses the word *motus*,[58] is unintelligible to him. Descartes means by this that the other senses of motion are simply unintelligible; he is not saying that they are intelligible in themselves but he finds them too difficult to grasp. However, the distinction between undergoing change by inertial local motion, and causing change in oneself by self-induced alteration or activity, is not simply unintelligible. Aristotle's example of the ball makes the distinction quite clear and easy to understand. Thus Descartes's claim, if sincere, that the distinction is simply unintelligible would have to have been caused by obscurity in the explanations he received.

A second piece of evidence for the hypothesis that pedagogical faults contributed to Descartes's superficial treatment of "self-

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[56] Ibid.

[57] *The World*; AT 11:39–40; CSM 1:94. For difficulties in interpreting precisely what Descartes meant by "place" in the "ordinary vs. true" definitions of motion (both of which concerned local motion) in the *Principles*, see Gabbey, "New Doctrines of Motion," 657.

[58] "Motus est actus entis in potentia, prout in potentia est" for "hêi tou dunamei ontos entelecheia, hê toiouton, kinêsis estin"; *Physics* 3.1.201a10–11.

motion" is the state of philosophical education in Europe at that time. Although by 1550 in Paris philosophical instruction in Greek was underway and Greek editions of Aristotle were being printed at low cost for students, the trend had apparently not resulted in a deep understanding of Aristotle's texts by the time Descartes was a young man.[59] Fonseca had felt the need to initiate the Coimbra project in 1564 to put more students into direct contact with the mind of Aristotle, "deploring the prevailing situation in which all students of philosophy clamored to be taken as Aristotelian, with so few actually able to understand his words."[60] And we have seen that even the results of this project, published in 1592 and 1602, were not as clear on the concept of self-motion as they could have been.[61] It is not unlikely, then, that Descartes's teachers were unprepared to give an adequate exposition of the Aristotelian commentaries they were teaching.[62] As late as 1642, we have evidence of an enduring, commonplace use of technical terminology among scholastics: Descartes's letter to Fr. Dinet, referring to his condemnation by the professors at Utrecht, alludes to terminology which tended to *mask*, or *avoid talk of*, Aristotle's meaning, rather than to elucidate it: "one must demand . . . an explanation [of scholastic technical terms] from the books of those who use such terminology."[63]

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[59] Perhaps because of the ongoing contest and tension between humanism and scholasticism, on which see Brian Copenhaver and Charles Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 65–6. Elementary Greek was offered at La Flèche; Descartes lacked interest in it and quickly forgot it (see Rodis-Lewis, *Descartes*, 13).

[60] See Fowler, *Descartes on the Human Soul*, 193 n. 14. Similarly Des Chene: the purpose of these commentaries was to stabilize the interpretation of Aristotle ("Coimbra Commentaries," 30). For an overview of late Medieval and Renaissance Aristotelianisms, see Copenhaver and Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy*, 60–76.

[61] Thus in this case, Des Chene's praise for the Coimbrans ought to be tempered: "a Latinity purged of Scholastic barbarities . . . If Aristotelianism could have been renewed, here was its best opportunity" ("Coimbra Commentaries," 42).

[62] See also Copenhaver and Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy*, 60: "we have more than enough evidence of bad, dull, doctrinaire performance in early modern classrooms."

[63] "As if philosophy . . . should have to teach a terminology which it does not need! . . . [O]ne must demand . . . an explanation [of scholastic technical terms] from the books of those who use such terminology" (AT 7:597; CSM 2:394).

Certainly if Descartes had carefully read, reflected on, and synthesized various passages in the Aristotelian commentaries, and if he had pondered the association his teachers had apparently made between self-nourishment and change, he could have done much to avert his own superficial treatment of the notion of *se movere*. There seems to be some truth in a third hypothesis, then: Descartes himself was to blame; he failed to read carefully (or listen to) "the Aristotelians" whose account he hoped to improve upon.

So there are apparently three causes of Descartes's superficial treatment of *se movere*. Can we assign more weight to any one of the three? The texts of Descartes's objectors suggest that the principal cause was inadequate presentation of the material by the "Aristotelians" of the day.

Remarkably, his misinterpretation of *se movere* went unobserved by all of his contemporary objectors who addressed this question of the soul as life or self-mover: Gassendi, who in his own time was accounted one of the three greatest living philosophers (in the company of Descartes and Hobbes);[64] Mersenne, the theologian, philosopher, and mathematician who had been Descartes's schoolmate at La Flèche; Bourdin, a Jesuit and mathematician; Henry More, a "Cambridge Platonist" familiar with ancient and late antique philosophy, who described Aristotle's philosophy as "obvious";[65] and Fromondus, the Louvain philosopher and theologian.[66] In their objections to Descartes, none of them identified the weakness in his arguments that relied on "self-motion," and they gave no clear indication of knowing

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[64] See Craig Brush, *The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi* (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1972), vii. Below I follow Brush's translations where available, except as noted. My translations of texts not translated by Brush, and all Latin quotations, are from the *Opera Omnia* of 1658, which I cite by volume.

[65] Richard Ward, *The Life of Henry More: Parts One and Two*, ed. Sarah Hutton et al. (1710; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 17–18.

[66] For a summary of objections to Descartes's account of animal souls in particular (and using other arguments based on alleged similarities between human and animal passions, intelligence, language, and imagination) by Pollot, Hobbes and Arnauld, see Fowler (*Descartes on the Human Soul*, 125, 128–30). Claude Perrault, writing in the second half of the century, gives a similar argument: the prudence and discretion of the movements by which animals shun or seek the harmful or advantageous are difficult to account for in Descartes's mechanistic philosophy (on Perrault, see J. Wright, "Perrault's Criticisms of the Cartesian Theory of the Soul," in *Descartes' Natural Philosophy*, 686 and following).

what Aristotle actually meant by this term. When they alluded to soul as life, they either failed to mention self-motion altogether, or mentioned motion without addressing its meaning, or referred to motion but identified it with local motion. These remarkable facts suggest a serious and pervasive weakness in the understanding of the Aristotelian definition of life in the faculties of the more prestigious educational institutions. Additional evidence for this theory comes from the philosophical texts of Gassendi and More, the two objectors with the most extensive and important philosophical corpora. Both Gassendi, who, like Descartes, sought to debunk the Aristotelian view that life required *anima*, and More, who desired to defend this traditional view, exhibit the same weakness in their grasp of "self-motion" that we found in Descartes.

Beginning with the authors of the *Objections to the Meditations* and taking them in order, we start with Gassendi. In his preface to the 1624 *Exercises Against the Aristotelians*, he tells Gaultier that while teaching Aristotle's philosophy at the Academy of Aix, "I always made it a point that my auditors should be able to defend Aristotle well."[67] And he sometimes distinguishes Aristotle from "Aristotelians," averring that the latter adulterated the former's ideas.[68] This would lead us to suppose that Gassendi had deep and thorough firsthand experience with Aristotle's texts. Yet he also says that "I was in no way required to make public [that is, publish] any of the points I put forth in defence of Aristotle [when I was teaching], for the voluminous works of the Aristotelians already fill the world . . . it [the Aristotelian position] is upheld more than adequately by Aristotelian authors."[69] Thus we are given pause, for we have already seen the danger of relying on the commentaries of, for example, the Conimbricenses and Toletus.

Indeed, Gassendi's handling of Aristotle has its faults. He sometimes shows himself to be unsure of the Peripatetic position,[70] or

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[67] Brush, 19.

[68] Brush, 23–4.

[69] Brush, 20.

[70] See *Syntagma*, pt. 2, sec. 1, bk. 4, chap. 8; Brush, 409: "The Peripatetics *appear* to hold this position (*videtur . . . sententia haec Peripatetica habenda*)" (emphasis added; Brush translation adapted). Contrast the confidence with which he summarizes for example, Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Stoics (ibid; Brush, 410).

leaves out important information.[71] And he gives the impression that his reading of Aristotle is superficial by giving mistaken citations for passages dealing with motion.[72]

Turning to texts in which Gassendi uses the concepts of self-motion, and motion generally, we note first that in the *Fifth Set of Objections* to the *Meditations*, Gassendi repeatedly alludes to Descartes's statements about the soul, life, and motion. When summarizing Descartes's account of his previously held belief that bodies lack the power of self-motion and that only souls possess it,[73] Gassendi says that it is unclear how Descartes can still maintain this,[74] since "[this] would imply that every body must by its nature be immobile, and that all its movements come from some incorporeal principle, and that we cannot suppose that water flows or an animal moves without some incorporeal movement."[75] Gassendi thus assumes that it is local motion that is relevant to the traditional claim that the soul is a source

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[71] In summarizing and rejecting Aristotle's argument that in a self-mover, the same part of the thing cannot be moved and moving at the same time in the same respect (*Physics* 8.5.257b10), Gassendi leaves out "in the same respect" (pt. 2, sec. 1, bk. 4, chap. 8; Brush, 420), which is emphasized by Aristotle. Gassendi's incomplete representation makes Aristotle's argument appear facile.

[72] He gives *Physics* 8.6 as the location of Aristotle's assertion that the same thing cannot be both mover and moved at the same time, which is not right; as Brush (420 n. 44) notes, it should be 8.5.257b (esp. 257b10). When reporting what is essentially the same claim, that Aristotle held that everything either moves (*kinein*) or is moved (*kineisthai*), Gassendi gives *Physics* 8.8 and *De Caelo* 2.2 as references (*Synt.*, pt. 2, sec. 1, bk. 4, chap. 8, p. 421), which is incorrect. As Brush again suggests (421 n. 45), Gassendi needs to cite *Physics* 8.5. Note that the strange citations are not limited to Aristotelian texts; *Phaedo* 94c–d seems irrelevant to Gassendi's point when he cites it at *Synt.*, pt. 2, sec. 1, bk. 4, chap. 8; Brush, 420.

[73] Second Meditation, cited above, section 1.

[74] Note that Gassendi's belief that Descartes "still" wants to maintain that bodies cannot move themselves is incorrect. Descartes had not asserted this at all; as he responds, "these were simply commonly held views which I was rehearsing so as to show in the appropriate place that they were false" (CSM 2:243; AT 7:351). Gassendi repeats this interpretation later in the same set of Objections: "Remember that you elsewhere denied that a body can move by itself, which implies that you are the cause of the movement" (CSM 2:237; AT 7:341).

[75] CSM 2:181; AT 7:260.

of motion.[76] He continues, again linking the soul's "motion" with local movements:

> You go on to say that, of the attributes ascribed to the soul, neither nutrition nor movement are to be found in you. . . . As far as movement is concerned, since it is you who cause your limbs (*membra*) to move, and they never assume any position unless you make them do so, how can this occur without movement on your part?[77]

Elsewhere in this passage, he does allude to the possibility of other senses of motion when he asks, "Why should you [the soul] not be in motion in many different ways?",[78] and when he says that "exertion" (*contentio*) implies mobility.[79] Yet we are given nothing more specific than this. When later giving the traditional definition of a human soul later in this work, Gassendi uses "motion" exclusively for the local motion of a human being *in toto*: "the internal principle by which a man lives, has sensations, moves around (*loco movetur*) and understands,"[80] and the only other reference he makes to the soul as a mover occurs when he tells Descartes that he interprets "motion" to mean "thinking."[81] Thus Gassendi's 1641 treatment of passages in which Descartes denies that the human soul is the cause of the body's self-motion (life) focuses on bodily movements, and it is vague about any other sort of motion a soul would cause besides locomotion or thought.

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[76] For Gassendi's own assertions that at least some matter is active, not inert, and that soul is corporeal (mobile atoms), see *Synt.*, pt. 2, sec. 1, bk. 4, chap. 8; Brush, 416–7, 420, 422–3, 431.

[77] CSM 2:182; AT 7:261. Gassendi is here addressing Descartes as a soul—since he claims to accept, for the sake of argument, Descartes's supposition that he has no body.

[78] "Cur non moveri pluribus motibus?" (CSM 2:182; AT 7:261).

[79] In contrast to being "at rest" (*non moveri*; ibid). "For, given that you move many of your limbs, how could you accomplish this unless you were in motion yourself? You certainly cannot be immobile, since exertion is required when you move your limbs, nor can you be at rest if you are to produce movement in the body." This is repeated later: "You must explain to us how 'directing' of movement can occur without some effort (*aliqua tui contentione*)—therefore motion—on your part" (CSM 2:237; AT 7:341).

[80] CSM 2:183; AT 7:263.

[81] He refers to "those noted philosophers who, to prove that we are immortal, assume that we are in perpetual motion or, as I interpret it, that we are perpetually thinking" (CSM 2:184; AT 7:264). Compare *On the Soul* 1.3.407a20; Aristotle, summarizing (and disagreeing with) Plato, says that mind's movement is thinking.

Later texts reinforce the impression that Gassendi was unaware of the meaning or implications of Aristotelian "self-motion." In the 1642 *De Motu,* Gassendi makes clear that he is aware that Aristotle posited multiple species of "movement." Like Descartes, he favors the view that all qualitative change can be explained by inertial local motions of particles,[82] although he offers no argument for this position besides an argument from authority.[83] What is more striking and important, however, is that in statements where he links life with motion, rather than indicating awareness of the sense of "motion" intended by Aristotle and denying that alteration is distinct from local motion, he guilelessly identifies this motion with local motion, as if accurately reporting the ancient idea.

Thus he asserts of Aristotle that "in the movements of animals he thought the parts should be distinguished, some of which were moved by others, until that one [part] which moved, itself being unmoved [namely, the soul]."[84] We infer that he understands the moved "parts" as limbs;[85] for when he goes on to allude to the ancient idea that life, self-motion, is cyclic (a claim by which Plato referred to fertility cycles[86]), an erroneous literalism reveals itself:

> No motion can be executed by an animal which is simply straight; a man, for instance, cannot trace a straight line with his finger or pen except through the combination of several circular movements at once.

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[82] "There is no motion that cannot be considered natural inasmuch as there is none that does not result from the fundamental particles of things, particles whose nature was willed by their author to include forever a principle of motion by which they could move. And this would seem to be the reason why they are mixed together in different ways and create different sorts of things which act variously among themselves and are acted upon, or move and are moved" (*De Motu,* First Letter; *Opera Omnia* 3:488, right col.; Brush, 126).

[83] "Every transformation by which . . . qualities come into being appear to be nothing more than certain local motions in which the fundamental particles of things, although very tiny and imperceptible, mix in different ways. . . . Such, at least, according to Sextus Empiricus, was the opinion of famous philosophers who held that such changes were no more than certain kinds of local motion against Aristotle, who defended the position that they were distinct from local motion" (ibid.).

[84] "in motibus animalium distinguendas censuerit parteis, quarum aliae moverentur ab aliis, ad usque unam, que moveret, per se immota" (*De Motu,* First Letter; *Opera Omnia* 3:488, left col.; my translation).

[85] So Brush, 126. These passages are separated by a few paragraphs, but Gassendi refers back to this one when he begins the second of the two.

[86] *Republic* 546a.

> . . . Also, consider the spontaneous motion of the arms as you walk in a hurry; their center is the shoulder blade . . . and the movement of the leg, whose center is the hipbone."[87]

As we have seen, this crude model is far from what Aristotle intended when he argued that the soul is the unmoved mover (principle of life) in an organism.[88]

Similarly, in the book on plants of the 1658 *Syntagma*, Gassendi sets out to defend the view of Epicurus that plants do not have souls. He raises the Aristotelian objection:

> But yet, you say, are not plants said to live and die? Therefore there is life in them. And if we first conceded life [to them], must not *anima* also be conceded to them, without which life cannot be made sense of? And anyway, isn't nutrition itself the action of life, and [didn't] Aristotle rightly contend that nothing without *anima* (*aneu psuchês*) is nurtured?[89]

Gassendi's response rests on an etymological "argument" based on the similarity between *animalis* and *anima*: if we attribute *anima* to them, there is nothing to prevent us calling them "animals," which is

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[87] "Non posse ullum motum ab animali exseri, qui simpliciter recus fit; neque hominem v.c. ducere posse digito, aut stilo rectam lineam, nisi pluribus motibus circularibus compositis simul. . . . Considera quoque ut inter expedite ambulandum, spontaneus ille bracchiorum motus, cuius centrum scapulae sunt . . . ac motus crurum, cuius centrum coxendices" (*De Motu*, First Letter; *Opera Omnia* 3:488, right col.; Brush, 128).

[88] Gassendi's account of cyclical bodily movements may be due to a misapplication of *On the Soul* 1.3.406b26 and following to the case of individual *animae*. The *DA* passage summarizes *Timaeus* 35 and following. In it Aristotle argues against Plato's depiction of the world-soul as having movements that are to be identified with the circular local movements of the heavenly bodies. *Physics* 8.8–9 may also be relevant, since Gassendi's comments throughout this chapter seem to be derived from or directed at *Physics* 8 (for example, he disagrees with Aristotle's distinction between natural and violent motion and alludes to celestial motions). In 8.8–9 Aristotle argues that since the universe must be infinite, single, and continuous in motion, the local motions (paths) of celestial bodies must be rotary rather than rectilinear, and rotary motion must be the primary locomotion in the universe.

[89] *Synt.*, pt. 2, sec. 3, bk. 4, chap. 1; *Opera Omnia* 2:145, left col.: "Attamen, inquies, nonne plantae vivere, et mori dicuntur? In iis igitur vita est; et, si vitam semel concessimus, none simul erit concedenda anima, sine qua non potest intelligi vita? Et, nonne ipsa saltem nutritio vitae action est, beneque Aristoteles nihil *aneu psuchês* sine anima nutriti contendit?" I am interpreting the *Opera Omnia* to intend *aneu*, given the parallel *sine*. The text itself is very unclear in the final two letters of the word; it is also unclear exactly which text (or secondary author) Gassendi has in mind when he attributes this phrase to Aristotle.

absurd, for they are not animals but plants.[90] Thus it is clear from language that *anima* can in no way be attributed to plants.[91] He denies that plants are actually alive (since only animals have *anima*); and interestingly, when he allows that plants may have life "analogously," we see him associate life with "faculty of motion," but give examples of local motion:

> It can be responded [to the Aristotelian challenge] that indeed properly [speaking] life does not exist without *anima* [and so strictly speaking, only animals are alive]; but nevertheless it [life] may be attributed [to plants], as to other things, by a sort of analogy. For certainly life, according to the more general notion, is nothing other than a certain enjoyment of vigor, and of active faculties of motion, just as death is the extinction of these. For in this way [namely, analogously] fire, when it is inflamed, is said to live, but when it is stifled, to die. In the same manner water, so long as it gushes forth, and flows, we call living, but when it is stagnant, 'dead.' And similarly, [we say that] a color which gleams forcefully [is] alive, [that] one which does not strike our sight, [is] 'dead.' In the same manner [we say that] a magnet, in which is the power of drawing iron, is 'live,' one in which this power has disappeared [is] 'dead.' . . . Therefore also the faculty of nutrition itself, even [the power of nurturing] from the inside, can be regarded as more general than [that which is] attributed to soul alone; so that whatever indeed has *anima*, is nurtured; but not everything that is nurtured has *anima*.[92]

The above shows that Gassendi knew that the accepted (Aristotelian) definition of life included "faculty of motion," that soul was supposed to be the cause of this faculty,[93] and that soul was supposed to be the cause of "nutrition from the inside" (that is, self-nutrition). However, he does not appear to have known that Aristotle intended nutrition to be identical to the faculty of (self-)motion. He mentions vigor and capacity for mobility as two separate items, using the plural demonstrative: "death is the extinction of these" (*earumdem*). Thus I

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[90] *Synt.*, pt. 2, sec. 3, bk. 4, ch. 1; *Opera Omnia* 2:144, right col.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid. 2:145, left col.: "Responderi potest, vitam quidem proprie non esse sine anima; sed eam tamen, ut aliis rebus, sic posse et plantis ex analogia quadam attribui. Vita quipped, generaliore notione, nihil aliud est, quam usura quaedam vigoris, mobilitatisque facultatem activarum, ut mors est earumdem extinctio. Sic enim ignis, dum flammescit, vivere dicitur; dum vero suffocatur, mori. Sic aquam, donec scaturit, fluitque, vivam dicimus; dum immota est, restagnatque, mortuam. Sic et colorem vividum, qui vehementer radiat; mortuum, qui visum non percellit. Sic magnetem vegetum, in quo est ferri trahendi vis; mortuum, in quo vis illa evanuit. . . . Heinc facultas quoque ipsa nutritionis, etiam ab intrinseco, censeri potest generalior, quam ut attribuatur soli animae; adeo ut, quicquid animam quidem habet, nutriatur; sed non quicquid nutritur, habeat animam."

take it that the examples he gives are intended to fall into one or the other of these categories—bright color into "vigor" and fire, water, and magnets into "faculty of motion." It becomes clear, then, that Gassendi believed the latter to be the faculty of either exhibiting local motion oneself or causing local motion in another thing: water gushes and flows, fire flickers and flames upward and outward, magnets move iron bits. Thus he, like Descartes, misses the meaning of the "self-motion" which he occasionally employs.

What Gassendi says about nutrition elsewhere in this work shows a lack of philosophical reflection on this phenomenon. Without argumentation (but citing the authority of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus), he asserts that nutrition and growth are qualities that "originate" (*procreari*) from the addition of new atoms to a thing,[94] and can be fully explained as addition of matter to the thing.[95] Thus rocks have nutrition and grow.[96] This fails to address the difference, pointed out by Aristotle, between mere addition and assimilation.[97] When Gassendi elsewhere gives *operatio*, *moliri*, and *agere* as synonyms for *vita* and

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[93] Gassendi also associates soul with self-motion when allowing for the possibility that the world has a corporeal soul, which is heat. He says, "such a principle, even as it creates itself, compels the body in which it resides to move itself (*dum seipsum creet, compellat corpus in quo est, ut moveatur ipsum*)" (*Synt.*, pt. 2, sec. 1, bk. 4, chap. 8; *Opera Omnia* 2:334, right col.; Brush, 412–13). He uses this definition in his ensuing argument, holding (against Aristotle) that vegetative and sensate faculties would require a soul that is corporeal (not incorporeal), and again seeming to interpret self-motion as the local motions of limbs or of the human body *in toto* ("Quod anima autem humana incorporea cum sit, et in ipsum tamen corpus suum agat, motumque ipsi imprimat; dicimus suo loco animam humanam, qua est intellectus, sev mens, atque adeo incorporea, non elicere actiones, nisi intellectualeis sev mentaleis, et incorporeas; et qua est sentiens, vegetans, praeditaque vi corporum motrice, atque adeo corporea est, elicere actions corporeas, actum corpus proprium, tum ipsius quoque interventu alienum movere"; ibid.).

[94] *Synt.*, pt. 2, sect. 1, bk. 5, chap. 7; Brush, 433.

[95] Among the changes (*mutationes*) which can be explained (*possunt explicari*) by addition of new parts (*accessione novarum, per accessionem*) is *nutritio* (*Synt.*, pt. 2, sect. 1, bk. 5, chap. 7; *Opera Omnia* 2:371, right col.; Brush, 433).

[96] "Indeed plants therefore are called *phuta*, that is, *nata* ['born'], 'specially,' as if in a certain special way, in the way that stones, and other things are born, and in the same way [have] nutrition for themselves, and increase in size" (*Synt.*, pt. 2, sec. 3, bk. 4; *Opera Omnia* 2:145, left col.).

[97] Examples of the former include putting an addition on a house, or the "growth" of crystals. Assimilation is distinct, of course, because it is the conversion and incorporation of matter. The distinction is described by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 5.4.1014b23 as "contact" versus "growing together."

motio,[98] we see that they are for Gassendi merely names for the inertial local motions of tiny particles in a body: growth, diminution, and other such "qualities" are "created" when these particles crash against one another.[99] Thus Gassendi's physics, like Descartes's, fails to explain why metabolism occurs in some things but not others, given that all material objects have moving particles.

Mersenne praised the Jesuits of his own century for their learning and profound knowledge,[100] yet his training with them did not equip him to provide a philosophical defense of souls as life principles, despite his desire to do so in the *Sixth Set of Objections* to the *Meditations*. He and his colleagues state that they are unwilling to accept Descartes's account of living things, but they give no reason why not:

> So far are we from accepting that all their [animals'] operations can be satisfactorily explained by means of mechanics, without invoking any sensation, life, or soul, that we are willing to wager anything you like that this is an impossible and ridiculous claim.[101]

Descartes quite rightly responds that "these remarks should not be taken to constitute an argument . . . indeed, the use of wagers in debate is only resorted to when there is a lack of arguments to prove the case."[102]

One year earlier, in a 1646 letter to Huygens, Mersenne came closer to pinpointing a real problem with Descartes's account when he expressed his disbelief that soul is unnecessary for explaining the "movements" of plants and animals:

> Do you think that Regius explains the movements (*mouvements*) of plants and animals without giving them souls, as the principles of Descartes seem to require? I do not believe that it can be done, for the passions and affections of a single dog would require an extraordinary multitude of springs of action (*une estrange multitude de ressorts*) to be able to be performed without a soul. And I am convinced that you are of my opinion.[103]

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[98] *Synt.*, pt. 2, sect. 3, bk. 13; *Opera Omnia* 2:583, left col.

[99] See ibid.; *Opera Omnia* 2:583, right col.–584); with pt. 2, sect. 3, bk. 4; *Opera Omnia* 2:162, for example, "intelligitur . . . ea corpuscula, ex quibus substantia componitur, qualitates istas creare, prout isto, aliove modo moventur; insinuantur, apllicantur."

[100] *Harmonie Universelle*, 24, cited in Peter R. Dear, *Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 224.

[101] AT 7:413; CSM 2:279.

[102] Replies to the Sixth Set of Objections, AT 7:426; CSM 2:288.

While this passage is difficult to interpret given its brevity,[104] it is safe to say that even it offers us no conclusive evidence that he had seen the problem with Descartes's account of self-motion. For Mersenne's claim is that these passions and affections require either a soul or an extraordinary multitude of "ressorts." That is, if the body had the necessary number or complexity of supporting organs or activities, then the soul would be unnecessary. Thus Mersenne misses the real weakness in Descartes's arguments because he does not know what philosophical purpose is served by Aristotelian soul. The philosophical

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[103] Mersenne to Huygens, *Correspondance du P. Marin Mersenne, religieux minime* 14:496–7; trans. Fowler (*Descartes on the Human Soul*, 150) adapted. "Croyez vous que le Sr Regius explique les mouvements des plantes et des animaux sans leur donner des ames, comme il semble que veulent les principes de Mr des Cartes? Je ne croy pas qu'il vienne à bout, car les passions et affections du seul chien auroit besoin d'une estrange multitude de ressorts pour pouvoir ester faites sans ame. Et ie m'assure que vous estes de mon sentiment."

[104] The best case that can be made for Mersenne requires taking him to intend the technical philosophical senses of the Latin cognates of *passions et affections*, and also to intend *ressorts* in the figurative sense of "cause agissante: énergie, force (généralement occulte) qui fait agir, se mouvoir" (see *Le Nouveau Petit Robert* [1958; Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1994]). The Latin *affectio* was used in classical and scholastic Latin for Aristotle's "disposition" (*diathesis*), namely, a qualitative condition that is easily changed (see Aristotle, *Categories* 8). The Latin *passio* often corresponded to Aristotle's *pathos*, meaning a condition that has been induced by a cause that may easily be rendered ineffective (see ibid.). Since Aristotle discusses disposition and passion under the heading of quality (though a passion is not properly speaking a quality), Mersenne could be coming close to identifying the problem of explaining qualitative change in a live organism. It is not obvious from the text, however, that he intends this; hence Fowler translates "actions and reactions" (*Descartes on the Human Soul*, 150). Moreover, it is not clear when the figurative sense of *ressort*, which is also needed for the best-case interpretation, became current. *Le Nouveau Petit Robert* assigns it to the sixteenth century but gives only Montaigne's phrase, "je ne sais guère par quels ressorts la peur agit en nous" as evidence. The first time this meaning begins to enter historical dictionaries is in the *Dictionnaire de L'Académie française*, 6th ed. (1832–35), which gives "Activité, force, énergie" (see this and earlier dictionary entries on ARTFL, http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dicollook.pl?strippedhw=ressort). The primary meanings of *ressort* in the seventeenth century were a "spring" used in a machine, and a juridical sense which is not relevant here. Thus Fowler seems on the whole correct to translate *un estrange multitude de ressorts* as "an extraordinarily complex network"; presumably a reference to "a complex network" is understood by taking "multitude de ressorts" to refer to many springs of action or change which operate according to some pattern, where the grounds of activity are organs arranged in a complex fashion. (I received helpful comments from Steve Maddux on the translation of Mersenne's *une estrange multitude de ressorts*.)

role of soul is not to supplement an insufficient quantity of motions which the body produces of its own accord, or to add an element of complexity to insufficiently complicated changes or states which the body produces or undergoes of its own accord. Rather, it is to account for the fact that some material bodies engage in the self-induced alteration which is nutrition, despite the fact that they may be structurally far less complex than others which do not do so (such as complex artefacts). Aristotle would point out that it is observable that a body, qua body, is unable of its own accord to produce any change in itself.

Pierre Bourdin, a Jesuit teacher of mathematics in Paris, alludes in the *Seventh Set of Objections* to Descartes's report that "according to my [former, Aristotelian] judgment the power of self-motion . . . was quite foreign to the nature of a body."[105] But Bourdin's treatment of this passage from the Second Meditation gives no indication that he understood why Aristotle would make such a judgment. Instead, he questions Descartes's definition of "body," focusing on the fact that Oviedo (a Spanish Jesuit) and others were open to redefining "body" to include "virtually extended" and indivisible things. When Bourdin again quotes Descartes's statement of what he formerly understood by "soul," in section four, he similarly directs all his comments to the question of the soul's incorporeality, arguing that Descartes has not sufficiently proven it.[106]

Henry More, who had enthusiastically immersed himself in the Cambridge philosophy curriculum at a time when it was dominated by Aristotle,[107] also objected to Descartes's account of soulless life. In 1648 he accused Descartes of "withholding life" from animals because the latter denied that all living things had souls; he objected that Descartes "would never concede that they really live."[108] Yet in this letter More says nothing very philosophical concerning the relation between life and soul. He says only that his spirit reacts from "sensitivity and tenderness" against the "cruelty" and "murderous sentiment" by which Descartes "dared to despoil of life and sense practically the whole race of animals, metamorphosing them into marble

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[105] AT 7:26 and 9:20; CSM 2:18; see above.

[106] CSM 2:327–9; AT 7:485–7.

[107] See Ward, Hutton, et al., *The Life of Henry More*, 17; for the curriculum of Cambridge, see ibid., 17 n. 16.

[108] AT 5:243 (Letter 531, 11 December 1648; trans. Cohen, 50).

statues and machines," adding that "such a position, hardly harmonious with the phenomena of nature, plainly is unheard of until now."[109] Apart from the undefended reference to the "phenomena of nature," this objection reduces to a sort of loyalty to the classical notion of soul as life-principle, coupled with an aesthetic abhorrence of mechanism and a sentimentality about animals; he offers Descartes no explicit reason to think that the mechanistic understanding of life is inadequate. Descartes simply responds by saying that he does not withhold life from animals, but rather that it consists in the heat of the heart.[110] More writes a long letter back,[111] but offers no response to this rejoinder.

More's own philosophical works make it plain that he was sympathetic to ancient philosophy, and not unfamiliar with Aristotle.[112] Moreover, of all Descartes's objectors, he came the closest to describing accurately the ancient concept of life. Nevertheless, these works suggest that his understanding of "self-motion" remained incomplete, insofar as he persisted in thinking that "motion" referred to local motions in a body. Although he sometimes connects activity or alteration with motion, he never simply identifies these with motion in the case of "self-motion."

In the 1659 *Immortality of the Soul*, More argues that there is such a thing as an immaterial soul. We might expect him to make use of Aristotle's distinction between self-motion and the suffering of motion as a way to advance his claim that matter alone cannot account for life. During the course of several arguments, he does rely upon a conjunction of the concepts of "motion" and "soul." Yet the motion he alludes to is local.

Thus when arguing that the soul cannot be located in the conarion alone, he asserts that the "plastick power" of the soul—the lowest faculty of the soul, in which man differs little from a plant[113]—sets up

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[109] AT 5:245; Cohen, 51.

[110] AT 5:278 (Letter 537, Feb. 5, 1649); my translation ("vitam enim nulli animali denego, utpote quam in solo cordis calore consistere statuo").

[111] AT 5:298–317, esp. 309–11 (Letter 544, 5 March 1649).

[112] For example, he assumes Aristotle's hierarchy of three types of souls (vegetative, sensate, rational), and makes use of the argument for the necessary existence of a self-mover (*Immortality*, bk. 1, chap. 6, axiom 16; *The Philosophical Writings of Henry More*, ed. Flora MacKinnon [New York: AMS Press, 1969], 74). All page numbers below are to MacKinnon.

[113] See *Enthuiasmus Triumphatus* (published 1656), sec. 4, where this is called "the vegetative or plantal faculties."

"motions" in the body; yet these are local motions similar to those mentioned by Descartes (and Regius after him): the systole and diastole of the heart, the reciprocation of the animal spirits. He asserts that these could not be perpetual if "some more mystical principle than what is merely mechanical did not give assistance,"[114] rather than arguing that "motion" in the sense of alteration/nutrition requires souls as its cause. Elsewhere we are told that brutes must have souls because "spontaneous motion," which More uses as synonym for "internal motion"[115] (compare the Conimbricenses' and Toletus' *intrinsecus motus*), cannot be explained by the conarion[116] of the brain or by the valves of the nervous system. But his reasoning is that the motions of running, striking, and thrusting require more force and strength than this gland can communicate through the animal spirits.[117] He thus mixes up *intrinsecus motus* with locomotion of a body *in toto*; these are two different categories in the ancient tradition which More takes himself to be defending. Moreover, in texts where we do find a convergence of the terms "motion" and "life," the two are not identified, nor is their relation spelled out.[118] Again, when More makes use of the traditional idea that spirit has self-motion unlike matter which does not, this is explained in spatial terms: "the power of contracting and dilating itself."[119] (More maintains this by asserting that "all immaterial beings are in some way extended."[120]) He unequivocally reduces alteration in the body to local motion of matter: a necessary *consequence* of spirit's power to move particles of matter locally is its power to alter matter.[121] Throughout the book he exhibits a general tendency to understand "motion" as local motion.[122]

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[114] *Immortality*, bk. 2, chap. 10, axiom 3; MacKinnon, 147–8.

[115] *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, 9.15; MacKinnon, 263.

[116] Pineal gland.

[117] *Immortality*, bk. 2, chap. 5, axiom 3; MacKinnon, 133.

[118] Perception, life, and motion are repeatedly listed as three different things (*Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, sec. 17; MacKinnon, 206 and 207); we hear of the "natural power of life *and* motion" (*Immortality*, bk. 2, chap. 15, axiom 5; MacKinnon, 144, emphasis added); "life *and* the faculty of moving . . . life . . . *also* the faculty of moving" (*Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, sec. 18; MacKinnon, 209, emphasis added); and More's definition of a spirit is "an immaterial substance intrinsically endued with life *and* the faculty of motion" (*Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, sec. 18; MacKinnon, 207, emphasis added).

[119] *Immortality*, bk. 1, chap. 7, axiom 4; MacKinnon, 80. Compare bk. 1, chap. 8, axiom 7; MacKinnon, 85.

[120] *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, sec. 5; MacKinnon, 188.

[121] *Immortality*, bk. 1, chap. 7, axiom 6; MacKinnon, 82.

More comes closest of all Descartes's objectors to clearly articulating the ancient concept of life when he refers to a power of "self-activity" in the 1668 *Divine Dialogues*. He describes this as "an active power in a spirit, whereby it either modifies itself according to its own nature or moves the matter regularly according to some certain modifications it impresses upon it."[123] This definition is somewhat noncommittal, but it shows awareness of a distinction between self-alteration and local motion; it allows for the Aristotelian view that local movements of material are a consequence of the soul's act of inducing alteration. We note, however, that More does not present self-activity as simply synonymous with "self-motion." The word "moves" is used of matter, and given his earlier descriptions of the "motions" which souls set up in bodies, the movement he has in mind seems to be local. Indeed, subsequently in the 1671 *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, spirit's "immediate property is activity" in the sense of "pervading or dispreading motion" in a body. Thus we are again left with the sense that More does not realize that the ancients maintained a real distinction between self-motion and local motion.[124] The meaning of the term "self-motion" is not clear to him.

Finally, Fromondus objected to Descartes's comparison of animals to machines and his replacement of nonrational soul with heat; but he, too, did not recognize Descartes's misapplication of Aristotelian "self-motion." In his letter to Plempius regarding the *Discourse*, he concerns himself with sensitive souls of brutes rather than the concept of life, remarking only that "such noble operations" as seeing and hearing "*do not seem to be able* to proceed from such an ignoble and

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[122] We find: there is motion in the world; matter is not self-movable; therefore matter received a certain quantity of motion at the moment of its first creation by God (*Immortality*, bk. 1, chap. 11, axioms 2–9; MacKinnon, 97–102). This sounds very much like Descartes's earlier account of the inertial local motion of minute particles, and shows no awareness of the import of Aristotle's claim that souls are "movers" of bodies. In another argument we hear that matter cannot sense, and that sense is motion (a claim made by Aristotle in *On the Soul* 2.4.415b23–5, where motion again means alteration). Here "sense" is said to be identical with "communication of motion"; but the motion alluded to is local, that is, "the many windings and turnings that must happen to the transmission of this motion, which are likely to be as so many refractions or reflexions" (*Immortality*, bk. 2, chap. 4, axiom 2; MacKinnon, 128–9; compare 2.4.8; MacKinnon, 130).

[123] *Divine Dialogues* 2; MacKinnon, 264.

[124] Ibid.

insensitive cause" as the sort of heat that is found in heated hay.[125] His next objection to Descartes's statement that there is no difference between a real animal and an automaton with the internal organs of an animal, is puzzling: "What need is there, then, to insert a substantial soul into brutes, if the heat of hay suffices for the operations of the internal and external senses and of appetite?"[126] It is unclear whether he means that Descartes is being inconsistent when he continues to speak of brute souls,[127] or whether Fromondus himself is trying to say that substantial animal souls are worth salvaging (without giving any reason why they should be).[128] Fromondus's only other argument is consequentialist: as a result of Descartes's equating live brute animals with machines, "perhaps the way may be made smooth for atheists, so that they also attribute the operations of the rational soul to a similar cause, and exclude it [rational soul] from the human body, or at least cram a material soul into us in exchange for an immaterial one. Such elevated operations should not be attributed to such a lowly cause."[129]

IV

Conclusions. The arguments whereby Descartes sought to debunk Aristotelian vegetative soul rely upon a mistaken sense of "motion." Moreover, among Descartes's contemporary objectors, neither Gassendi, who like Descartes attacked the Aristotelian view that life required *anima*, nor any of the others, who desired to defend this traditional view, gives us any indication of having understood what Aristotle meant by "life is self-motion." All of this serves as evidence that in the early seventeenth century, what passed for competence in Aristotle was, as John Cottingham has said in another context, "re-

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[125] 13 September 1637, point 1; AT 1:403, emphasis added (*non videntur posse prodire*). Translations of Fromondus are my own.

[126] Ibid., point 2: "Quid igitur opus animas substantiales brutis inserere, si calor foeni sufficiat ad omnium sensuum internorum, externorum, et appetitûs operationes?"

[127] Compare *Discourse*; AT 6:58, 59.

[128] If this is the case, the term "substantial souls" (*animas substantiales*) is surprising, since neither Aristotle nor Aquinas accepted that the souls of animals are substances; Fromondus would presumably be using it because animal souls are (according to the tradition) the forms of animals, which (animals) are substances (that is, animal souls are 'substantial forms').

[129] 13 September 1637, point 2.

spect for authority and skill in jargon-manipulation,"[130] rather than deep assimilation and clear articulation of central philosophical concepts. That is unfortunate in this case. For, subsequently, the intriguing explanatory power of the ancient definition of life became increasingly overlooked.[131]

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[130] John Cottingham, *Descartes* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 5.

[131] I received helpful comments from Arthur Madigan, S.J. on an earlier version of this article.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD

I

NOTHING APPEARS LESS PROBLEMATIC than self-consciousness. Without it, no inquiry seems possible, for how can one seek knowledge unless one is aware of undertaking that quest? Moreover, consciousness of anything other than the self is always plagued with knowing something whose existence cannot lie in the consciousness of it. As Descartes observed, whenever one represents an object different from one's consciousness, it is always doubtful whether that object exists or corresponds with its representation.[1] By contrast, insofar as consciousness of one's self-consciousness is the very being of self-consciousness, the gap between object and representation here seems uniquely absent. Not only is my representation of myself as self-conscious constitutive of my being self-conscious, but nothing prevents that representation from corresponding to what it is about.

This privileged certainty, however, generates skepticism regarding knowledge of anything other than one's own consciousness, including other minds. If knowledge of self-conscious is secured by its identity of subject and object, of knowing and what knowing is knowing of, wherever that identity is lacking, cognition confronts the dilemma of bridging a gap that is insurmountable if knowing has no access to its object other than by representing it.

The yawning solipsism that attends the privileged self-certainty of self-consciousness is not mitigated by the oft alleged dependence of consciousness upon self-consciousness. To paraphrase Kant, consciousness of any object is possible only if consciousness relates itself to its own representation of the object. Otherwise, the putative knowledge belongs to no one and there is no consciousness of the

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[1]See René Descartes, *Meditations On First Philosophy*, 3d ed., trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), Meditation One, 13–17.

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represented object. If this relation of consciousness to its own representation is self-consciousness, then there can be no consciousness of an object without a simultaneous self-consciousness.[2] The problem with securing this dependency is that the privileged certainty of self-consciousness renders suspect whether consciousness can ever relate to anything but itself. So long as self-consciousness is construed to be primary, it remains doubtful whether there can be any consciousness of a non-self to accompany self-consciousness.

The solitary primacy of self-consciousness, however, is just as questionable as is how consciousness can be aware of itself.

II

To begin with, self-consciousness must presuppose consciousness if to be self-conscious is to be conscious of one's consciousness. In that case, consciousness must be present, relating to an object it distinguishes from itself. Consciousness may always involve self-relation in that consciousness relates to an object only by relating to its own mental content. Nonetheless, in order for this self-relation to involve intentionality, to be about something objective rather than subjective, consciousness must treat its own mental content as the determination of something independently given from which it is disengaged. Without disengaging itself from the same content to which it stands in self-relation, consciousness reverts to a preconscious psyche that feels nothing but its own feeling self, never attaining an opposition of subject and object. For this reason, the relation of consciousness to its own mental content is not equivalent to consciousness *of consciousness*. Consciousness's relation to its own representation is only part of consciousness, a part that must be accompanied by a relation to that content as something other to consciousness. Accordingly, consciousness does not collapse into self-consciousness.

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[2] Significantly, Kant construes this self-relation as involving not awareness of consciousness as an object of experience, but only the thought of the "I," a thought which must always be thinkable, rather than actually thought, in conjunction with awareness of any object. This thought, moreover, is a completely empty representation of a self devoid of any individuating content. Why this is so will become clear in the following. See also P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: Methuen, 1979), 82.

Because mind is enabled to be conscious of something other than itself only by detaching itself from its own mental content, neither self-consciousness nor consciousness can be primary. Just as consciousness depends upon the disengagement by which self-feeling becomes sensation of something objective, so self-consciousness depends upon consciousness as the object of its own disengaged awareness.

This double dependency undercuts Cartesian solipsism, since if self-consciousness presupposes consciousness, not to mention the preconscious psyche, then self-certainty cannot be had apart from certainty of something not the self, namely, an object. Consciousness of a non-self, however, involves more than merely what is logically other to the subject. The dependence of self-consciousness upon consciousness has a further specificity, which is argued for in parallel ways by Kant and Strawson.

III

In his famous "Refutation of Idealism" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,[3] Kant upholds the dependence of self-consciousness on consciousness by arguing that the temporal succession of any conscious awareness cannot just consist in consciousness of one representation after another. For any plurality of representations to be perceived in temporal succession, something must be given as a persisting backdrop, enabling the continuity of time to be apprehended. Mere repetition of the same content in different representations cannot suffice since no matter how instantaneously they vanish or how much recurring detail they contain, none represents their temporal connection to one another in the stream of consciousness. Nothing in any perception can bridge the ceasing to be of one and the coming to be of another. What is needed is something that persists independently of the flow of representations, something reidentifiable from one moment to the next, even if only through the representations comprising the mental content of consciousness. To apprehend the temporal sequence of its own representations, consciousness must perceive representations

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[3] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B274–9.

that count as determinations of something persisting in space, that one abiding framework given independently of mental succession. Without consciousness of an object in space, consciousness has no enduring resource external to the succession of representations with which to connect one perceived moment to the next. Insofar as self-consciousness involves awareness of manifold mental contents whose temporal succession falls within one consciousness, there can be no consciousness of self without awareness of spatial objectivity. Self-consciousness therefore always involves consciousness of not just a non-self, but a spatial object.

Strawson comes to an analogous conclusion by focusing not on the preconditions of temporal awareness, but by providing an indirect proof, showing how a "no-space world" cannot suffice for attributing representations to one consciousness or for identifying objective particulars.[4] Presuming that a consciousness solely aware of sounds has no perception of spatial relations, Strawson examines this case to see whether any mind unaware of space can still use its space-deprived representations to identify objects and retain the unity of its awareness. Vital for identifying objects is the ability to distinguish objects from the representations of them, a distinction requiring some way of apprehending objects to exist even when they are not being represented. This goes together with being able to reidentify an object through representations separated by an interval in time. No matter how sounds may be sequenced and no matter how a continuous "reference tone" may modulate in conjunction with accompanying sounds that do and do not resemble one another, consciousness can never thereby obtain awareness of anything that can be certifiably distinguished from the sounds that it hears. The mere fact that a sound similar to one heard before some interval is accompanied by a certain modulation in the continuous background tone can hardly guarantee that something exists during that interval, or that reoccurring sounds signify the same persisting object. Temporal relations are simply insufficient to give representations any identifiable objectivity. To the extent that consciousness of self depends upon consciousness of an object, temporal relations will equally fail to provide the unity of consciousness allowing all representations to be attributed to the same awareness. No concatenation of sounds can independently secure

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[4] See Strawson, *Individuals*, chap. 2, 64–86.

that those sounds are all perceived by one consciousness, rather than being differently distributed among the auditory perceptions of many others.

This suggests something at the core of Kant's transcendental deduction: that the conditions for any object being given to consciousness are equally the conditions for the unity of representations in one consciousness, without which self-consciousness is impossible. The transcendental deduction imputes those conditions to the necessary connection of representations under concepts in judgment, thereby linking consciousness of objects with the unity of apperception. Significantly, the parallel arguments of the "Refutation of Idealism" and the "no-space world" do not appeal to concepts and judgment, which would then invoke linguistic intelligence. Instead, they offer something else: the spatio-temporality of objectivity. Only insofar as consciousness is aware of an objectivity determined in space and time can its successive mental contents be united in one consciousness.

This linkage between awareness of spatial objects and the unity of consciousness may secure the dependence of self-consciousness on consciousness, but it does not establish how self-consciousness is possible. To be conscious of itself, consciousness must be conscious of an object and have that consciousness as its object. This involves distinguishing between object and subject, while still somehow having the subject of consciousness be manifest to itself as an object. That consciousness must always involve consciousness of objects in space may provide a further necessary condition for self-consciousness, but it is hardly sufficient.

IV

Nevertheless, the irreducibility of consciousness of spatial objectivity might suggest that self-consciousness is achievable, at least in part, through consciousness of a particular body to which the subject of awareness is specially connected. If such privileged connection can be accounted for and if that connection can be manifest to consciousness, then self-consciousness might be explained through these relationships. Moreover, if such connections between consciousness and a body both exist and become objective for consciousness, then

knowledge of and interaction with other minds becomes less inexplicable.

Such a connection between awareness of one's body and self-consciousness would still allow for consciousness of spatial objectivity to be unaccompanied by self-consciousness. That is, it might be possible to be conscious of objects in space without perceiving one's body, or to be conscious of one's body without recognizing it to be in any special relationship with one's awareness. These possibilities would be removed if a yet stronger connection held, namely that consciousness necessarily involves not only awareness of spatial objectivity but also awareness of the subject's own body in its unique spatio-temporal location within that objectivity and in its unique relation to the subject's consciousness. If this were true, not only would consciousness and self-consciousness go inextricably together, but the self of consciousness would necessarily have an individuated tangible reality observable by itself and potentially by others. To the extent that the body is among other objects in space and time, self-consciousness via awareness of one's own body would include consciousness of its contrast to other physical objects. Consciousness of oneself as embodied would thereby be accompanied by consciousness of a physical non-self.

Although introspection might offer empirical confirmation of such connections, no observation can supply sufficient evidence for their necessity. One might always find one's own consciousness accompanied by awareness of one's body, and encounter reports by others confirming the same unfailing linkage in their own experience, but neither testimony can guarantee the like for all past or future occurrence. By the same token, no introspection or survey of others can determine what enables any consciousness to recognize its body as its own. Whatever may apply in some observed cases need not have any universal applicability.

A more plausible strategy for establishing the necessity of consciousness of one's body lies in showing that without that awareness what is otherwise ingredient in consciousness is impossible.

Partly supporting this avenue is the idea that any receptivity of consciousness depends upon having a body through whose sensory apparatus sensations of objects can be given. In that case, all perception will reflect the spatio-temporal orientation of the body's sense organs, not to mention their physiological constitution. As such, con-

sciousness will not only relate to its own awareness in being aware of its representations, but it will encounter the mark of its own body in the view it has of the world.

This physiological embeddedness of perception need not be challenged by the absence of any systematic reference to particular senses and their organs in a work such as Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. That absence may instead reflect how *what* sensory apparatus underlies the receptivity of consciousness is contingent upon the individual's species being and personal physiological history. Whether or not Aristotle is correct in asserting that no other sense organs can function without the sense of touch,[5] the contingency of sensory configuration does not remove the requirement that consciousness have *some* sense organ, whose situation conditions whatever experience can be had.

Hints of such a proviso are manifest in Kant's account of the "Analogies of Experience," which focus on how certain temporal relations of perceptions are necessary to any experience of objects. Although Kant fails to address explicitly the role of consciousness of one's body, aspects of his argument here reflect it. This is evident in the analyses of the second and third analogies,[6] which consider the conditions for experiencing the succession and simultaneity of objects and events. Kant points out that the order of perceptions in experiencing successive events cannot be a matter of indifference, since in that case nothing could distinguish a subjective series of imagined representations from an objective succession of observed occurrences. If, for example, a boat is traveling downstream, observation of it upstream must precede observation of it downstream. By contrast, when objects coexist, the order in which they are perceived is arbitrary. It matters not whether one first observes the front or back of a room, for example, so long as what is front and back coexist. This order indifference of perceptions of coexisting objects depends, however, on consciousness having a unique vantage point that can be

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[5] See Aristotle, *De Anima* 3.12.434b1–22, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1:690–1. The irreducibility of spatial perception, as a precondition of the unity of consciousness, may support Aristotle's claim. Visual perception, for example, may not be able to provide spatial perception without being coordinated with touch, which first allows differences of light and dark and color to convey spatial relations.

[6] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A189–218, B232–65.

altered at will.[7] Otherwise, the possibility of alternate orders is inexplicable. Moreover, which perceptions can indifferently precede or follow one another will depend upon what spatial orientation the observer takes, with each change in orientation connected to its predecessor by movements, observation of which is not order indifferent. Successive observations of any event will equally depend upon consciousness retaining locations from which objective alterations are perceivable. Any change in view will itself comprise an event in time, involving the movements determining the variation in orientation. That this is so can only be available to consciousness if it can be aware of its own situation in time and space, a situation presumably dependent upon having a unique body.

All of these involvements of the body in observation take for granted that consciousness is able to recognize its body and how it positions perception. Yet how is this possible? Is the ever present fact, that perception occurs through the body, something built into consciousness by the way in which the orientation of perception is always perceivably connected to how the body is uniquely positioned?

If this is so, then consciousness may be always potentially or actually conscious of how perception is relative to one perceived object, on whose orientation and condition the field of perception depends. Does this suffice, however, for consciousness to connect all perceptions as its own or to take that privileged object as its own embodiment? These considerations go together, for if consciousness cannot be certain of that object as its own unique body, it may not be able to claim as uniquely its own the perceptions which are all relative to the situation of that body.

As Strawson has observed, no reflection on the connection of perceptions to a perceived body is sufficient to unite them in one consciousness. Even if what is perceived is perceived to be relative to the location and condition of one object in the field of perception, the various perceptions might still belong to different awarenesses which alternately receive successive situated perceptions.[8] In that situation multiple minds might share the same body without that connection individuating them.

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[7] Of course, Kant's psychological determinism leaves this possibility inexplicable, at least as far as observable behavior is concerned.

[8] Strawson, *Individuals*, 98 and 101.

The same difficulty stymies any attempt to ground the unity of self-consciousness on an awareness of a connection between the field of perception and not merely a situated body, but a further connection between intentions and perceived behavior of that body. Consciousness that a body is one's own may well require some perceived correlation between observed movements of the body and mental contents such as impulse, desire, purpose, and intention. Nonetheless, self-consciousness will depend upon possession of those internal and external observations by the same awareness both at one and successive moments. That unification, however, is presupposed rather than instituted by consciousness of any relation between inner intentions and outer behavior of a body. To connect intention and action, consciousness must already recognize as its own that intention as well as the awareness in which intention and observed action both fall.

How is this possible? Consciousness may always involve awareness of physical objects and be potentially aware of one body to which the field of awareness is uniquely connected, but what enables consciousness to be aware of its exclusive possession of these mental contents? This very question suggests the answer, for self-ascription of one's mental contents to a body can no longer be problematic if the unity of awareness depends upon consciousness of a body of which consciousness must know itself to have exclusive possession.

Such a dependence has been advanced in parallel by Merleau-Ponty and Strawson.[9] Both point to two central requirements: (1) that the unity of awareness depends upon the individuation of consciousness enabling it both to be distinguished and to distinguish itself from any other, and (2) that consciousness cannot be individuated without standing in exclusive relation to a unique body. In order for mental contents to be connected to one awareness, that awareness must have an identity of its own. If it cannot be individuated, any contents ascribed to it can just as well be ascribed to some other standpoint. In other words, to be a unity, consciousness must be not just a consciousness in general, that is, an undifferentiated particular, but an individual consciousness. Without that individuality, consciousness can no more be identified by itself than by others. No assortment or succession of mental contents can provide that individuality, since

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[9] See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (Routledge: London, 1998), and Strawson, *Individuals*.

whether they all belong to the same awareness is precisely what is in question. Simply pointing to them does not secure their unification in one consciousness.

Both Merleau-Ponty and Strawson take the individuating embodiment of consciousness as basic, since without it no unity of awareness is possible. Consequently, any "pure" consciousness, such as Descartes, as well as Kant, would entertain is a derivative abstraction, presupposing the concrete person. Accordingly, when Kant speaks of the "I" that accompanies all representations as a condition of their unification in one consciousness, it is not surprising that he offers it as an abstract "thought," devoid of any individuating content.[10] That abstraction is unavoidable since without any connection to a body, the "I" is just an apperception in general, no different from any other.[11] For just this reason, the possible accompaniment of each representation with that thought does not suffice to unite them in one, identifiable awareness, as the transcendental deduction of the categories supposes. By the same token, when Descartes reflects on the "thinking thing," it appears in complete isolation from any other self in contrast to which it would have to be somehow individuated, ceasing to be merely a "thinking thing."

Given that a body has an individuated being in space-time, excluding everything else from its unique situation and life-history, consciousness is individuated by its exclusive embodiment. Indeed, if the unity of consciousness depends upon having a unique identity, and no consciousness is possible without that unity, then consciousness is per se an embodied mind with a unique itinerary in the world.

Although, as Strawson observes, individuation presumes the possibility of a plurality of particulars without which nothing universal can be ascribed to a subject,[12] that possibility does not dictate that consciousness requires any relation to others. Consciousness can have its unique embodiment whether or not it actually coexists with other minds, let alone has any awareness of them. Indeed, conscious-

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[10] In section 16 of the B edition Transcendental Deduction, Kant points out that because the representation, "I think," must accompany all other representations, it cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. Hence, nothing manifold can be given in the "I think," which must be a purely simple representation, devoid of individuating content. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B132 and B135.

[11] Strawson makes this point. See *Individuals*, 82.

[12] Strawson, *Individuals*, 99.

ness hardly forfeits its concrete identity if it were to be the last mind standing.

Is it possible, however, for consciousness to be aware of its unique identity without either being in relation to others, or more specifically, being or having been conscious of other selves? The answer to this question raises a problem that the primacy of embodied consciousness does not immediately resolve: how is consciousness self-aware, given its concrete being in the world? That consciousness cannot be without being embodied may be true, but that truth does not tell us in what way consciousness recognizes itself as an object.

V

In the wake of Wilfrid Sellars and, more recently, Donald Davidson, a view has gained increasing currency that self-consciousness necessarily operates in conjunction with consciousness of objects and consciousness of other selves. What allegedly connects these three forms of consciousness is the supposed bond between knowledge and linguistic intelligence. On this view, knowledge involves truth claims, which take the form of propositions involving the determination of individuals through concepts. Because propositions and the concepts they contain involve language, and because language cannot be private, knowledge rests upon linguistic intelligence and the interaction among interlocutors on which language and thought depend. Moreover, because language fixes meanings by a triangulation in which individuals simultaneously observe one another using common expressions to refer to commonly observable objects, no knowledge can be had apart from awareness of objects, of others, and of oneself participating in linguistic convention. *If* one grants that consciousness always involves knowledge claims, then self-consciousness will necessarily be discursive, involving propositional knowledge that cannot be had apart from knowledge of objects and knowledge of other interlocutors. Not only is solipsism precluded, but so is any skepticism of other minds.

The proponents of this view have generally attached to it an epistemological foundationalism by treating the linguistic conditions of meaning as conditions of truth. Because these conditions involve interwoven conventions that are contingent, treating them as

epistemological foundations leads to a pragmatic holism, where all terms and standards of justification are regarded as just as corrigible and contingent as the conventions they rest upon. This view is self-defeating, for it deprives its own account about language-formation and the forms of consciousness of any abiding authority. In so doing, it presents one more example of the insupportable dilemma philosophy falls into whenever it seeks transcendental conditions for knowledge. Whether these be formulated in terms of consciousness or linguistic practice, the same difficulty arises: by seeking to identify anything as the privileged structure or process determining knowledge, one is compelled to make knowledge claims about that privileged foundation, claims that cannot have any legitimacy given how valid knowledge is supposed to be only determinable by appeal to that foundation. One can forego such seeking to know before knowing by simply refraining from treating the linguistic conditions of meaning as conditions of knowledge. If this is done, the impossibility of massive uncertainty about what terms mean need not signify that it is impossible for there to be massive ignorance of which meanings are true. Triangulation may be basic to the fixing of meanings, but that does not prevent it from leaving undetermined which of those thoughts that are thinkable and expressible in language are valid.

If one pares away the bogus epistemological foundationalism from the linkage of self-consciousness, consciousness of objects, and consciousness of others, one is still left with a refutation of solipsism and skepticism of other minds. Although knowledge may not be guaranteed, it will hold that one cannot be certain of oneself without being certain of objects and of other selves. Within this nexus, self-consciousness will necessarily be accompanied by consciousness of objects in space and of one's own body. Without both of these, as well as the tangible embodiments to which they refer, linguistic interaction can hardly operate. Interlocutors, after all, must be able to have a tangible presence for one another, as well as be aware of other tangible things about which they can communicate and think.

These requirements, however, do not dictate that individuals are self-conscious only while being conscious of other interlocutors or communicating with them. One could still be incommunicatively alone, either temporarily or for good, and yet retain self-consciousness, so long as one had once engaged in the intersubjective conven-

tions enabling one to first learn language, and with it, the practice of thinking.

These considerations all follow upon the presumption that self-consciousness and linguistic intelligence necessarily go together. Certainly they may accompany one another and, in so doing, carry with them all the above implications. Yet, it is hard not to wonder how self-consciousness could inherently involve linguistic competence. If self-consciousness were wedded to linguistic intelligence, then the triangulation by which meaning is fixed and language acquired would have to generate simultaneously awareness of self, of objects, and of others. Yet how could individuals recognize their common responses to commonly observed objects, thereby gaining access to concepts, language, and knowledge, if they did not already possess a prelinguistic, preconceptual consciousness of self, of objects, and of others? Without such nondiscursive awareness, the participants in the establishment of linguistic interaction would have no way to discriminate their responses from one another or from objects they observe in common.

If this is the case, then self-consciousness as such need not be discursive or involve discursive knowledge. Although it may come to involve thought and speech thanks to the further mental achievement of intelligence, self-consciousness must involve an awareness that can distinguish subject and object without thinking concepts and making judgments.

Neither tangible objects, including the body and other selves, nor mental relationships need thereby be deprived of conceptual determinations. Universal features, as well as connections among individuals, their particularities, and different types of universals, can all pervade the fabric of nature, human physiology, and psychological process. None of that is obliterated by consciousness or self-consciousness failing to grasp these conceptual terms as such by perceiving without theorizing, that is, without apprehending in thought what is conceptually determinate in objectivity. Theorizing does require linguistic intelligence and therefore presupposes the interaction that engenders language and thinking. For just this reason, the nondiscursive self-consciousness that linguistic intelligence presupposes must be certain of itself in distinction from other objects without theorizing, without having to think or say anything.

How can this be, and what does it tell us about the way in which consciousness is aware of itself?

VI

Important clues toward a solution are provided by Hegel's analyses of desire and recognitive self-consciousness in his systematic account of mind, the so-called *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. There Hegel identifies desire as the minimal form of self-consciousness, one that need not involve thought, speech or any other intersubjectivity.[13] In so doing, Hegel sheds light on how self-consciousness can be nondiscursive, as well as noncognitive.

Although desire's connection to self-consciousness may not seem evident, its connection to consciousness is obvious. Desire is intentional insofar as the subject of desire thereby relates to the object desired. Yet if desire were just a cognitive relation, wherein consciousness perceives a thing and its properties or understands the dynamical interaction of things through force and law, all that would be present would be an awareness of objects through mental determinations from which consciousness has extricated itself. The consciousness of these objective relations would not itself be objective to consciousness, not even if the objects in question included the body to which consciousness stands uniquely related. In perceiving one's body, one does not perceive one's perceiving, any more than in perceiving other putative persons one perceives their perceiving.[14] In

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[13] See G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind (Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences [1830]*), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pars. 426–9, pp. 167–70.

[14] In the additions to pars. 418 (p. 159) and 423 (pp. 164–5) of his *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel suggests that self-consciousness becomes kindled when consciousness observes a living organism, whose self-sustaining process confronts consciousness with something subjective. Consciousness cannot thereby become objective to itself, even if life has a self-ordering character akin to the self of consciousness. The awareness of life still remains distinct from the life it observes. The same can be said of consciousness of law. Hegel suggests, in the addition to par. 422 (p. 163) of the *Philosophy of Mind*, that observing law in nature confronts consciousness with the same inner unity of distinct determinations characterizing its own ego. But does consciousness thereby become objective to itself and turn into self-consciousness, as Hegel intimates (albeit with the qualification that the transformation of consciousness is only implicit) in par. 423 (p. 164)? Law may be internally differentiated like the ego, but law does not oppose itself to its determinations in the way in which consciousness disengages itself from its own mental content while relating to it as something other, objective. Hence, law is not consciousness of an object, nor is consciousness of law consciousness of consciousness.

both cases, consciousness relates to its mental contents in order to be aware of an object, but in so doing it does not relate to its own consciousness of them. If that were all that desire involved, consciousness would be present, but not self-consciousness.

With desire, however, something more is added. As desired, the object is not merely perceived as something external to the perceiving self. It is further treated as something whose independence from the subject of awareness is to be annulled. The desired object is to be rendered a means of satisfaction, which minimally entails in some respect yielding its externality and being assimilated by the subject. Morever, this projected nullity is not just theoretical; desire involves the impulse to achieve gratification by actually canceling the indifferent givenness of the object of desire and allowing the self to lay hold of it. To the extent that this occurs, desire satisfaction objectively exhibits a subjectification of what consciousness demarcates from itself as objectively external. This subjectification takes the form of a gratifying consumption of the object of desire, in some way removing its external independence and absorbing it into the subject.

Desire does not thereby involve thought in the manner in which willing realizes a preconceived aim, acting both on purpose and with a motive that concerns the universal implications of the deed.[15] Desire just seeks satisfaction, nullifying the independence of the object irrespective of any end or principle. Through this objective negation of the objectivity of the object, consciousness relates solely to its own negative relating to the object. The elimination and absorption that this comprises both require the embodiment of consciousness. Only if consciousness is embodied can it effect any objective removal of the independence of the object and only if consciousness involves its own living organism can it assimilate the object. This is true whether the gratification of desire involves a literal devouring of the object or some lesser alteration, such as being made to appear to the subject's more theoretical senses, hearing or sight, that leaves the object otherwise intact. Moreover, for consciousness to be aware of this material or largely formal assimilation as a subjectivization of the object, it must recognize its body as its own instead of perceiving the desire satisfaction as a transaction between two objects from which it is equally extricated.

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[15] The latter is what Kant referred to as the "maxim" of action.

This recognition by consciousness of its own body might seem already to presuppose self-consciousness, subverting any place for desire in the constitution of consciousness of self. This would be the case if consciousness of the body as consciousness's own were given independently of desire-satisfaction. Yet if the body manifests the consciousness to which it is exclusively related only in the process of desire, then the problem of circularity may be removed.

Nonetheless, the self-awareness ingredient in desire might still seem preempted by the connection of the unity of consciousness with the individuation provided by consciousness's embodiment. That connection might seem to imply that consciousness must always already be cognizant of itself as a concrete subject in the objective world. This is not the case, for consciousness's individuation as an embodied mind can be a precondition of the unity of consciousness without being something of which mind is conscious. For this reason, consciousness can always engage in the doubts Descartes avows in viewing his body and wondering if he is dreaming, or in viewing a hatted figure on the street and wondering whether it is an automaton. That consciousness must have a unique body to engage in any doubts does not prevent any particular representation from being suspect. This is true even if consciousness doubts theoretically, using concepts and language that render past interaction with others indubitable. Consequently, the individuating embodiment of consciousness does not render desire redundant. In desiring, consciousness enjoys a relation to itself as objective that it does not have simply by inhabiting a body through which its mental contents are united and individuated. Significantly, the desiring mind's consciousness of its negation of the object of desire involves both consciousness of spatial objectivity as well as consciousness of its own body. Neither of these apprehensions entail thinking concepts and engaging in speech. For this reason, there is nothing incoherent about attributing desire to preverbal children, or, for that matter, dumb animals.

Whatever self-consciousness desire contains is, nonetheless, wholly negative in character. The two sides of desire, the canceling of the externality of the object and its absorption by the subject may comprise a single process in which consciousness and self-consciousness become identified, in that what the self is conscious of as its object becomes reduced to the subject.[16] Yet this identity attains no per-

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[16] See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, par. 425, p. 165.

sisting being. The relation to itself that consciousness gains through desire is completely abstract[17] since consciousness's self-identity here lies in the removal rather than the abiding reality of anything objective. The objectivity consciousness has for itself in desire consists entirely in its body's negation of the independent being of an object. The achievement of that negation equally eliminates itself. That is, the satisfaction of desire brings to an end the nullifying of some externality of the object of desire, which is what objectively manifests the self to itself. Desire therefore provides the most ephemeral and empty form that self-consciousness can take, a form burdened by consciousness, from whose independent, selfless object it is never liberated.[18] Because satisfaction occurs in the one subject through a transient consumption of an external given, the self's objectification perenially relapses into subjectivity, leaving consciousness with the same confrontation with independent objectivity from which appetite proceeds.[19]

VII

Recognitive self-consciousness presents a more abiding self-manifestation, which involves intersubjectivity without necessarily invoking thought or speech.

Generally, awareness of oneself by another provides two features necessary for consciousness of consciousness that are unattainable so long as the mind relates only to itself or to objects that are not subjects. To be conscious of consciousness in any positive way, the mind must relate to an object from which it is disengaged, and that object must be consciousness.[20] No solitary self-relation can provide the disengagement allowing consciousness to be an object to the mind.

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[17] For this reason, Hegel describes consciousness of desire as abstract self-consciousness. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, par. 425, p. 165.

[18] As Hegel observes, self-consciousness as desire is thereby the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. As much as desire relates to the object as null, it still confronts it as an other. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, par. 425, p. 165.

[19] See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to par. 428, p. 169.

[20] As Hegel observes, whereas self-consciousness, in having consciousness for its object, sets itself over against it, consciousness is still also retained as a moment in self-consciousness itself. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to par. 417, p. 158.

Introspection remains caught within the subject, whereas any awareness of an object that is not a conscious self provides no abiding objectification of awareness. Hence, consciousness of consciousness is only concretely possible when consciousness has as its object *another* consciousness. This requires the embodiment of both the other self and the consciousness that is conscious of the other. Only then can either be individuated from one another and be manifest as a distinct object of awareness. Yet, however this be achieved, consciousness of another consciousness does not provide self-consciousness unless awareness of the other consciousness manifests to consciousness its *own* awareness of the other.

In that case, self-consciousness is no longer just consciousness of consciousness. Because consciousness is consciousness *of an object* and not consciousness *of consciousness*, the consciousness of consciousness does not have the same object as the consciousness that is *its* object. The awareness of consciousness may have a subject for its object, but that subject has a non-self for its object. For this reason, the consciousness of consciousness is not reflexively conscious of itself.[21] To have itself as its object, this consciousness must have as its object not consciousness (qua consciousness of an object), but the consciousness of consciousness. Consciousness of consciousness can be an object, however, only if consciousness has *another* consciousness of consciousness for its object. If that other consciousness of consciousness has the first consciousness as *its* object, then that first consciousness encounters its own awareness of consciousness in being conscious of the other's awareness of consciousness. By being conscious of another who is conscious of it, consciousness has consciousness of consciousness as its object, an object that has it for an object. Then, each consciousness has the same structure and is aware of that convergence. Each apprehends itself to be the object of the other's awareness, as well as to be an awareness of that other awareness. Consciousness is aware of another consciousness that is aware of the former's awareness of it. Through this reciprocal recognition, consciousness is self-conscious in being aware of another self-consciousness that is self-aware in the same fashion.

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[21] As Hegel puts it, immediate self-consciousness has only the "I" for its object, not yet the "I=I." See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to par. 424, p. 165.

The interrelation may be conceivable, but how can this reciprocal recognition take place? If the cognitive consciousness of perception and understanding cannot provide an objective manifestation of consciousness, then merely perceiving and comprehending an other embodied subject will fail to give consciousness an objectification of its own awareness. Can desire provide the lacking objectification?

If the desire in question is a desire for the other, reducing the other consciousness to an object of satisfaction, then consciousness is left with the same purely negative and self-eliminating self-consciousness that results from desiring any object. One consciousness may perceive its nullifying of the independence of the other, but the achievement of satisfaction leaves no positive remainder in which consciousness can apprehend itself. This is true even if contending subjects risk their lives in seeking to reduce their counterpart to an object of their desire. Although they may evince their own irreducibility to their body, jeopardizing their lives does not give them a positive objectification.[22]

Hegel points to another option: an interaction wherein one consciousness achieves an abiding subordination of another consciousness to its desire.[23] Instead of annihilating the other, the dominating consciousness has that other serve its desire in some ongoing way. Here the subordination has a positive objectivity, consisting in the subordinate consciousness attending to the desire of the other by observably providing means of satisfaction. Although these means thereby yield their externality and become assimilated like any object of desire, the subservient consciousness remains external to the consciousness of its superordinate. In so doing, it effects an enduring satisfaction of desire, which objectively reflects the consciousness of the dominant figure. By observing another satisfying its desire through provision of the means of gratification, the superordinate is conscious of its own desire as served by its subordinate's ongoing performance.

There is, of course, a lack of reciprocity, residing in how the superordinate's desire for the subordination of the other is not equal to the subordinate's own desire, which serves the superordinate's desire instead of desiring the superordinate's subordination to it. Consciousness therefore is not aware of itself in the awareness of its

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[22] See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, par. 432, p. 172; and addition to par. 432, p. 172.

[23] See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, pars. 430–5, pp. 170–6.

counterpart: the subservient consciousness submits to the other's desire, whereas the dominant consciousness does not share the desire of its subordinate. Owing to this discrepancy, consciousness and self-consciousness remain distinct. What the superordinate is conscious of in confronting the subordination of the other is a reflection of its desire, not a consciousness of self.

This discrepancy is removed when what one party desires in relation to the other is what that other desires in relation to it. Or, a reciprocated recognition is achieved when, to paraphrase Sartre, each party desires the desire of the other for it.[24] In this case, one is conscious of another self that objectively manifests its consciousness of one's own consciousness by observably desiring to satisfy one's own desire, while one is doing the same with respect to that other. Each party desires that its counterpart desire it in turn, that it conform to the desire of the other just as the other conforms to its desire. The desire of each is thereby the desire of the other. Because the consciousness of each now involves the same consciousness of the other, each party has an individuated, yet universal self-consciousness.[25] In their mutual accommodation of desire, each party is conscious of another consciousness, whose awareness both reflects and is identical in form to its own, without relinquishing the individuality that keeps the relation from collapsing into an undifferentiated unity.

One of the significant obstacles to comprehending this relationship is the temptation to ascribe too much to it, a temptation applying equally to the subordination where one individual serves the desire of another without reciprocation. That "master–servant" relation can become clothed with various institutional forms of bondage, from indentured servitude to slavery. As just a relation of desire, all it comprises is the subordination of one self to the desire of another, a subordination that need not involve any other conventional practice. By the same token, the relation of mutual desire satisfaction may be associated with love (for example, in Sartre), or institutions of rights (for example, property, moral, household, civil, or political rights). As such, however, it only contains subjects becoming self-conscious by desiring to become an object of, that is, to serve one another's desire.

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[24] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), 490.

[25] See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, pars. 436–7, pp. 176–8.

By so coordinating desires, each party relates to itself as a subject of desire in so relating to its counterpart. To relate to one self as a subject of love or rights, the relation to other must involve more than desire and its gratification.

Keeping within these limits is important. Because the different engagements of desire presuppose rather than constitute consciousness, they do not entail what implausibly results if any were necessary for the mind to be aware of its own mental contents. Then, the various shapes of desire (desiring some non-self, desiring the subordination of another self, and desiring the desire of another) could never be suspended without annulling consciousness. In that case, nothing could be perceived without already being desired.

Similarly, because consciousness and self-consciousness are prerequisites for linguistic intelligence, recognitive desire, be it unequal or mutual, need not involve thought and language. If it did, the origin and acquisition of language would be inexplicable, since prior to discourse, individuals would be unable to distinguish themselves from others or other objects, precluding the triangulation by which meanings are fixed through shared recognition of common responses to commonly observed objects. This impasse might seem insurmountable, for how can individuals recognize one another as self-consciousness without conceiving how each is one of a kind, that is, a particular individual sharing the universal nature of self-consciousness? Does this not require thinking a concept of self-consciousness, whose universality each is known to embody as a particular individuated from its counterparts? If recognitive self-consciousness requires understanding self-consciousness in its universality, that is, thinking the concept of self-consciousness, and if thought requires language which cannot be private, then self-consciousness would be impossible apart from linguistic interaction. Self-consciousness would then necessarily involve consciousness of oneself and others as interlocutors, as discursive agents.

What allows this to be circumvented is the character of desire. Since desire and its object are both individual, concepts are unnecessary to apprehend or manifest either. To the extent that the embodied psyche can give expression to its feelings and consciousness can perceive these expressions and any associated behavior, subjects can

interact in regard to their desires without speaking or theorizing.[26] To be aware of one's own desiring consciousness in being aware of the desiring consciousness of another, an individual must apprehend its own desire satisfaction to be desired by another, whose gratification one just as much desires. This involves consciousness of the correspondence not of objects and concepts, but of objects and desire, on which depends satisfaction rather than theoretical truth. What is special here about the match of objects and desire is that the objects are subjects of desire.

If this is so, then consciousness of self need not require thinking any concept of oneself, any more than consciousness of others need require theorizing about them. Having a theory of self and of others does depend on linguistic intelligence, but before language can be engaged in, consciousness must discriminate itself from others. This may occur when individuals desire in respect to one another.

Nonetheless, the preverbal intersubjectivity in which nondiscursive self-consciousness resides can hardly involve self-knowledge or knowledge of others. Lacking concepts and speech, the self-awareness ingredient in desire does not judge or take any propositional attitude. At most, it registers the fit between its own mental determinations and the objectivity from which it distinguishes itself, a fit of which consciousness may be certain without knowing anything conceptual. Whether these determinations are "correct" signifies little more than the satisfaction or lack thereof that attends desire.

Still, such self-consciousness provides a key mental prerequisite for the discursive intersubjectivity in which language and thought arise. Without the discriminations of self and other through desire, the resources are lacking for individuals to compare their responses to one another in reference to objects they share in common. If this is so, interlocutors cannot fail to be certain of one another as subjects of desire. Such certainty will then underlie self-knowledge and knowledge of others, insofar as only when individuals can recognize one another giving expression to a shared awareness of the same objectivity, can they be certain of their own rationality. With that, self-conscious-

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[26] Conscious subjects may, however, have difficulty recognizing the desire of others, as is perhaps exhibited in certain cases of autism, where individuals seem unable to distinguish minds from things and therefore fail to develop linguistic intelligence.

ness can become self-knowledge, conceptualizing its own universal character.

The seeds of discursive reason are planted with the universality attained by self-consciousness through the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, an identity achieved by the subject having as its object another subject no different from and reflecting itself.[27] Although recognitive desire does not conceive that universality, or the identity of subjectivity and objectivity in which it resides, it sets the stage for mind's transcending its own particularity and having thoughts that are objective.

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[27] See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, addition to par. 437, p. 177.

HOW DOES KANT PROVE THAT WE PERCEIVE, AND NOT MERELY IMAGINE, PHYSICAL OBJECTS?*

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

I

IN THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM and his notes to it in the B Preface, Kant frames his antiskeptical issue in terms of proving "the reality of outer sense," which requires proving that we perceive, not merely imagine, physical objects in space and time.[1] Kant's contemporary critic Maimon reasserted the Humean objection, that the appearance of physical objects in space and time is a deceptive illusion produced by our imagination.[2] The same kind of objection is made today, for example, by Stroud, both to Kant and to his recent expositors. Maimon's objection rests on serious misunderstandings of Kant's analyses and proofs,[3] and I agree with Stroud and Rorty that recent "analytic transcendental arguments" fail to rebut (in effect) Maimon's objection.[4]

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*This essay is dedicated to Burkhard Tuschling, *wegführender Philosoph.*

[1] Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*), Bxl–xli n., B276–7 n. Kant's first *Kritik* appears in *Kants Gesammelte Schriften* (hereafter, "Ak"), 29 vols., Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1902–). The numbers in citations to this work indicate volume:page.lines; for example, Ak 3:137.5–13. Others of Kant's works are cited by the initials of their German titles. All translations from Kant's works are mine; the pagination from Ak is provided in all recent translations of his works.

[2] Solomon Maimon, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Valerio Verra (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965), 5:377–8, 386.

[3] For example, his writings show no trace of Kant's key doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception. I found none, and neither did Achim Engstler, *Untersuchungen zum Idealismus Salomon Maimons* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990), 94–5, 122–3.

[4] Recent reconstructions fail to engage the core of Kant's proof, because they focus on our possessing the concept "physical object," or on our using it, though without requiring our justified or even correct use of it. Strawson

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Asking *how* Kant proves that we perceive rather than merely imagine physical objects in space and time, presumes that Kant *does* prove this. This I affirm. Affirming this, however, does not presume that Kant proved it in precisely the way he proposed. I contend that Kant's proof succeeds in ways, and to an extent, that even Kant did not appreciate. In part, this is because his proof need not appeal to transcendental idealism. Indeed, parts of Kant's proof refute his key arguments for transcendental idealism. This paper epitomizes the key steps in Kant's unofficial, though sound, transcendental proof for the conclusion of his Refutation of Idealism: namely, "The mere, though empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."[5]

II

The first important point, neglected by recent reconstructions, concerns method. Recent "analytic transcendental arguments" are, of course, analytic; they attempt to justify substantive, antiskeptical conclusions by analyzing the possibility of self-conscious experience. Yet Kant stresses that no analytic argument can justify any synthetic prop-

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(*The Bounds of Sense* [London: Methuen, 1966]), Rorty ("Strawson's Objectivity Argument," *Review of Metaphysics* 24 [1970]: 222, 224; "Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments," *Nous* 5 [1971]: 3–14), and Stroud ("Transcendental Arguments and 'Epistemological Naturalism'," *Philosophical Studies* 31 [1977]: 106, 110) focus too much on concept possession, and specify their "application" too vaguely, to capture the character and point of Kant's transcendental proofs. Similarly, Bennett's "Objectivity Argument" focuses on the "application" of concepts in a way that reflects rather than rejects Hume's analysis in "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses" (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2) because in Bennett's argument their "application" does not require their correct (truthful) application. See Bennett, *Kant's Analytic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 202–14; and "Analytic Transcendental Arguments," in *Transcendental Arguments and Science*, ed. Peter Bieri, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Lorenz Krüger (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), 52–5. On the inadequacy of "analytic transcendental arguments," see Thomas Grundmann, *Analytische Transzendentalphilosophie. Eine Kritik* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1994); David Bell, "Transcendental Arguments and Non-Naturalistic Anti-Realism," in *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 189–210; and Kenneth R. Westphal, *Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chap. 1.

[5] B275; Ak 3:191.18–20. The full analysis is provided in Westphal, *Kant's Transcendental Proof*.

osition a priori.[6] If recent notions of philosophical analysis are more expansive than Kant's, they are not expansive enough to support Kant's Refutation of Idealism.

Furthermore, "analytic transcendental arguments" take as their *analysandum* the possibility of consciousness per se. All such arguments are refuted by Rorty's objection, that

> Arguments of the Strawsonian type rest on considerations of which words can be understood independently of which other words. The relevance of these considerations vanishes if we admit the possibility of a being who could experience something as an *X* but could not use the word '*X*' nor any equivalent expression.[7]

However, the possibility of Rorty's imagined being would not perturb Kant at all. Kant expressly aims at identifying the transcendental conditions necessary for the possibility of human self-consciousness, and more particularly, the transcendental conditions required for us to be aware of our existence as determined in time, that is, to be aware of some events happening before, during and after others.[8] To do this, Kant engages us with a series of wildly counterfactual thought-experiments designed to bring us to recognize some of our key cognitive capacities, and their attendant incapacities. Appreciating and assessing these thought experiments involves "transcendental reflection."[9]

III

Kant's analysis of space and time stresses the spatio-temporality of our forms of intuition and our use of concepts of space and time in order, *inter alia*, to make an important semantic point about determinate reference, that is, reference to any one particular, single item. Kant stresses our incapacity to represent to ourselves the absence of space and time. Nor can we perceive space or time as such, though of

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[6] B263–5, B810; Ak 3:184.26–185.19, 509.24–510.25. See Manfred Baum, *Deduktion und Beweis in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie* (Königstein: Hain bei Athenäum, 1986), 1, 175–81.

[7] Rorty, "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," 224, compare 231.

[8] More specifically, Kant's analysis seeks the transcendental conditions that make self-consciousness possible for finite beings possessing spatio-temporal forms of intuition and a discursive understanding, though human beings are the only instance of such beings we know of.

[9] Westphal, *Kant's Transcendental Proof*, chap. 1.

course we can conceive of their being void, or even of their being absent.[10] Kant's point concerns a key feature of the representational capacities of human beings—of *our* representational capacities. Whether other beings (for example, of the kind Rorty imagines) have different representational capacities is irrelevant to understanding *human* knowledge. The positive implications of Kant's observations about our spatio-temporal representational capacities concerns an important semantic and cognitive insight that undergirds Kant's insistence on the distinction between, and the interdependence of, sensibility and understanding in human knowledge of the world.

One key semantic point, recognized by Kant, is that definite descriptions do not suffice for knowledge of particulars. Putative definite descriptions aren't self-identifying: they don't intrinsically reveal whether they are empty, uniquely satisfied, or ambiguous. Any reasonably specific description (*sans* token indexicals, covert or overt) may be satisfied by nothing or by several things. Specificity of description cannot guarantee particularity of reference. Whether a description is empty, definite, or ambiguous depends equally on the contents of the world. For human beings, the only way to pick out spatio-temporal particulars is by sensing them (directly or indirectly). For human beings, singular cognitive reference requires singular sensory presentation. Semantic reference to particulars requires token indexicals in some form, which can play their role in human cognition only in perceptual circumstances (which can include observational instruments). Perceptual circumstances, for human beings, are spatio-temporal circumstances. Identifying spatio-temporal particulars by sensing them involves, in part, identifying at least approximately the spatio-temporal regions they occupy.[11]

Our ineliminable recourse to spatio-temporal specification is reflected by recent analyses of the "character" of demonstrative terms, where such terms can be used or understood only by understanding the speaker-centered spatio-temporal reference frame they implicitly presuppose.[12] Conversely, for us, singular cognitive reference also re-

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[10] A19–20, 22–3, 31, 172–3, 188, 214, 487/B34, 37–8, 46, 207–8, 214, 231, 261, 515.

[11] The cognitive insufficiency of descriptions theories of reference was Kant's point of departure for the whole *Critique*. See Arthur Melnick, *Space, Time and Thought in Kant* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 1–5, 25–6.

[12] David Kaplan, "On Demonstratives," in *Themes from Kaplan*, ed. Joseph Almog et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 481–563; John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," *Nous* 13 (1979): 3–21; and Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), chap. 6.

quires predication, namely, ascribing some at least approximately identified characteristics to any particular we sense, within some at least approximately determined spatio-temporal region. Moreover, predication and spatio-temporal determination are interdependent.[13] Kant's account of the conjoint cognitive functioning of human sensibility and understanding reaches this same conclusion (below, section 9).

IV

Kant's proof succeeds to a greater extent than even he appreciated because it provides two sound, genuinely transcendental arguments for (not "from") mental content externalism. The first of these arguments turns on the following considerations: Kant's "formal" idealism requires that the matter of experience be given to us *ab extra*. This is a transcendental material condition of self-conscious experience.[14] Another transcendental material condition of self-conscious experience is the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold.[15] Kant notes that any world in which human beings are capable of self-conscious experience is one that must provide us with a certain minimal, recognizable degree of regularity and variety among the contents of our sensations. In any world lacking this minimum degree of regularity and variety, we could make no judgments. Therefore, we could not identify objects or events; therefore, we could not distinguish ourselves from them; and therefore, we could not be self-conscious.

In this connection Kant argues that the fact that a complete sensibility and understanding are capable of associating perceptions does not of itself determine whether it is possible for appearances or perceptions to be associated.[16] If they are not associable, there may be fleeting episodes of empirical consciousness (that is, random sensations), but there could be no integrated, and hence no self-conscious, experience. In part this would be because those irregular sensations would afford no basis for developing empirical concepts nor for using categorial concepts to judge objects. (There could be no schematism

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[13] Gareth Evans, "Identity and Predication," *Journal of Philosophy* 72, no. 13 (1975): 343–63.

[14] Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 250.

[15] A112–4.

[16] A121–3.

and hence no use of Kant's categories in a world of utterly chaotic sensations.) In this regard, the necessity of the associability of the sensory manifold is a conditional necessity, holding between that manifold and any self-conscious human subject. Necessarily, if a human subject is self-consciously aware of an object (or event) via a manifold of sensory intuition, then the content of that manifold is associable. The associability of this content *is* its "affinity." Because it is necessary for the possibility of self-conscious experience, such affinity is transcendental.

Kant makes the transcendental status of this issue plainest in the following passage, though here he speaks of a "logical law of genera" instead of the "transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold":

> If among the appearances offering themselves to us there were such a great variety—I will not say of form (for they might be similar to one another in that) but of content, that is, regarding the manifoldness of existing beings—that even the most acute human understanding, through comparison of one with another, could not detect the least similarity (a case which can at least be thought), then the logical law of genera would not obtain at all, no concept of a genus, nor any other universal concept, *indeed no understanding at all would obtain*, since the understanding has to do with such concepts. The logical principle of genera therefore presupposes a transcendental [principle of genera] if it is to be applied to nature (by which I here understand only objects that are given to us). According to that [latter] principle, sameness of kind is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of a possible experience (even though we cannot determine its degree *a priori*), because *without it no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible.*[17]

Despite Kant's shift in terminology, it is plain that the condition that satisfies the "logical law of genera" at this fundamental level is the very same as that which satisfies the "transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold." In the extreme case suggested here by Kant, where there is no humanly detectable regularities or variety within the contents of our sensory experience—call this "transcendental chaos"—there could be no human thought, and so no human self-conscious, at all.[18] Kant establishes this necessary transcendental

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[17] A653–4/B681–2; Ak 3:433.14–29 (emphases added).

[18] Kant's argument about this "Logical Law of Genera" closely parallels his argument about the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold: both concern the recognizable orderliness of what we sense, and the constitutive necessity of that orderliness for the very functioning of our understanding. This functioning is required for any synthetic unity of apperception, and thus is required for any analytic unity of apperception, that is, for the occurrence of any human "I think." There is, however, a difference between Kant's two cases: The Logical Law of Genera concerns objects, while Kant usually states transcendental affinity of the manifold of sensory intuition in terms of the contents of sensations (but see A90–1/B122–3). Plainly, if the Logical Law of

condition for self-conscious human experience by identifying a key cognitive incapacity of ours: our inability to be self-conscious, even to think, even to generate or employ concepts, in a world of transcendental chaos. We can recognize Kant's insight only by carefully considering the radically counter-factual case he confronts us with: by recognizing how utterly incapacitating transcendental chaos would be for our own thought, experience, and self-consciousness.

Genera is satisfied, so is the transcendental affinity of the manifold of sensory intuition. However, perhaps there could be transcendental affinity among the manifold of sensory intuition only to the extent that there were humanly detectable regularities and variety among sensory contents, without our being able to identify objects in nature. To this extent, the Logical Law of Genera is a stronger principle. The extent to which the satisfaction of these two principles could in fact diverge is difficult to determine. Kant claims that failure to satisfy either principle has the same consequence, namely, human understanding simply could not function. In that case, there could be no synthetic unity of apperception, and so no analytic unity of apperception, and so no self-consciousness of the form expressed by "I think" (B131–9). The difficult point is to determine whether human understanding could function while using only the categories of quality and quantity; judgments using these two categories could potentially be made in circumstances that satisfied the transcendental affinity of the manifold of sensory intuition, though not the Logical Law of Genera. Resolving this issue would require minute investigation of Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Fortunately, two central points suffice here. First, both principles, the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold and the Logical Law of Genera, provide transcendental proofs of mental content externalism, though of slightly different kinds. In either case, this is a major anti-Cartesian result. Second, Kant's antiskeptical transcendental proof of realism *sans phrase* needn't appeal to the bare possibility of the analytic unity of apperception. It can appeal to the perhaps stronger, certainly more explicit premise of Kant's Refutation of Idealism, that we are aware of our own existence as empirically determined in time (B275).

The substantive difference between Kant's two principles can be clarified by considering why he uses two designations for what is at bottom the same principle. The transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold concerns the bare minimum level of regularity and variety among the contents of our sensations that is required to enable us to identify kinds or genera at all. Once satisfied, there is then a reflective issue, addressed by Kant's Transcendental Law of Genera, concerning the extent to which the kinds or genera we identify can be systematized. Thus, satisfying the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold is a precondition for our generating any empirical intuitions at all, while the reflective issue addressed by Kant's Transcendental Law of Genera presumes that we have sufficiently coherent empirical intuitions to identify spatio-temporal objects or events, where we try to systematize the characteristics of them we have identified. This contrast, however, did not preclude Kant from highlighting, in the passage just quoted, the transcendental, constitutive issue of the affinity of the sensory manifold while explaining the status of his transcendental law of genera.

This transcendental proof establishes a conditionally necessary constraint on the sensory contents provided to us by whatever we experience. Below a certain (a priori indeterminable) degree of regularity and variety among the contents of our sensations, our understanding cannot make judgments; consequently under that condition we cannot be self-conscious. (Above this minimal level of regularity and variety, there is then a reflective issue about the extent to which our experience of the world can be systematized.)

This condition is peculiar because it is both transcendental and formal, and yet neither conceptual nor intuitive, but rather material. The transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold is transcendental because it is a necessary a priori condition of the possibility of self-conscious experience. It is formal because it concerns the orderliness of the matter or content of sensation. However, ultimately it is satisfied neither by Kant's a priori intuitive conditions of experience, space and time as forms of human intuition, nor by the a priori conceptual conditions of experience, our categories of judgment. As Kant twice acknowledges, its satisfaction is due to the "content" or the "object" of experience.[19] Because the matter of sensation is given us *ab extra*, we do not and cannot generate it. Consequently, we also cannot generate or otherwise insure any degree of regularity or variety among the contents of our sensations. The contents of our sensations, along with their recognizable similarities and differences, must be given to us by something other than ourselves. Consequently, this is a genuinely transcendental argument for mental content externalism: we cannot be self-consciously aware of any purported "mental" contents without being aware of at least some "mental" contents that concern and derive from something other than and outside of us.[20]

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[19] A112–3, A653–4/B681–2.

[20] Thus, transcendental proofs can justify conclusions much stronger than Rorty recognizes; he claims that the most they can show are interrelations among thoughts. See "Strawson's Objectivity Argument," 236; "Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments," *Nous* 5 (1971): 3–14. Part of why Kant fails to recognize his own achievement in this regard is that the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold is a formal, transcendental, though material condition for the very possibility of self-conscious experience. The architectonic of Kant's transcendental idealism does not provide for such conditions. For a concise discussion of such issues, see Kenneth R. Westphal, "Must the Transcendental Conditions for the Possibility of Experience be Ideal?" in *Eredità Kantiane (1804-2004): questioni emergenti e problemi irrisolti*, ed. Cinzia Ferrini (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2004), 107–26. Significantly, the later Wittgenstein makes the same case for mental content externalism, though without invoking Kant's specific cognitive psychology. See Kenneth R. Westphal, "Kant, Wittgenstein, and Transcendental Chaos," *Philosophical Investigations* 28, no. 4 (2005): 303–23.

V

Kant's semantic point about determinate cognitive reference, and his first proof of mental content externalism, are reinforced and augmented by his proof that we can only make legitimate causal judgments about spatio-temporal substances. This argument provides a second, stronger transcendental proof of mental content externalism. It proceeds in two steps: The Paralogisms of Rational Psychology prove that we cannot make any legitimate causal judgments about merely temporal objects or events, while the Analogies of Experience prove that we can make legitimate causal judgments only about spatio-temporal substances.

Kant contends that causality is strictly related to substance.[21] Kant argues in the Paralogisms (in both editions) against our knowledge of a substantial self, and he argues that in psychology we have no evidence of any extended substance.[22] If we have no evidence of a substantial self, then none of us can use any of the Principles of the Analogies to make judgments about ourselves. Thus we cannot justify any determinate causal judgments in psychology because we cannot identify any causally active substance(s) within the sole form of inner sense, namely time.

The main target of the Paralogisms, to be sure, is traditional rationalist psychology,[23] but even when stating this, Kant indicates an empirical aspect of his criticism: the concept of a simple nature cannot be a predicate in an objectively valid experiential judgment.[24] Kant quickly elaborates the empirical aspect of his criticism by criticizing any empirical use of the category of substance regarding either oneself or one's psychological states: the only empirically usable concept of substance is the permanence of an object given in experience, but no such permanence can be demonstrated in the case of the "I."[25] Kant argues that there can be no synthetic a priori principles about the soul at all, of any kind. Any rational doctrine of the soul, whether a priori or empirical, purports to make synthetic judgments a priori. Such judgments require intuitions as a judgmental connecting link, but

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[21] B183, A182–84/B225–7, A204/B249; Ak 3:137.30–138.4, 163.1–32, 176.19–20.

[22] A381, B291, B293–4.

[23] A342/B400, B405–6; Ak 3:263.16–20, 266.16–25.

[24] A361.

[25] A349–50.

there are no suitable intuitions to be found in inner experience,[26] because we intuit nothing permanent or abiding in inner sense.[27] Consequently, rational psychology is not a doctrine but a discipline limiting our cognitive aspirations.[28]

VI

An important though neglected feature of Kant's analysis of legitimate causal judgments is that we can only make such judgments about spatio-temporal substances. The importance of being able to identify "permanent" or abiding substances, that is, objects or events that persist through changes, and why we can only identify such substances within space and time conjointly, are made evident by a widely neglected feature of Kant's Analogies of Experience. Kant's three Analogies form a tightly integrated set of mutually supporting principles, each of which can be used only together with the other two.[29] The First Analogy treats the persistence of substance through changes of state (transformations); the Second Analogy treats only rule-governed causal processes within any one substance; and it is the Third Analogy alone which treats causal interaction between any two (or more) substances. Kant is express about this.[30] Hence only with the Third Analogy does Kant respond directly to Hume's skepticism about our knowledge of causal powers, because only there does he defend a transeunt account of causality, the view that something in a causally active substance goes out beyond that substance to influence or causally affect something else, that is, to effect a change in a distinct substance—in brief, the thesis that all physical events have external causes.[31] Despite the complexities of these issues, the main

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[26] A398–9; Ak 4:248.28–249.11; B421–2; Ak 3:275.13–20.

[27] A366; Ak 4:230.18–28; compare A349–50, A361, A381, A398–9, A402–3; Ak 4:221.1–15, 227.21–8, 251.12–20; B420; Ak 3:274.15–24.

[28] B421; Ak 3:274.36–275.4; compare B420; Ak 3:274.24–6; *KdU* §89, 5:460.20–32.

[29] Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 168, 212–14, 224–5, 228, 239, 246, 274–5; Westphal, *Kant's Transcendental Proof*, §§36–9.

[30] B111; *KdU*, Ak 5:181.

[31] I retain the archaic spelling of "transeunt" because the *Oxford English Dictionary* indicates it is used precisely and exclusively in the sense here indicated.

point Kant makes about the necessarily joint use of the three principles of the Analogies can be summarized briefly.

Determining that we witness either coexistence or succession requires discriminating the one from the other, and both determinations require that we identify objects that persist through both the real and the apparent changes involved in the sequence of appearances we witness. We cannot directly perceive or ascertain either time or space (above, section 2), and the mere order in which we apprehend appearances does not determine an objective order of objects or events. Consequently, given our cognitive capacities, we can determine which states of affairs precede which others, and which states coexist, only under the condition that we identify enduring substances that interact and thus produce changes of state in one another. The existence of identifying enduring substances is necessary for us to determine the variety of spatial locations that objects or events occupy, to determine changes of place (both local and translational motion), and to determine the nonspatial changes (transformations) objects undergo. To make any one such identification requires discriminating the present case from its possible alternatives, which requires conjoint use of all three principles defended in the Analogies. Failing to employ these principles successfully would leave us, as Kant says in the A Deduction, with "nothing but a blind play of representations, that is, less than a dream."[32]

That Kant is correct about these important theses can be seen by recalling Hume's perplexities in "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses,"[33] and certain facts Kant notes about the requirements for our distinguishing the subjective order of apprehension from the objective order of events. Kant notes that apprehending the manifold features of a house is successive, although the features of the house exist concurrently.[34] Hume concurs, for when a porter delivered him a letter, he recognized that the porter climbed stairs that must still exist beyond the bounds of Hume's study, and that the door to his study must still exist behind his back, if he heard the porter's knock and the

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[32] A112, Ak 4:84.30–1.
[33] Hume, *Treatise*, bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2.
[34] A190/B236.

door's squeaky hinge as the porter entered.[35] The implications of Hume's observations are manifold.[36]

Note first that these observations acknowledge that we ascribe both perduring existence and causal properties to ordinary physical objects. Second, these ascriptions require concepts that cannot be defined in accord with Hume's own concept-empiricism, namely, the concepts "cause" and "physical object."[37] These concepts are thus a priori. In view of the widespread recent rejection of concept-empiricism, it is worth noting that Kant's analysis shows that these are very special a priori concepts, because their legitimate use is required for anyone to be self-conscious at all, and so to learn, define, or acquire any concept that requires experience for its meaning or acquisition. In brief, Kant's Categories count as what may be called pure a priori concepts.

Third, Hume notes that ascribing continued existence and causal properties to physical objects outstrips our sensory observations, as Hume understands them.[38] Nevertheless, ascribing these characteris-

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[35] Hume, *Treatise*, bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2, par. 20.

[36] For discussion of this section of Hume's *Treatise*, see Robert Paul Wolff, "Hume's Theory of Mental Activity," in *Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Anchor, 1966), 99–128; Barry Stroud, *Hume* (London: Routledge, 1977), 96–117; Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume* (London: Macmillan, 1941), 443–94; and Kenneth R. Westphal, *Hegel, Hume und die Identität wahrnehmbarer Dinge* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998), §4.

[37] Regarding "cause," see B240–1 and Lewis White Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 121–9; regarding "physical object," see Hume, *Treatise*, bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2, pars. 23–8. Stroud claims that Hume's appeal to propensities can be eliminated by replacing such talk with conditional regularities about the occurrence of certain "perceptions" in the mind, given certain series of other perceptions (*Hume*, 131). However, at best this provides only occasioning causes of the use of the concept "body," but accounts neither for the definition nor the origin of that concept. Moltke Gram overlooks Hume's recognition of the shortcomings of general principles of psychological association in accounting either for our concepts of or our beliefs about causal relations among physical objects ("The Skeptical Attack on Substance: Kantian Answers," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 8 [1983]: 366). Rorty likewise overlooks the problems Hume found in his study ("Strawson's Objectivity Argument," 209). Hume awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers only because he rethought Hume's first *Enquiry* deeply enough to recognize its implications for causality and especially for physical objects, which Hume developed only in the *Treatise* (bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2). It behooves Kant's critics to study Hume with equal care.

[38] Hume, *Treatise*, bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2, pars. 20, 22, compare par. 56.

tics to physical objects is necessary in order to preserve the coherence of our beliefs about the world.[39] Hume finds such "coherence" too weak to justify trusting his senses.[40] Hume overlooked what Kant saw, namely, that the coherence of our beliefs about our surroundings is only the tip of the issue. At stake is their very existence, their very possibility.[41] Without the capacity to make causal judgments we could never "derive" (as Kant says) the subjective order of apprehension from the objective order of the world,[42] nor could we distinguish between our subjective order of apprehension and any objective order of things and the events in which they participate,[43] including those events called "perceiving" them. We could not identify sensed objects at all, not even putatively; we could not identify the door on the basis of its squeak, nor could we identify ourselves as being aware of the door on the basis of its squeak. In practice, Hume clearly distinguished the subjective order in which his experiences occurred from the objective causal order of objects and events that gave rise to his experiences, though his epistemology cannot account for this ability. Kant's transcendental proofs concern not merely the possession of certain concepts but their use in legitimate (that is, true and justified) cognitive judgments of these sorts.[44] (In this regard, motions of our own bodies alter our perspectives in ways required to distinguish the

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[39] Hume, *Treatise*, bk. 1, pt. 4 sec. 2, pars. 18–21.

[40] Hume, *Treatise*, bk. 1, pt. 4 sec. 2, par. 56.

[41] This central feature of Kant's transcendental proofs is omitted by Stephen Körner ("Zur Kantischen Begründung der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaften," *Kant-Studien* 56, no. 3/4 [1966]: 463–73; and "The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions," in *Kant Studies Today*, ed. Lewis White Beck [LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1969], 230–44), by Jay Rosenberg ("Transcendental Arguments Revisited," *Journal of Philosophy* 75, no. 18 [1975]: 611–24; and "Transcendental Arguments and Pragmatic Epistemology," in *Transcendental Arguments and Science*, 245–62), and by Robert Stern ("On Kant's Response to Hume: The Second Analogy as Transcendental Argument," in *Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Robert Stern [Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999], 47–66). It is noted, however, by the following: Quassim Cassam, "Transcendental Arguments, Transcendental Synthesis and Transcendental Idealism," *Philosophical Quarterly* 37, no. 149 (1987): 355; and Barry Stroud, "Kant and Skepticism," *The Skeptical Tradition*, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 429; and Stroud, "Kantian Argument, Conceptual Capacities, and Invulnerability," in *Kant and Contemporary Epistemology*, ed. Paolo Parrini (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 248.

[42] A193/B238.

[43] A193–5/B238–9.

[44] See above, n. 4.

objective order of events from the subjective order of apprehension, as noted in Kant's example of viewing a house.[45]) Because we can use the categories of cause and substance only with regard to spatial objects and events, and because we can identify a temporal order of events only by correctly using the concepts of cause and substance, by which alone we can distinguish the subjective order of apprehension from the objective order of events, the objective order of events we identify must be a causal order of perceptible spatio-temporal substances.

VII

I have alluded to the transcendental character of Kant's proofs of mental content externalism, and his proof that we can only make legitimate causal judgments about spatial substances (above, sections 4–6), without having yet sufficiently explained their transcendental character. Their transcendental character concerns their being formal cognitive conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience, which can be known a priori, and from which follow other a priori knowledge.[46] Both of these features stem from the fundamental roles of such judgments in our self-ascription of our own experiences. Famously, Kant argues that each of us must be able to identify our representations as our own, "for otherwise I would have as multicolored, diverse a *self* as I have representations of which I am conscious."[47] Kant's term *verschieden* ("diverse") connotes either qualitative or quantitative distinctness. While not as strong, say, as *verteilten* ("distributed") Kant uses it here to contrast with the analytic unity of apperception, to emphasise the lack of such unity in the indicated circumstance, in which we would have, at most, only flickering moments of sensory consciousness, though (Kant argues) no self-consciousness (see above, section 4). Beforehand he says this directly, using a stronger term: "For the empirical consciousness which accompanies diverse (*verschiedene*) representations is in itself dispersed (*zerstreut*) and without connection to the identity of the subject."[48]

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[45] A192/B237–8.
[46] B25, 40.
[47] B134; Ak 3:110.7–9; compare A111–12.
[48] B133; Ak 3:109.16–18.

At an utter minimum, Kant's point is that, because sensory representations are fleeting, their mere occurrence does not suffice for us to identify or to recall them as our own. Each sensory representation is at best only a momentary bit of consciousness, and can neither provide nor serve as a consciousness (much less a self-consciousness) of any plurality of sensory representations. Being able to recognize any plurality of sensory representations as one's own requires intellectual recognition of that plurality of representations, and of oneself as aware of them. The recognition of such representations as one's own requires intellectual judgment. Being able to recognize a plurality of representations as one's own is necessary for gaining any stable knowledge—or even stable beliefs—about what we experience. The analytic unity of apperception, expressed by the "I think," requires for its possibility the synthetic unity of apperception through which a plurality of sensations are integrated together and recognized as one's own.[49] The transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold, that is, a humanly detectable degree of regularity and variety among the contents of what we sense, is a minimum condition for the possibility of any synthetic unity of apperception. Transcendental chaos (above, section 4) blocks the analytic unity of apperception because it blocks the synthetic unity of apperception. Transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold is thus a minimal condition required for our understanding to function, to develop or use concepts at all.

Moreover, the relevant kind of recollection of our own sensory states requires more than that some current state be caused by some prior, putatively recollected state. It requires that our present recollection be, and manifestly be, of a prior state of one's own. Hume's causal account of memory fails to meet this requirement.[50] This kind of recollection is required both for the recognition of any stable object or of any process (whether motion or transformation) over any period of time, however short, as well as for the recognition of any personal history of experiences, however brief or long, however haphazard or integrated it may be. Kant's point is that the mere occurrence of a recollection-impression within a bundle or the mere inherence of a representational state, the object of which happens to be past, within a

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[49] B131–9.

[50] Stroud, *Hume*, 124–6, 135–40; Keith Yandell, *Hume's "Inexplicable Mystery": His Views on Religion* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 108–10.

Cartesian mental substance, do not suffice—for beings like us—to identify those states as our own and so to be able to base cognitive judgments on them.

The thought experiment signalled here by Kant's "otherwise"[51] is to reflect on the implications of our only having fleeting episodes of empirical awareness, that is, sensations, or analogously Humean impressions, which would indeed enable us only to have "as multicolored, diverse a *self* as I have representations of which I am conscious." Reflecting on this wildly counterfactual state of affairs underscores and should support our endorsment of Kant's conclusions that the analytic unity of apperception is necessary for any empirically determinate self-conscious experience we enjoy, and that this analytic unity of apperception is rooted in the synthetic unity of apperception. Through this synthetic unity alone we can grasp various sensory representations as belonging together in the perception of any one object or event, and through it alone we can grasp various sensory perceptions of objects or events as belonging to our own first-person experience and its history.[52]

The fundamental role of this synthetic unity of apperception for the possibility of the occurrence of any analytic unity of apperception, for any instance of the "*I* think," is supported by Kant's proof of the transcendental affinity of the manifold of sensory intuition (above, section 4) and his proof that legitimate causal judgments can only be made about spatio-temporal substances (above, sections 5 and 6). If either of these conditions fails to be satisfied, no human "I think" could occur, because conditions required for any synthetic unity of apperception would not be satisfied, in which case no apperception, no analytic unity of self-consciousness, could occur either. Consequently, both of these conditions are genuinely transcendental.[53] The fact that making causal judgments requires being able to identify particular causally active substances in space thus provides a second, stronger proof of mental content externalism. Understanding why this is the case again raises issues central to Kant's semantics.

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[51] B134.
[52] B131–6.

VIII

Kant's complex semantics are based on his Table of Judgments. Fortunately, Kant's completeness proof for the Table of Judgments has been brilliantly reconstructed by Wolff,[54] which enables us to reconsider Kant's semantics and Transcendental Deduction much more carefully than heretofore.

Kant holds that our pure a priori concepts, the categories, have a logical significance independent of their schematization. This logical significance, catalogued in the Table of Judgments,[55] is enriched with

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[53] It may appear that §20 of Kant's Transcendental Deduction tries to establish conditions for the possibility of human self-consciousness that are independent of and prior to the conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. §20 focuses only on conceptual transcendental conditions, and it does not consider the material transcendental conditions that are latent in Kant's account, especially of transcendental affinity. §20 considers *Anschauungen*, not *Empfindungen*. Any one *Anschauung* already integrates ("synthesizes") some plurality of sensory *Empfindungen*. Hence, if there is any given empirical *Anschauung* (as §20 requires), there must be transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold contained within that sensory intuition. §20 argues, in brief, that empirical intuitions must stand under the categories, because we have no other functions of unity that could possibly guide the synthesis required by or for any one empirical intuition, because synthesizing sensations into an intuition likewise requires that those sensations exhibit transcendental affinity. In these ways, the Transcendental Deduction requires the broader issues highlighted here.

§20 may appear to focus on our concept of "cause" rather than "substance." However, it treats the Categories *en bloc*, and so includes "substance" as much as "cause," and it refers back to §19 (as it should), where an example of a substance—a body—is a key illustration of Kant's point.

I cannot enter further into the details of Kant's Transcendental Deduction here. See Baum, *Deduktion*; Melnick *Space, Time and Thought*; Pierre Keller, *Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Robert Greenberg, *Kant's Theory of A Priori Knowledge* (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). Important cautions are issued by Guyer, *Claims*, and "The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 123–60; and by Robert Howell, *Kant's Transcendental Deduction* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992). I believe the Deduction must be thoroughly rethought in light of Michael Wolff's brilliant work: *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995); "Erwiderung auf die Einwände von Ansgar Beckermann und Ulrich Nortmann," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 52, no. 3 (1998): 435–59; and "Nachtrag zu meiner Kontrovers mit Ulrich Nortmann," *Zeischrift für philosophische Forschung* 54, no. 1 (2000): 86–94.

[54] See references to Wolff in the preceding note.

[55] A79, 147/B104–5, 186; Ak 3:92.16–19, 139.11–37.

a transcendental significance by relating pure concepts to the sensible manifold provided by our forms of intuition.[56] This is the task of Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories. However, this transcendental significance of the categories does not suffice for determinate cognitive reference to particulars. Determinate cognitive reference to particulars also requires one of two further steps: either the categories must be "schematized" in order to refer them to possible sensory appearances, thereby obtaining singular determinate reference only in connection with singular sensory presentation of spatio-temporal particulars; or the unschematized Categories can be referred to particular moral agents by using various principles of Kant's practical philosophy. (This second kind of singular reference is not relevant to the present topic and shall not be discussed further here.)

Kant closely associates significance (*Bedeutung*), sense (*Sinn*), and even content (*Inhalt*) with a concept's "connection" (*Beziehung*) or reference to objects, where this referentiality is secured via our forms of sensory intuition.[57] Kant's account of "objective validity" requires that, for any concept to be fully meaningful, it must be referable to possible or actual objects of human experience, where such "referability" is secured spatio-temporally, via our spatio-temporal forms of intuition and singular sensory presentation. This component of Kant's theory of semantic meaning concerns referentiality, not "empirical content" as understood by various empiricist theories of meaning, to which Kant's views have been erroneously assimilated.[58]

Kant's semantics explicitly proscribes both empirical and synthetic a priori knowledge of particular objects beyond the bounds of sensory experience.[59] When Kant states that a "merely transcendental" use of categories is "in fact absolutely no use," his full statement indicates that this uselessness pertains to determinate judgments

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[56] A76–7/B102, A147/B186, A248/B305, A254/B309; compare B148–9, A181/B224; Ak 3:91.2–13, 139.25–9, 208.16–29, 210.35–211.14; compare Ak 3:118.7–16, 161.27–31.

[57] B300.

[58] For example, by Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 16, and by Eric Sandberg, "Thinking Things in Themselves," in *Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress*, ed. Gerhard Funke and Thomas Seebohm (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), 2.2:23–31. On the semantic sense of Kant's term *Beziehung*, see Greenberg, *Kant's Theory*, 57–67, 69–71, 119 n. 17, 187–8; and Robert Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2002), 83–95, 136–7.

[59] A247–8/B304–5; Ak 3:207.23–208.15.

about particular objects; that is, the transcendental use affords neither empirical nor synthetic a priori knowledge of particular objects. This is clear from the specific context, though Kant himself added in his *Nachträge* the further clarification that this use is no real use "to know something."[60] Similarly, he clarified the meaning of his statement that no object is determined in the absence of the condition of sensible intuition, by adding "thus nothing is known."[61] The transcendental use of pure categories affords no knowledge, neither empirical nor synthetic a priori, of particular objects. This is the "transcendental use" of pure concepts Kant repeatedly criticizes and repudiates in his *Critique of Pure Reason*; this is the nerve of his critique of rationalist metaphysical pretensions to knowledge. Conversely, Kant's semantics affords genuine cognitive significance only when concepts are "connected" or referred to particular objects via singular sensory presentation, and thus provides for singular cognitive reference.

IX

The importance of and the relations among these key points—namely, the spatio-temporal character of our representational capacities (above, section 3); Kant's first transcendental proof of mental content externalism (section 4); the restriction of legitimate causal judgments to objects and events in space (sections 5 and 6); the way in which the "I think" presupposes a synthetic unity of apperception (section 7); and the role of singular sensory presentation in genuine cognitive significance (section 8)—all converge in Kant's claim that "Thought is the act of relating given intuition to an object."[62] How these key points bear on Kant's claim can be understood by considering Kant's account of sensations and perceptual synthesis.

Kant espoused a sophisticated version of sensationism.[63] On Kant's considered view, outer sensations are not themselves objects of self-conscious awareness (except under highly unusual

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[60] Ak 23:48.16–17; compare Beno Erdmann, *Nachträge zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Kiel: Lipsius & Fischer: 1881), no. cxxvii.

[61] Ak 33:48.14.

[62] A247/B304; Ak 3:207.23–4.

[63] Rolf George, "Kant's Sensationism," *Synthese* 47, no. 2 (1981): 229–55; compare William Harper, "Kant on Space, Empirical Realism, and the Foundations of Geometry," *Topoi* 3, no. 2 (1984): 143–61.

circumstances), although they are basic events or processes of sensing. In Kant's usage, sensation (*Empfindung*, and its cognates) indicates a corresponding object or a reality (*Real*, *Wirklichkeit*).[64] Kant's view can be put adverbially: we sense (for example) greenly; we do not sense green, although we sense green features of objects or, less commonly, of colored light; we sense "the real" that corresponds to sensation. Sensations, or acts of sensing, are momentary; only series of sensations are temporally extended.[65] We can have self-conscious experience of any object or event only insofar as we integrate a plurality of sensations when perceiving that object (or event), and only insofar as we judgmentally identify and integrate several of its sensed features.[66] Only this integration and judgmental articulation enables us either to experience or to know any particular object or event, by enabling us to exploit information about it provided through sensation. The synthesis that brings about the referential and representational role of sensations is a function of the kinds of judgments we as human beings can make.[67] Only the categories, which derive their functions of unity from our twelve basic forms of judgment, can guide our judgmental integration of sensations in our experience or knowledge of any objects or events.[68]

Kant's doctrines of perceptual and judgmental "synthesis" clearly identify what is now called "the binding problem" in neurophysiology

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[64] B34, 74, 182, 207, 209, 609, 751; A20, 166, 373–4.

[65] B209.

[66] George reminds us that in contemporaneous philosophical usage, Kant's related term "*Erkenntnis*" (in the distributed singular) designates cognitive reference to a particular object or event. See "Sensationism"; compare Kant's taxonomy of representations (A319–20/B376–7).

[67] Regarding "synthesis," see Baum, *Deduktion*; Paul Guyer, "Psychology and the Transcendental Deduction," in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions*, ed. Eckart Förster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 47–68; Patricia Kitcher, *Kant's Transcendental Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Howell, *Kant's Transcendental Deduction*; Andrew Brook, *Kant and the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Jay Rosenberg, *Accessing Kant: A Relaxed Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[68] See, for example, Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 115–22, 173–94; Herbert J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, 2 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1936), 1:245–8, 260–2, 304–5, 2:21–4, 31–2, 42–65, 68–9; Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations*, 76–83; Wolff, *Urteilstafel*, 58–73; Greenberg, *Kant's Theory*, 137–57; and J. Michael Young, "Functions of Thought and the Synthesis of Intuitions," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, 112–13.

of perception. The "binding problem" is actually a set of problems regarding the proper coordination of sensory, perceptual, or cognitive information within our neuropsychological processes of cognition.[69] To the transcendental power of imagination, Kant ascribed the proper coordination of sensations into percepts of particular objects or events. To cognitive judgments of the understanding, Kant ascribed the proper coordination of our recognition of individual features, aspects, or characteristics into the recognition of any one particular object or event.[70] If contemporary neurophysiology ascribes more integrative functions to our sensory apparatus than Kant allowed, this does not detract from Kant's keen recognition of a genuine problem, widely neglected by advocates of the "new way of ideas" and of sense data. Moreover, it detracts nothing from Kant's identification of a crucial problem involved in our explicit cognitive recognition that any one object or event displays a particular set of characteristics.

Because we cannot perceive either space or time as such (above, section 3), we cannot group apparent sensory qualities into properties of objects simply by their apparent spatio-temporal coördinates. We can only identify the spatio-temporal region occupied by any particular object by recognizing the spatio-temporal array of objects and events before us. Doing this requires identifying those objects as causally interacting substances that determine one another's locations, motions, and transformations (per above, sections 5 and 6). In this way, Kant's analysis reaches Evans's conclusion, that predication and spatio-temporal localization are mutually interdependent.[71] To this Kant adds: both of these coordinated forms of identification are parasitic on the causal order of physical events in space and time, on the basis of which alone we can distinguish our subjective order of experience from the objective order of events (above, sections 5 and 6). Only by distinguishing these can we identify objects or events at all, and only by identifying them can we identify ourselves both as distinct from them and as aware of them. Our empirically determined self-consciousness (above, section 1) is precisely our awareness of

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[69] Adina Roskies, "The Binding Problem," *Neuron* 24 (1999): 7–125. This set of problems has only recently received attention from contemporary epistemologists; see *The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Association*, ed. Axel Cleermans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

[70] A79/B105–06, B152, B162 n.

[71] Evans, "Identity and Predication."

ourselves as being aware of some events occurring before, during, and after others. For reasons summarized herein, Kant is right that this form of self-consciousness is only possible for us human beings on the basis of our consciousness of objects outside us in space. Consequently, anyone who is self-conscious enough to follow this line of reasoning, or even simply to raise skeptical questions, can know a priori that we have at least some knowledge of physical objects in our environs by understanding Kant's proof.

Kant's proof of the "reality" of perception is a transcendental proof of unqualified realism about molar objects in our physical environs. It is not a proof of some transcendentally qualified, merely "empirical" realism. In part this is because Kant's main arguments for transcendental idealism assume rather than prove that the transcendental conditions for self-conscious human experience can be satisfied or fulfilled only if transcendental idealism is true. This assumption is refuted by Kant's own transcendental arguments for mental content externalism (sections 4–6, 9), because this argument shows both that transcendental conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience can be satisfied by mind-independent factors, and that the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold can be satisfied only by a mind-independent factor, namely, the degree of orderliness among the manifold of given material of sensation. This proof thus provides a sound version of the "neglected alternative" objection to Kant's arguments, and it thus provides a model for the construction of such objections regarding the satisfaction of the other transcendental conditions Kant identifies.

X

Skeptics and *advocati diaboli* may retort that this is a nice story but hardly a proof. The issue thus raised requires appreciating what Kant's proof achieves and what can properly be expected of philosophical proof. One of the deepest errors of "analytic transcendental arguments" has been to assimilate Kant's analyses to the Cartesian predicament Kant decidedly rejected. Kant is the first great non-Cartesian epistemologist. He decisively rejected Cartesianism in several ways. First, Kant rejects the Cartesian assumption, shared by Hume, that runs through the entire sense-data tradition, namely, that

states of sensory consciousness (sensations) are automatically also states of our self-consciousness. This assumption, when conjoined with infallibilist assumptions about epistemic justification (see below), inevitably leads to the ego-centric predicament of insoluble Cartesian skepticism.

Kant also rejected Cartesianism, secondly, by espousing certain forms of externalism, not only regarding mental content (above, section 4) and causal judgment (sections 5, 6, 9), but also regarding epistemic justification. Kant's transcendental conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience need only *be* satisfied for any human to be self-conscious; no one needs to *know* that they are satisfied in order to be self-conscious, nor does anyone need to know that they are satisfied in order to understand or to use Kant's proof. On the contrary, transcendental proofs work due to the converse relation between their *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi*: the satisfaction of the transcendental conditions of the possibility of self-conscious human experience is the *ratio essendi* of self-conscious human experience. Once Kant's proof establishes this, then anyone's actual self-conscious experience is—and if one understands Kant's proof, it is also known to be—the *ratio cognoscendi* of there being perceptible, causally active physical objects in one's surroundings.

A third aspect of Kant's non-Cartesianism is his clear recognition that any tenable epistemology requires some substantive premises that cannot be proven by purely deductive means and do not pass the test of Descartes's evil deceiver. This is why Kant's method of transcendental reflection involves our reflecting on some carefully chosen, wildly counterfactual circumstances in order to identify some of our key cognitive capacities and their attendant incapacities (above, sections 2 and 4).

Skeptics and *advocati diaboli* dismiss premises that do not meet infallibilist standards. Kant, however, recognized infallibilist models of epistemic justification as the skeptical trap and philosophical pipedream they are. He understood very well the failure of Descartes's effort to refute skepticism *moro geometrico*. To this I add: Descartes's argument is infected, not by one, but by five distinct vicious circularities.[72] Kant was right to develop a radically non-Cartesian approach to skepticism and to the philosophical analysis of our empirical knowledge. Not only does Kant advocate a fallibilist account of empirical

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[72] Kenneth R. Westphal, "Sextus Empiricus *Contra* René Descartes," *Philosophy Research Archives* 13 (1987–88): 91–128.

knowledge,[73] he advocates a fallibilist account of transcendental knowledge as well: establishing the basic inventory of our human cognitive capacities and incapacities is a collective undertaking, requiring constructive mutual assessment.[74] Any form of justification based on constructive mutual assessment is inherently fallibilist, because we human beings are inherently fallible.

Kant's non-Cartesian insights did not prevent him from also trying to prove his antiskeptical conclusions "apodictically."[75] Kant's model for this was the traditional model of a rational science that deduces every conclusion from rational first principles (*scientia*), as exemplified by Christian Wolff.[76] To fulfill this deductivist model, Kant proposed to establish his transcendental account of human knowledge in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which Kant understood to require transcendental idealism. Kant proposed that transcendental philosophy would establish both the legitimacy of and the parameters for properly scientific (*wissenschaftliche*) metaphysics, which he duly published as *The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* ("*Foundations*" for short) and *The Metaphysics of Morals*. In turn, the *Foundations* were to establish the a priori principles required to ground and justify empirical physics. This is a grand philosophical vision. Having examined it very closely, I submit that no one could better carry out this vision than Kant did.[77] However, this aspect of Kant's epistemology ultimately serves to undermine its own deductivist model of "scientific" justification, and thus to reinforce the fallibilist model of justification embedded in Kant's method of transcendental reflection.

Very briefly, Kant's transcendental idealism and his foundational sequence of transcendental, metaphysical, and empirical principles fails to prove the key causal principle central to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, namely, that every event has a cause. The problem is that Kant's analysis in the *Critique of Pure Reason* expressly addresses only the general causal principle, that every event has a cause. However, the causal principle actually required by the Analogies of Experience is the specific causal thesis, that every physical event has an ex-

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[73] A766–7/B794–5.

[74] Onora O'Neill, "Vindicating Reason," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*, 280–308.

[75] Bxxii, 765.

[76] Bxxxvi.

[77] Westphal, *Kant's Transcendental Proof*, chaps. 4–6.

ternal physical cause (transeunt causality). Kant distinguished these two principles only in the *Foundations*, where he also recognized that this specific causal thesis cannot be proven on transcendental grounds alone, for it also requires metaphysics. With this, Kant's foundational order of philosophical priority is jeopardized. However, careful examination of Kant's proof of the specific causal principle in the *Foundations* reveals that his key premise rests not on metaphysical analysis, but on our empirical ignorance of any instances of hylozoism. With this, Kant's foundational order of philosophical priority is destroyed, as are the deductivist, "scientific" aspirations embodied in Kant's grand vision of "scientific" philosophy. Neither Kant's transcendental idealism nor his deductivist model of rational, scientific knowledge can prove apodictically the causal principle we need and use, namely, that every physical event has an external physical cause. Transcendental idealism provides no answer to Hume's causal skepticism.

XI

Does the failure of Kant's deductivist model provide aid or comfort to skeptics? No. An extension of Kant's new method of transcendental reflection, along the lines recommended herein, provides sufficient proof of the specific causal principle. In part, this is due to Kant's semantics (above, section 8): we can use the general causal principle in connection with (*in Beziehung auf*) particular objects only in those cases where we can refer the specific causal principle to spatio-temporal objects. Once the distinction between these two causal principles is recognized, Kant's Transcendental Deduction and Analogies of Experience can be revised accordingly, in part by highlighting the fallibilist aspects of Kant's methods, to provide a genuinely transcendental proof of the conclusion of Kant's Refutation of Idealism. This proof is strongly reinforced by Kant's two transcendental proofs of mental content externalism (above, sections 4–6, 8, 9). Kant's fallibilism, along with the failure of both Descartes and Kant's own deductivist efforts, help show that the infallibilist assumptions involved in global perceptual skepticism are far from innocent or inevitable assumptions. Indeed, they are themselves a key roadblock to understanding our empirical knowledge.

Global perceptual skepticism challenges the "whole of our perceptual experience." In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant points out

that this putative "whole of perceptual experience" is itself no object of perceptual experience.[78] No wonder it cannot be justified by recourse to perception! Furthermore, as a "whole," this alleged "whole of perceptual experience" is at best an Idea, in Kant's technical sense. More precisely, it is inherently a transcendent Idea, to which we can give no objective validity. Furthermore, the skeptical "hypotheses" used to generate this alleged "whole of perceptual experience" are all designed in principle to be cognitively transcendent; in principle, they cannot be verified or refuted by any empirical evidence or inquiry. Consequently, they are "hypotheses" in name only, and radically distinct in kind from genuine, empirically usable hypotheses.

Kant's criticisms of these skeptical strategies are underscored by his semantics of cognitive reference (section 8), which entail that none of these skeptical hypotheses, nor the alleged "whole of perceptual experience," admit of any determinate reference to any particulars we can identify. Finally, Kant's fallibilism, together with his transcendental proof that we can be self-conscious of our existence as determined in time only if in fact we are aware of, and have some knowledge of, spatio-temporal, causally active substances in our surroundings, block the skeptical generalization from occasional perceptual error to the possibility of universal perceptual delusion. It does so by demonstrating that any world in which we are altogether perceptually deluded is a world in which no human being can be self-conscious. In any such world, no human being can raise skeptical doubts. So if we are alert enough to raise skeptical doubts, a close study of Kant's transcendental proof of realism suffices to allay those doubts permanently. Global perceptual skeptics simply assume that we can be self-conscious without being conscious of anything outside our minds. Kant's transcendental proof of realism shows just how portentous this assumption is. If Kant is right, global perceptual skepticism rests on profound, even willful self-ignorance: the question "What can I know?"[79] is indeed closely connected to the question, "What is it to be human?"[80]

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[78] A483–4/B511–2.

[79] A805/B833.

[80] A805/B833, *Logik*, Ak 9:25. I am grateful to Robert Greenberg, Robert Howell, and Jeffrey Edwards for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

IMMEDIACY AND MEDIATION IN SCHLEIERMACHER'S *REDEN ÜBER DIE RELIGION*

DALIA T. NASSAR

TRADITIONALLY, SCHLEIERMACHER'S *REDEN ÜBER DIE RELIGION* (1799) has been considered to emphasize intuition and immediacy as the means by which to understand and relate to the world. This reading was popularized by Wilhelm Dilthey and carried on into the twentieth century by Karl Barth and Hans-Georg Gadamer.[1] Though none of these thinkers is solely interested in the *Reden*, it forms their starting point and as such informs much of their interpretation of Schleiermacher's later works. More recently, however, an emphasis on Schleiermacher's notion of mediacy has appeared, with readings ranging so widely that some call Schleiermacher a "good Kantian," remaining within the limitations of Kant's first *Kritik*, while others claim that Schleiermacher is proto-Hegelian, and still others, that he is a proto-pragmatist.[2] In emphasizing one or the other, immediacy or mediacy,

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[1] Wilhelm Dilthey, *Leben Schleiermachers*, ed. Martin Redecker (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1970); Karl Barth, *Die Protestantische Theologie im 19 Jahrhundert* (Zürich: Evangelische Verlag, 1947); Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1986). For the most recent interpretation of Schleiermacher's emphasis on immediacy, see Manfred Frank, "Metaphysical Foundations: A Look at Schleiermacher's *Dialectic*," trans. Jacqueline Mariña and Christine Helmer, in *The Cambridge Companion to Schleiermacher*, ed. Jacqueline Mariña (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15–34. Frank's claim that Schleiermacher is indebted to Leibniz and his teacher Eberhard—more so than he is to Kant, for example—concludes, as Frank himself observes, in a contradiction: Schleiermacher adopts Leibniz's notion of identity, which is mediated through the concept, but nevertheless emphasizes the priority of being or the object prior to self-consciousness or the subject. See Frank, 31–3.

[2] With regard to the first reading of Schleiermacher as remaining true to Kantian limitations, see Julia Lamm, *The Living God: Schleiermacher's Theological Appropriation of Spinoza* (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). See n. 44 below on my contention with Lamm's reading. As for readings of Schleiermacher as proto-Hegelian, see Michael Theunissen, "Introduction: Zehn Thesen über Schleiermacher Heute," in *Schleiermacher's Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition*, ed. Sergio

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intuition or mediation, these attempts have avoided the complexity of Schleiermacher's project: the fact that Schleiermacher considers immediacy and mediacy, intuition and mediation, of equal significance and goes so far as to place them side by side in his understanding of experience and of knowledge.

That Schleiermacher underscores the notions of "intuition" and "immediacy" in the *Reden* is well known. After all, in the famous second speech of the *Reden*, Schleiermacher asks his readers "to become familiar with this concept: intuition of the universe. It is the hinge of my whole speech; it is the highest and most universal formula of religion on the basis of which you should be able to find every place in religion, from which you may determine its essence and limits."[3] The outcome of intuition, he continues, is feeling.[4] "The same actions of the universe through which it reveals itself to you in the finite also bring it into a new relationship to your mind and your condition; in

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Sorrention (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 1–2. He writes, "Schleiermacher ist, ungeachtet seines Insistierens auf Unmittelbarkeit, ebensosehr Vermittlungsdenker wie sein Antipode Hegel." Theunissen's association of Schleiermacher with Hegel may be on the right track in its suggestion of the significance of mediation in Schleiermacher; however, it is certainly inaccurate to understand Schleiermacher's notion of mediation as proto-Hegelian. Indeed, as we shall see, for Schleiermacher, mediation has nothing to do with discursivity or the creation of a system. Rather, it is a creative practice, or what I call "world creation." For Schleiermacher as a proto-pragmatist, see Jeffrey Kinlaw, "Quine, Schleiermacher, and the Case Against Analyticity: An Argument for Schleiermacher as a Proto-pragmatist," unpublished manuscript. Kinlaw completely foregoes the notion of intuition in Schleiermacher, arguing that indeed, intuition is significant only in the first edition of the *Reden*. It is in fact true that Schleiermacher speaks less of intuition in the later two editions; however, he continues to speak of feeling *(Gefühl)* which he considers immediate. As such, the notion of immediacy is not one that Schleiermacher gives up. For more on the significance of feeling in Schleiermacher, see n. 4 below.

[3] Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Hermann Fischer and Günter Meckenstock (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980). I will provide two page numbers when citing the first edition of the *Reden* (1799), the first from the *Kristische Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter, "*KGA*") and the second from the English translation, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, ed. and trans. Richard Crouter, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). I will provide Crouter's complete translations, unless otherwise indicated with a "translation altered." When citing the second or third editions of the *Reden* (1806, 1821), I will provide only one page reference, to the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 12. The citation of this passage is thus as follows, *KGA* 2:213; Crouter, 24.

the act of intuiting it, you must necessarily be seized by various feelings."[5] It is thus not at all strange to conclude, as has often been done, that for Schleiermacher, religion amounts to an unmediated and passive relation to the divine, which results in subjective feeling.[6] However, this is not the extent of Schleiermacher's understanding of religion, nor is it the extent of his understanding of the notion of intuition. With regard to the first, Schleiermacher writes in his fourth speech that "[o]nce there is religion, it must necessarily be social," and "man is primarily concerned to communicate these intuitions and feelings."[7]

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[4] The notion of feeling, *Gefühl*, is a significant one in Schleiermacher, one that has played a central role in Schleiermacher scholarship. In his later edition of the *Reden*, Schleiermacher emphasizes feeling and downplays intuition. In his later works, Schleiermacher famously describes the relationship between the infinite God and the finite individual human being as a feeling of *schlechthin Abhengägkeit*, absolute dependence. On the differences of emphasis between the first and second editions of the *Reden*, especially with regard to feeling, see Herman Süsskind, *Der Einfluß Schellings auf die Entwicklung von Schleiermachers System* (Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 1909), 229–34. On the notion of *Gefühl* in Schleiermacher's early unpublished works, see Julia Lamm, "The Early Philosophical Roots of Schleiermacher's Notion of 'Gefühl,' 1788–1794," *Harvard Theological Review* 87 (1994): 67–106. Because of Schleiermacher's emphasis on feeling, Karl Barth takes feeling to be the mediator between the infinite and the finite. It is within the individual's subjective feeling that the infinite is manifest, nowhere else. He writes, "Nur im Gefühl seiner Wirkung ist uns Gott als Ursache gegeben, nicht anderswie. . . . Wir hätten es dann nich mit Gott, sondern mit der Welt zu tun. Also ist Gott uns nicht gegenständlich gegeben, Gott bedetutet vielmehr 'zurückschieben.' Das Bewußtsein um Gott bleibt also 'eingesclossen' in das Gefühl, und so kann die Aussprache der Vorstellung 'Gott' nichts Anderes bedeuten als die Aussrpache des Gefühls über sich selber, die *unmitterbarste Selbst-Reflexion*," *Die Protestantische Theologie*, 418. Because he takes feeling to be the means by which one encounters God, and downplays intuition, I believe Barth mistakenly locates the relation between the infinite and finite within the human self. This leads Barth to conclude that Schleiermacher's religion is subjectivist and anthropomorphic, and does not allow for a true "Other." In contrast to Barth's reading, I posit that what mediates the infinite is not merely the feeling of the infinite in the human self, but everything—the entire world is a mediator of the infinite. The question thus arises, how does one know if the infinite is in fact what one is encountering, and not something very big. To this question, Barth would answer, feeling. In contrast, I would say that infinite leads to the "higher standpoint," and, also very significantly, to a desire to share one's vision within a community and to create a community.

[5] *KGA* 2:218; Crouter, 29.

[6] Barth's examination of Schleiermacher's *Reden* offers precisely such a reading, see *Die Protestantische Theologie*, 379–424. See also n. 4 above.

[7] *KGA* 2:267; Crouter, 73.

As such, religion is not merely passive intuition of the universe but also active communication of this intuition.

This significant act of communication, Schleiermacher explains, takes place through the office of "mediator [*Mittler*]," "an old rejected concept," that Schleiermacher asks his readers to bring back into discourse.[8] As we shall see, the notion of mediation and the office of mediator are of central importance to Schleiermacher's understanding of knowledge and experience. In the first speech, for example, he uses different terms to denote the office of mediator: besides *Mittler*, Schleiermacher uses the terms *Dolmestschern* (translators, interpreters), *Priester des Höchsten* (priests of the highest), as well as *Gesandte* (ambassadors).

With regard to Schleiermacher's understanding of the nature of intuition, it is important to note that though intuition is not conceptual or discursive, and in fact gives rise to feeling that gives way to an "immediate" experience of the infinite or divine, this immediacy of intuition is not to be mistaken for an immediate revelation or manifestation of the divine. That is, though the intuiter may sense some kind of immediacy with the divine or infinite, the divine or infinite never reveals itself immediately, or "as such," but rather, it always reveals itself indirectly, in something distinct but not separate from itself, namely, the finite particular. Thus, on the one hand, religion cannot be understood merely as the outcome passive intuition and feeling; nor, on the other, can intuition be understood as immediate in the sense of an unmediated manifestation of the divine.

It is the purpose of this article to outline the relation, as Schleiermacher explains it, between immediacy and mediacy, between passivity and activity, between intuition and mediation. That intuition and mediation are commensurate appears, at least at first sight, impossible: how, one asks, is it possible to have an immediate "intuition" or "feeling" of the infinite universe and, at the same time, communicate or mediate this intuition? After all, the very notion of immediacy excludes the possibility of discursive communication. This difficulty rests, however, on the assumption that the infinite universe must be either transcendent or immanent. If it is the former, then it cannot be

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[8] *KGA* 2:232; Crouter, 41.

mediated in the finite world—as transcendent the infinite must always remain outside of the finite; thus, any relation to the infinite must remain immediate and intuitive. If it is the latter, then it is not distinct from the finite; indeed, as immanent, the infinite universe and the finite in which it manifests itself collapse into one. Thus, it would be absurd to speak of an immediate intuition with regard to it—as it is nothing other than the finite mediations.

Yet, in spite of this difficulty, Schleiermacher places the two concepts—immediacy and mediacy, intuition and mediation—side by side, and he considers them not only compatible and of equal importance but also indispensable to one another. How does Schleiermacher resolve this difficulty, and does he, in the end, succeed? It is the attempt of this article to engage this seeming paradox, and as such, to provide a more complete account of Schleiermacher's understanding of religion. Certainly, the most significant task is to uncover Schleiermacher's understanding of the infinite universe, the divine, how it reveals itself through intuition, and how such intuition is expressed or mediated.[9] As such, the first section is an explanation of Schleiermacher's ontology, with special emphasis on Schleiermacher's adoption of and departure from Spinozan doctrine. The second is an analysis of intuition and of the passive element of mediation. It argues that for Schleiermacher intuition and mediation cannot be so easily separated and, indeed, that to intuit the universe is to become a mediator of it as well. The third section discusses the active aspect of mediation. There, it will be emphasized that for Schleiermacher mediation is not discursive or conceptual, but rather a practice or a way of life, what I call "world creation." This world, as we shall see, is a continuous and unending attempt at mirroring the infinite universe, and mediation as world creation is the continuous attempt to bring the infinite universe into the finite world of humanity. The last remarks form a brief discussion of Schleiermacher's success in surpassing the difficulty we have brought to surface.

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[9] Though Schleiermacher makes use of the term "divine [*Gottheit*]" in the first edition of the *Reden* (1799), the prevalent terms are "infinite [*unendlich*]" and "universe [*Universum*]," which are then replaced with "divine [*Gottheit*]" in the second and third editions (1806, 1821 respectively). For our purposes, I will assume that all three have the same meaning.

I

While Schleiermacher later came to deny any philosophical affinity between his own thought and Spinoza's, there is clear evidence that this denial was not genuine.[10] In the 1799 edition of the *Reden*, Schleiermacher mentions Spinoza twice by name, and both times favorably. He does not forego this attitude toward Spinoza in 1806 when he writes, "When all philosophers shall be religious and seek for God, like Spinoza, and all artists shall be pious and love Christ, like Novalis, then will the mighty resurrection of both world be initiated." These allusions are not, however, the extent of Schleiermacher's debt to Spinoza; rather, Spinoza's thought pervades the *Reden*.[11]

Though the Latin edition of Spinoza's *Ethics* was available in Germany as early as 1667,[12] Spinoza's popularity came through Jacobi's *Briefe*, and most of the romantics, including Schleiermacher, came to

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[10] As Albert L. Blackwell argues, Schleiermacher's wish to dissociate himself from Spinoza, who was at that time considered a pantheist and therefore an atheist, is not convincing. The heart of the matter rests on Schleiermacher's relations with his mentor, Friedrich Samuel Gottfried Sack, who, as one of the censors on the Prussian board of censors, accused the *Reden* of Spinozism. However, Schleiermacher's defense, which Blackwell cites, "You take something spoken of only in passing, on only a few pages, for the principal part?", rests on the fact that Spinoza's name is mentioned only twice in the *Speeches*. But, Blackwell argues, Schleiermacher's "complaint oversimplifies the issue . . . the mood of the entire second *Speech*—considerably the longest of the five speeches that comprise the book—corresponds closely to the tone of Spinoza's philosophy"; Albert L. Blackwell, "The Antagonistic Correspondence of 1801 between Chaplain Sack and his Protégé Schleiermacher," *Harvard Theological Review* 74 (1981): 118–9; see also 101–21.

[11] For a complete study of Spinoza's influence on Schleiermacher, see Lamm, *The Living God*, 86–7. She writes, "Schleiermacher's *system* remains a form of Spinozism, not only nominally in its direct appeal to Spinoza ('the holy rejected Spinoza!'), but also fundamentally. As was true in his earlier essays of 1793–94, Spinoza still helps him, on the one hand, to overcome Kant's bifurcated reality by insisting on the unity of all that is, and, on the other, to avoid Fichte's resolution of that bifurcation by insisting on the reality of nature and our dependence on it. But the appeal in 1799 finds something else in Spinoza: Spinoza's intuition of the infinite is an expression of a pious sensibility." For all of the influences on Schleiermacher, including Herder's generous reading of Spinoza and neo-Spinozism in Germany, see Kurt Nowak's biography, *Schleiermacher: Leben, Werke und Wirkung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2001), and his study of Schleiermacher's relation to the early romantics, *Schleiermacher und die Frühromantik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1986).

[12] Regarding Spinoza's status in the German academy at the time, see David Bell, *Spinoza in Germany from 1670 to the Age of Goethe* (London: The Institute of German Studies, University of London, 1984).

know Spinoza through Jacobi.[13] Jacobi, as it turns out, was both a close interpreter and a critic of Spinoza's doctrine, and thus Schleiermacher's understanding of Spinoza, mediated through Jacobi, was in the most significant ways both accurate and aware of the difficulties inherent in Spinoza's doctrine. The doctrine, as it was given by Jacobi and in turn studied and adopted by Schleiermacher, amounts to three points: monism (the infinite substance is the underlying and necessary condition for all existence), the principle of inherency (particular things cannot be separated from the infinite as they are inherently a part of it, nor can they be separated from one another as they form an original whole), and the harmony of the universe (the particular is not opposed to the universe but is a significant functioning member of it). Schleiermacher departs from Spinoza in one significant way: he depicts the infinite universe as a unity of continually active forces through which the infinite reveals itself in the finite at every moment. As such, Schleiermacher emphasizes the reality of change and the reality of the finite particular, as distinct from the infinite substance.

In the *Ethics*, Spinoza considers all change and movement to be the result of contingency. Since God is necessary and all things follow from God (are caused by God), all things are necessary. Thus, change (and hence movement) is impossible, as it would imply contingency, which is impossible. Further, for Spinoza, the relation between the infinite and all its attributes and modes, whether infinite or finite, is a relation of causality. God is considered a "free" or "first" cause, and this means that "God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one."[14] Attributes and modes, in turn, are caused by God, since they follow from his nature and not from their own: "I assert that all things that happen happen solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow from the necessity of his essence."[15] It is for this reason that Jacobi concludes that for Spinoza particular

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[13] See Lamm, *The Living God*, 13–4. Manfred Frank emphasizes the role played by Karl-Heinrich Heydenreich's *Natur und Gott nach Spinoza* (1789), which appeared almost at the same time as Jacobi's letters. Frank claims that the significant role that feeling, especially self-feeling, plays in Schleiermacher can be traced back to Heydenreich's interpretation of Spinoza. See Frank's "Metaphysical Foundations," 18.

[14] Spinoza, *Ethics*, ed. and trans. G. H. R. Parkinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). In citing this text, I will provide the book number, followed by a colon, the proposition number, and, in cases where it is either a collorary or a scholium, followed by a comma and then an indication of either. This citation is as follows: 1:17.

[15] Spinoza, *Ethics* 1:15, scholium.

things are not real things but only appearances of the infinite.[16] After all, not only does their existence depend on the infinite, but more significantly, their own cause is outside of themselves. This relation between God as cause and the world as effect is a mechanical relation, whereby the cause of the particular thing exists outside of itself.

In disagreeing with Spinoza on the nature of the infinite, Schleiermacher also disagrees with Spinoza on the nature of the relation between the infinite to the finite. There are indeed three consequences to Schleiermacher's disagreement. First, though Schleiermacher agrees with Spinoza that the particular finite depends for its existence on its original relation with the infinite, he does not consider the cause of the finite thing to exist outside of itself. In fact, for Schleiermacher, the entire notion of causality is not pertinent.[17] The infinite does not "cause" the finite, as it does in Spinoza. Rather, all finite things are the result of the two forces of attraction and repulsion coming together in a unique combination.[18]

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[16] "Individual things therefore, so far as they exist only in a certain determinate mode, are *non-entia*; the indeterminate infinite being is the only single true *ens reale, hoc est, est omne esse, & praeter quod nullum datur esse* [This is the real being; it is the all of being, and apart from it there is no being]"; Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Werke*, ed. Klaus Hammacher and Walter Jaeschke, vol. 1, *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998), B100.

[17] Compare Karl Barth's lecture on Schleiermacher: "Ich wüßte keine Stelle, aus der sich ergeben würde, daß das Schleiermachersche Universum etwas Anderes wäre als . . . die übermächtige *Kausalität*"; *Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1978), 452. Barth's mischaracterization of the relation between the infinite and finite as one of overpowering causality leads to his view that for Schleiermacher the infinite universe is nothing but activity. Barth thus asks, "was unterscheidet dann eigentlich diese göttliche Aktion etwa von einem in die Unendlichkeit projizierten Wasserfall, der alle wirklichen und möglichen Turbinen in diesem armen Erdental gleichzeitig in Bewegung setzt?" (453). The difference between a big waterfall and the infinite lies in fact that one's intuition of the infinite yields a "higher standpoint" from which one comes to see that the infinite does not relate to the finite in a causal way but rather, as we shall shortly see, in an organic way. The higher standpoint recognizes that every particular finite has its own "inner fate," to use Schleiermacher's phrase, within it, but at the same time cannot exist isolated outside of the whole. Looking at a waterfall as waterfall, or as something gigantic, does not yield a higher standpoint. Only seeing the infinite in the waterfall would lead to such a standpoint. See also Schleiermacher's polemic against natural religion, *KGA* 2:225; Crouter, 35 and *KGA* 2:310; Crouter, 109–11.

[18] For a comparison between Schleiermacher's two notions of attraction and repulsion and Schelling's potencies, see Süsskind, *Der Einfluß Schellings*, esp. 194–204.

These forces, he writes, are the work of the deity (*Gottheit*), who "by an immutable law, has compelled itself to divide its great work endlessly, to fuse together each definite being only out of two opposing forces."[19] The deity brings forth all things through the opposition of the two forces. All individual things are therefore unique meeting points in which the two opposing forces combine. In this way the deity distinguishes them both from itself and from one another. As manifestations of the work and will of the deity, individual things are in a state of continuous attraction and repulsion—as Schleiermacher puts it, one "will find himself everywhere in eternal conflict and in the most indissoluble union with [nature], with his own being at its innermost center and its outermost boundary."[20] The two forces are in opposition because attraction, on the one hand, "strives to draw into itself everything that surrounds it, ensnaring it in its own life, and whenever possible, wholly absorbing it into its innermost being," and repulsion, on the other, "longs to extend its own inner self further, thereby permeating and imparting to everything from within, while never being exhausted itself."[21] Both forces, though moving in opposing directions and according to opposing principles, strive toward assimilation. While attraction attempts to assimilate all things to itself by making what is external conform to what is internal in it, repulsion moves outward, beyond itself, and attempts to assimilate itself to what is external by entering into it.

The continuous conflict between the two forces is what Schleiermacher calls "life." "Every life is only the result of a continuous appropriation and repulsion; everything has its determinate being only by virtue of the way in which it uniquely combines and retains the two primal forces [*Urkräfte*] of nature: the thirsty attraction and the expansion of the active and living self."[22] All things—whether organic or inorganic, corporeal or intellectual—are thus different combinations of these two forces. In this sense, all things are identical. Their difference, however, is the result of, first, the degree to which the two forces are present in them, and second, the unique way that each unites the two forces. In the first sense, their difference is of a passive sort dependent on the existence of the two forces within them. The

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[19] *KGA* 2:191; Crouter, 5.
[20] *KGA* 2:264; Crouter, 70.
[21] *KGA* 2:191; Crouter, 5.
[22] Ibid.

second difference, however, is an active one that requires that they determine themselves in some way and to some degree.

Let us take a look at what it means for all things to be identical yet different in the sense Schleiermacher has posited. For example, what distinguishes a stone from a vegetable is not that the stone is inorganic dead matter and the vegetable organic life; rather, as two different results of a unique unity of the two opposing forces, what distinguishes them are the different ways in which the two forces are combined within each, and the different degrees to which the two forces exist in each. Thus, the difference between human beings and animals is not a difference in kind (rational or irrational) but a difference in degree. "[E]ven the spirits," Schleiermacher writes referring to the identity and difference between all things as a matter of degree, "as soon as they are transplanted into this world, would have to follow such a law."[23]

Though all things are identical in that they are constituted of the same two forces, important differences between them remain.[24] The intellectual world, for example, is a higher, more developed manifestation of the two forces, Schleiermacher explains, because it

> consists in the fact that not only are all possible combinations of these two forces between the two opposed ends really present in humanity, with now one and now the other nearly excluding everything and leaving only an infinitely small part to its opposite, but also a common bond of consciousness embraces them all so that each person, even though he can be nothing other than what he must be, nevertheless recognized all others as clearly as himself and perfectly comprehends all individual presentations of humanity [*alle einzelne Darstellungen der Menschheit vollkommen begreife*].[25]

Though the "common bond of consciousness" is humanity's distinguishing characteristic, it does not separate humanity from all other existing finite things. For the difference is the result of, first, the degree to which the two forces are present in humanity, and second, the unique way that it unites the two forces. Thus, if we return to use the

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[23] *KGA* 2:191; Crouter, 5.

[24] As we shall see in section 3, this is a point of difference between Schleiermacher and Spinoza. While, for Spinoza, finite individuals remain mere appearances of the infinite substance, for Schleiermacher, though identical with the infinite substance, finite individuals are real entities that contain within them their own life, what he calls an "inner fate." As such, they are distinct from as well as identical to the infinite substance.

[25] *KGA* 2:192; Crouter, 5–6 (translation altered).

language of causality, we would say that each particular finite thing contains within itself its own "cause." This cause both unites it with and separates it from all other finite things. Indeed, this cause is what makes it unique, determining its relation to other finite things as well as to the infinite.

Schleiermacher differs with Spinoza in a second way: with regard to the relation between the infinite and the finite. Though he agrees with Spinoza that finite things can be understood only in their relations to the infinite, he does not consider this relation one-sided. That is, the infinite not only affects the finite, but also is affected by the finite. In essence, the relation between infinite and finite in Schleiermacher is one of continuous reciprocity. To put it concisely: though the infinite and finite remain distinct and are irreducible to one another, for Schleiermacher, the infinite does not exist outside of its revelations or presentations in the finite, and the finite, in turn, does not exist outside of the original unity that is the infinite.[26] He writes, for example, that it is an "illusion to seek the infinite precisely outside the finite, seek the opposite outside that to which it is opposed."[27] Thus, even though the infinite is an original underlying unity that precedes the finite and is not a sum of aggregates, it exists only in relation to the finite. It does not cause the finite, nor is it caused by it. The relation between the two is not one of mechanical causality, but of organic continuity. The infinite universe is therefore neither transcendent insofar as it does not exist outside of its finite presentations, nor imminent in that it remains distinct from its finite presentations.[28] This last point marks the third difference between Schleiermacher and Spinoza: for Spinoza, the relation between the infinite and the finite

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[26] Compare Süsskind, *Der Einfluß Schellings*, 23, who describes the difference between Spinoza and Schleiermacher in somewhat different terms. He explains that the basic principle of Spinoza's thought is the inherence of the finite things in the infinite. In contrast, for Schleiermacher, the idea is turned upside down, where it is the infinite that inheres in the finite. Though I think Süsskind is making an important point by showing how radically different Schleiermacher's understanding of the relation between the infinite and finite is from Spinoza's understanding, and in turn underscoring the reality of the finite individual thing for Schleiermacher, I do not think that the relationship is one-sided. That is, it is not only that the infinite inheres in the finite, but also that the finite inheres in the infinite.

[27] *KGA* 2:252; Crouter, 59.

[28] Spinoza's substance, in contrast, is imminent in that its finite modifications do not contain their cause within themselves and are therefore not independent and distinct from it.

was a one-sided relation where the finite was simply an illusory effect of the original reality—the infinite substance. In contrast, for Schleiermacher, the finite is real, and it is an equal partner in its relation to the infinite. To understand this last point, we must turn to Schleiermacher's notion of the infinite.

Precisely because the infinite is the concern of religion, as religion has a "sense and taste for the infinite," it has been continually distorted. Schleiermacher is thus keen to demarcate his understanding of the infinite.[29] First, he distinguishes his notion of the infinite from physical nature which he describes as "dead matter." This notion of the infinite has been the basis of natural religion. He writes, "Neither fear of the material forces [*materiellen Kräften*] you see operating on this earth nor joy at the beauty of corporeal nature will or can give you the first intuitions of this world and its spirit."[30] In fact, he continues, it is this "inanimate matter" that we wish to dominate and control: "Indeed, it is the great aim of all diligence that is applied to the formation of the earth that the dominance of the forces of na-

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[29] Compare Wolfgang H. Pegler, *Schleiermachers Philosophie* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 50–2. Pegler outlines three different notions that Schleiermacher has of 'nature': *Natur als Widerstand, Natur als Wesen*, and *Natur als Ganze. Natur als Widerstand* is the infinite as dead matter, as I identify it below. Pegler adds that *Natur als Widerstand* works against reason, and in turn contrasts it with *Natur als Wesen* which is in accord with reason. In *Schleiermacher und die Frühromantik*, Kurt Nowak posits five different ways in which the *Universum* in Schleiermacher is depicted. "1. Universum als Totalitat alles Seins und Geschehens im Sinne eines relative un-spezifischen Globalbegriffs; 2. Universum als Natur, freilich nur als dessen vergänglicher Vorhof; 3. Universum als Menschheit; 4. Universum als geistig und religiös transparent gewordener Geschehenszusammenhang geschichtlichen Seins und Werdens; 5. Universum als das tranzendent-immanente Ineinanderschlagen des Ganzen und des Einzelnen" (167). In his later book, *Schleiermacher*, Nowak posits only the last four notions of the *Universum* (104). What is missing in the second book is Nowak's first description of the *Universum*. In contrast to both Nowak's and Pegler's readings of *Natur/Universum*, which make Schleiermacher seem to have several different notions which he employs, I think Schleiermacher has one consistent notion to which he returns time and again, and the other notions, whether they be "dead nature," or "infinite humanity," are used by Schleiermacher as examples from which to distinguish his one consistent notion of *Universum*. More significantly, I disagree with Nowak's equation of the *Universum* with *Menschheit*. *Menschheit* is a particular historical manifestation of the infinite and ahistorical. Though there is an identity between the two—we will turn to this in the following sections—they are in fact separate and distinct. In positing *Menschheit* as simply identical with *Universum*, Nowak's reading can lead to an idealist and anthropocentric Schleiermacher.

[30] *KGA* 2:232; Crouter, 42.

ture over us would be annihilated and all fear of them cease."[31] He concludes his polemic against natural religion by asking this important question, "How, therefore, could we intuit the universe in what we endeavor to master and have in part already mastered?"[32]

The second notion of the infinite from which Schleiermacher distances himself seems, at least at first sight, to be a notion he would actually endorse. It is the infinite as "divine unity and eternal immutability."[33] Following his condemnation of natural religion, Schleiermacher beseeches his readers to "raise" themselves to a perspective from which they would no longer view natural masses as the infinite, but instead the laws underlying them. He writes,

> raise yourselves to the view of how these laws embrace everything, the largest and the smallest, the world systems and the small mote of dust that flutters about restlessly in the air, and then say whether you do no intuit the divine unity and the eternal immutability of the world.[34]

However, such an attempt to posit a "higher unity" or a "relation of greatness" necessarily fails, Schleiermacher claims, as the infinite universe is constantly changing and developing, for thus, any static concept of it would be inadequate.[35] There is something yet higher than "eternal unity." He writes,

> The perturbations in the course of the stars indicate a higher unity, a bolder combination than that which we have already proved true from the regularity of their paths, and the anomalies, the superfluous touches of malleable nature, compel us to see that it treats its most definite forms with an arbitrariness, with an inventiveness, as it were, whose principle we can discover only from a higher standpoint.[36]

This higher standpoint, which recognizes the anomalies, the arbitrariness and inventiveness of the infinite, essentially its developing and dynamic nature, is the perspective that sees the infinite as a living

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[31] *KGA* 2:224; Crouter, 34. See also *KGA* 2:290; Crouter, 93: "One thing we hope from the perfection of the sciences and arts is that they will make these dead forces subject to us, that they might turn the corporeal world and everything of the spiritual world that can be regulated into a fairy palace where the god of the earth needs only to utter a magic word or to press a button to have his commands done."

[32] *KGA* 2:224; Crouter, 34.

[33] This understanding of the infinite as eternal and immutable is in fact very close to Spinoza's understanding of substance.

[34] *KGA* 2:225; Crouter, 35.

[35] *KGA* 2:226; Crouter, 36.

[36] Ibid.

organism. It is to this notion of the infinite that Schleiermacher turns his attention, after having discredited the two noted above.[37]

Schleiermacher's notion of the infinite as a living organism follows from his three points of departure from Spinoza: it is both the ground for and the effect of the finite, it is alive and developing, and it does not exist outside of its relation to individual finite things that are free. As ground, it is the ultimate underlying being, nothing can exist outside of it. It "presents [*darstellt*] itself as totality, as unity in multiplicity, as system."[38] As alive, this infinite, in contrast to the dead matter of physical nature, not only nourishes itself but also "forcibly draws dead matter into its life."[39] All things are alive and participating in this organic whole, all things are interactive and changing. In turn, all these things participate in such a way that they form a "coherent whole" and are not merely random parts that do not relate to one another in undetermined ways. Together, the notions that the infinite is a developing unified ground amount to an understanding of the infinite as a coherent underlying whole:

> We do not feel ourselves dependent on the Whole in so far as it is an aggregate of mutually conditioned parts of which we ourselves are one, but only in so far as underneath this coherence there is a unity conditioning all things and conditioning our relations to the other parts of the Whole.[40]

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[37] *KGA* 2:225; Crouter, 35. That Schleiermacher dismisses nature, on the one hand, and depicts the infinite as this living dynamic organism, on the other, makes his view of nature and its relation to humanity a difficult one to pin down. However, it is important to point out that for Schleiermacher nature in the first sense—the nature which he dismisses—is *dead* nature, and is conceived as such precisely because it is based on the framework of mechanical causation. In contrast, the universe is *living* organism. Because of Schleiermacher's first harsh dismissal of mechanical dead nature, many have interpreted him as advancing the thesis that humanity should forcibly alter nature to suit its needs. I think this is a misinterpretation of Schleiermacher based on a misunderstanding of (1) his notion of mechanical nature, and (2) his notion of the infinite universe as living organism. Such misunderstanding leads in turn to conclusions such as Nowak's and Barth's, where humanity is understood to be the final goal or focus of religion. I do not think this is an accurate assessment of Schleiermacher's *Reden*, as humanity is one part of living *natural* organism. Herman Süsskind also subscribes to Barth's and Nowak's reading when he distinguishes between Schleiermacher and Schelling on the belief that for Schelling nature plays a significant role, and for Schleiermacher, it is only to be dominated. See Süsskind, *Der Einfluß Schellings*, 210.

[38] *KGA* 2:245; Crouter, 53. See also *KGA* 2:212; Crouter, 23.

[39] *KGA* 2:227; Crouter, 36.

[40] *KGA* 12:130.

From this perspective, there is "neither cause nor effect, neither preservation nor destruction."[41] Rather, what we have is an "eternal destiny [*ewigen Schicksal*]," and a "uniform progress of the whole."[42] All things in the organic whole are constituted in accordance with an inner fate (freedom) and are inherently related and determined entities, connected through their mutual relation to and dependence on the whole. They remain, however, independent of the whole insofar as they are real finite particular entities, and not simply illusory manifestations of the whole. Their freedom lies in precisely this independence—in the inner rather than outer fate (a fate given to them by an external foreign entity). Finally, all things act in accord with the progress of the whole. This progress is history, and the development of the whole manifests itself in history.[43]

Thus far we have examined two of the three defining characteristics of Schleiermacher's notion of the infinite, namely, that it is unified ground and that it is alive and developing. The third, and most significant aspect of the infinite, the aspect, in fact, that underlies the first two, is its relation with the finite. We have only hinted at what this relation amounts to and how the infinite manifests itself in its parts and can only exist in such self-presentations. However, we have yet to provide a full examination of the exact relation.

II

The essence of religion, for Schleiermacher, is neither thinking nor acting (as is the case in metaphysics or morality, respectively) but "feeling and intuition." Religion, Schleiermacher writes, "wishes to intuit the universe, wishes devoutly to overhear the universe's own presentations [*Darstellungen*] and actions, longs to be grasped and filled by the universe's immediate [*unmitterlbaren*] influences in childlike

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[41] *KGA* 2:234; Crouter, 43.

[42] Ibid.

[43] As to whether the movement of history is linear and moving toward a final goal, I think it is unclear where Schleiermacher stands. Kurt Nowak writes "Der Begriff Universum . . . widerstrebte einer linearen Entwicklungsvorstellung" (*Schleiermacher und die Frühromantik*, 188). On the other hand, in *Der Einfluß Schellings* Süsskind writes, "Die Geschichte stellt keinen Kreislauf dar, sondern einen Fortschritt zu Höherem und Volkommenerem" (32).

passivity."[44] By underscoring immediacy, Schleiermacher wants to distinguish between religion and metaphysics and to eliminate metaphysical tendencies in religion, because in metaphysics all particulars are subsumed under a universal concept and placed within a system. Schleiermacher argues that, first, subsumption is necessarily incomplete, as there will always remain a particular which has yet to be subsumed, and this undermines the totality of the system as it presently stands. Even if such a particular can be subsumed, and the system continues to grow, there will always remain an endless number of yet unsubsumed particulars. Second, he claims that the particulars "are lost [*verliert*]" within the system. Their singularity is lost, he writes, in the "uniformity of the abstract concept."[45] For these two reasons, religion relies on intuition, which grasps the singular in a nonconceptual way. "Intuition is and always remains something individual, set apart, the immediate [*umittelbare*] perception, nothing more. To bind it and to incorporate it into a whole is once more the business not of sense but of abstract thought."[46]

Intuition is thus of the particular, characterized by "childlike passivity" toward the universe's revelations and actions. The intuiter receives the actions or revelations of the universe, but he does not act in any way in order to receive these revelations. The universe affects the individual, and in turn the individual intuiter gets a glimpse of the universe's structures. "All intuition proceeds from an influence of the

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[44] *KGA* 2:211; Crouter, 22 (translation altered). Compare Richard Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* (New York: Harper, 1941), 110. Brandt considers the passage to which I am here referring, in which Schleiermacher equates intuition with "childlike passivity," to be unreliable and thus not worthy of further interrogation. He considers this passage, and others like it in which Schleiermacher depicts the subject's relation to the intuition, to be merely "psychological," and since "Schleiermacher's intent in writing this book" was not psychological, "too much reliance should not be placed on these passages." Brandt then goes on to argue that Schleiermacher's notion of intuition is not merely subjective, but that it "furnish[es] objective knowledge of the nature of the universe" (117). It is difficult to understand what Brandt means by "merely psychological," and how he establishes the objectivity of intuition when he does not take into consideration these "merely psychological" passages. In fact, these passages are the most significant with regard to the question of the subjectivity and objectivity of intuition. For it is within these passages that Schleiermacher outlines the relationship between the individual and the universe that is born out of intuition, and in turn, the vision and higher standpoint born out of intuition.

[45] *KGA* 2:213; Crouter, 24.

[46] *KGA* 2:215; Crouter, 26.

intuited on the one who intuits, from an original and independent action of the former," writes Schleiermacher, "which is then grasped, apprehended, and conceived by the latter according to one's own nature."[47] In this important passage, Schleiermacher establishes the priority of being over the consciousness of being by emphasizing that intuition takes place through a passive receptivity of the actions of an "original and independent" actor—the universe. Further, he adds that following such passivity, the individual comes to apprehend the intuition "according to one's own nature." Such apprehension does not entail conceptualization of the universe through a faculty of representation (in the Kantian sense),[48] or through a system of thought (in the Hegelian sense). Rather, as we shall shortly see, to "grasp, apprehend,

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[47] *KGA* 2:213; Crouter, 24.

[48] Compare Lamm, *The Living God*, 86. Lamm argues that the individual intuiter does play a role in the act of intuition and that intuition is not mere reception of the immediate universe. Though I agree that the intuiter does play a role in the act of intuition, that the intuiter's "sense and imagination," affect how he receives the universe, I do not agree with Lamm that the moment of intuition "acknowledges the structures of our understanding and the limits of our reason." Lamm explains that Schleiermacher's is a "higher realism," or a post-Kantian Spinozism. By this she means that though Schleiermacher has a monistic worldview like Spinoza's, it is not a naïve realism, but it in fact recognizes the role played by our faculties in our perception—hence it is post-Kantian. "Things are not as we perceive them to be," she writes to further explain what she means by "post-Kantian" "higher realism." It is unclear what Lamm means by this statement, that things are not as we perceive them to be, on two bases. First, in intuition, we—as Lamm acknowledges—do not gain conceptual knowledge of the object of our intuition. Rather, all that we have is the effect it has on our senses. Schleiermacher uses the analogy of light to vision to explain what takes place in intuition. Our vision is not of light, we do not come to an understanding of what light is. Yet, in intuition we are forced outside of ourselves, outside of our faculty of representation and conceptualization, and forced, in essence, to encounter something that cannot be conceptualized. This is what makes intuition special. If we were to constrain our intuition of the infinite within Kantian categories, then do we in fact get out of the Kantian gap between subject and object, knower and known? Second, intuition is said to be "immediate" and "particular" by Schleiermacher. Lamm is aware of this, and in fact she emphasizes this point to prove Schleiermacher's realism. However, what can Schleiermacher mean by "immediate" intuition, on the one hand, and the feeling of the infinite, on the other, if all we have is a constrained representation of the infinite mediated through the limits of our capacity to reason? I believe that if we were to constrain intuition within the Kantian categories, as Lamm does, then we do not escape Kantian dualism. In fact, it is precisely because of its capacity to receive what is unrepresentable and inconceptualizable that intuition overcomes the split. Further, if we attempt to conceptualize and make the intuition enter into our faculty of representation, then we lose the excessive quality of the infinite and, in turn, the feeling of excitement that is born out of this excess.

and conceive . . . according to one's own nature," that is, to mediate the infinite in the finite, is to give it determinate form by reflecting the infinite in one's self and one's world. Such determinate form is not the result of conceptual or representational mediation. If it were, then the particular would be subsumed under the universal, intuition would be surmounted by reason and representation, and that which is intuited, the singular and immediate, would turn into a representation placed alongside other representations thus forming a system.[49] However, Schleiermacher says that it is impossible to have a "system of intuitions," for by their very nature, intuitions cannot be conceptualized.

Intuition, it is also important to note, does not lead to knowledge about the object intuited such that the individual intuiter comes to an understanding of it. "What you know or believe about the nature of things lies far beyond the realm of intuition," Schleiermacher writes.[50] Further, intuition results in a new perspective. To see the infinite in the finite, "to accept [*hinnehmen*] everything as a part of the whole and everything limited as a presentation [*Darstellung*] of the infinite is religion."[51] The outcome of intuition is thus not knowledge of a particular object, but religion, or the acceptance of "everything as a part of the whole." Schleiermacher later calls this acceptance a "higher standpoint" (*höherer Standpunkt*) and explains that it results in feeling. Religion is the acceptance of the vision of intuition, the higher standpoint that such a vision entails, and the feeling that results from such an acceptance. What is this vision that the intuiter has, and how does it yield religious feeling?

Schleiermacher describes what the intuiter sees in the intuition. To quote at length,

> Its chemical forces [*Kräfte*], the eternal laws according to which bodies are formed and destroyed, it is in these that we most clearly and in a most holy manner intuit the universe. See how attraction [*Neigung*] and repulsion [*Widerstreben*] determine everything and are uninterrupt-

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[49] If Schleiermacher were indeed attempting to join together the notion of immediate intuition with conceptual or representational mediation (which he is not), then he would not be able to escape the paradox we pointed out above. For it would be paradoxical to emphasize intuition in that it alone grasps the particular, on the one hand, and to attempt to systematize the intuition, on the other, thus "losing" the particular in the concept.

[50] *KGA* 2:214; Crouter, 25.

[51] *KGA* 2:216; Crouter, 27.

> edly active everywhere, how all diversity and opposition are only apparent and relative, and all individuality is merely an empty name. See how all likeness strives to conceal itself and to divide into a thousand diverse forms, and how nowhere do you find something simple, but everything is ornately connected and intertwined.[52]

In intuition, one sees the continued activity of the universe, the movement of the two original forces of attraction and repulsion and how these forces "determine everything" and are "uninterruptedly active." What the intuiter thus sees is the identity of all things—all things are made of the same two forces, "all diversity and opposition are only apparent and relative . . . all individuality is merely an empty name." In turn, the intuiter comes to recognize how all things necessarily and immanently affect one another—"everything is ornately connected and intertwined." Schleiermacher continues detailing what takes place in intuition:

> This is the spirit of the world [*Geist der Welt*] that reveals [*offenbart*] itself in the smallest things just as perfectly and visibly as in the greatest; that is an intuition of the universe that develops out of everything and seizes the mind. But only the person who in fact sees it everywhere, who, not only in all alterations but in all existence, finds nothing else but a production [*Werk*] of this spirit and a presentation [*Darstellung*] and execution of these laws, only to him is everything visible really a world, formed and permeated by divinity, and is one.[53]

The intuiter recognizes an original identity not only between all finite things but also, as this second quotation indicates, between finite things and the infinite universe. All things are a "production" and "presentation" of the laws of the divine, "formed and permeated" by it. As such, all finite things—in their multiplicity and variety—cannot be understood outside of their relation to the infinite, to the divine which "brings them forth" and whose production and presentation they are.

What is revealed in intuition is thus the relation between the infinite and the finite we outlined in the preceeding section. We must remember, however, that it is not everyone who enjoys this perspective, who "sees [the spirit of the world] everywhere," the original unity and identity between the infinite and finite, on the one hand, and between all finite things, on the other. Rather, it is only to the "pious mind" that "religion makes everything holy and valuable, even unholiness and commonness itself."[54] Those who have a pious mind, or those who

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[52] *KGA* 2:227; Crouter, 36 (translation altered).
[53] Ibid.
[54] *KGA* 2:218; Crouter, 29.

have attained the "higher standpoint," are able to recognize the inherency between infinite and finite and the inner connection (*Zusammenghang*) between all finite things to one another.

Since the higher standpoint is itself a consequence of intuition, the question becomes, how does intuition come about? Schleiermacher explains that a person must have a "point" of contact with the infinite in order to intuit in the first place. Insofar as all things in the world are manifestations of the infinite universe, and insofar as the vision of such manifestations is religion, then "[e]verything that exists is necessary for religion, and everything that can be is for it a true indispensable image [*Bild*] of the infinite; it is just a question of finding the point [*den Punkt*] from which one's relationship to the infinite can be discovered."[55] This point, which he also calls the "touchstone [*Prüfstein*]" to the infinite, makes it possible for intuition to take place and, in turn, for an inuiter to gain a higher standpoint.[56]

Schleiermacher explains at the beginning of the second speech that those who are preparing themselves to have a vision of the divine, "look with undivided attention at the place where the vision is to show itself [*wo die Erscheinung sich zeigen soll*]."[57] In this place, Schleiermacher explains, "A manifestation [*Erscheinung*], an event develops quickly and magically into an image [*Bild*] of the universe." The person who is to intuit must thus focus his attention at a specific place, a particular finite point. In turn, the intuiter to whom this manifestation is apparent "lie[s] in the bosom of the infinite world" and becomes "its soul."[58] As such, not only is the intuiter's attention fixed on a specific place, but also he is himself located spatially in a specific point.

The notion of place is significant here. First, in order to have an intuition, one must have a specific point or a place of contact. Second, the intuiter possesses a place in the bosom of the universe. Then, through the act of intuition, the individual enters into a "spatial exchange" with the infinite. The individual's body extends beyond itself into the universe, on the one hand, and the infinite universe enters

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[55] *KGA* 2:218; Crouter, 29.
[56] *KGA* 2:213; Crouter, 24.
[57] *KGA* 2:206; Crouter, 18.
[58] *KGA* 2:221; Crouter, 32.

and is individuated in the individual's body, on the other. Schleiermacher describes this exchange, this expansion and attraction:

> At this moment I am its soul, for I feel all its forces [*Kräfte*] and its infinite life as my own; at this moment it is my body, for I penetrate [*durchdringe*] its muscles and its infinite life as my own, and its innermost nerves move according to my sense and my presentiment as my own.[59]

In this way, not only is the place to which the intuiter's attention was turned transformed to become the place of the universe's revelations,[60] but also the individual himself is transformed to become precisely such a point of revelation. At the moment of intuition, the intuiter expands to encompass the infinite, and, at the same time, the infinite enters the individual and itself becomes individualized, that is, specifically determined in one place. Through such an exchange, the intuiter is transformed and becomes not merely an intuiter but also a mediator. For the intuiter functions as "point of contact" with the universe, as the place in which the universe manifests itself. The individual intuiter becomes one in whom the infinite is revealed. Schleiermacher writes,

> in whomever religion has thus worked back again inwardly and has discovered there the infinite, it is complete in that person in this respect; he no longer needs a mediator [*Mittler*] for some intuition of humanity, and he himself can be a mediator for many.[61]

In this way, the spatial exchange that takes place between the infinite universe and the finite individual intuiter during the moment of intuition leads to an individuation of the infinite, on the one hand, and to an expansion of the finite, on the other, allowing the individual to become a mediator, one in whom the infinite universe is reflected.

It is important to return here, albeit briefly, to Schleiermacher's understanding of a particular point as a unique combination of the two forces. As noted above, there are different degrees in which all parts of the universe manifest the universe. These degrees depend on the

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[59] Ibid.

[60] In the same passage where Schleiermacher asks his readers to familiarize themselves with the notion of intuition, he also writes that on the basis of intuition, "you should be able to find every place in religion, from which you may determine its essence and its limits"; *KGA* 2:213; Crouter, 24.

[61] *KGA* 2:232; Crouter, 42.

unique way in which the two forces of attraction and repulsion are combined. Humanity distinguishes itself from other members of the universe by what Schleiermacher calls its "bond of consciousness." Within this bond of consciousness, however, not all individuals are capable of "penetrat[ing] into the secrets of [the combination of the two forces] brought to rest."[62] Rather, only "the thoughtful expert" can do so, someone whom the deity sends and employs as "translators of its will and its works and as mediators of what would otherwise remain eternally separated."[63] This translator is none other than the mediator.

The mediator's nature demonstrates both a "high level of that force of attraction that actively seizes surrounding things," as well as "so much of the spiritual penetration drive, which strives for the infinite and impregnates all spirit and life."[64] As such, the mediator, as a point of equilibrium and high intensity within the human bond of consciousness, reflects more completely the infinite in his action of self-reflection. Further, in containing both of the forces of attraction and repulsion at such an intensity, the mediator is driven back and forth by them, moving outward and then returning inward, and then again outward. Such oscillation between the inner and the outer, between delineation of oneself (self-determination, the unique way in which one combines the two forces) and overcoming of oneself (expansion beyond the outlines of individual personality) is the presentation of the infinite in the finite, that is, mediation.

Thus, the mediator's proximity to the universe is what allows him to present or exhibit the universe in himself. The mediator's self-reflection reveals the universe because of his special place as a meeting point of the two forces. As such, the mediator functions as a mirror for the universe.[65] Spinoza, whom Schleiermacher describes as permeated by "the high world spirit," saw "how he too was [the uni-

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[62] *KGA* 2:193; Crouter, 6.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Süsskind writes that Rudolf Haym was the first to come to this conclusion and this precise characterization of the world as "mirror" to the universe. However, Haym came to this after he read Dilthey's *Lebens Schleiermachers* and thus after he had already written *Die Romantische Schule*. Süsskind quotes Haym, "Das Endliche, Einzelne, Individuelle ist Ausdruck, *Spiegel* des Unendlichen"; *Der Einfluß Schellings*, 21.

verse's] most lovable mirror."[66] For "he was reflected in the eternal world," "was full of religion and full of holy spirit."[67] The mediator is the mirror of the infinite universe, reflecting in himself the will and work of the universe. It is important to note that in identifying human self-consciousness with the activity of the universe, Schleiermacher is not an idealist. Rather, following Spinoza, Schleiermacher posits the infinite universe first, and then posits human self-consciousness as the reflection of this original being.

This form of mediation is passive: it requires little activity on the part of the intuiter-mediator. The universe is self-mediating through the individual mediator. Schleiermacher maintains that whatever degree of the two forces an individual or a class manifests, it remains, nonetheless, a part of the universe, a member that participates in the movement of the whole. Indeed, these different degrees of development are nothing other than the different ways in which finite individuals present the infinite whole within themselves: "everything is a work of the universe and only thus can religion regard humans."[68] A single individual element in the universe is nothing but the "work of the universe," and humans are nothing but one of these works, a point in which the infinite universe reveals itself.

III

Yet, in spite of such emphasis on the passive nature of the intuition-mediation of the infinite in the finite, from the perspective of the finite individual, such mediation is an active undertaking. First, though intuition is passive, what one intuits, the vision that one has of the infinite, depends in part on the individual's place in the universe, what Schleiermacher calls the individual's sense and imagination.

> Which of these intuitions of the universe we appropriate depends on our sense of the universe. This is the proper measure of our religiousness; whether we have a God as a part of our intuition depends on the direction of our imagination.[69]

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[66] *KGA* 2:213; Crouter, 24.
[67] Ibid.
[68] *KGA* 2:143; Crouter, 58–9.
[69] *KGA* 2:245; Crouter, 53.

Thus, the act of intuition depends in part on the particularity of the individual, for it is the individual's unique reception of the infinite that makes the infinite's manifestation indeed infinite.[70]

However, this is not the extent of activity. Schleiermacher maintains that intuition is possible only within the world of humanity. He writes: "in order to intuit the world and to have religion, man must have first found humanity, and he finds it only in love and through love."[71] Indeed, humanity makes intuition possible precisely because it gives us a "world," and it is in this world that we intuit.[72] The first man, alone, did not have a world; however, the deity "created for him a partner, and now, for the first time, the world rose before his eyes. In the flesh and bone of his bone he discovered humanity, and in humanity the world."[73] The world is an outcome of humanity—of human relations, imagination, and communication. However, it is not only the world that is discovered in humanity, but also the infinite universe: "You will know that it is our imagination [*Phantasie*] that created the world for you, and that you can have no God without the world."[74] Schleiermacher is here saying that the world created by humanity is also the world in which the divine reveals itself. Indeed, as we have noted, and as Schleiermacher emphasizes here once again, the divine (God) cannot be had ("you can have no God") outside of the finite world, intuitions of the infinite are possible only in this world. For it is only in the world that we can find the infinite, or, as

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[70] Kurt Nowak argues that intuition is necessarily active for Schleiermacher on the premise that the very individuation of the infinite is dependent on the activity of the finite. He writes, "Als so und nicht anders Wahrgenommenes konnte es sich aber nicht ohne die je verschiedenartige Subjektivität des anschauenden Individuums konstituieren. Dadurch wurde der Wahrnehmungsakt aus seiner Gleichförmigkeit befreit und in die Unendlichen der (religiösen) Individuen multipliziert. Auf diese Weise gewann die 'Religion' bis eine Unendlichte variable Gestaltungen und Ausdrucksformen, eine nicht ausschöpfbare individuelle Fülle—ein Gedanke, der das romantische Individualitatsmuster in eine letzte konsequenzführte"; *Schleiermacher und die Frühromantik*, 169. This kind of activity attributed to the moment of intuition is distinct from the Kantian constraints which Lamm wants to attribute to intuition. See n. 48 above.

[71] *KGA* 2:228; Crouter, 38.

[72] Recall that though intuition is of the infinite, it is always of the infinite as mediated; thus, there must always be, prior to the act of intuition, some form of mediation. Here Schleiermacher explains that this mediation is the "human world."

[73] *KGA* 2:227–8; Crouter, 37.

[74] *KGA* 2:245; Crouter, 53.

Schleiermacher puts it, we can be conscious of "the infinite . . . only . . . mediated through a finite object [*mittelst des Endlichen*], by means of which our tendency to postulate and seek a world, leads us from *detail and part to the All and the Whole.*"[75] What is remarkable is that this world in which the divine reveals itself—the world which is meant to reflect the divine—is also the world which human beings actively create.

Schleiermacher makes his point even more strongly when he seems to identify the infinite with humanity, and intuition of the infinite with intuition of humanity. To quote at length,

> There were moments when, in spite of all distinctions of sex, culture, and external circumstances, you thought, felt, and acted this way, when you really were this or that person. You have passed through all these different forms within your own order; you yourself are a compendium [*Kompendium*] of humanity; in a certain sense your personality embraces the whole of human nature in all its presentations this is *nothing but your own self* that is reproduced, clearly delineated, and immortalized in all its alterations [*und dies ist in allen ihren Darstellungen nichts, als euer eigenes Vervielfältigtes, deutlicher ausgezeichnetes, und in allen seinen Veränderungen verwigtes Ich*]. In whomever religion has thus worked back again inwardly and has discovered there the infinite, it is complete in that person in this respect; he no longer needs a mediator [*Mittler*] for some intuition of humanity, and he himself can be a mediator for many.[76]

In this polemical passage,[77] Schleiermacher seems to equate humanity and the world it has created with the infinite. He who finds humanity within himself and has, as such, become a "compendium" of humanity, is also the person who has discovered the infinite within himself. For this reason, this person "no longer needs a mediator for some intuition of *humanity*," but becomes a mediator for many. Thus, it would seem that in finding humanity within oneself, one also finds the infinite.

A careful interpretation of this "compendium" passage shows that Schleiermacher is neither positing an anthropomorphic understanding

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[75] *KGA* 12:130, #2.

[76] *KGA* 2:232; Crouter, 42 (translation altered).

[77] Polemical because of its focus on humanity, and the identification—it would seem—of humanity with the infinite. Some thinkers take this passage as evidence of Schleiermacher's anthropomorphism, while others are willing to overlook it. See Franz Christ, *Menschlich von Gott reden. Das problem des anthropomorphismus bei Schleiermacher* (Zürich: Ökumenische Theologie 1982). Karl Barth accuses Schleiermacher of anthropocentrism, see his lectures on Schleiermacher, *Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe* 2:440–5.

of the divine nor even leaning toward anthropocentrism. First, to be a compendium of humanity whereby one extends beyond himself to encompass all "distinctions of sex, culture and external circumstances," and therein to find the infinite, does not mean, as has often be interpreted, that humanity and the infinite are identical.[78] Rather, to come to see that the entirety of human nature "is nothing but your own self," that is, to come to recognize the same in the other and the other in the same, depends upon an original intuition of the infinite and a recognition of how the infinite permeates everything, namely, the "higher standpoint." To see the other in the same and the same in the other, to recognize that humanity in "all its versions" is nothing but one's self, is the result of an intuition of the universe. Such an intuition, as we saw in the previous sections, is an intuition of the infinite in the finite. Thus, it is possible, and indeed necessary, that the individual intuiter intuit the infinite not in some transcendent being beyond the world, but in the human world—the finite—itself. To say that in humanity one finds the infinite is not to anthropomorphize the infinite, but to provide one example in which the infinite manifests itself. It is thus not the case that the intuiter's intuition is of humanity (recall, for Schleiermacher, intuition teaches us nothing about the object intuited); rather, it is mediated through humanity. Thus, to have an intuition of infinite humanity and to identify infinite humanity with

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[78] See for example Nowak's list of the different meanings the infinite has, one of which is *Menschheit*, n. 29. Nowak also edits a collection of Schleiermacher's *Athenaeum Fragments*, which he calls "*Bruchstücke der Unendlichen Menschheit.*" In his *Nachwort*, Nowak does not provide an explanation as to why he edits the collection under that name. He speaks only of how the romantics were interested in bringing humanity into harmony with the universe (in fact, in this explanatory notes, he rarely mentions humanity). See *Bruchstücke der Unendlichen Menschheit: Fragmente, Aphorismen und Notate der frühromantischen Jahre*, ed. Kurt Nowak (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlanganstalt, 2000). Also see Emil Fuchs, *Vom Werden dreier Denker. Was wollen Fichte, Schelling und Schleiermacher in den ersten Periode ihrer Entwicklung*? (Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 1904), 372–4. Fuchs has an interesting reading of Schleiermacher's notion of intuition, in which he argues that for Schleiermacher there are three different kinds of intuition: *sinnliche Anschauung*, *religiöse Anschauung*, and *Selbstanschauung*. He explains that there is an "almost immutable necessity," quoting Schleiermacher, between *Selbstanschauung* and *religiöse Anschauung* which makes "das Universum als Gott d. h. als Persönlichkeit zu denken, da ja die Anschauung kein anderes Bild geistigen Wesens entwerfen kann als das von Menschen genommene" (374). See also, Barth, *Die protestantische Theologie*, 379–424.

the universe, as its mirror, means only that infinite humanity is the object of the universe's mediations and manifestations. In the same way that history and nature are also objects of the universe's mediations, so is humanity. However, and this remains the pressing point, the infinite universe, according to Schleiermacher, can reveal itself only in the world created by humanity. In order to ascertain the meaning of this statement, it is necessary to understand what Schleiermacher means by human world and its relation to the infinite.

In the *Monologen*, published only a year after the first edition of the *Reden*, Schleiermacher outlines three major themes: the inner self, in contrast to the external world; relations between human selves, what he calls "eternal communities"; and finally, the influence that the activity of each human self has upon the development of the whole. Schleiermacher begins the *Monologen* by underscoring the existence of an inner self that must be distinguished from the transient self that belongs to time and to the activities of the external world. As the only true self, the inner self is not bound to the natural necessity of the external world; it is eternal and in community with other eternal selves. Further, though Schleiermacher distinguishes between the inner self and the external world, he writes that efforts at self-development also develop (*bilden*) the world in which one exists.[79] It would thus seem that Schleiermacher's notion of an inner self is not one of any isolated, self-centered self, but rather of a self that is inherently connected with and participating in the activity and development of the world (like the individual depicted in the *Reden*). "There is no action in me that I can rightly regard as isolated, and none about which I could say that it is a whole."[80]

There are two senses in which community is significant here. Each of the senses corresponds to the "twofold vocation of man on earth."[81] The first is "to develop [*bilden*] humanity in oneself to a definite form."[82] This development takes place when the individual comes to recognize the whole of humanity within himself. Such development can only occur within a community. Schleiermacher writes, "I cannot develop myself in isolation. . . . I must go out and join a community with other spirits, to see the many forms of humanity and what is alien

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[79] *KGA* 3:11.
[80] *KGA* 3:12.
[81] *KGA* 3:19.
[82] *KGA* 3:20.

to me, to know what can become of myself, and to determine more securely through give and take my own nature."[83] Through relations within a community one comes to differentiate oneself, to distinguish oneself, and in turn, to delineate oneself. This moment of delineation is composed of the two drives of extension and attraction. In the first instance, the individual must have "a sense open for everything that is not themselves,"[84] and, in the second, the individual assimilates all that is other into himself, or to use Schleiermacher's words, one comes to "bear [one's] stamp," on all that is other.[85] This movement of extension and return to self is the movement of the mediator, in the first instance moving outward to "go through all of humanity,"[86] and in the second, returning to oneself to find the infinite therein. Through this movement from otherness to self, "the most distant ceases to appear strange and ceases to repel."[87]

The second way in which community is significant has less to do with individual delineation and more with the overcoming of the delineated particular self. It corresponds with the second of the vocations, namely, "to present [*darstellen*] [humanity] in many different kinds of action, or to portray [*abbilden*] it externally through artistic works so that everyone must recognize what one wants to show."[88] In the *Reden*, Schleiermacher considers the heretic an exemplary instantiation of both individual delineation and individual overcoming, the twofold vocation of humanity. "Something highly voluntary is the cause of [heresy's] having arisen," because the heretic freely chooses to make "a particular intuition of the universe the center of the whole of religion" and in turn relates "everything therein to it."[89] However, this is not the extent of the heretic's activity. By making such a choice, the heretic not only individuates himself but also determines the whole, giving it a particular shape:

> everything that was previously ambiguous and indeterminate is fixed; of the infinite varied views and relationships of individual elements, all of which were possible and all of which should be presented, a single one is thoroughly related through every such formation; all individual ele-

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[83] *KGA* 3:21.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.
[86] *KGA* 2:232; Crouter, 42.
[87] *KGA* 12:142, #14.
[88] *KGA* 3:20.
[89] *KGA* 2:302; Crouter, 104.

> ments now appear from a perspective of the same name that is turned toward that center, and just in this way all feelings receive a common tone while becoming livelier and more engaged in one another.[90]

Determining the whole leads to the establishment of a "firm abode" and "an active citizenship" in the world. Only then, Schleiermacher continues, can one boast of "contributing something to the existence and growth of the whole; only he is a truly religious person with a character and fixed and definite traits."[91] What the heretic does is, on the one hand, delineate himself by choosing to make one intuition the center of his existence, and, on the other, expand beyond himself by giving expression to the infinite through such delimitation.

The question arises, what does it mean to "give expression" to the infinite? There are two ways in which the infinite is expressed or communicated. In the first sense, the intuiter relates his vision to others. Schleiermacher describes this moment:

> In the forum of mutual communication where such an exchange takes place, no one is either a priest or a layperson. Rather, each person is a priest to the extent that he draws others to himself . . . each is a layperson to the extent that he follows the art and direction of another. . . . There is none of that tyrannical aristocracy . . . this society is a priestly people, a perfect republic where each leads and is led; each follows in the other the same power that he also feels in himself and with which he rules others.[92]

Expression of the infinite in this forum of mutual communication is expression of one's vision of the infinite, namely, sharing one's intuition with others. The heretic establishes a community when he chooses to make one intuition the central guiding intuition of his life and, in turn, to portray this intuition to others. "He steps forth to present his own intuition as the object for the rest, to lead them into the region of religion where he is at home and to implant his holy feelings in them; he expresses the universe, and the community follows his inspired speech in holy silence."[93] When attempting such expression of one's original intuition, the expression remains secondary to the moment of intuition and to the feeling one wishes to relate: "his first endeavor, when a religious view has become clear to him or a

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[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.
[92] *KGA* 2:269; Crouter, 75.
[93] Ibid.

pious feeling penetrates his soul, is also to direct others to the object, and if possible, to communicate *the vibrations of his mind to them.*"[94] It is in the moment of intuition that the infinite is grasped, and it is in feeling that the infinite is realized. In turn, the moment of communicating the infinite remains dependent upon the original intuition and consequent feeling. Thus, in such expression the intuition remains the primary point of contact between the individual and the universe, the "touchstone."

However, for Schleiermacher, communication of the infinite does not merely amount to relating one's original intuition to others.[95] In fact, the very act of communication itself is an expression of the infinite—not in the secondary way described above, that is, as a relation of one's original intuition, but in a primary way. He writes,

> The more each person approaches the universe, the more he communicates himself to others, and the more perfectly do they become one; none is conscious of himself alone, but each is simultaneously conscious of the other. They are no longer merely people, but also humanity; going out beyond themselves, triumphing over themselves, they are on the way to true immortality and eternity.[96]

This is a significant passage and deserves to be read closely. First, communication and approximation to the universe are depicted as parallel ("the more each person approaches the universe, the more he communicates himself to others"). In turn, such communication creates a community ("the more perfectly do they become one," and "they are no longer merely people, but also humanity"). Thus, in communicating, the individual is at once approximating the universe and creating a human community. Such community-creation also involves self-overcoming ("going out beyond themselves, triumphing over themselves"), for it is only in overcoming one's delineated personality that one can truly become a mediator, give expression to the infinite and be its mirror. Thus, the mediator must not merely move outward then return inward, for that is only the first step in mediation, the step outlined above and described as "self-formation." The second step, community-formation, requires moving outward again, or "self-overcoming." In the same way that the heretic, following his delineation, expresses the infinite by determining all that is indeterminate, so here the individual gives expression to the infinite in the very act of com-

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[94] *KGA* 2:267–8; Crouter, 73 (emphasis added).

munication, in the simultaneous act of determination of and approximation to the infinite. Such determination of the infinite through communication is community-formation, the building of the "perfect republic" through continued expression of the infinite.

The human vocation thus involves, on the one hand, self-formation and delineation within the community and, on the other, self-overcoming in order to portray the infinite in the creation of such a

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[95] Compare Barth, *Die Protestantische Theologie*, 405–6. Barth writes that for Schleiermacher, feeling is the primary way of relating to God, and that the word is only secondary, in that it is only a communication of the original feeling. For this reason, Barth calls Schleiermacher's theology a "Theologie des frommen Selbstbewußtseins." According to Barth, insofar as feeling is what brings about self-conscious, it is also what mediates one's finitude to the infinity of God. For this reason, Schleiermacher's theology is a theology of feeling, a theology of self-consciousness. "Weil das Gefühl an sich die siegreiche Mitte zwischen Wissen und Tun, weil es im Unterschied zu diesen Funktionen das eigentliche Selbstbewußtsein selber und schon damit mindestens der subjektive Repräsentant der Wahrheit ist, und weil das Gefühl als frommes Gefühl der schlechthinnigen Abhängigkeit des Menschen, d. h. das Gefühl seiner Beziehung zu Gott ist, darum ist die Schleiermachersche Theologie Gefühltheologie, genauer gesagt: Theologie des frommen Gefühls, oder Bewußtseinstheologie, genauer gesagt: Theologie des frommen Selbstbewußtseins." This leads Barth to conclude that for Schleiermacher the Word has only a secondary significance in relation to feeling. "Die Sätze sind nur das Abgeleitete, der innere Zustand ist das Ursprüngliche" (406). The word is thus only a reporting of the original relation between the finite and the infinite, mediated by feeling (and therefore not the word). In contrast to Barth's assessment, I contend that for Schleiermacher communication works on two levels: the first is the way in which it is deemed by Barth—as secondary in relation to the original intuition—and the second level of communication is communication as itself revelation of the infinite. Through communicating, one is not merely relating an original event but also creating a world in which another original event will take place. Moreover, the very act of communicating, of making determinate and thus individuating the infinite, is a revelation of the infinite. It is thus not a merely secondary relation to the infinite that relates an original intuition, or feeling, but also a primary relation to the infinite that reveals the infinite in its own way. Barth's critique of Schleiermacher's anthropomorphism of God is based on the premise that Schleiermacher's theology is a theology of *Selbtsbewußtsein*, that is, where human self-consciousness is a revelation of the infinite, a reflection of it, a "mirror" of its "will and works." As I hope to show, mediation is not limited to passive mirroring of the infinite universe; it also entails activity on the part of the human being, and this activity is nothing less than the creation of a community. Further, this community is not a complete reflection of the infinite, but it is always striving to attain such perfection. In this way, Schleiermacher not only retains distinctness between the infinite universe and finite humanity, but he also underscores that the "mirroring" of the infinite in the finite remains incomplete. As such, the infinite does not become the finite, and therefore, the divine cannot be identified with the human.

[96] *KGA* 2:291; Crouter, 94.

community. Whereas in the first sense the individual determines himself, in the second, the individual determines the community, in attempting to give expression to the infinite through his acts and works. This community forms a "living organic whole," where every member is not merely a member but indeed "indispensable to all others."[97]

Communication as community-creation is the determination of what is indeterminate, in other words, the bringing of the infinite universe into the finite world, or mediation. It is in this way that communication and approximation to the infinite are parallel. In communication one is not merely communicating but, more significantly, creating a world, the "perfect republic," that mediates the infinite, or through which the infinite mediates itself. The individual is thus not merely a passive agent but also a creator. Through such creation, the world, as mediation, and the individual, as mediator, become mirrors of the universe. To quote at length,

> By making him aware of the concept of his reciprocal action with the world and teaching him to know himself not only as creature but also as creator, philosophy will no longer tolerate the person under its purview who, turning his gaze steadfastly to his own spirit in order to seek the universe there, should miss the mark and pine in poverty and need. The anxious wall of division will be torn down; everything external to him is merely an other within him; everything is the reflection of his spirit, and his spirit is the reproduction of everything. The human spirit will dare to seek itself in this reflection without losing itself or going out of itself; it can never be exhausted while intuiting itself, for everything lies within it.[98]

IV

What we noted to be the significant characteristic of intuition—intuition as the touchstone between the infinite and finite—and of passive mediation—reflecting the infinite universe—are no longer simply the outcome of intuition and passive mediation, but also of active mediation. To mediate the universe, to bring it into the world, and thus to create a world that mediates—reflects—the universe, is also a means by which the individual finds a point of contact with and in turn approaches the universe. The world itself thus becomes a touchstone, a place for such contact. If we recall, at the beginning of

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[97] *KGA* 12:143, #14.
[98] *KGA* 2:263–4; Crouter, 70.

the second speech, Schleiermacher writes that those who have intuitions of the infinite "look with undivided attention to the place where the vision is to show itself." This place is precisely the world created out of the mediation of the infinite, for through such mediation, a sacred place is born, a "perfect republic," in which hearers and listeners mutually partake of the continuing development of the world to which they belong. "A person," writes Schleiermacher, "belongs to the world that he helps to create."[99] Thus, while through intuition one comes to recognize one's place in the universe and to reveal it in a passive way, through mediation, one communicates and in turn creates one's place in the world, and thus one makes possible future revelations of the infinite and communication of one's intuitions.

Intuition and mediation cannot be easily separated. In fact, intuition, as we saw, is a passive form of mediation and depends upon prior mediation—depends upon a world, a finite particular point in which the infinite reveals itself. In turn, mediation can take place only after one has seen the original and inherent unity between the finite and the infinite. Underlying Schleiermacher's understanding of the relation between intuition and mediation, between passivity and activity, is his understanding of the relation between the infinite and the finite.

At the end of the second speech, Schleiermacher describes immortality as the "annihilation" of one's individuality for the sake of the "one and all," the "fusion" of oneself with the universe. "Immortality," he writes, "may not be a wish unless it has first been a task you have carried out. To be one with the infinite in the midst of the finite and to be eternal in a moment, that is the immortaity of religion."[100] Immortality does not mean going beyond the finite in order to be one with a transcendent infinite, for the infinite, according to Schleiermacher, is not transcendent. It does not exist outside of its finite manifestations. However, this does not mean that it is imminent in the traditional sense. For, in spite of its relation to the finite, it remains distinct from the finite. The infinite and the finite do not collapse into one. Each retains its independence. For this reason, the infinite universe is neither transcendent nor imminent in the traditional senses of these terms. Rather, it is identical yet distinct from its finite members.

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[99] Ibid., 35.
[100] *KGA* 2:247; Crouter, 54.

As such, intuition and mediation are not opposed concepts, for, as we have shown, to intuit does not mean to move beyond the finite world into the infinite, and to mediate does not mean to subsume the infinite (and thus lose it) in a finite system. The infinite exists in its finite manifestations, and the finite is a mediation of the infinite. For this reason, the two concepts, intuition and mediation, must go hand in hand. To intuit the infinite universe always already implies the mediation of the infinite in the finite; in turn, to mediate the infinite universe always already implies an intuition of the infinite in the finite.

Finally, mediation, according to Schleiermacher, is the creation of a world, a "perfect republic," that functions as a point of contact with the infinite universe, as a reflection of it. This mediation does not in any way imply discursive conceptualization. Rather, as a creative practice, mediation is a continual "approximation," to use Schleiermacher's word, to the infinite, an unending attempt to be eternal in a moment.

Tübingen, Germany

THE MYTH OF ATOMISM

DOUGLAS J. DEN UYL and DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN

Free above Scot-free, that observes no laws,
Obey no governor, use no religion
But what they draw from their own ancient custom,
Or constitute themselves, yet they are no rebels.[1]

CHARLES TAYLOR, IN TWO IMPORTANT ESSAYS,[2] offers both a refutation of what appears to be the foundations of liberalism[3] as well as an alternative "third way" to the liberal-communitarian debate. In this paper we are broadly interested in the role of community within a liberal framework, and for that reason the Taylor essays are a useful way to begin such an exploration. There is, we believe, much in Taylor with which to agree. If liberalism somehow fails to accommodate any meaningful conception of community or somehow manages to undermine the possibility of community, that would be a serious strike against it. "Atomism" is one of those concepts inherently linked by thinkers such as Taylor to liberalism. It is the sort of concept meant to evoke, if not describe, a perspective on human association that is at least problematic to community-building, if not directly undermining it. Taylor's

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[1] This is an epigraph from chap. 12 of Sir Walter Scott's *The Antiquary*, ed. Nicola J. Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 114. The citation in the text says it is adapted from Richard Brome, *A Jovial Crew*, 2.1.2–6.

[2] Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in *Communitarianism and Individualism*, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 29–50 (taken from *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 187–210); and "Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 159–82.

[3] We shall continue our practice of referring to "liberalism" rather than either "classical liberalism" or "libertarianism." Unless otherwise noted, we mean by "liberalism" classical liberalism or libertarianism. Taylor's criticisms of liberalism (and he tends to mean by it more modern liberalism than classical) are meant to cover the entire liberal family from classical liberalism, to modern liberalism, to libertarianism.

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first essay with the title of "Atomism" explores this idea and levels the charge of anticommunity against liberalism. The second essay, "Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," builds upon that charge but seeks to moderate the apparent antiliberal stance of the first. Our position is that liberalism is not opposed to community and that "atomism" when applied to liberalism is something of a myth—a caricature rather than an integral part of liberalism. Our specific theses will be the following: (1) "atomism" as used by Taylor is a confused tool and one whose uses for understanding liberalism are extremely limited, if applicable at all; (2) the applicability of "atomism" is ironically more consistent with certain forms of collectivism than with liberalism; and (3) Taylor's own proposed way of navigating the difference between liberalism and communitarianism is in the end a form of communitarianism and not an alternative at all.

I

Let's begin with the way in which Taylor conceives of "atomism." Atomism is the doctrine that makes the theory of "the priority of the individual and his rights over society"[4] possible by positing a certain view of human nature and the human condition without which the priority of rights could not be asserted. The priority-of-rights thesis ascribes to persons rights as such, that is unconditionally, but it does not do so to social categories such as "belonging" or "obedience."[5] Atomism thus "affirms the self sufficiency of man alone or, if you prefer, of the individual."[6] The classical thinkers who hold to this position are Hobbes and Locke, according to Taylor.[7]

Before continuing further we must note that this characterization of atomism is about as precise as Taylor gets in this article. Yet it is not the vagueness to which we so much object, as it is the inaccuracy of this concept when applied to any recognizable liberal doctrine or thinker! First, Hobbes is not an atomist on this account. On the usual reading, persons in the state of nature have no rights, only liberties. And even Locke, who does ascribe rights to individuals in the state of

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[4] Taylor, "Atomism," 29.
[5] Ibid., 30.
[6] Ibid., 32.
[7] Ibid., 30.

nature, does not do so over and above society, because there is no "society" in the state of nature in the sense that Taylor means it, namely, where concepts such as "belonging" and "obedience" are generally applicable. There is, nonetheless, society for Locke, since people in his state of nature still interact and even do so peacefully at times. What there is not is general loyalty and obedience. In addition, for Hobbes at least, there is no argument of self-sufficiency as Taylor suggests. It is precisely because we are not self-sufficient that we need to leave the state of nature and seek the company of others. We are social animals for Hobbes as well as Aristotle, just not for the same reasons. For Hobbes, individuals seek society for the benefits that associating with others may bring, whereas for Aristotle, "seeking" society seems somehow incoherent since society is not something we come to, but that within which we are born. Yet whether we are born to it or seek its utility, there really is no life outside of society for either Hobbes or Aristotle. Locke, perhaps, gives the strongest appearance of self-sufficiency to individuals in the state of nature, and also attributes to them rights that precede a generalized social order. Yet, while individuals are granted rights in a state of nature for Locke, these rights are not conceived of apart from others. Indeed, it is the very presence of others that makes the rights meaningful, for these rights specify the boundaries of appropriate treatment among individuals. There is, it must be noted, nothing logically inconsistent in these rights-holders belonging to groups and even obeying others while in the state of nature, though the "inconveniences" of that state weigh heavily against this possibility in any general sense. Finally, it can be said of both of these thinkers that their descriptions of the state of nature were not meant to be historical descriptions of some distant human life, nor even a description of a possible human circumstance, except under highly specialized and exceptional conditions (for example, the loss of a sovereign). Rather, Hobbes and Locke offer us a tool[8] for helping us think about society, not a substitute social system.

For someone as well-steeped in the history of thought as Taylor, it is remarkable that all of the above is simply set aside. Since Taylor is surely aware of these features of the thought of Hobbes and Locke, what he must be objecting to in the end is the contractarian approach

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[8] For an example of this use of "state of nature," see Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), chap. 1.

to understanding social and political relations. In turn, what this seems to mean is that Taylor is opposed to the idea of starting with a category such as "individual" when doing social and political theory. We shall see evidence for this claim in a moment. It is certainly all right to be critical of contractarianism. We ourselves are critical. But one cannot beg all the important questions by assuming that collectivities that give rise to such descriptions as "belonging" and "obedience" are our starting tools of conceptual social/political analysis. This form of question-begging is not, we would emphasize, a charge that can be leveled at the contractarians, because for these authors (Hobbes and Locke) the contractarian element was only one portion of their political philosophy, not the whole of it, or even the point of it. For both authors, the contractarian component was a way of determining something about the legitimacy of sovereign authority and a means for understanding (however rightly or wrongly) the basis for stable human relations. It was not a complete theory of society, nor a description of the whole of social life. A tool of analysis is not the thing analyzed. Holding the individual as the primary unit of analysis in thinking about society may be mistaken, but it does not *ipso facto* imply that social relations are somehow secondary. Individuals may relate to each other *as* individuals, however truncated a version of sociality that may appear to some. Moreover, if individuals are not the primary unit for social analysis, then what is, for Taylor? We shall also come back to this momentarily.

Strangely, it is contemporary authors such as Rawls who are thoroughgoing contractarians in the sense of trying to formulate a complete political theory independent of a metaphysics and philosophy of human nature. The contemporary desire to give self-sufficient status to political philosophy is a way of saying that the contractarian theory covers the whole of the issue. However, this was not the theory of Hobbes and Locke. This is not to say that there may not be meaningful ways in which to describe Hobbes or Locke as "atomists." But if this is so, it is worth keeping in mind that Hobbes was not a liberal, thus making the connection between liberalism and atomism less than exclusive and necessary. We might also note in this connection that Taylor wishes to hold up Aristotle as the opposite of "atomists" like Hobbes and Locke, because Aristotle asserts our natural sociality.[9] The irony here is that it is actually Aristotle who advocates self-

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[9] But see Fred D. Miller Jr.'s discussion of the sense in which the "polis" is natural for Aristotle in *Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's "Politics"* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 27–66.

sufficiency of the individual,[10] unlike Hobbes and Locke, as is evident from book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Taylor is more precise in the later article, "Cross Purposes: The Liberal–Communitarian Debate." In that essay Taylor wishes to distinguish ontology from advocacy. There he claims it is conceivable that one could be an ontological atomist and yet a "holist" when it comes to political programs, or the reverse, or a matched pair in either direction. Ontology refers to the nature of things, while advocacy refers to the sort of social/political order being recommended. On the ontological side, atomism is defined as holding that "in (a), the order of explanation, you can and ought to account for social actions, structures, and conditions, in terms of the properties of the constituent individuals; and in (b), the order of deliberation, you can and ought to account for social goods in terms of concatenations of individual goods."[11] Presumably this ontology is to be contrasted with a holistic one, although no such precise definition of holism is offered by Taylor. If we reverse the characterization, we would get the definition that holism holds that "in (a), the order of explanation, you can and ought to account for social actions, structures, and conditions in terms of the properties of social wholes; and in (b), the order of deliberation, you can and ought to account for social goods in terms of a social good that cannot, without remainder, be reduced to the goods of individuals." Although Taylor again does not specify, it would seem in the advocacy area that an atomist would be one who gives rights a priority over "social" categories such as belonging or obedience. In similar fashion, an advocacy holist would give social categories a priority over individual rights.

Ironically, Taylor holds that there is no necessary connection between ontology and advocacy. One could be a holist (what Taylor calls a "collectivist") in ontology and an atomist (what Taylor calls an

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[10] "Self-sufficiency" for an individual human being is an alternate, though not exhaustive, way of understanding human flourishing. This is in the Aristotelian tradition the ultimate good or *telos*. One attains self-sufficiency when one's actions proceed from an understanding of the principal components of what one is doing and why one is doing it. This does not preclude the possibility of recognizing that one may rely upon many other things and persons as we undertake our actions, but it does make the aim of ethics ultimately self-perfectionist in orientation. Hence, there is no ontological conflict for this tradition between individualism and sociality.

[11] Taylor, "Cross Purposes," 159.

"individualist") in advocacy (Humboldt), or an atomist in ontology and a holist in advocacy (Skinner), or more commonly, a matched pair (atomist, atomist [Nozick]; holist, holist [Marx]). It is not exactly clear where Taylor places himself, but the essay appears to advocate holism in ontology and atomism in advocacy. This is a way of saying that Taylor wants some sort of generally liberal order that is rooted in a collectivist or holistic foundation. This interpretation, however, would run contrary to Taylor's article, "Atomism," since it would seem to give rights too much social standing, for that article is largely one of advocacy. One is therefore tempted to see Taylor as a holist holist. The liberal elements would be part of the order because of their contribution to the social enterprise. What seems clear to us, however, is that a necessary condition for being a liberal, in Taylor's view, is that one be an advocacy atomist. Otherwise there would be no point in emphasizing the need to consider the Humboldt possibility of holistic ontology and atomistic advocacy. If that is correct, the issue of how to interpret Taylor would thus be to ask whether his doctrine is, in the end, a liberal one. We think not. If that conclusion is correct, the second essay is more a corrective for contemporary liberals generally than a statement of Taylor's own position.

We can represent Taylor's universe by a simple box that might look as follows:

O-Atomism (ontological atomism) A-Atomism (advocacy atomism) (Nozick)	O-Atomism A-Holism (Skinner)
O-Holism A-Atomism (Humboldt, Taylor?)	O-Holism A-Holism (Marx, Taylor?)

The main problem with this universe is that although it appears that there are alternative scenarios and no necessary connection between the ontological and the advocacy side, the point of the article at issue—Taylor's "Cross Purposes" article—is that ontological atomism cannot sustain any coherent, perhaps even meaningful, sense of political and social culture. Ontological atomism leads to the undoing of society and political culture, not a different form of society. Holism is the only acceptable ontological basis for understanding society. If we

adopt atomism we are adopting an anti- or asocial alternative. To the degree society exists, atomism is absent or inadequate as an account of it. Atomism as a social form is therefore a myth for Taylor. From his perspective, atomism is the myth that some sort of social order is possible which is adequately described by atomism. Atomism, in fact, misses something both essential to and defining of what it means to have a social/political culture.

From our perspective, the myth of atomism is that fitting oneself into the upper-left quadrant precludes the possibility of meaningful sociality. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case. "Atomism" and sociality are not opposed. The difference between the upper-left quadrant and the lower quadrants is one of *dynamism* versus *stasis*, and not one of sociality or the lack thereof. What is completely absent from Taylor's account is that communities can be formed, reformed, and modified. The propensity for Taylor, as for MacIntyre,[12] is to think of communities in terms of predefined roles that determine and direct the individual. This may be true of some communities, but it is not a defining feature of communities per se. Communities grounded in consent and interest can exist as well. Thus, the upper-left quadrant can sustain community and communities, but there is a dynamism to them due to their forward-looking or *ex post* character[13] that is absent or retarded by the alternatives of the lower quadrants. The choice is therefore not one between "real" communities (holistic ones) and their disintegrating shadows (atomistic ones), as Taylor and others would have it, but between different types of communities.

The upper-right quadrant is another one calling for comment, from our perspective. This quadrant does seem to us to identify the destruction of community rather than to express a form of it. It is a form of true atomism where individuals are disconnected from one another as a systematic part of the design and nature of the "social"/political order. In this way the ontology is effectively created by the advocacy. It is ultimately determined by, and is the result of, a political policy. The push for collectivity, in other words, perverts the

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[12] See the discussion of MacIntyre on this point in Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, *Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionism Politics* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), chap. 10, 225–44.

[13] This point will be developed in greater detail later in the paper, but what we mean by *ex post* here is that the communities are not determined *ex ante* by the political/legal order.

ontological foundation of the community. It becomes an artifice of what is advocated rather than a basis for the advocacy. In this category we would put all of the twentieth-century communist regimes whose effect has been to purge community from the social substratum for the sake of the collective in the abstract. In the process, individuals are separated from family, friends, and interest groups and considered only in terms of their role in serving the state. This "social" condition is surely atomism and a perversion of community. We will, therefore, distinguish it from "individualism" which may not be inconsistent with community.

From what we have said so far then, our depiction would look as follows:

O-Individualism A-Individualism Dynamic (Nozick)	O-Atomism A-Holism Static (Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany)
O-Holism A-Individualism Dynamic or Static (Humboldt)	O-Holism A-Holism Static (Marx, Taylor, MacIntyre, Sandel)

Atomism for us (as in the upper-right box) exists where society has fragmented and splintered. It is primarily a defect of holism, despite many presumptions to the contrary by social theorists. It can be a defect of individualism, as we shall see later, but at this stage it is important to see its path from holism. While a full argument cannot be provided here, the basic rationale for saying that atomism is a function of holism is the one just noted, namely, that the leaders of these totalitarian regimes allow relations among people to take place, if at all, only through modalities that they have defined, thus removing authentic relations among people themselves. Moreover, to achieve in practice this end of total life through the collective, control of the population has required instilling a high level of mutual mistrust among citizens through spying and reporting of "crimes" against the state by fellow citizens. In our opinion, the pathological route to the upper-right quadrant generally begins in the lower-left quadrant and moves right. Pathology in that lower-left quadrant would lead one to move into the lower-right quadrant and pathology in that quadrant would lead to-

ward the upper-right quadrant. The counterintuitive element is that, as holism increases, so does the likelihood of atomization. The reason is that more of the individual's choices and roles are "defined by society" rather than being choices of the individuals themselves. Rather than producing more harmony, one finds instead a massive coordination problem in synchronizing social roles and functions that would otherwise be synchronized by the choices and interests of individuals.[14] The tendency in the face of this is to force a resolution by acts of command which, in turn, may call for further such "solutions." Eventually, more and more relationships among people are defined rather than grown or discovered, increasing the separation among them and the likelihood of the abuse of power. It is, then, a myth that the actual cases of atomism the world has experienced were born out of individualism. Experience tends to suggest that they were born out of pushes for increased holism, as in the case of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. The defects of individualism tend to be banality and vice—forms of atomism much less pernicious and damaging to society.

From this it seems reasonable to conclude that the stable quadrants seem to us to be the upper-left and lower-right (assuming the lower-right is endogenous and not an exogenously evolved product of the lower-left quadrant). If Taylor is advocating the lower-left, this seems to us an unstable solution, mainly because the idea that individuals are not the primary unit of social analysis suggests that, in any cases of conflict, their wishes, purposes, and projects would have to be subordinated to forms that do represent the foundational core of society. So, either we end up advocating holism as well, or we drop back and question the holistic premise that social wholes are the basic unit of social analysis, pushing the argument into either the upper-left or lower-right quadrants. Either way, the tendency would be not to remain long in the lower-left quadrant.

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[14] This problem is parallel to that noted by F. A. Hayek in his "The Use of Knowledge In Society," *American Economic Review* 35, no. 4 (September 1945): 519–30, for those who believed they could centrally plan an economy. See also Douglas B. Rasmussen's review of Michael Novak's *The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (*American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 68 [Autumn 1994]: 558–62), where the importance of this parallel for ethics, economics, and politics is discussed. Finally, on the role of choice in creating groups, see Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, *Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order* (La Salle: Open Court, 1991), 134.

II

It should be evident by now that we need have no quarrel with Taylor's distinction between ontology and advocacy. This is a useful distinction, if only to help clarify some important issues. It is also a distinction that divides the argument into two stages. The first is the ontological stage. This is the stage that "Cross Purposes" is largely concerned with. The "Atomism" article is primarily concerned with advocacy issues which boil down to the primacy-of-rights position. The ontological side of the argument attempts to show that "society" cannot be reduced to, or meaningfully understood in terms of, individuals and their relations with one another. This is the position with which we shall begin.

Individuals and Society. According to Taylor, when we take society as being composed essentially of individual actors, and so must understand all activities as properties of those actors as well as all social goods as being reducible to the "concatenation of individual goods," then we have missed what is most important and fundamental for describing community and political culture. What is missing is a way of being or relating to one another that is not a constituent of either you, me, or some other person, but rather of *us*. As Taylor puts it:

> Some things have value to me and to you, and some things essentially have value to us. That is, their being for us enters into and constitutes their value for us. . . . The good is that we share. This I will call an "immediately" common good.[15]

These "common goods" or values are what are essential to society or community. They are to be contrasted with "convergent" goods which are those that are good for you and me and him respectively and collectively. Convergent goods are enjoyed in the company of others, but they are not shared goods or goods experienced as being of *us*, considered as an indivisible unit. Rather, convergent goods are either distinctly enjoyed or distinctly attached to individuals, however much they may be in a common pool of goods. Taylor seems to hold that only convergent goods are consistent with atomism (or what we would prefer to call individualism). Common goods, the necessary

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[15] Taylor, "Cross Purposes," 168.

ones, are not. "Procedural" liberalism,[16] Taylor's term for rights-based liberalism, can only produce convergent goods, because its goods are either instrumental or predicated of individuals and thus not common. But the paradox, he claims, is that to be free, common goods are necessary. In a political culture, the common goods are termed "patriotic" goods by Taylor. Thus, his thesis is, "that the essential condition of a free (nondespotic) regime is that the citizens have this kind of patriotic identification."[17] Citizens must identify "with the republic as a common enterprise" making the republic itself a common good. Common goods are also essentially pursued for their own sake and not because of some bad consequence that will befall one (a punishment or reward) in their pursuit or avoidance. Defense, for Taylor, is a convergent good. We each enjoy it separately, however "public" it may be. For whether provided by the state or your local protection agency, so long as it is secured, its mode of provision is immaterial to the enjoyment of the good. What we need is a common good—a good that can be enjoyed only as a function of us jointly considered, not separately provided for. That is the "republican" common enterprise Taylor claims is necessary.

The force of much of Taylor's argument is lessened considerably once one recalls Oakeshott's distinction between civil and enterprise associations. Without begging some important questions, one cannot assume, as Taylor does, that a free republic must be a "common enterprise" or even that it should be. Oakshottean civil associations are not only consistent with individualism, but they also suggest that our freedom may depend largely upon avoiding the temptation to see political culture precisely the way Taylor wants us to—as a common enterprise. Civil associations for Oakeshott are rule-governed relationships among free and equal persons whose rules specify common responsibilities rather than common ends, purposes, or tasks. An enterprise association, by contrast, is an association of persons who share a common purpose, task, or goal. As a reminder of Oakeshott's distinction, here is a representative passage describing a civil association:

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[16] Proceduralism will be discussed shortly, but the idea here is that all political goods are instrumentalized and that there are no underlying substantive goods.

[17] Taylor, "Cross Purposes," 170.

> The laws of civil association . . . are not imposed upon an already shaped and articulated engagement; they relate to the miscellaneous, unforeseeable choices and transactions of agents each concerned to live the life of a "man like me," who are joined in no common purpose or engagement, who may be strangers to one another, the objects of whose loves are as various as themselves, and who may lack any but this moral allegiance to one another.[18]

The rules of a civil association are common to the members, a function of their interrelationship and not of them singly, and they have their value as a function of that joint engagement of the members. This sort of arrangement is a kind of common good, as we have argued elsewhere,[19] but it is rather far removed from the sort of common good Taylor claims is necessary for both political and social culture and a free society. A civil association represents a conceptual alternative, consistent with Taylor's ontological atomism (or what we prefer to call individualism), to the enterprise approach adopted by Taylor. Moreover, it is both in itself more liberal than any enterprise association and, we believe, less subject to devolution into nonliberal orders.

In any case, Taylor's main worry seems to be that unless some feature of the political is valued in itself, for its own sake, and valued as a function of membership in the political order, all political norms will be instrumentalized, thus giving no special status to liberal political culture itself, and making it vulnerable to takeover from without and atomism from within. Atomism from within is the death of liberal political culture, and not just for the logical reason that one cannot defend an order if that order has no inherent meaning but only derived meanings (all is instrumentalized). The problem is also that, by being focused in on their own atomistic worlds, members of the purely procedural liberal polity will not have a sufficient stake in the polity itself (because by definition all goods are at best convergent) and thus no incentive to stem any tide of despotism that may come along. One cannot be motivated to serve a value that applies to us, if

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[18] Michael Oakeshott, *Human Conduct* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 129. Paul Franco's discussion of Oakeshott on the nature of practices is particularly relevant to our point here. See his essay, "Michael Oakeshott as a Liberal Theorist," *Political Theory* 18, no. 3 (August 1990): 411–36, esp. 421–2.

[19] See Rasmussen and Den Uyl, *Norms of Liberty*, chap. 8, and *Liberty and Nature*, 143.

the only values one has are those that serve oneself. There must be somewhere a moment or point of patriotism.[20]

The reason for bringing up civil associations in response to this claim about the need for patriotism is twofold: (1) patriotism need not take on enterprise forms, and (2) there may be forms of patriotism quite consistent with ontological individualism. It might seem that in saying this Taylor is proved essentially right, because his point was that at some level pure procedural liberalism had to disappear. But the principle of the insufficiency of procedural liberalism, as conceived by Taylor, does not consider the possibility that procedures themselves may be the basis upon which the members are joined together. Taylor is thus correct to realize that something besides pure proceduralism must be present, but he fails to consider an alternative way in which "proceduralism" might be viewed.

Of course, much of the success of Taylor's criticism depends upon what is meant by "proceduralism." Does this mean that liberalism is without any ethical basis and as such can offer no foundation for itself as a political order? This seems to be the sort of view Taylor has in mind, and if he is correct to be dubious of such a view (as are we), does this mean that he is correct to treat all norms as of the same type and thus not consider the possibility that there can be a difference between principles that make a certain set of actions possible and the actions those principles protect? That is, there may be some principles which are normative without referring to substantive ends, while there are others that do so refer. Are the former sorts of principles procedural?

The first sort of principles can be described as "metanorms." Simply put, metanorms are ethical principles whose function is to address the political problem of integrated diversity. They are procedural in that they are concerned with the overall framework or structure of the social and political context in which humans pursue substantive ends. They are of a type which leads to civil associations in the terminology being used here. We have argued elsewhere[21] that the need for these principles is not grounded in some "atomistic" conception of human nature—that is, an "unencumbered self" of

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[20] See Rasmussen and Den Uyl, *Norms of Liberty*, chap. 10, 242–4, for a related discussion of these issues.

[21] Rasmussen and Den Uyl, *Norms of Liberty*, chaps. 4, 11, and 12.

contractarian, Cartesian, or Kantian conceptions. Rather, the need for meta-norms arises from a neo-Aristotelian conception of human nature in which individualism is understood both from an ontological and advocacy perspective. So understood, it requires that attention be given to finding an ethical basis for a solution to a problem that arises from human flourishing's being both highly individualized and profoundly social. In other words, there is a substantive moral basis of Aristotelian inspiration for there being ethical principles (that is, metanorms) that are concerned not with attaining substantive moral ends, but instead with providing a political/legal structure or framework (that is, a set of procedures that regulate conduct) so that the pursuit of these substantive moral ends might be possible. Indeed, it is in terms of finding a solution to this problem that political philosophy since the rise of Modernity can be best understood.

Since the liberal tradition has been more or less the only political tradition to address regularly this structural or procedural problem, this problem can most appropriately be labeled "liberalism's problem." This problem consists in the following questions: How is the appropriate political/legal order—the order that provides the overall structure to the social/political context—to be determined? How can the universalism of political/legal structural principles square with the pluralism, sociality, and self-directed character of human flourishing? How is it possible to have an ethical basis for an overall or general social/political context—a context that is open-ended or cosmopolitan—that will not require, as a matter of principle, that one form of human flourishing be preferred to another? In other words, how can the possibility that various forms of human flourishing will not be in structural conflict be achieved? It is by considering these questions that the moral significance of liberalism and civil associations, as opposed to enterprise associations, can be best appreciated. In fact, as we shall see shortly, it can be in terms of loyalty to the ethical principles that solve liberalism's problem (metanorms) that "patriotism" can be both understood and achieved in a liberal order.

A cautionary note should be sounded here, and a point of emphasis should be made. There is nothing in this approach to liberalism that assumes "justificatory neutralism." Neither liberalism nor any political philosophy, for that matter, can be sustained by attempting to avoid deeper philosophical issues. This is one of Taylor's important insights. One foundation is not as good as another, and ethical

noncognitivism is not a solution to any problem. Thus, what is important for anyone who examines Taylor's objections to liberalism to consider is the possibility that the solution to liberalism's problem is grounded in criteria that are based on the central characteristics of a neo-Aristotelian conception of human flourishing in which its social dimension is given full expression.

As already noted, we argue for this approach to solving liberalism's problem elsewhere, and we cannot, for reasons of space, develop that argument here. What we can do is point to its conclusion—namely, that protecting the possibility of agency or self-direction is the only way to solve liberalism's problem that is compatible with this neo-Aristotelian conception of human flourishing. Moreover, only a liberalism whose political/legal structural principles are based on individual negative rights offers a principled basis for protecting the possibility of self-direction. Thus, it is in terms of finding a solution to liberalism's problem that the political priority of individual rights arises, and it is in terms of these rights that an ethical framework for a political order, understood as a civil association, is provided.

Accordingly, Taylor fails to consider the possibility that something can have value to each of us as a function of our relationship with each other without thereby having to be an end for us. What belongs to us as a whole may only be the securing of the conditions or framework for the pursuit of goods (ends). Those goods we pursue might be the object of some enterprise, but the condition or framework for them is not, in itself, one such good. To consider the principles which secure the conditions for the pursuit of ends or goods (metanorms) as themselves an end is to misunderstand their nature. We may have to act that way toward securing those conditions, but if so, that would be a sign of some pathology in the conditions—the conditions have come under attack or are breaking down for some reason. In and of themselves, they exist not as ends but to make the pursuit of ends possible.

Should there be no pathology of securing those metanormative principles, "patriotism" serves no particular function in the activities of the members in a liberal civil association.[22] Taylor would like to

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[22] This is not, however, to say that one cannot take pride in the principles and institutions that secure those conditions. One can be a "patriotic" liberal in consort with others in the sense of being proud that his or her social order has understood the principle of liberalism, or has the best understanding of it, without turning the regime into a common enterprise. Indeed, one can legitimately revel in the "ourness" of the institutions; but that makes "us" engaged not in an enterprise, but instead in a joint act of appreciation.

have it the other way, such that a special political purpose is served by the principles of the regime. Rather than a formal structure of individual rights and obligations that define limits, Taylor would prefer political participation. This approach is his "other model"[23] of liberalism, to be distinguished from the rights model. This other model calls for "participation in self-rule." The model of individual rights and equal treatment, by contrast, secures conditions for agents to pursue their ends, rather than calling agents into political practices that determine social goals and projects. But while this model of participation may give Taylor his "republicanism," it does so, we believe, at the expense of his liberalism.

The paradox is that by treating patriotism as a common enterprise good, one undermines liberalism just as much as (if not more than) one does when one ignores the need for some sort of "patriotism." The reason is almost the mirror image of Taylor's reason: just as there cannot be pure proceduralism without threatening the idea that liberalism has some inherent integrity, so too there cannot be pure substantialism without threatening the value most integral to liberalism, namely liberty. Pure substantialism would transform condition-setting principles into condition-seeking principles. If there is only end-seeking, in social actors, we would have no principle that constrains, limits, or bounds end-seeking in a social setting—nothing that sees the need for ethical principles that determine the political/legal structural principles that govern the social context. Such an approach takes us back to the ancient idea that statecraft is soulcraft, and it is but a recipe for the omnipresent state and the destruction of liberty.

Our last point about condition- or framework-setting versus condition-seeking principles is stated somewhat abstractly, but here is what we mean. The obvious sort of example here would be equality of result versus equality of opportunity. Both are based upon the abstract notion of equality among persons, but the latter is a condition-setting principle since it is not concerned with outcomes, while the former is condition-seeking since it is so concerned. In this connection one begins to realize that to have condition-seeking principles there must be commonality of purpose, which suggests an enterprise association. Condition-seeking principles get the results one wants

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[23] Taylor, "Cross Purposes," 179.

only if all the members work together toward the end of restructuring their society to arrive at a certain condition. But we need do nothing in common to secure equality of opportunity, except to refrain from the sorts of interferences with one another that might block an opportunity.

It is at this stage that one begins to see once again the point of Taylor's thesis. It is simply that he wants to make room for a holistic ontology upon which he will endeavor to graft a largely individualistic advocacy position. A holistic ontology, he believes, will allow him to hold that there can be common goods that require political participation in order to be secured. Once secured, those goods or conditions would be thought to give greater freedom to the individual—hence the appearance of not abandoning liberalism. However, Taylor has taken this approach at the expense of atomism at the ontological level, which, he claims, is essentially impossible anyway. What we have argued thus far is that it is not impossible. There can be a kind of atomistic ontology that does not run afoul of the need to say that liberalism cannot be open to everything. We have also claimed that holistic ontology and atomistic advocacy is an unstable solution.[24] In effect then, we have been arguing that ontology and advocacy are not as unconnected as Taylor would like. As Aristotelians we can say that a distinction is not a separation, and while we accept the distinction between ontology and advocacy, it is looking more and more as though the two are not so easily separated as first appearances suggest—that is, one's ontology either affects one's advocacy or should do so, if one is consistent. Let's go back a moment and remind ourselves of what holism must mean and why it might not be so compatible with atomism as Taylor allows. Then we shall examine a little more closely why the sort of example Taylor gives for the presence of holism does not do the work he wants it to in ruling out ontological atomism.

Holism, as we said in the beginning of our discussion, must mean for Taylor that in (a), the order of explanation, you can and ought to account for social actions, structures, and conditions in terms of the

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[24] It should be noted that the "instability" here is conceptual. There are many habits, traditions, institutions, interests, and the like that make conceptually unstable positions "stable" in the "real" world. We are not rationalists who discount these factors. But conceptual instability will have, in the long run at least, effects upon the coherency of practice which, in time, will affect the stability of practice as well.

properties of social wholes; and in (b), the order of deliberation, you can and ought to account for social goods in terms of a social good that cannot, without remainder, be reduced to the goods of individuals. We cannot, of course, undertake a discussion here of the relative merits of methodological and ontological individualism. We can, however, note generally that this definition of holism has the problem of failing to give any reason to care about the actions or status of individuals to which liberalism, by Taylor's own admission, must give center weight. For apart from the question of whether there can even be such phenomena as individual "autonomy" under this definition, it is not clear at all (a) that it can factor in to any explanation of social action, and (b) why, in thinking about social life, we should come to value it. If, for example, autonomy were a sign of a condition in society which we do value that is not reducible to the value put on it by individuals, then by this definition (b) it would not be a condition that we value because it is a property of individuals who manifest that state; rather, it is valuable because it is a property of some social whole. Yet if that is so, it is not clear that we are speaking any longer of autonomy, since the autonomy of social groups is not at issue. If we then, look to (a) for help, all we find is that we cannot meaningfully speak of individuals when thinking of social actions, but only of social wholes. In other words, the explanation side of the ontological account of holism is no help to us in grounding the deliberative side, where value lies. The reason is that, if individuals can and should be assimilated to other social wholes (for example, the family, the club, group, or whatever) which were themselves subsets of the social whole in question, there would be absolutely no loss of social value from the holistic perspective—that is, no loss if individuals are not considered. Indeed, this may be the very thing sought by holists—fully to predicate the individual of something grander than himself or herself.

Thus, the ultimate role of individuals in the holistic perspective becomes one of coming to see the grander value encapsulated in whatever social whole is the object of interest. This is true whether one is speaking of the club, the state, the group, or whatever collectivity comes to have the central purposes or ends. In these situations we also believe there is a tendency to give those who "see" and interpret that higher value more status than those who do not. There is no sense in Taylor—indeed quite the opposite—that political participa-

tion is for the sake of defining the scope for individual action, rather than for assimilating the individual into, and orienting the individual toward, the social goods Taylor or others regard as paramount. In this respect, political participation is transformative rather than protective, as it would not be in an order where individuals are the ultimate ontological unit and politics functions to protect rights and sort out any ambiguities in their definition and application. As we have intimated, the transformative[25] politics coming out of holism is a good deal more likely to lead to despotism and the loss of liberty than the protective politics resulting from atomism is. This point seems especially true within the mass cultures of the recent centuries.[26]

If the definition of holism we have provided for Taylor is correct, it leaves no room for the possibility of a mixed social order—one which has elements of holism and atomism. The same is true of the definition of atomism that he actually provides—that is, it seems to leave no room for holistic communities. Our common sense seems to tell us that the world we experience contains something of both. Some families, or organizations, or friendships seem particularly "holistic" in their operation, while other facets of social life seem particularly "atomistic" (commerce). Still others seem mixtures of both (team sports). The phenomenology of a world of mixed orders is not, however, the ontology of such a world. In the end, we believe Taylor is largely correct in his definitions, and the bottom line has to be a choice between individualism, on the one hand, and holism, on the other. Fortunately, what may have to be true at a "metaphysical" or ontological level is not necessarily so stark in practice. That is to say, we believe that the acceptance of the individualist ontology does

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[25] Indeed, there is significant similarity between Taylor's view of political participation as transformative and Habermas's attempts to ground political communication in "discourse ethics." For an evaluation of Habermas, see Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Political Legitimacy and Discourse Ethics," in *Liberty for the 21st Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought*, ed. Tibor R. Machan and Douglas B. Rasmussen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 351–74. (This is a slightly revised version of the same article that first appeared in the *International Philosophical Quarterly* 32 [March 1992]: 17–34.)

[26] Taylor and others may wish to argue that the atomism of mass culture makes those cultures particularly prone to the sorts of collectivist dictatorship found in the twentieth century. In this respect, assuming the isolated individual longs for leadership and a cause to follow, the atomist and the holist are equally to blame. We try to respond to this in part in the section to follow.

not preclude the closeness often associated with "holistic" communities. Indeed, we wish to distinguish what we will call symmetric communities from asymmetric ones in this regard, and to try to give some account of a meaningful community within an individualist ontology. We will move into this topic by adopting some form of what Taylor believes to be essential to understanding a "common good" that is different from convergent goods held in common.

Forms of Community. We have already noted that the essence of Taylor's argument against atomism in political culture is his call for "patriotism." The following passage is his way of identifying the core of patriotism:

> Patriotism is based on identification with others in a particular common enterprise. I am not dedicated to defending the liberty of just anyone, but I feel the bond of solidarity with my compatriots in our common enterprise, the common expression of our respective dignity. Patriotism is somewhere between friendship, or family feeling, on one side, and altruistic dedication on the other. The latter has no concern for the particular: I am inclined to act for the good of anyone anywhere. The former attach me to particular people. My patriotic allegiance does not bind me to individual people in this familial way; I may not know most of my compatriots, and may not particularly want them as friends when I do meet them. But particularity enters in because my bond to these people passes through our participation in a common political entity.[27]

The main problem with what is said here is that this description could be made of virtually any large enterprise association, such as a corporation. But we shall come back to this issue shortly. Not long after the foregoing passage Taylor also provides us with an example of the kind of relationship between people that is needed to get the sort of common bond of the type that is found in patriotism. Here, in full, is his example:

> There is a distinction largely ignored, or mischaracterized, in post-Cartesian thought: that between matters which are for me and for you, on the one hand, and those which are for us, on the other. . . . In a banal context, we transfer matters from one category to the other when we open an ordinary conversation over the back fence. "Fine weather we're having," I say to my neighbor. Prior to this, he was aware of the weather, may have been attending to it; obviously I was as well. It was a matter for him, and also for me. What the conversation-opener does is make it now a matter for *us*: we are attending to it now together. It is important to see that this attending-together is not reducible to an ag-

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[27] Taylor, "Cross Purposes," 166.

> gregation of attendings-separately. Obviously it involves something more than each of us enjoying the weather on our own. But our atomistic prejudices may tempt us to try to account for this more in terms of aggregations of monological mind-states; . . . But just adding these monological states does not get us the dialogic condition where things are for us. In certain circumstances, I can know just by seeing you that you are enjoying the weather, and you know the same of me. . . . Nevertheless, it is very different when we actually start conversing. A conversation is not the coordination of actions of different individuals, but a common action in this strong, irreducible sense; it is *our* action.[28]

The important question here is, does some relationship's being *our* relationship preclude an "atomistic" or individualistic ontology? We believe the answer is not only "no," but that such an ontology actually makes it more ours than the alternative. That, too, in a moment.

First, let us notice a couple of things about this example that seem pertinent to our discussion. The main thing to notice is that the subject (the weather) of Taylor's interlocutors exists prior to them, is not the result of any of their actions, and is something they can do nothing about. An analogous example from the political realm would be if two neighbors were discussing a recent regulation put forth by one of the many governmental regulatory agencies. Needless to say—though in this context maybe not so needless—those interlocutors may have not only no stake in the regulation but also no loyalty to it, and they may be positively harmed by it. Of course, Taylor's point would presumably be that what the "us" is here is not the subject matter but the conversation itself. This response, however, actually undermines his point. Conversations are things we create and have control over, and which do not exist before we start them. Also, they are started by individuals. It is true that a conversation is something about "us"—that is, something we possess as a "we." But that "us" or "we" remains only as long as the individuals are engaged in it. Once they stop, so does the conversation, making it in some very important way "reducible" to the individuals involved. Consequently, what Taylor needs is, after all, the subject matter here—that is, he needs some good that is prior to and exists independently of the individuals involved in order to have a common good that is not reducible to the individuals involved and whose goodness is not affected by their interests, actions, or presence. Otherwise, there is no reason to posit a good outside of an individualist ontology.

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[28] Ibid., 167.

Taylor goes on to note that these conversations are "sustained by little rituals" that help the interlocutors communicate and share the experience. This is, no doubt, true and important. It is also, in many ways, beside the point. For there can be such tacit rituals in relations that are not at all common enterprises of any kind. Indeed, the particular sort of conversation Taylor identifies here is generally not one marking off a common enterprise, even among the interlocutors. The tacit rituals are precisely the tools used to acknowledge the presence of another, wish them well, and go about one's business. Neither of us may have any interest in the other, let alone the weather, but we have this "conversation" about the weather as a means of courtesy and neighborliness. The interlocutors have no common projects and no common goals, though they might be said to have a common interest in neighborliness.

Our point is not to attack the idea of there being common goods or to suggest that only monological (to use Taylor's language) relationships are real, but rather to suggest that some common relationships among persons are structural rather than goal-directed. Conversations are often punctuated with these boundary checking and structural maintenance sorts of "rituals." Imagine, for example, seeing someone you have not seen for a long time. Besides wishing to share in genuine memories and sympathizing with current plights and projects, much of your opening conversation is spent in simply figuring out whether and to what degree "things have changed" and how one has to speak accordingly. You may have become friends years ago when you both were working for left-liberal candidate Jones. Your friend now tells you he has become a conservative Republican in the intervening years. What has been established here is not a new project for you both to pursue the intricacies of conservative Republicanism; rather, a fence or signpost has been erected which marks off appropriate and inappropriate territory for civil conversation. The commonality thus has to do with the framework within which the conversation will take place rather than a common discursive project (though that may be there too).

What seems clear to us is that some of the common or joint engagements we have with others predate our entry, and some are created as a result of our very interactions. Some of these interactions are essentially structural, and some are goal-directed. We are, of course, born into a world of virtually all *ex ante* communities, since

we did not make any of them. Some of those communities remain pretty much that way through our lives, such as our families. Some of these communities are *ex post*, meaning they are virtually wholly our creation, such as a friendship. Of course, as the friendship moves forward, it tends to become more *ex ante*, and similarly as the family moves forward it tends to become more *ex post* (through marriage, divorce, and death). In saying this, however, we are not saying anything that contradicts ontological individualism. In all cases, there is no contradiction in making one's choices fundamental to ones relations with others. One can choose to remain interested in one's family and to subordinate one's own particular interests to a perspective that looks to the good of all the family members. One can equally imagine a community where one's interests in this regard are simply irrelevant and one has little or no say in one's role. One's friends are, by definition, chosen, but one's associates need not be. There have been many societies where one's role, rank, and future endeavors have been defined for one *ex ante*.

It is conceivable, then, that we might look at this matter in terms of whether one's interests, choices, and aspirations match or are consistent with either the structural or the goal-directed features of a given community. If they are, we would describe that community as symmetrical; if not, asymmetrical. Relating this to political culture, it seems to us that the drift of Taylor's argument is to establish a symmetrical *ex ante* community with respect to goals, but a symmetrical *ex post* community with respect to structure. Political participation by individuals would determine the structure of the community, which is a way of saying that the structure is unknown until the participation takes place. But the product of the structural process (social goals) would produce a community in which the members' interests are to be assimilated into the goals and projects of the community, making those goals *ex ante* vis-à-vis the individual.

We, by contrast, want the opposite and regard the opposite to be descriptive of a liberal order, as we have argued elsewhere.[29] Because political culture in a liberal order is devoted to securing and maintaining metanorms, that culture is largely *ex ante* for us when speaking of the phenomenology to the individual of that culture. This is because the metanorms are in-principle norms that make it possible for other

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[29] Most recently in Rasmussen and Den Uyl, *Norms of Liberty*.

norms to be pursued, so structurally they are prior. In the social community at large, however, the predominant modality for communities is *ex post*. Since no one is locked into a community, even the family, except by choice or consent (there is always the right of exit), the effective modality here is *ex post*. Of course, just as there would be some *ex ante* elements in Taylor's political culture and *ex post* elements in ours—his participants would have to participate in something and ours would have ways of modifying the understanding of the metanorms in practice—there would also be some *ex ante* modes in the social culture of ours and some *ex post* modes in his. Basically, however, the picture looks as follows:

	Ex Ante	Ex post
Political Culture (structural)	Liberalism	Communitarianism
Social Culture (goal-directed)	Communitarianism	Liberalism

In this representation we have labeled ourselves with "liberalism" and Taylor with "communitarianism." For various reasons we have put forth elsewhere,[30] Taylor is not a liberal for us, though undoubtedly there are liberal elements in his desired social/political order. We define liberalism as structurally metanormative, leaving for other labels political orders that may have liberal elements. Perhaps Taylor would prefer "republican" to "communitarian." It should also be evident that the sort of community or relationship among the members involved in the upper-left quadrant is one of what we identified earlier as a civic association, while the lower-right quadrant would be generally characterized by enterprise associations. The communitarian quadrants, however, would be defined in both cases as enterprise associations.

We can offer a similar map of the political landscape by turning our attention again to symmetry and asymmetry. In this particular representation, however, one sees the perversion of the symmetrical forms in the right hand quadrants. Ideally, the liberal, for example, would want citizens who appreciate and understand both the role of metanorms in defining a liberal order and why that order is limited to

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[30] Rasmussen and Den Uyl, *Norms of Liberty*, chap. 2.

those metanorms. If the rules that govern the liberal order become unappreciated and unreflected upon by the members of the order, they will certainly function as mere legalisms, controlling the order but without ownership by the members of the political order. Here Taylor is surely right. The liberal order needs an "us" to buy into it, or else it stagnates into a mere formalism. The legalistic perversion is something like the atomism Taylor decries, for in this case individuals pursue their ends within a framework they neither appreciate nor understand. This is much like our present situation where few understand the principles behind the American founding and the Constitution. But Taylor has his own version of atomism, for the perversion of his communitarianism is statism. What he hopes for is that through political participation citizens will come to follow and assimilate themselves willingly to the goals of the state. But if that doesn't happen, the citizens will then merely be obeying the dictates of the state. As we have noted, there are few political cultures more atomistic than statist ones, where in the extreme, as depicted by novels like *1984*, reporting and spying on one's neighbor about deviations from the ends of the state is the normal political culture. Putting all this graphically would look as follows:

	Symmetrical	Asymmetrical
Civic Association	Liberalism	Legalism (atomism)
Enterprise Association	Communitarianism	Statism (atomism)

We can now perhaps combine some of the material for one final look at how these various characterizations of political and social community lay out in our respective theories of the appropriate political order. It should be evident, however, that atomism—as a doctrine which holds that individuals have no relationship to one another as members of an association that is essentially related to their commonness—is not to be found in the core of liberalism, even under an ontology of individualism. Thus, one of the central myths of atomism is that it is to be predicated solely of liberalism. Atomism, as discussed earlier, is a social pathology, not a description of liberalism or even a pathology especially characteristic of it. Given that, here's how our

field of communities maps out based on what we have put forward in this essay:

	Symmetrical	Asymmetrical
Civic Association (political structure social associations)	Liberalism (ex ante ex post)	Legalism (ex ante ex ante)
Enterprise Association (political structure social associations)	Communitarianism (ex post ex ante)	Statism (ex post ex post)

To sum up the foregoing descriptively, liberalism is a symmetrical civic association whose political structure is largely *ex ante* because of its concern with metanorms, but whose social associations are largely *ex post* because the universal right of exit effectively makes all associations "voluntary" or by consent. Communitarianism, by contrast, is an enterprise association whose political structure is *ex post* because the political/social ends are set through participation in the political process, but whose social associations are *ex ante* because their permissibility is defined by the outcome of the political process itself. A perversion of the liberal order is when the *ex ante* political structure begins to seep into the associations in society at large. Here rules—rather than interest, choice, or personal virtue—form the basis of legitimate associations of individuals in groups. This is today's "liberalism," with its plethora of "rights," rules of political correctness, and regulations of actions beyond what is needed to prevent boundary-crossings. The perversion of communitarianism is statism, where all facets of life are made a part of the political process and the whole culture becomes politicized.

These depictions are, no doubt, somewhat archetypical, since we may find in the real world mixtures of liberalism and communitarianism as well as legalism and statism. The archetypes are useful, however, because they clearly help us realize the extent to which an individualist ontology can incorporate different political and communal perspectives as well as identify for us the essential features that characterize the community bond. We now need to return to the issue of ontology and advocacy once again. In the foregoing section it appears we have seconded Taylor's distinction between ontology and advo-

cacy, for it seems that what we have said is that with an individualist ontology one can be either a liberal or a communitarian. So far as it goes, that is true. But for us the question is: given an individualist ontology, what political/social form best respects the normative principles we believe are implied by or associated with that ontology? The communitarian or republican alternative is not completely without merit in this regard, but it is nonetheless inferior to the liberal.

III

We have argued for three theses in the paper. First, "atomism" as used by Taylor is a confused conceptual tool and one whose uses for understanding liberalism is extremely limited, if applicable at all. Second, the applicability of "atomism" is ironically more consistent with certain forms of collectivism than with liberalism. Third, Taylor's own proposed way of navigating the difference between liberalism and communitarianism is, in the end, a form of communitarianism and not an alternative at all.

We have also noted that there is indeed a social pathology that can be termed "atomism." This is where individuals are disconnected from one another. We noted politically that atomism is possibly more characteristic of collectivist political orders than liberal ones. On a conceptual level, this pathology is not the result of any particular ontological position. Rather, it is primarily the result of assuming that all ethical principles are of one type—that is, of failing to distinguish between condition-setting principles (metanorms) and condition-seeking principles (norms).

When engaging in political design, the conflation of types of principles means that if one advocated liberty and tolerance, then there would be no underlying substantive ethical principles—what we termed "pure proceduralism"—and thus no place for ranking personal and communal values above the procedural values of liberty and tolerance. By the same token, if one advocated substantive moral principles, then there would be no place for the procedural principles of liberty and tolerance to have primary importance—what we termed "pure substantialism." The first way leads to "legalism," and the second way leads to "statism." Both ways destroy social life and leave individuals alienated from one another. We have thus argued that the

key to understanding the essence of liberalism is seeing that it is the only political philosophy that generally recognizes that not all ethical principles need to be of the same type or have the same function.

Further, we have argued that ontological individualism is not in conflict with social reality and can accommodate its various forms, while holism has no reason to grant individual aspirations any importance and ultimately diminishes the individual. Finally, we have noted that there is a neo-Aristotelian understanding of both individualism and the moral life that gives primary importance to finding ethical principles that provide guidance in securing a political/legal framework for social life in which no form of human flourishing (with its relevant community and culture) is given structural preference. We have noted that a liberal regime based on the protection of individual rights has the best chance of being such a framework and, as such, can inspire patriotic loyalty.

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SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF

ALSTON, William P. *Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. xiii + 256 pp. Cloth: $45.00—Those accustomed to the thoroughness, exactitude, and incisiveness of Alston's epistemological forays will not be disappointed by this work. Once more, Alston takes a keen-edged scalpel to various central issues such as externalism versus internalism, reliabilism, foundationalism, coherence, truth-conduciveness, epistemic virtue, skepticism, contextualism (though Alston means something different by it than the view now widely disputed in the literature), and epistemic probability. However, his central thesis is that researchers should replace the notion of "justified belief" with a series of positive distinctively epistemic features of beliefs, called "epistemic desiderata" or "EDs." He maintains that philosophers have been bamboozled by focusing on the question of when a belief is justified. The field is much more crowded. Although not every petitioner warrants entrance, a number of candidate EDs deserve consideration.

EDs are not a loosely bound collection of random features. They are held together by the central goal of belief—the production of true beliefs, or at least of their probability. Alston lists EDs under five headings. A selection of candidates, with the groups under which they fall, include, under I, truth itself; under II, that the subject have adequate evidence for the belief, that the belief be *based on* adequate evidence, and that it be formed by a reliable process; under III, that the evidence be cognitively accessible to the subject and that he have a well-grounded metabelief that the evidence is an ED; under IV, that the belief be held permissibly and/or responsibly; and, under V, that the belief satisfy the cognitive goals of explanation, coherence, systematicity, and/or fostering further understanding. Not all the contenders on this list pass Alston's tests. For example, those in group IV presuppose that belief is generally under voluntary control, a view he rejects; and, for example, coherence, from group V, doesn't pass his test for being inherently truth-conducive. Nevertheless, he deems it preferable simply to list as many positive epistemic features of beliefs as one can, rather than raise the uniform question "When is a belief justified?" On the other hand, he also notes that many of the issues raised in this new context have been bruited under justificationist assumptions, and the levels of support for leading options remain unchanged by this replacement of topic.

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*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

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As for truth-conductivity, Alston is interested only in *adequate* grounds for belief. (He seems willing to entertain the notion that some adequate beliefs are ungrounded, but he regards such cases as highly exceptional, "and for purposes of epistemology we can neglect that possibility.") The next step is to choose between epistemically relevant theories of probability. He opts for a frequency version of objective probability. The fit isn't ideal. First, it covers only propositions that are believed. Next, frequencies must include subjunctivities, what *would* occur as well as runs of actual cases. A few other minor adjustments are also needed, but this is a close enough fit for his inquiry.

Moreover, even among EDs Alston accepts, some EDs are more equal than others. (Apologies to Orwell.) Reliability and either the having or being based on adequate evidence are more directly truth-conducive, and others, such as the intellectual virtues listed, on the one hand, by Sosa and Goldman, and, on the other, by Zagzebski, are included only insofar as they further reliability (of producing true beliefs).

Finally, in roughly his last fifty pages, Alston reflects metaepistemically, on getting around a series of skeptical problems, especially those in which our grounds confront either vicious circularity or an endless series of further, unanchored groundings. Briefly, his solution is to take a more modest, piecemeal, top-down approach to groundings. This enables him to appeal to something not already presupposed in the method we employ for grounding more specific groups of beliefs. However, if we try to go global, the threat of circularity or an infinite chain returns. This isn't wholly unwelcome; it may be taken as a sign that we are getting too close to truth-conduciveness itself for independent confirmation.

Alston treats a number of other topics in the course of his exposition. For example, he defends externalism and proposes accepting what he calls psychological realism to solve its notorious generality problem. He rejects deontological theories, as I have stated, as requiring voluntary belief; those requiring only indirect actions toward belief-acquisition are insufficiently truth-conducive. And in scouting the prospects for skepticism he defends the Ür-thesis of foundationalism: that we can have nonarbitrary, adequately grounded, basic beliefs, without appealing to an infinite series of groundings or inviting vicious circularity. Thus, the critical exposition covers quite a number of currently hot topics in epistemology.

In fact, there are far too many topics for me to do justice to in this review. But a further word about the replacement of justificationism by EDs may be forgiven. It seems unclear to me that much has really changed. A major concern is that the term "justification," with roots in morality, lends itself to internalist, and in particular deontological, accounts, and Alston has objected to their distinctive EDs. There is some reason to believe that this worry is exaggerated. However, the difference also raises a question of the choice between evaluative monism, represented by justificationism, and pluralism, represented by EDs. As for monism, Alston himself seems to find work for it under different titles; see, for example, his restriction to *adequate* grounds. There is a level past which it is correct to maintain that the subject should or shouldn't hold a certain belief. Whether we call beliefs achieving that status justified, it is, as an increasingly popular term has it, an entitlement which it seems we want to retain in our epistemic evaluations. But it is also just the sort of monistic evaluation of beliefs that Alston appears at times to advise us to abandon. Add to that, first, the large number of issues discussed in a justificationist context that can be mooted

in an ED setting without missing a beat, and, second, the author's many acknowledgements that the new mode leaves many of the earlier problems with precisely the polemical rank they had before the switch. Thus, while it is often a good idea periodically to refresh shopworn philosophical vocabulary that has collected unwanted baggage, it appears in this case that the single substantive reason for the change is to deprive deontologists, coherentists, and perhaps others of a cheap, and dubious, lexicographic victory. But pluralism still doesn't appear to have displaced monism in epistemic evaluation. None of this detracts from any of the substantive results Alston achieves, but, if correct, it renders his central thesis less revolutionary than he recommends readers take it.—Gerald Vision, *Temple University.*

BEETS, M. G. J. *From Time to Eternity: A Companion to Plato's* Phaedo. Baarn: Duna, 2003. 286 pp. Cloth, n.p.—The author presents this volume as "a companion to Plato's *Phaedo*"; as such, one expects it to engage closely the dialogue without abandoning critical rigor, while at the same time exposing us to some of the varied and rich issues that sustain today's readings of Plato. As Beets's Prologue indicates, his work focuses on "the issue of the coexistence and transition from the world of becoming to that of being" (p. i). The work is divided in two parts. The first part takes up one third of the book and begins by discussing human thought in terms of two main levels of thinking: intuitive and entirely determined by the world, and purely formal and "truly free thinking" (p. 16). Setting out from this differentiation, the first chapter offers a conceptual structure that will determine the rest of the book. In the same chapter Beets goes on to present philosophical thought as the task of "calling up" from the deeper recesses of our mind our knowledge of "the universal a priori," or the purely formal, which in turn turns us toward the objective nature of reality and free thinking (p. 22). The chapter closes as Beets establishes the limitations of conceptual human knowledge in terms of the striving for a knowledge of absolute being or the noumenal, which, although available to the mystic (p. 42), cannot be accomplished by conceptual knowledge but does serve as "the foothold for meaningful cultural, religious, philosophical, and scientific life and for human ethics" (p. 42). In following Beets's itinerary we find out that knowledge of the intuited world can be turned to knowledge of the purely structural, and that in this sense human life through critical conceptual knowledge may be a passage toward the eternal. This occurs if one realizes that the world as it appears is a lie and if we listen to the silent voice in the recess of our mind, which tells us of the a priori. This knowledge of the purely formal in the intuited also leads to Beets's final insight, namely, that ultimately death will lead us to know the eternal. At this point the author equates absolute being, the noumenal, and God. Thus, the path is laid for the passage from time to the eternal.

As the language already cited indicates, Beets's work is determined by a general reading of Kant, which appears as the basic tool for the interpretation of the dialogue. The other text looming over the *Phaedo* is the gospel of John. The influence of Beets's reading of John goes so far as to allow the author to repeat in the introductory part of his companion to Plato's *Phaedo* the first part of his book *The Wordless Voice: A Philosopher's Approach to St. John's Gospel* (Baarn, 2003). It is unfortunate

that although Beets refers to other Platonic dialogues in his interpretation, he is never clear as to his specific understanding of the conceptual relationship of those dialogues to the *Phaedo*.

The second two thirds of Beets's book offer a reading of the *Phaedo* heavily directed by the conceptual guidelines and issues set up in the first part. The reading does not offer a close discussion of the text but focuses on the aims already established, to the point that Beets himself indicates that the first pages of the dialogue simply "require no comment" (p. 95). Also, in light of the highly ambitious tone of the project, one is disappointed in discovering that throughout the interpretation the Greek is never discussed, with the exception of a few simple terms commonly used, which are immediately transliterated into the language of mind and subjectivity, or into senses recognizable through Christian readings of the Greeks: *psyche* becomes "mind," *soma* refers to the subjective "I," and *mania* is read through the words of Christ. Beets's reading cannot be underestimated in its persistence; as a result, without any recourse to the Greek or to other issues now for long densely populating Plato's beautiful text, one is constantly brought back to the introductory thesis and set up, often leaving the aporetic richness which may lead to "free thinking" for the certainty of already prescribed resolutions. The second part ultimately accompanies one to the famous last words of the dialogue, which, in light of Beets's final thesis, fittingly appear as an indication of "[t]he return to health after a period of sickness" (p. 274).

Also surprising to any one looking for a companion is the absence in "Notes and References" of references to the helpful and rich secondary literature on the dialogue. Highly estimable characteristics of the work are the absence of overly technical language and the accessibility of the writing.—Alejandro Vallega, *California State University, Stanislaus.*

CLEARY, John and Gary GURTLER, Editors. *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy.* Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005. xxiii + 329 pp. Cloth, $156.00—This is the twentieth volume in this respected series on ancient philosophy that offers scholarly presentations on ancient speculators with comments on each by competent respondents.

The first colloquium, by Maria and Alfred Miller, is a superb integrative interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of *ousia*, *psuche*, and *to zen* or "being-alive." Nearly one hundred pages of careful analyses of Aristotle's texts are seasoned with analogies concerning hardware/software, the hermeneutics of reflexive interpretation of specific fields using general ontological principles, and implications of Gibbs free-energy bond strength (pp. 10 n. 17; 36 n. 50; 80 n. 93). The unifying thesis is that "self-maintenance of the individual entity and its dynamic, but stable species-configuration depend causally on each other in the *hou heneka* relation whose outcome is the unitary existence as *entelecheia*. With this dynamic ontology of *ousia*, then, Aristotle first provided a consistent temporal account for the characteristics of entities previously attributed to the statically conceived *eidos*" (p. 94).

John Cleary raises two central difficulties. Can this reading reconcile Aristotle's purported understanding of species as unchanging forms with evolutionary theory's view of species as historically stable patterns

of organization? And is it possible to situate Aristotle's view of soul–body relation within the post-Cartesian debate without assuming that the latter's problematics are identical with Aristotle's concerns (pp. 102–4)? Arguably, clarifications to each exist in other contexts. (See Fran O'Rourke, "Aristotle and the Metaphysics of Evolution," *The Review of Metaphysics* 58 (2004): 3–59; A. P. Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body* [Leiden: Brill, 2003].)

Next, Marcelo Boeri examines how Aristotle and the Stoa assimilated the Socratic distinction between real and apparent good in relation to *akrasia*. Depicting how the former incorporate and criticize Socratic intellectualism, Boeri explores psychological factors in the akratic agent (pp. 132–9). Iakovos Vasiliou, in a richly documented response, insists that epistemological issues, particularly as clarified in *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*, ought to be examined and resolved first (pp. 143–8).

The third, sixth, and seventh colloquia center on distinct aspects of Plato's *Republic*. The first, by Aryeh Kosman, reads the *Republic* as depicting justice as normative principle of difference, with unity being a concomitance of *sophrosone* (pp. 154–61). Mary-Hannah Jones argues, however, that "justice for Plato is not the same as the normative principle of difference . . . [but rather] a special kind of normative difference," implying thus that for Plato the austere, the luxurious, and the ideal polis do not coincide in being equally just (p. 171). Related considerations arise in Susan Meyer's presentation on class assignment and specialization in the *Republic*, which analyzes the "Myth of Metals" and the possibility of migration between classes, yet concludes that the "Principle of Specialization" that makes the city just is blind to questions of distributive justice (p. 243). In his response, Tad Brennan insists that while Plato's depiction of the distribution of political power is fair by the standards of distribution although Plato did not make such his goal, not only does Kallipolis seemingly offer goods proportionate to the burden of ruling, it also has mechanisms for promoting qualified offspring from the artisan class (p. 257). The final lengthy examination of the *Republic*, by Daniel Devereux, concerns the relation between justice and happiness, and concludes that while Plato is appropriately described as a eudaimonist, it remains unclear whether he would agree with Aristotle in calling such the supreme good, for through the voice of Socrates (367c5–7) happiness is implied to be a consequence of justice (p. 304). This conclusion is nuanced in Lee Franklin's response that "if Justice is a *dunamis*, we cannot separate what the state is from what it does" (p. 311).

The fourth colloquium, by John Sallis, concerns the flow of *phusis* and philosophy's origin in Plato's *Theaetetus*. In a textured reflection on Socrates' gradual differentiation of perception and knowledge in the commonality of becoming and being, Sallis highlights references to Homer, Thales, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, which are bound together in the narration bound by *katabasis* at the beginning and end of the dialogue (p. 191). The weave of Sallis's musings is extended by Nikolas Pappas, who portrays Plato's paradoxes concerning the tension between the *archai* of philosophizing as personal beginning and philosophy's historical antecedents (p. 199).

Ursula Coope's colloquium carefully examines Aristotle's view of agency in *Physics* 3.3 and suggests that "the agent's action is the same as the patient's change" (p. 209). Following Aristotle's subtle reflections, she concludes that "what can make agency seem puzzling is that an agent has the potential for something else to be other than it is" (p.

219). In his succinct response, Daryl Tress suggests that Coope's view that change occurs because the agent has potential for something else to become does not improve on Plato's inability "to explain why changes are not always and everywhere initiated" (p. 225). Viewed correctly, what Aristotle meant is that "the agent's act is, immediately, the motion, occurring when the potentials of agent (to do) and patient (to undergo) meet and actualize" (p. 224).

As in prior proceedings in this valuable series, these dialogical investigations offer sustained focus and depth of analysis.—Michael Ewbank, *Logos Institute.*

COCHRAN, Terry. *Twilight of the Literary: Figures of Thought in the Age of Print.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 288 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $18.95—The emergence of modernity in Western thinking entails a new, radically different worldview from the past, one dominated by secular understandings of history and tradition, and of new forms of what Cochran calls "collective consciousness." Modernity also requires a rethinking of the role of human knowledge in the world. Cochran's aim is to explore the conceptual and linguistic underpinnings of these developments by looking at the ideas of a variety of thinkers, and by focusing in particular on the rise of the print medium, the book, as the dominant medium for recording, preserving, and disseminating thought. By modernity, Cochran means the world's "relative disengagement from a theologically grounded view of human history" (p. 1). His approach is fundamentally postmodernist, although he mentions few postmodernists in his exposition; he is inspired mainly by critical theory, especially Gramsci. He wants to challenge the traditional view of the progress of knowledge, which he believes was strongly influenced in terms of its theoretical understanding by Leibniz (with his ideas about the institutionalization of knowledge) and Kant (who reflected a great deal on the status of the book and the printed medium, and who contributed to laying the foundations for modern globalism, especially with his ideas on Enlightenment). This is the view that history is linear: that we are always adding to the sum total of knowledge, which inevitably opens a distinction between the present and the past; that we learn from the past, and project toward a better future. This view is fundamentally against the relativistic tendencies of the modern age, and it contributed to the emergence of several concepts that became central to our understanding of culture: the totality of human knowledge, adding to knowledge, the university as center of knowledge, the scholarly expert, the emergence of the subject, the expert informing the public, and so on.

Cochran, in the manner of Foucault, suggests that these are all cultural constructs, and he believes that there are similarly key assumptions and preconceived notions behind the whole idea of secular modernity, notions he calls "figures of thought." One of his theses is that the multiplicity of media at the end of the twentieth century (and the dominance of the *image*) involve new ways of transcribing human thought for posterity and alters our understandings of historical continuity. The multiplicity of media have led to a focus on culture as a privileged object of reflection, and the primary assumptions about how one interprets the transmission of culture have become destabilized. Cochran wishes to

provide a new critical perspective on the material basis of modernity, which involves an interrogation of the print medium as the dominant physical means of inscribing human thinking. He holds that "the shifting conditions of generating and materially inscribing human thought have profound repercussions on the emergence and consolidation of world-views in the so-called modern age, and this book attempts to bring into focus the fundamental elements of this modern constellation of notions and presuppositions" (p. 3).

Another of Cochran's theses is that the onslaught of the image as the primary medium today, and the diminishing role of the book, implies "a disengagement of language from the primary production of cultural hegemony and raises questions about cosmopolitical knowledge and about the model of globalization itself, not to mention about the figures of thought that have structured modern historical understanding" (p. 27). In short, with the arrival of the image, and the plethora of media which disseminate it to every corner of the globe, the traditional view of knowledge, which was based on the book, is now challenged, and new possibilities are opened up.

Cochran attempts to illustrate these themes with an overview of the relevant ideas of leading thinkers who he believes made a contribution to the development of both approaches, including Dante, Machiavelli, Heidegger, Benjamin, and Gramsci. This discussion provides an interesting overview of "the culture of the book," and of modern critiques of this approach to knowledge. But the work overall suffers from problems that will be familiar to anyone who has read much of this literature. Although Cochran is most concerned with describing the processes he sees operating in the move to modernity, and in the attempt to critique traditional categories, his work suffers from the fact that his overall theses are vaguely stated and developed; he does not make a sufficient effort to give them a concreteness that would show how they apply to real world cultural issues. As a result, from the philosophical point of view, the exposition reveals a paucity of clear arguments in support of his main claims. There are three key philosophical questions raised by Cochran's approach: (i) how exactly is knowledge "produced" by cultural forces; (ii) how is it possible for certain people to transcend these forces in order to provide an objectively true account of them (for instance, Cochran, Benjamin, and Gramsci); (iii) how can one advocate political and ethical consequences (for example, Gramsci's, and those of the critical theorists) of the critique of culture, if one's critique is founded upon undermining the objectivity of knowledge and value? These are the questions facing the postmodernist approach to philosophy, literature, knowledge, and culture, and, like the work of many today who adopt a similar approach, they are really the foundations of Cochran's theses, but, unfortunately, not explicitly identified and defended in this book.—Brendan Sweetman, *Rockhurst University.*

CRIVELLI, Paolo. *Aristotle on Truth.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 340 pp. Cloth, $85.00—Too often Aristotle's account of truth is summed up by repeating some variant of "to say of what is that it is and of what it is not that it is not, is to say the true; while to say of what is that it is not or of what is not that it is, is to say the false," and

matters are left at that. Or worse still, it is simply described as a "correspondence theory." The importance of Paolo Crivelli's book is that it perspicuously fills in the blanks so that in its realm Aristotle's account can be seen as comparable to current truth-conditional compositional accounts like Tarski's and those deployed by figures such as Davidson. Crivelli's goals are to provide "a precise reconstruction of all of Aristotle's most significant views on truth and falsehood and to gain a philosophical understanding of them" (p. 39). He goes far toward attaining these ends. His approach consists of relating Aristotle's views to those at the forefront of contemporary discussions of similar topics and therewith adapting some of the most central themes of current philosophical logic and logical theory to explicate Aristotle on truth. One of these themes is the presentation of truth conditions for the various sorts of sentences dealt with by Aristotle and which still play a role on the present scene. In doing this he performs a valuable service to the scholarly community, allowing Aristotle scholars and others to apply seminal ideas from the Philosopher to topics in the history of philosophy, for example, the Terminist tradition, and to contemporary discussions. The book opens with an overview of Aristotle's theory of truth and is followed by material organized into three parts: (1) Bearers of Truth and Falsehood, (2) Empty Terms, (3) Truth and Time. These are followed by appendices which include translations of sections of the *Metaphysics* and discussions of many placed and of future-tense predication.

Part 1 examines the truth-vehicles Aristotle considered, indicating where these come closest to contemporary views, for example, sentences (utterances), thoughts (mental entities of a sort), and states of affairs. Crivelli also makes clear that Aristotle had additional truth-vehicles which are not part of contemporary discussions, and he explains their role in Aristotle. There are useful discussions of where Aristotle abandons bivalence and why. Part 1 also contains Crivelli's truth conditional account of Aristotle's theory. I take liberties here in summarizing it as follows. One can think of singular subject-copula-predicate assertoric categorical sentences in the present tense as the basic type to be evaluated as true or false. Unlike Tarskian and other contemporary approaches, the Aristotelian base clause contains subject-copula-traditional predicate sentences and not Fregean atomic predications. Another crucial difference from most current semantics is the importance of tense in the base clause. Current theories tend to be of tenseless Fregean predications. Then, as in contemporary semantics, other types of sentences are provided with apposite truth-conditions. So future-tense sentences, past-tense sentences, modal sentences, what are presently called truth-functional sentences, and to some extent the familiar A, E, I, and O form categoricals are explained along these lines. So in a sense the most significant truth condition is the one given for the above-mentioned present-tense singular sentences.

This naturally leads to the part 2 discussions of the accuracy of portraying Aristotle's theory as a "correspondence theory," the liar's paradox, and the problem of empty terms. As for the latter, we are to some extent at a loss in discussing how Aristotle's theory of truth should deal with empty terms and in particular with empty singular names. There is only one example of an empty term in Aristotle. It is "goat-stag," and this is not much to go on. Moreover, unlike the singular term "Vulcan," and the general one "unicorn," which are simple/unstructured; "goat-stag" seems to be complex or structured. Crivelli reports on Aristotle holding the view that an apparently singular sentence with such a term would not be treated as singular, but as involving separate sentences

concerning goats and stags. Crivelli suggests that there are problems with this view. It strikes the present reviewer that the upshot of this specific historical investigation is that we need to look at later figures in the Aristotelian tradition for a systematic approach to empty names, for example, Ockham, Buridan, Leibniz, Kant, and Lesniewski. However, just as there is little consensus among current philosophers on the subject of empty names, we might not expect much among past figures.

Part 3 contains material on time, change, and the famous determinism problem from the *De Interpretatione*. In appendix 6 there is a formal presentation, a rational reconstruction, employing predicate logic to interpret Aristotle's account of future-tense assertions.

In taking on the task of explaining Aristotle's views on truth using ideas from current philosophical logic, Crivelli has provided us with a much needed perspective. We now have a rigorously formulated, unified view of the referential semantics,the truth conditions, for Aristotle's own logical forms. By rendering Aristotle's accomplishments in terms of contemporary logical theory, Aristotle appears in a new light, in a present-day form with renewed significance.—Alex Orenstein, *City University of New York.*

DELL'OLIO, Andrew J. *Foundations of Moral Selfhood: Aquinas on Divine Goodness and the Connection of the Virtues*. Studies in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, vol. 8. New York: Peter Lang, 2003. xi + 203 pp. Cloth, $63.95—One of the significant factors in the recent rehabilitation of medieval philosophy has been a renewed interest in virtue ethics, so-called, for which the credit must, in large part, go to Alasdair MacIntyre. However, some now working in the field of virtue ethics appear to be embarrassed by the metaphysical or theological context in which virtue ethics had its original expression, and attempts have been made to detach the ethics from the metaphysics and the theology. Two questions frame the structure of Andrew Dell'Olio's book: first, the historical and exegetical question of how St. Thomas manages to link up the secular and the religious orders of virtue without fragmenting the unity of the moral self; the second, the thematic question of the significance of St. Thomas's account of the virtues to contemporary discussion. The early chapters of the book attempt to show that a de-theologized presentation of St. Thomas's ethics fails to do justice to the rich vision of the good he presents in the *Summa Theologiae*. Dell'Olio, convincingly in my opinion, shows that Thomas succeeds in reconciling both a natural and a supernatural orientation of the will to the good, and thus that his ethics is more than a mere representation of Aristotle's. The central chapters discuss the issues of God and the human good, and the connection of the virtues.

The last chapter—in the opinion of this reviewer, the most interesting in the book—is a consideration of the relevance of Aquinas to contemporary virtue ethics mediated through the work of Charles Taylor, Iris Murdoch, and Alasdair Macintyre. It begins explicitly with a commitment to propose "something like a transcendental argument for the necessity of God for virtue ethics," although Dell'Olio immediately says that he does not go so far as actually to propose such an argument. All the more puzzling to find him wondering later on in this chapter

whether "Taylor would find the kind of transcendental argument I have proposed in this chapter to be sound" (p. 173). Is he, or is he not, proposing an argument?

After this promising beginning it is somewhat puzzling to find Dell'Olio apparently retreating to a "de-provincialized Thomism" or a "postmodern Thomism," which he characterizes as follows: "a de-provincialized Thomism would [be] an open rather than closed tradition; one that does not call for a slavish discipleship to the past. . . . Indeed, it would be a postmodern Thomism, one that emphasizes the mystical, Platonic side of Aquinas, with an emphasis on the good rather than being and the centrality of negative theology over the rationalist attempts at onto-theology" (p. 169). Apart from the use of the term "postmodern," there is much that any Thomist could go along with here. Matters become a little more worrying when the passage continues: "This postmodern Thomism would participate in the contemporary conversation on ethical theory with openness to other, alternative versions of the good, and willing [sic] to engage in the analysis of the theoretical, indeed metaphysical presuppositions of such perspectives, including the possibility that no conception of a hyper-good is rationally satisfactory in any ultimate sense" (pp. 169–70). It is difficult to see many who would consider themselves Thomists rushing to sign up to this vision, particularly when Dell'Olio goes on to say that "perhaps it is not the truth of theism that is important but rather its conceptual richness that commends itself to ethical theorists. It is its pragmatic value, not only for how one lives . . . but for how one thinks" (pp. 173–4). However, we cannot complain that we have not been warned, for Dell'Olio had already served warning at the beginning of the book that "[t]he Aquinas that emerges from this study is no mere Thomist. . . . By drawing our attention towards the primacy of the good and the virtue of charity or love in his ethics, this book might also serve to commend Aquinas as a resource to those interested in pursuing a postmodern ethic of virtue" (p. 3).

The book is well written, the style clear, and the discussion well controlled and perspicuous. The presentation of the book is generally very good but it is marred somewhat by the presence of a number of "orphans" (as in "widows and orphans"—I counted at least eleven of these), and by the ubiquitous use of "his or her," "him or her," which disrupt the flow of the text. These blemishes to one side, Professor Dell'Olio has produced a book that is well worth reading, and which makes a worthwhile contribution to both historical and contemporary issues in ethics.—Gerard Casey, *University College Dublin.*

DE VRIES, Hent. *Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas.* Translated by Geoffrey Hale. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. xxxiv + 657 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $24.95—In *Minimal Theologies* Hent de Vries offers a revision of his German language edition of *Theologie im pianissimo* published in 1989. There has been an impressive amount of scholarly work on Adorno and Levinas since 1989, "but this literature pays no attention to a systematic confrontation between their respective philosophical projects, if it mentions their names in conjunction at all" (p. xv). What his work contributes is

an analysis of the works of Adorno and Levinas as being focused on a common project. That project is the exploration of "native modalities of the *performative contradiction* of argumentative discourse as it seeks to come to terms with *its* other" (p. xvi). Further, he contrasts these with the later Habermas and early Derrida. This is a meticulous work that provides important insights into these thinkers and religious philosophy. It is directed at a scholarly audience and could be of use in a graduate seminar focusing either on these thinkers or on contemporary issues surrounding the relationship between faith and reason.

The book consists of a four parts. Part 1 is titled "Antiprolegomena." De Vries begins by noting that since the Enlightenment "both theologians and philosophers have shared the opinion that the existence of God must be affirmed, even if, upon closer examination, it could only be figured as a kind of 'postulate,' an 'idea,' or 'the absolute other'" (p. 50). His "antiprolegomena" is a correction to, and an undoing of, the presuppositions of theology which restrict discourse and imagination to natural theology (p. 52). In doing this he highlights a stalemate that on the one hand argues for the science of God, and on the other the science of "God." The first is unhelpful because it cannot live up to the scientific standards of public availability and proof, the latter because it fails to distinguish a specific subject matter in contrast to other disciplines. He closes this section by quoting Kant, "That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether. . . . What has hitherto been called metaphysics cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forgo it entirely is impossible" (p. 163). De Vries argues that this diagnosis leads us to adopt a minimal theology.

Part 2 is titled "Dialectica." This section argues that in Adorno's writings "philosophy is neither rendered obsolete nor fully aestheticized. . . . On the contrary, at decisive moments Adorno brings philosophy and art into a subtle, *fragmentary-complementary* or, better, *alternating* relationship" (p. 168). Using the method of negative dialectics, Adorno seeks the other of reason. This leads to a conundrum that levels the other of reason, and yet the only way to approach this problem is through philosophical discourse (p. 300). This means that a critique of thinking is offered through thinking itself. Such an approach raises questions as to whether nonreason can provide any meaningful answers.

Part 3 is titled "Phaenomenologica." This section explores Levinas's critique of Western philosophy which is centered on an investigation of the relationship between the same and the other, identity and difference, immanence and transcendence (p. 348). Levinas seems to grant that in some sense reason leads to atheism, or that there is a reasonable ground for atheism. Having accepted this he seeks some ground besides rationality for belief in what is transcendent and other. This section also looks at Derrida, who "holds up to Levinas not the anchor of reason in the sea of skepticism but, rather, the *groundlessness* of thought and experience" (p. 524).

Part 4 is titled "Hermeneutica Sacra sive Profana." It begins by asking the question: "What at this historical moment—after Auschwitz—still remains of the questions traditionally asked by the disciplines of classical, biblical, dogmatic, and philosophical theology?" (p. 529). De Vries has traced Adorno's dialectical critique of dialectics and Levinas's phenomenological critique of phenomenology. In this section he considers, among other things, the nature of idolatry. He argues that if the knowledge of God is channeled through humans it cannot be made absolute

without violating the law against idolatry which says "nothing human can be made absolute" (p. 630). Consistent with the rest of the book this continues the assumption that human rationality cannot understand God.

As a study of Adorno, Levinas, Habermas, and Derrida, this is a judicious work. It raises further issues that would be worthy of consideration. While it is true that these thinkers assume that the modern world has shown that theology could not be rationally defended, it would be interesting both to place them in a larger intellectual context among other thinkers who also believed that human language and thought were inadequate to understand God, and to see how they would respond to the classical solutions to this problem. This would contrast their solution with that of others who maintained that it is possible to affirm the ability for humans to use reason to know God without ending in idolatry. It would also be interesting to contrast them with theologians of the modern age who affirm human knowledge of the divine and give rational defenses of the faith. In suggesting these sorts of further studies the work is stimulating and provocative.—Owen Anderson, *Arizona State University.*

DIERKSMEIER, Claus. *Der absolute Grund des Rechts: Karl Christian Friedrich Krause in Auseinandersetzung mit Fichte und Schelling.* Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag Günther Holzboog, 2003. 585 pp. Cloth, €98.00.—K. C. F. Krause (1781–1832), a disciple of Fichte and Schelling, distinguished himself by elaborating a coherent philosophy of law. In his exhaustive study Dierksmeier first mentions the various authors who influenced Krause, to point out next the latter's criticism of Fichte, who did not succeed in clarifying the foundation of law. Krause himself sees this foundation in the human person and the rational nature of man. Rather than following Fichte and Schelling, Krause joins Kant: rights and law are an expression of accomplished humanity. In Schelling's view, on the other hand, right is the organ of freedom. For Kant, law itself must create order to be law. Krause is convinced that the basic structure of man's intellectual life consists in striving toward wisdom, love, religion, and art. Using Kant's distinction between analytical and synthetic thought, Krause considers law as being an absolute, irreplaceable category of the practical reason, prior to every juridical order. In complete freedom our reason must reach the *Wesenschau,* that is, penetrate the essence of things. Laws must agree with man's essence, which exists in a likeness to God. Therefore, to express what is right, in the full sense of the term, law must be considered a property of God and something divine.

Law is not understood when seen as a manmade construction—the idea of God is its primary foundation. Law is the basis of what is right since God, its source, gives legitimacy to all other attempts at grounding what is right. Krause sees a gradation in such arguments: the primary basis is God, then man, next nature, and finally the matter dealt with. The nature of the latter has been created by God. Since God is a person, he is as a person the foundation of all rights. Man's personal being implies his dignity, and his dignity determines his rights.

In a following section, Dierksmeier speaks of Krause's theory of human dignity, which is not the same as the aptitude to be the subject of rights (*Rechtswürde*): all men have the same human rights and are subject to them. However, Krause distinguishes between this aptitude and the capacity to exercise these rights (*Rechtsfähigkeit*). He claims equal rights for the sexes and demands specific rules which promote the development of their respective aptitudes.

Dierksmeier points out that some criticized Krause for having assigned rights to nature as such. To determine what is true Krause distinguishes between "a law of nature," "a law in nature," "law or rights derived from nature," and "laws or rights based upon nature". This distinction yields four types of theories of the natural law. Krause would like to translate the expression *lex naturalis* as "law which does justice to man and nature." Somewhat surprisingly Krause considers animals of higher species persons at a lower level, and not, as Fichte and Schelling did, as things. Nevertheless, animals cannot cross a borderline: they do not know about God, live at a lower level of freedom, and enjoy limited rights only.

As mentioned above, Krause does not acknowledge that inanimate things constitute subjects of rights. They neither need rights nor is there an objective ground to attribute rights to them. Animals, on the other hand, may be used as things, but they may not be considered as such or used for any purpose whatever. The last criterium for using things is our personal context and social situation (*Bezugsrahmen*). With regard to the right of ownership, Krause pleads in favor of a universal commandment of justice, in order to correct injustices in the ownership claims of people.

Dierksmeier concludes his account of Krause's philosophy of law with a chapter on private law and a second on public law. To understand better Krause's view, one should not, contrary what is usually done, divide the study of private law into a treatise of the rights of persons and one of the rights concerning things. The first chapter comprises sections on freedom, private property, contracts, and social life. Because of the rich contents, Dierksmeier, writes one may rank this philosophy of private law with that of Kant and Hegel. Krause succeeds in clarifying an impressive number of the concrete applications of private law and explaining the principles which underpin them. The chapter on public law in divided in sections on society law, criminal, constitutional, and international law. Here Krause's view of relatively autonomous and subsidiary subsystems is typical of his presentation. From constitutional law he passes to international law. However, he does not stop short at the confines of our planet; rather, he claims that his philosophy of law applies to all rational beings wherever, for whom God is the personified basis and source of the very being of law.

Dierksmeier draws attention to the fact that since Krause did not hold a chair at a university, his theory met with little interest in Germany but that in some other countries, such as Spain, Portugal, and almost all the Latin America states, it was welcomed under the name of *krausismo* and became the symbol of the liberal movement of renewal. However, his thought was suspected of being opposed to the Catholic faith and of promoting pantheism. His writings were listed in the Index of prohibited books. Interest in Krause's thought might grow if scholars, when studying German Idealism, would pay attention to his philosophy of law.—Eduard Gaugler, *Mannheim University.*

DILTHEY, Wilhelm. *Selected Works, Volume III: The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences.* Translated and edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 400 pp. Cloth, $60.00—The fourth to appear of a projected six volumes, the third volume of Dilthey's *Selected Works* is a meticulous, eminently responsible translation of the seventh volume of his *Gesammelte Schriften* (1927). Its textual corpus offers many repetitions of terms and themes, concepts envisioned, revised, and discarded, alternative formulations of the same proposition or postulate, sentences begun but left unfinished. It provides a fitting autograph of the thinker whom writing made anxious and who was ready with rare confidence to identify the human experience of "inadequacy" (p. 59) or "aversion" as the primary affective motor at once of hermeneutical progress and of the "nexus of the great world events" (p. 187). Amid an array of drafts and supplements, however, the corpus also includes Dilthey's most sustained and systematic contribution to a critique of historical reason, a "fourth critique" that remains true to Kant's methodological precedent even as it draws regularly on Husserl's lexicon and semantic analyses. The editors adopt the title of that critique as the subtitle of the third volume itself.

In that subtitle, "formation" translates *Aufbau*, and is intended to suggest the shaping of something concrete rather than an abstraction or a construction of a thing of one kind from or out of something of a different kind. The something, the substance at issue is "lived experience" (p. 26). It is the only kind of substance of concern to the "human sciences," the latter a familiar translation of *Geisteswissenschaften*, which might nevertheless be brought into English with slightly greater semantic accuracy as "experiential sciences," for it is precisely their grounding in and generation of experience and nothing but experience that links together both history and what Dilthey calls the "systematic social sciences," just as it distinguishes them all from the sciences of an inorganic and mindless nature (p. 37). In the latter, fixed in "the enduring subsoil of life" (p. 153), the division between the physical and the psychical is incidental if it is of relevance at all; in the former, it is foundational (p. 101). In the former, inquiry proceeds from what I experience as "there for me," through introspection, to a "reflexive awareness" that is more adequate the greater its contextual depth and comprehensiveness, and the more it is tempered and adjusted to the objectified experience of others (pp. 59–60, 157). In the latter, inquiry proceeds away from what I experience toward the increasingly universal conceptualization of causal relations and systems whose existence is entirely independent of any experience (p. 157). In the human sciences, "everything from the process of understanding onwards is determined by the relationship of *mutual dependence*"; in the natural sciences, "conceptual cognition . . . proceeds through a formation . . . in which the lower stratum is always independent of the one that it grounds" (p. 164; italics in original).

Such dichotomies surely strike the contemporary philosopher of science—and many a contemporary scientist—as too stark. Dilthey's unwavering appeal to the relations between part and whole, and between margin and center, in defining everything from institutions and epochs to the ground of the interpreter's judgment of what does and does not belong to the valid representation of historical organization (p. 33), seems similarly quaint. Yet so long as the experiential remains irreducible to the neurophysiological, the psychical to the physical, Dilthey's effort to derive the general parameters of history as we know it from the parameters of historical experience as we have it remains of more than

(so to speak) historical interest. Particularly provocative is his positing of the "productive system" as both the minimal and the maximal object of historical intelligibility and, a fortiori, historical analysis. Whether it be an individual actor or an institutional or aesthetic complex, such a system is in every case a teleological system, broadly construed, the realization of a "creative, evaluative, and active source, something that expresses and objectifies itself" (p. 109). It comprises in every case a "structural nexus" (p. 36) that endows it with its center and its unity and so with its meaning. Among productive systems, individual actors alone are ontologically real, but the collective and cumulative objectifications of spirit that they traverse (p. 188) also determine their life-horizons (p. 198) and color their sensibilities and their strivings. Every objective determination of life is, however, a restriction of it, and in the finitude of that restriction lies a constant compulsion to change: just as any age, for example, arises "from the insufficiency of an earlier one, so it carries within itself the limits, tensions, and sufferings that prepare for the future" (p. 207). For the existentialist Heidegger, Dilthey had failed to pose the question of the historicity of Being radically enough. The third volume of his *Selected Works* affords us the opportunity to consider anew whether, postexistentialist and posthumanist *avant l'heure*, Dilthey and his system-theoretic vitalism may have done Heidegger's own radicalism one better.—James D. Faubion, *Rice University.*

EDMONSON, III, Henry T. *John Dewey and the Decline of American Education.* Wilmington: ISI Books, 2006. xiv + 134 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $15.00—If you are of a certain age, let us say, old enough to be a grandparent, you have seen it happen in your lifetime. You do not need this work to tell you that American public education at all levels has degenerated in the course of the past half century. Edmonson lays the blame on the unfortunate espousal in professional educational circles of John Dewey's theory of education. Dewey's emphasis on experience denigrates the inherited and the necessity to study ancient and foreign languages in order to master the past. For him, the function of education is to challenge the received, to challenge Western civilization in its core beliefs. Dewey's philosophy of education is, of course, only one aspect of his pragmatic naturalism, but more than that it is a political program. Dewey came to that position slowly. If one were to survey only his later atheistic and socialist writings, one would be surprised to find the newly created Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins lecturing to students at the University of Michigan on "Our obligation to know God." That was when Dewey was still a convinced Hegelian and open to the transcendent. As Hegel came under fire by empiricists on both sides of the Atlantic for his failure to adequately account for method as actually practiced in the natural sciences, Dewey abandoned the idealism of his intellectual mentor in favor of British empiricism. He became a disciple of David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx, and subsequently embraced the social determinism of Emil Durkheim.

British empiricism, in its denial of evidence for the existence of God, deprived religion of its rational foundation, leaving religion on intellectual shaky ground, with consequences in the moral and social orders. Dewey believed that many of the values held dear by the religious are

worthy of consideration and should not be abandoned, but a proper rationale ought to be sought for those values deemed commendable. Whatever role religion may have played in the past, it is an unreliable source of knowledge, he maintained, and, in spite of contentions to the contrary, even of motivation. The thrust of his critique of religion was not merely to eliminate churches from political life, but to reduce their effectiveness in private life. Religion he deemed socially dangerous insofar as it gives practical credence to a divine law and attempts to mold personal and social conduct in conformity with norms that look beyond temporal society. The aim of his educational philosophy could be summed up in the slogan, "The function of education is to challenge, not perpetuate, the inherited."

The implications of Dewey's naturalism are many, but the governing principle of his educational project is found in his desire to use the schools to solve social and political problems. Recognizing that the pursuit of change through politics can be frustratingly slow, Dewey concluded that the use of education to change the world is far more efficient. Edmonson is convinced that Dewey's primary interest is not the good of the student but the promotion of his socialist agenda. "Thanks in no small part to Dewey," Edmonson writes, "much of what characterizes contemporary education is a revolt against various expressions of authority, a revolt against a canon of learning, a revolt against tradition, a revolt against religious values, a revolt against moral standards, a revolt against logic—even a revolt against grammar and spelling." Concluding that most disputes in education today are far more than technical quarrels, that they are fundamental philosophical disagreements, Edmonson in his final chapter, "Disinheriting Dewey," asks, "What should a good educational philosophy look like?" Although he gives no detailed answer, one can find the answer in the work of some of Dewey's less celebrated contemporaries, who early on saw the danger of a Dewey-inspired progressive education. Mortimer Adler of the University of Chicago wrote a work entitled, "How to Read A Book," a not too subtle attack on Dewey's philosophy of education that called for a mastery of the great books of the Western literary canon that shaped our culture. Mark van Doren's, "The Liberal Education," was essentially a defense of the education that gave us Jefferson, Adams, and Hamilton.

Sadly, the secular outlook embraced by Dewey and his disciples eventually penetrated all levels of the academy, leading to a deterioration of both moral and intellectual standards. Deprived of its anchorage in classical learning and biblical morality, and without any discernable moral compass, the educational system in the United States became vulnerable to every passing fad. The current vogue of multiculturalism and affirmative action have resulted in a "dumbing down" of the curriculum to accommodate all. The depreciation of history and classical languages and the neglect of foreign languages has ill prepared students for advanced studies in the humanities, let alone an understanding of events on the world stage. Useful technical education and education in the sciences have fared no better. Edmonson tells us that in the recently administered Third International Math and Science Study, American twelfthth graders scored near the bottom, placing nineteenth out of twenty-one developed nations in math and science, and that our advanced students did even worse, scoring last in physics.

Edmonson doesn't draw the conclusion, but one puts this book down with the conviction that unless control of primary and secondary education is wrested from the U.S. educational establishment, corrective measures are not likely to occur.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America.*

FRIERSON, Patrick R. *Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. x + 211 pp. Cloth, $55.00—In this volume, Patrick Frierson provides a study of a central controversial issue in the philosophy of Kant that is a model of clarity, precision, and focus, and also a graceful and engaging work of philosophical literature.

The central issue in this study is whether Kant's conception of the transcendental freedom of the human being as a moral agent can be reconciled with his discussions of "moral anthropology." By "moral anthropology," a phrase that he adopts from Kant's usage in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Frierson means the use of the knowledge of human beings derived from anthropology, or the empirical study of human nature, to promote moral action. Kant's discussions of moral anthropology appear, not at the center of his critical works in moral philosophy, but as a recurring theme in his writings from the same period concerning such topics as education, history, religion, and anthropology. Frierson takes as his point of departure the criticism of Kant in a review by Schleiermacher, who regarded Kant's attempt to affirm both transcendental freedom and moral anthropology as a fundamental inconsistency in his system. On the other hand, Frierson notes that a number of recent authors, such as Herman, Sherman, Louden, and Munzel, have sought to demonstrate the continuity between Kant's moral philosophy and his anthropology. He argues effectively, however, that although these authors have offered helpful studies of Kant's moral anthropology, they have not articulated an account of the relation between transcendental freedom and empirical influences that is needed to provide the context for any project of moral anthropology.

After a valuable discussion in his early chapters of the relevant aspects of Kant's moral philosophy and anthropological writings, including the distinction between a noumenal "ground" and an empirical "cause" of action, Frierson seeks in chapter 5 to defend Kant from Schleiermacher's criticism by reconstructing his view of the relation between transcendental freedom and moral anthropology. Frierson's proposed solution rests upon Kant's metaphysical distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal self, which is often downplayed by modern defenders of Kant's moral philosophy. In his view, Kant denies that empirical conditions have any influence on the transcendental freedom of the noumenal self, and, in this respect, moral anthropology is indeed irrelevant to moral agency. However, according to Frierson's reconstruction, as a noumenal agent I am aware that, while I am always responsible for my present moral decisions, the expressions of these decisions are the actions, in time, of a human being as a phenomenal self with an empirical character. Furthermore, I recognize that my noumenal agency is corrupted by a propensity to radical evil, which has affected my decisions in the past and which I expect to influence my decisions in the future. On Kant's view, I thus recognize that I have a duty to direct my present actions to support the expressions of good will in my future actions, both by cultivating habits in myself that are images of goodness (such as politeness and restraint of the passions), and by participating in social institutions (educational, political, and religious) that tend to promote good actions in myself and others. However, Frierson argues in chapter 6 that Kant does not and cannot regard my efforts to promote moral conduct in others as a duty to determine their decisions and actions, which are and must be free. Instead, he offers an interpretation of Kant in which these efforts are expressions of my duties of virtue to promote my own moral progress and the happiness of others.

Frierson acknowledges a number of limitations to his study: he does not attempt to provide a systematic account of Kant's moral anthropology, or to defend the consistency of Kant's underlying account of transcendental freedom and natural determinism, or to show that Kant's moral or metaphysical theories are right or even the best available. By offering a plausible reconstruction of Kant's view of the relation between transcendental freedom and moral anthropology, however, he has provided a crucial framework for discussions of this issue, and he has also indicated new directions for inquiry into other aspects of Kant's moral theory and anthropology.

I conclude with two criticisms, one technical and the other programmatic. First, Frierson offers many valuable references to the recently published student transcripts of Kant's lectures in anthropology. However, he does not consistently indicate the year and author of the transcript with each citation, which I think would be desirable since these lectures were given annually over twenty-four years and transcribed by many different auditors. Second, Frierson's depiction of his project leaves open a question that I think should be explicitly stated: Is his reconstruction of Kant's view a consistent resolution of an apparent inconsistency in Kant's system, or a further explication of a position that is irreducibly paradoxical? The excellence of Frierson's study gives this further question even greater focus.—Claudia M. Schmidt, *Marquette University.*

GERSON, Lloyd P. *Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. viii + 308 pp. Cloth, $55.00—Professor Gerson has written a study of Plato using a contemporary analytic theme as his beginning, namely, whether Plato makes a distinction between "human being" and "personhood." Gerson believes that Plato does make such a distinction, and that this distinction is based on his theory of knowledge. While Gerson makes it clear that he is aware of contemporary discussion and of the possibility that his theme is anachronistic when applied to Plato, he forges ahead with a study that shows itself to be sympathetic to Plato's writings without being unduly attentive to analytic narrative.

Knowing Persons consists of six chapters together with introduction and conclusion in a dialogically historical format. The layout indicates that Gerson is comfortable that the dialogues can be safely demarcated as early, middle, and late, and that Plato did not develop in the sense that he radically altered his views as time passed. Gerson's thesis is that Plato is best understood when we distinguish between "embodied" and "disembodied" states rather than adhere to "soul" and "body" dichotomies. Chapter 1 deals with some of the early dialogues; chapter 2 with the *Phaedo*; chapter 3 with "divided persons" in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*; chapter 4 with "knowledge and belief" in the *Republic*; chapter 5 with *Theaetetus*; and chapter 6 with a cursory treatment of *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*. Gerson uses a descriptive approach interlaced with commentary.

To prove his argument that Plato has a distinctive idea of personhood, albeit pre-Christian, Gerson attempts to show that a study of what Plato means by knowledge will produce the following result: knowledge is

theoretically neither representational nor propositional: "All types of cognition other than knowledge are representational for Plato. . . . I take it that infallibility entails and is entailed by the nonrepresentational nature of knowledge. If knowledge is nonrepresentational, it is nonpropositional, because all propositions are representations" (186). We, however, insofar as we are embodied, cannot reach the level of pure knowledge but must develop, according to what is best in us, as far as we can toward pure knowing. Gerson does not believe that all embodied states are equal, but that some approach knowing more than others.

In his introduction, Gerson says he will not pursue the "method" of knowledge but will confine himself to what Plato says knowledge "is." Neither does he discuss the historical context, influence, or importance of Platonism. Discussion of other interpretation is mostly with contemporary professors on particular points as they arise in the dialogues Gerson chooses to emphasize. The scholarly materials at the end of the book are thus divided into a Bibliography (mostly recent vintage), an Index of Texts (almost exclusively Platonic), an Index of Modern Authors (largely commentators), and a General Index.

In chapter 6 Gerson's discussion of the *Timaeus* is notable for arguing that the demiurgos is Plato's paradigm of a disembodied thinker: "I have been arguing throughout this book that knowledge is a state in which there is cognitional identity between knower and known. It is frankly unbelievable that Plato supposed the Demiurge has mere concepts or images of Forms in his mind. . . . I suggest that the self-transformation we seek is present paradigmatically in the Demiurge, who is identifiable as a pure subject of knowing. The Demiurge does permanently what we aim to do ideally, namely, contemplate Forms" (p. 250).

Gerson's conclusion does not really add anything to his discussion of Plato. The study concludes with Plato as "entailing an extraordinary transformation of the self" (p. 281). The implications of such a transformation would be worthy of a second study, which better understands how the method of knowledge and its actuality as content are inextricably entwined. Plato, Plotinus, and others understand that dialectic is not a tool. A study of the *Parmenides* dialogue in relation to that of the *Timaeus* would show how thinking and the embodiment of the cosmos occur together. In these dialogues we come to understand that the good is teleological; that in Plato's writings, and with being generally, what occurs last in time is logically first. Gerson's effort to show Plato's consistency is actually a kind of empirical proof of this Aristotelian insight.

For the ancients, immortality is not just an ideal but the proof that being really does trump not-being, and that philosophy, as Plato's greatest pupil defined it, really is the "knowledge of the truth." That our capacity for truth does not entail demiurgic power was the ancient problematic. Christian insight into the Divine Persons as passing on personhood to humanity as divine image claimed to be the solution. For moderns this is a problem so long as philosophy is unhistorically idiosyncratic or scientifically puzzling. Reading Gerson, one can sense that a struggle can still take place that resists reducing philosophy to a crossword puzzle even as it has lost its passion for truth as beyond belief.—James Lowry, *Dominican College of Philosophy and Theology.*

GUALA, Francesco. *The Methodology of Experimental Economics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 286 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $27.99—"This book aims to show that methodology is important and useful for experimental economists, but also that philosophers of science can learn from experimental economics" (p. ix). With these words Francesco Guala makes clear right from the start what moved him to write this important book. The book is divided into two parts. The first part is dedicated to the theme of "inferences within the experiment," and the second to "inferences from the experiment." Each part is divided into five chapters.

For the author, the hypothetico-deductive model (HD) is the very simple and general model of the scientific method. It is useful for solving a large number of logical problems, such as the Duhem-Quine problem (D-Q). According to this model, "no hypothesis can be logically falsified by the empirical evidence." However, says Guala, this model is "admittedly abstract and semplicistic," and it should be amended in order to make room for some exceptions and counterexamples. The classical schema that describes the HD model can be understood with reference to the *modus tollens* of classical logic. Given the theory t, we deduce from it the consequence p; and we see that p happens. Through this, we may deduce that p is confirmed, or we deduce that the theory t under our control is shown to be false. Not well that in the first philosophical formulation we did use the expression "verified," and we did not use it as there exists an irremediable logical asymmetry between falsification and confirmation. No one can guarantee that for $n - 1$ a confirmation will not transform itself into a refutation (falsification). This method seems to give an answer as much to problems of experimental science as to those of nonexperimental science. Nevertheless, for Guala, needing to distinguish between experimental sciences and nonexperimental sciences, the HD model appears insufficient. With respect to the question from where empirical evidence p derives, we are able to affirm that a fact is explained under the profile of the science when the assertion that describes it (the *explanandum*) is deduced from an *explanans* constituted by initial conditions or causes covered by universal laws. An explanation, whether it belongs to the physical-natural word or to the socio-economic world, assumes the rank of scientific description whenever the *explanandum* is logically deducible from the *explanans* and the descriptive assertions that express the initial conditions and relevant laws governing them are empirically proven. For Guala, the D-Q problem constitutes a problem for ultradeductivist philosophers such as Popper, from the moment that a proof of some theory makes recourse to auxiliary hypotheses: initial conditions, *ceteris paribus* clauses, background information, and so on. In any case, it is necessary to recognize that such problems very much presented themselves to those very ultradeductivist philosophers, who were well aware of our need to move in an indeterminate sea of initial conditions.

Experimental economy has aroused a great deal of interest in recent years and seems to have overcome some legitimate resistance from followers of the social sciences. In 2002, the Nobel Academy gave prizes to Vernon Smith and Daniel Kahneman, two illustrious experimental economists. In this way, the work of economists in the laboratory has received official recognition, and at a very high level. Still, there remain in the field the same reasons that some have advanced a certain perplexity when confronting the so-called experimental economics.

What is the method of economics? What kind of science is economic science? If one poses this question within a Kantian epistemology, only two answers are possible. Either it is an analytic science, or it is an empirical science. If we accept the widespread assumption that economic science occupies itself with economic facts, it is then necessary to say that economics is an empirical science. A priori might refer at best to financial mathematics and mathematical applications to economics. Economic science would be, nonetheless, fundamentally empirical. Seeing that economic facts are offered to us from history, it would be easy to take the next step and say that economics is an historical science. And this is the conclusion to which the historical school of economics has come.

It is exactly this point to which the polemic of Carl Member is addressed, and from which his proposed methodological alternative departs. For Menger, economic laws have an a priori validity independent of empirical verification, that is, nonetheless, not indifferent with respect to the empirical world, as is the case with analytic judgments. These economic judgments express general forms and tendencies of economic action that are certainly operative where one finds an economic action. These judgments precede empirical experience. Empirical experience confirms them or falsifies them.

There exists an important difference between the natural sciences and the human sciences. Human science has to do with man. The sciences of human conduct, in particular, have as their subject man himself, and we are able to know human conduct from the outside, in the same way as we know phenomena in the natural sphere. Nevertheless, we are able to know human conduct from the inside, because we are human and we experience our actions from the inside. For this reason, we do not limit ourselves to knowing conduct from the outside and take note of it. Therefore, for this reason the ambit of a priori laws in the sciences that study human action is very much larger and more complex. It is not the case that one of the masterworks of the Austrian school of economics, *Human Action*, by Ludwig von Mises—strangely absent from the book by Guala—commences with a theory of human action for later delimiting the catallatic field of action, that is, of economic action properly speaking.—Flavio Felice, *Pontifical Lateran University of Rome.*

KUISMA, Oiva. *Art or Experience: A Study on Plotinus's Aesthetics.* Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 120. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 2003. 207 pp. Paper, €22.00—It is difficult to write clearly about any aspect of Plotinus' thought. There are many reasons for this. One reason is that he is a very systematic thinker. So, for example, to treat his aesthetics one must also discuss his metaphysics, psychology, and his ethics. Anther reason is his well-known subtlety and obscurity of expression. Kuisma's book on Plotinus' aesthetics, however, shows that it is possible to write clearly, accurately, and succinctly about Plotinus. This book is a pleasure to read. Kuisma argues against a modern, widely held interpretation of Plotinus's aesthetics which claims that "Plotinus, in contrast to Plato, accepted the possibility of the artistic imitation of intelligible Forms," thus giving "a new

direction to Platonic art theory" (p. 12). His thesis is, instead, that "the objects of artistic imitation are limited to the sphere of perceptions," although this limitation can be overcome to some extent by "the use of symbols and symbolic conventions" (p. 43), inasmuch as symbolic representations do not convey on the basis of sameness of form. He calls the common view "strong *mimesis*," and his own view, "weak *mimesis*" (p. 43). Clearly, Kuisma's view shows Plotinus to be a traditional Platonist. Indeed, it would be odd if Plotinus, of all people, should discount Plato's doubts about the ability of sensibles to represent eternal form.

The strong *mimesis* view is supported by four arguments: (1) the fact that beauty derives from participation in form indicates that works of art, insofar as they are beautiful, represent intelligible form; (2) imitative representations can lead a viewer to recollection of intelligible Beauty; (3) artists, just as nature, are guided by ordering principles (*logoi*); (4) Pheidias' famous statue of Zeus was able to represent Zeus without being based on a perceptible model. If Zeus can be thus represented, so can the forms. The central section of Kuisma's book is devoted to refuting these arguments. Argument (1) asserts that because beauty of the physical derives from participation in form, a beautiful work of art, as participating in form, represents form, that is, intelligible form. Kuisma points out that this argument is based on an equivocation. To make the equivocation explicit, Kuisma distinguishes between what he calls "vertical likeness" and "horizontal likeness." Vertical likeness is instantiation. A tree instantiates the form or species of the natural kind Tree. Such likeness, insofar as it is likeness, is unidirectional: the tree is like the form Tree, but the form, at the higher level, is not like the tree. If a painting possessed "vertical likeness" of the form Tree, it would be a living tree, not a painting: "artistic surface forms are not instantiations of natural forms, because in that case they would be living entities" (p. 70). Artistic imitation, then, involves only "horizontal likeness"; such likeness cannot represent what is ontologically "higher," that is, intelligible form. With respect to (2), Plotinus does claim that the physical beauty, including the beauty of artistic representation, can be instrumental in "recollecting the truth" (II.9.16.47). Even so, this does not mean that art somehow represents intelligible reality. Following Plato quite closely, Plotinus claims only that art can be a cause for the soul to turn away from the physical world and toward its own nature, which, for Plotinus, is rooted in intelligible reality. So the soul, in "recollecting the truth," contemplates itself, not what art represents: "anamnetic recognition should not be confused with recognition based on imitative similarity" (p. 174). Kuisma also points out that by giving a positive assessment of physical beauty, Plotinus is making an argument against the "aesthetic pessimism" or "aesthetic nihilism" (p. 78) of the Gnostics, and does so without abandoning his Platonic commitments. On (3), Plotinus says that craftsmen, including artists, "do not simply imitate what they see, but they run back up to the forming principles (*logous*) from which nature derives" (V.8.1.35–6). But this does not mean, Kuisma persuasively argues, that artists "produce imitations of abstract *logoi*" (p. 95); it means only that on the basis of their knowledge of *logoi* they can represent instantiations of natural kinds, for example a polar bear, without using a physical model. Finally, (4) is based on a comment at V.8.1.38–40: "Pheidias . . . understood what Zeus would look like if he wanted to make himself visible." This argument assumes that Zeus, as a divine being, is on the same ontological level as intelligible form and thus infers that strong *mimesis* is possible. This inference is not warranted, however, because "it confuses mental images, or subjective 'ideas,' of mythi-

cal entities with transcendental ideas" (p. 111). So, the strong *mimesis* view fails. The view arises, Kuisma argues, when the Platonic forms (ideas) "are downgraded" to the level of "human subjectivity or when they are confused with the Aristotelian notion of forms in matter" (p. 143), or else when "imitation is confused with symbolization" (p. 133). In short, the claim that Plotinus gave a new direction to Platonic art theory is false. We are left with weak *mimesis*, which is no departure from standard Platonic doctrine. Kuisma's refutation of the strong *mimesis* view is unassailable, and in the course of making it the author has provided much insight into Plotinus' philosophy as well.—Dana R. Miller, *Fordham University*.

LEE, Mi-Kyoung. *Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 254 pp. Cloth, $74.00—Mi-Kyoung Lee has produced an engaging study of the development of skepticism in ancient Greece. Although arguments against the possibility of knowledge—and responses thereto—were common during the Hellenistic period, the great works of the Classical period hardly give skepticism a second thought. Were great minds like Plato and Aristotle blithely unaware of the threat posed by skepticism? Lee's answer is that the questions and arguments of Hellenistic period skeptics were not unprecedented, for a nascent form of skepticism had already been debated in the Classical period. The relativism of Protagoras' measure doctrine—"Man is the measure of all things"—was a challenge to Classical epistemologies, for it implied that no one could ever be mistaken about anything. Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus all recognized this challenge, and their responses to it shaped the debate over skepticism in the Hellenistic period.

Sifting through the testimony of later philosophers, Lee explains how Protagoras's measure doctrine should be understood. On the basis of views that other thinkers attributed to Protagoras and their responses to those views, Lee argues that Protagoras did not defend a theory about truth itself, such as truth-relativism (nothing is true *simpliciter*; things are only true relative to particular individuals in particular contexts). Rather, the measure doctrine asserts fact-relativism—the idea that every property or state of affairs is relative to particular individuals. Thus, Protagoras had a nonrelativized notion of truth, but he claimed that things actually are as they appear to us; each and every human being can determine what is true simply by consulting his own beliefs.

Although Protagoras did not develop a full-fledged relativist epistemology, Plato did. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato offers a "Secret Doctrine" on behalf of Protagoras. This doctrine, which Plato introduces so that he can then refute it, is a set of metaphysical theses meant to explain and justify Protagoras' measure doctrine. At its heart are two ideas: (1) the Heraclitean claim that all things are constantly changing, and (2) total relativity—the claim that "nothing is anything by itself, but is so only relative to something else" (p. 86). In Lee's view, Plato's Secret Doctrine and his attack thereupon constitute, not a conclusive refutation of Protagoras, but a Classical experiment in thinking about relativism.

Aristotle is more explicit than Plato on the skeptical implications of relativism. In *Metaphysics* book 4, chapter 5, Aristotle identifies three beliefs as leading to the conclusion that the truth about things can never be known: (P) the Protagorean measure doctrine; (H) the Heraclitean idea that all is in flux; and (C) the contradictionist claim that everything both is and is not the case. Aristotle responds to the skeptical implications of these ideas, not by attacking skepticism itself, but by identifying and undermining the faulty assumptions that lie behind beliefs (P), (H), and (C). All three beliefs rest on the mistaken idea that thinking is like perceiving—that the mind's thinking is a purely passive affection caused by the objects of thought. Beliefs (P), (H), and (C) also presuppose that all of reality is material—that to be is to be perceivable. Lee thus demonstrates that Aristotle was "genuinely interested in engaging with and fending off [skeptical] challenges to his own realist and objectivist assumptions" (p. 253).

Although neither a relativist nor a skeptic, Democritus was the Classical philosopher whose ideas were most akin to those of Protagoras. Democritus held that a thing has a sensible quality if and only if it appears to have that quality to some perceiver. So sensible qualities really are as they appear to us, for that is all sensible qualities are—our sense perceptions tell us only how things affect our senses, not what things are like in themselves. In order to know what things are like in themselves, Democritus argued, our minds must grasp that which is too fine for the senses to discern—namely, atoms and the void. Democritus thus embraced a qualified version of the Protagorean measure doctrine. The senses are (incomplete) measures of truth because knowledge is impossible without sensation—without sense data, our minds would have nothing about which to think. Human beings (as both sensing and thinking things) are complete measures of truth because when we think carefully about the things that cause our sensations, we are capable of understanding the truth about those things.

This book is thoroughly researched, well argued, and clearly written. Lee's analysis of epistemological issues is technically rigorous, but she gives plenty of everyday examples to make the finer points clear to nonspecialists. I would especially urge anyone interested in Plato's *Theaetetus* to read Lee's fifth chapter, which offers an excellent explication of a very difficult section of that dialogue.—Christopher Gilbert, *Cuesta College.*

LIVINGSTON, Paul. *Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. viii + 279 pp. Cloth, $70.00—The core of Livingston's book consists of a series of four critical studies of how twentieth-century analytic philosophy dealt with what many (Livingston included) believe to be a hard case: consciousness. What makes it hard, the thinking goes, is a perceived dissonance that arises when analytic philosophy, with its emphasis on representing the world against a background of linguistic structure, comes face to face with pure subjective content. How can the latter be accommodated within the former without ignoring some of its fundamental properties? The root problem is endlessly old and much larger than the scope of Livingston's immediate concern. While we have pure experiences—be-

ing whacked by a golf ball or swept up by a tornado—the instant we reflect on our situation, immediacy is lost and knowledge becomes unavoidably perspectival, restricted, partial—a world structured by predication. Can the former be accommodated within the latter without doing injustice to the very qualities that distinguish it? Each philosophical generation has dealt with some version of the problem, from Plato's insistence that real knowledge demands that the mind kick the traces of earthly existence, to more recent attempts to isolate a "given" element in experience, and thereby relate phenomenal immediacy to structured propositional knowledge.

Livingston's study outlines a connected series of attempts by analytic philosophers to come to grips with immediate experience. Each proffered solution, he suggests, comes to grief by neglecting some essential feature of consciousness. In response to critical notice of such a deficit, other analysts then offer new accounts that purport to cover the prior lacuna, but they meet the same fate as their forebears by ignoring other features, and so it went through most of the twentieth century. Thus he traces the process from the failure of Schlick's (and Carnap's) foundationalism to Neurath's subsequent attempt to fix the problem via his coherentist conception of our relation to the world (with an interesting segue to Husserl for some contrast to the positivist struggles). Next Livingston considers the transition from the failure of Ryle's version of behaviorism to Smart/Place identity theory, then on to Putnam/Fodor style functionalism and its troubles with qualia, and on to models of the mind as information processor, and so on.

Livingston's discussion of the philosophical changes within the tradition is well done, and in itself is a valuable retrospective on the development of analytic philosophy. Drawing on a wide range of recent scholarship, he gives a balanced account of that development and exposes common misinterpretations of the process of change within it.

The setting within which these core chapters are placed—the *raison d'être* for undertaking the analysis in the first place—is, on the other hand, problematic. Livingston interprets the analytic interlude as an episode in a broader, historically based quest for self understanding (interpreted within the study as an analysis of the ordinary language of consciousness). Understood within this broader context, Livingston holds that by its very nature, the kind of structuralism typical of the analytic approach will always leave out some essential aspect of the ordinary experience of consciousness. As he puts it, "structuralist forms of explanation fail to explain *everything* that figures in our ordinary linguistic practices" (p. 201). As an alternative, Livingston suggests adopting the later Wittgensteinian therapeutic approach of analyzing the language of consciousness on a case-by-case basis. The problem is that while such an approach avoids the to-and-fro of the analytic tradition, it does so by ignoring the subject at hand. The explanation of consciousness demands more than the episodic analysis of the idiom in question.

But the problem with all this has less to do with consciousness than with explanation, broadly conceived. What does it take to understand something? The philosopher Richard Rudner put it this way—if you think that understanding tornadoes demands direct experience of one, you are guilty of committing what he called the "reproductive fallacy"—in general, the belief that explanation requires reproducing reality rather than just (conventionally) explaining it. Like the romanticist advocacy of *verstehen* as an explanatory device, there are those who think that an adequate account of consciousness requires "capturing" or "grasping" it

in its phenomenal immediacy, that is, that an explanation should reproduce the phenomenon rather than explain it. But as we learned at Hume's knee, the best we will ever do in truly explaining things is the method of science, which is inevitably piecemeal and perspectival.

Viewed in this light, the analytic tradition, which is a smooth extension of science itself, can be viewed not as a series of misses with respect to consciousness, but as a series of positive steps, each revealing something about an aspect of the subject.—James Van Evra, *University of Waterloo.*

OPPENHEIM, Frank. *Reverences for the Relations of Life: Re-imagining Pragmatism via Josiah Royce's Interactions with Peirce, James, and Dewey.* South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. 520 pp. Cloth, $68.00—This meticulous and thorough book will stimulate new insights into the thought and life of Josiah Royce as well as into the ideas and experiences of three other giants in American philosophy, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The interactions and relationships of the four philosophers are explored in terms of their impact on the thought, experiences, and developed philosophies of each individual. This astute probing reveals previously neglected contributions. Thus, Royce's notions about the "psychology of belief," the attack on mind stuff, and the "stream of consciousness" contributed to James's ideas on these topics (p. 289). Then there are Peirce's strong contributions to Royce's logic and later thought as well as the influence of James's *Principles of Psychology* on Dewey.

"The relations of life" also points to the various ways Peirce, James, Royce, and Dewey argued for the need to balance responsibly genuine individualism with promotion of authentic communities. Insightfully, Oppenheim urges a combination of the strengths of both Royce's and Dewey's doctrines of community, bringing Dewey's superb analysis of social dynamics and problem solving method to Royce's analysis of the levels and degrees of community as well as his unique notion of a universal Spirit community of interpretation (p. 423).

Oppenheim provides new insight into the work of each of these four American philosophers as he explores different personal and philosophical temperaments and styles as well as differing responses to various philosophical traditions. Thus, Dewey and Royce were both influenced by evolutionary thought and incorporated it in various ways in their philosophies. Royce and Peirce argued against nominalism and both asserted and maintained strong elements of realism in their work. Thus, in 1916, Royce asserts, "The whole intention with which we approach this work [metaphysics] is the *intention to be as realistic as we can.*" (pp. 126–7 and 210). Likewise, both Dewey and Royce explored the work of Spinoza (p. 287), and both were acquainted with Eastern thought (pp. 294 and 310–11). Royce studied Sanskrit in order to read the Hindu *Bhagavad-Gita* and Vedas; he penetrated the major branches of Buddhism and the moral code of Japanese Bushido. Royce and Dewey, as well as Peirce and James, valued the power of science and Peirce, Royce, and Dewey explored its logic. As Oppenheim correctly notes, however, Royce seemed more conscious than Dewey of the limitations of science (p. 335). Further, Dewey, in his enthusiasm for sci-

ence, seems to have granted intelligence (reason in its widest sense) unrestricted power, while Royce affirmed realms of mystery that transcend the limits of scientifically knowable realities (p. 334).

Oppenheim also insightfully probes the differences among these four thinkers on their views on truth, reality, metaphysics, ethics, and especially about religion and Christianity. I strongly concur that Royce's trio of Philadelphia addresses on truth, though unpublished, merit close attention (p. 295), as do areas already explored by Oppenheim, namely, Royce's later metaphysics and ethics. With the advent of this work one can no longer dismiss Royce as a Hegelian Idealist, for Royce, like James, saw metaphysical exploring as always tentative and fallible, and both James and Royce proposed a voluntaristic metaphysics. Unlike James, Royce's metaphysics is deeply semiotic, communal, and logocentric. Further, it contains strong realistic elements.

The influence of their personal experience of religion, especially in its Puritan forms, on each of these thinkers, especially as advocated by a mother or father, is explored along with their own experiences with mysticism. The clearest differences among the four occur in their differing approaches to religion. Royce provides us with an original and unique philosophical stance toward Christianity (p. 383): a richly nuanced understanding of faith and of the communal nature of religious experience, with an emphasis upon "spirit" and a tolerance to religion's many forms. Royce's lifelong, deep exploration of the problem of evil is well worth more probing reflection (pp. 403–19). Further exploration is needed of Peirce's "Neglected Argument" and Royce's "relational form of the ontological argument."

Finally, this book provides much evidence for the thesis that Royce's "prophetic pragmatism" strengthens and transforms pragmatism and is, in fact, as Peirce strongly asserted the closest to his own "pragmaticism." Royce's position in American philosophy and American pragmatism demands strong reassessment and his many rich contributions acknowledged. This book will be a valuable resource to all who wish to explore the nuances and depths of the lives and philosophical work of these four giants in American thought. Its interactive approach highlights hidden strengths and weaknesses. In addition, the construction of the book is modular so that one can focus on certain thinkers or topics without damage to the overall arguments of the book.—Jaquelyn Ann K. Kegley, *California State University, Bakersfield.*

PASKOW, Alan. *The Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological Investigation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xi + 260 pp. Cloth, $65.00—Much recent discussion in philosophical aesthetics has focused on the issue of defining art, particularly visual art. Such efforts generally presume that art is important without explaining why it is important. It is the latter question that Alan Paskow addresses. He is interested in discovering how and why art, and especially painting, matter in our lives. This is an important topic. If art did not matter to people in some deeply personal sense, it would not be the subject of such intense interest, whether on the part of the art-appreciating public or of academic philosophers. Paskow attempts to link the work of art to the viewer's existence, to show its continuity with life, and to provide a

framework that makes sense of the many effects art can have on those who experience it. To classify something as an artwork is to identify it as the kind of thing that can and should have value in our lives; and such value is not a question of pure, disinterested contemplation cut off from quotidian existence.

Paskow's approach is phenomenological, drawing on Husserl and especially Heidegger, although not ignoring developments in analytic aesthetics. He finds particularly useful Husserl's emphasis on first-person consciousness, arguing that we might make better progress in understanding why art is important if we start with "our personal *experience* of artworks, the sensuous and affective dimension that takes place in our first-person engagement with them" (p. 204). The third-person perspective, which Paskow takes to be characteristic of analytic aesthetics and which approaches the artwork from the "outside," will have a role to play as well, although it will remain subordinate to the individual's personal experience.

Paskow is willing to take bold stands. In chapter 1 he argues that the characters in fiction and the people and things depicted in painting are much more real than most philosophers grant. They are not sealed off in a world of their own, nor are they simply images in the mind. From the first-person perspective, they are "out there," real in the sense of having an affect on our lives, of being the subjects of emotion and concern, and even of assuming a place in the midst of ordinary reality. To be sure, this claim has its difficulties, which Paskow attempts to meet by appealing to a distinction between what he terms "consciousness$_1$," which is consciousness absorbed in the quasi-real world of the work, and "consciousness$_2$," which reminds consciousness$_1$ from a third-person perspective that what it is experiencing is, after all, an image or fiction. This reminder, however, does not erase the personal, existential impact of the work, "which continues to reverberate in my world" (p. 64). (One might ask whether it would not be more plausible to speak here of a single consciousness carrying out two different but complementary activities, rather than of two separate conscious agents, as the author does on p. 63).

In chapters 2 and 3, Paskow sets the stage for his full account of why painting matters by drawing out implications of Heidegger's notions of being-in-the-world and being-with-others, and the relation of both to *Seinskönnen*, our potentiality to become more authentic in our being with others in the world. Experience is not comprised of isolated Cartesian minds striving to connect with objects. Connection or "co-being" is there from the start. Persons and even things have an immediate emotional and existential resonance and the capability of changing us. This, the author argues in chapter 4, is equally true of what is depicted in paintings. Paintings matter to us and effect our lives when we enter into and dwell "with their depicted worlds" (p. 204), allowing them "to speak to us" (p. 159). Just as our properly human being is to be in the world with others, so our genuine experience of the artwork is to enter into its world. Being-in-the-world, however, is not merely a model for the way in which we should relate to the worlds depicted in paintings. Rather, there is an existential bond between my relation to the world of the work and my relation to the real world and to the others who inhabit it with me. I bring my experience of the world to my experience of the work, and the world of the work in turn deepens my appreciation of the ordinary universe. In that sense, depicted beings are not simply "about" the world but are in and of it, for they can change my world and how I

relate to others and to their worlds. The work is "a quasi-living being who can be a special 'other' to challenge the way in which we have determinedly spent our lives shaping our destiny" (p. 226).

The final chapter, on interpretation, balances the claim that one should give full weight to one's personal experience of an artwork with the work's complex contextual and cultural character, which calls for interpretation. In an illuminating array of interpretive vignettes—Marxist, feminist, and others—directed toward Vermeer's *Woman Holding a Balance*, Paskow makes a strong case that interpretation, however useful, must remain subordinate to the first-person inhabiting of the work.

There are encouraging signs that aestheticians are beginning to venture into the territory this book so ably explores. Paskow's timely and important study places him in the vanguard of that movement.—John B. Brough, *Georgetown University*.

POZZO, Riccardo, Editor. *The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy*. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 39. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003. xvi + 336 pp. Cloth, $69.95—This volume presents a series of lectures given at the Catholic University of America seeking to show the impact Aristotle had on modern, that is, postmedieval philosophy. The lectures were invited to focus on their philosopher's response to Aristotle's intellectual virtues—art, prudence, science, wisdom, and understanding—as given in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6. Most participants did not follow this direction, but in one way or another studied their philosopher's relation to Aristotle. The volume is remarkable both in the varied experts' knowledge of Aristotle and contemporary Aristotelian scholarship, but also in the range of scholarship in their own topic. Ricardo Pozzo, who edited the volume, wrote an excellent introduction reviewing the contributions and giving the background of the series.

Edward P. Mahony leads off the essays with a review of Aristotle's use by late medieval and Renaissance philosophers. His chapter is an impressive review of Aristotle's critics and proponents in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. His knowledge of the literature is remarkable, and he shows himself to be a worthy heir to his mentor, the late Paul Oskar Kristeller. The survey features Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Bessarion, Pletho, Nifo, Pomponazzi, and a number of others confirming the vitality of intellectual activity in an era so long-neglected by standard histories of philosophy.

Antonino Poppi's paper reviewed Iacopo Zabarella on Aristotelianism as a rigorous science. Without explicitly working on the intellectual virtues, he presents a study of the importance of the University of Padua in the latter half of the sixteenth century and Zabarella's leadership in that milieu. His study presents Aristotle's logic and philosophy of science and his influence extended beyond Italy to the German Lutheran universities into the seventeenth century.

William A. Wallace, writing on the influence of Aristotle on Galileo's logic and its use in his science, presents an exciting biography of young Galileo's education in which he came to study Aristotle's logic. He shows, through a manuscript not included in Favoro's official edition, that Galileo took Aristotle seriously on the nature of demonstration; and

while he worked to replace the Aristotelian system with Copernicus's solar-centered system, he judged himself to be a true follower of Aristotle on matters of logic and scientific method. This was to me the most interesting paper in the whole volume.

In his essay "Wrestling with a Wraith: André Semery, S.J. (1630–1717) on Aristotle's Goat-Stag and knowing the unknowable," John Doyle, perhaps the country's outstanding expert of Francisco Suarez, S.J. (1548–1617) undertook to study André Semery. Semery was a noted teacher and moral theologian at the Jesuit Roman College mid-seventeenth century, and the paper consists in the knowable status of Aristotle's Goat-Stag, an imaginary being whose contradictory essence precluded its real possibility. It is a difficult essay, but Doyle argues that Semery made a contribution to epistemology which anticipated the work of Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Russell, and Quine. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the Goat-Stag's knowable status is one of "transcendental unknowability" on the boundary line between the knowable and the unknowable.

Christia Mercer's essay on "Leibniz, Aristotle, and Ethical Knowledge" brings out that Leibniz wrote little or nothing on the intellectual virtues. Instead while using Aristotle's notion of substance in his metaphysics, in his ethical thinking he was influenced by Plato. The good person is one who grasps the harmony achieved in recognizing that all are so many mirrors reflecting a unity which has God at its source. Dr. Mercer's article shows an impressive knowledge of post-Lutheran German thought especially in the intellectual activity after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

Richard L. Velkey's chapter on Rousseau does not concern itself with the intellectual virtues; instead, he presents a profound analysis of Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Men*, bringing out Rousseau's originality and his influence upon Kant and other German thinkers such as Fichte and Hölderin. Special attention is given to Rousseau's reflections on the nature of primitive man in contrast to Aristotle's presentation of the human person in the *Politics*. Velkey does concede that there are limitations to Rousseau's account of the development of language.

Ricardo Pozzo on "Kant on the Intellectual Virtues" affirms that Kant was quite familiar with Aristotle's thought on the virtues. The German philosophic tradition that provided the education Kant received was steeped in Aristotelianism, especially its logic which was formed by the use of Zabarella's writings on Aristotle. This essay is impressive in the knowledge it shows of the philosophic scene in Germany in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, but it disappoints in its neglect to inform about what Kant had to say about the intellectual virtues.

Alfredo Farrarin, in his "Hegel's Appropriation of the Aristotelian Intellect," stresses that Hegel found in the Aristotelian *nous* a principle he could appreciate. Ignoring the discussion of the intellectual virtues, Farrarin provides a masterful analysis of Aristotle's treatment of the mind in the *De Anima* 3.4 and 3.5. He argues that Hegel found Aristotle's *nous* something he could identify with in his own philosophy of the Absolute Spirit. Plotinus' treatment of *nous* is also considered and Farrarin concludes that the lack of will distinguishes his *nous* from the Absolute Spirit. This is a difficult essay to review since much of the difficulty lies originally in the difficulty of understanding Hegel.

"Tragedy in the Philosophic Age of the Greeks: Aristotle's Reply to Nietzsche," by Michael Davis, is a brilliant essay. Davis gives a detailed exposition of the *Poetics* and relates it to questions Nietzsche raised in

the original version of *The Birth of Tragedy*. If art arises out of some need, what was the need the seemingly healthy Greeks had which promoted the drama of Euripedes and Sophocles? Davis uses Aristotle to answer Nietzsche's question: "Nietzsche seems in his idiosyncratic way rather to have reconstructed from the decayed tradition of Platonic and Aristotelian 'rationalism' Aristotle's understanding of the dependence of philosophy on poetry" (p. 230).

Richard Cobb-Steven's "The Presence of the Aristotleian Nous in Husserl's Philosophy" seeks to find common ground between Husserl and Aristotle in the area of grasping form. Using mathematics and number as his example, he presents an interesting review of the ancient emphasis of whole numbers. He then presents the development which followed the invention of algebra, and he shows how it revolutionized the history of mathematics. Mathematicians where freed from having to suppose an ontological basis for their calculations. For someone unfamiliar with the vocabulary of phenomenology this would be a difficult essay.

Stanly Rosen's "Phronesis or Ontology, Aristotle and Heidegger" recognizes Heidegger's preoccupation with Aristotle throughout his philosophic career, and in this essay Rosen focuses on Heidegger's analysis of *phronesis* in his *Sophist* lectures. He asserts that Heidegger misunderstands Aristotle and that consequently the presentation of prudence is flawed. Rosen gives an excellent exposition of Aristotle and shows how Heidegger's thrust toward ontology falsifies Aristotle's teaching on prudence. "The closest Heidegger comes to Aristotle's nobility is authenticity or genuineness and this is not close enough, as Heidegger himself insists that his term ontological has no 'value' connotations whatsoever. But if this is so, then neither does human existence" (p. 264). "Heidegger's existential ontology, however brilliant, and perhaps because of its very brilliance, can bring nothing to human affairs but blindness" (p. 265).

Daniel O. Dahlstrom faced a difficult challenge in responding to Wittgenstein and Aristotle's intellectual virtues, since Wittgenstein is reputed never to have read Aristotle, and the dismissive mention he makes of Aristotelian logic can be explained as something he picked up from Bertrand Russell. However, under the heading of "Wittgenstein's Intellectual Virtues," Dahlstrom works closely with the Greek text of Aristotle, giving an excellent treatment of Aristotle on the virtues and noting especially variations across such writings as the *Ethics*, *De Anima*, *Politics*, *Posterior Analytics*, and *Metaphysics*, particularly with respect to *nous* or the virtue of understanding. Dahlstrom then turns to Wittgenstein and attempts to compare them as philosophers struggling in their own ways to pursue their vocations as philosophers.

Enrico Berti, in "The Reception of Aristotle's Intellectual Virtues in Gadamer and the Hermeneutic Philosophy," is able to show Gadamer's special knowledge of the intellectual virtues. For Gadamer wrote a translation of the *Ethics* giving attention to book 6, and especially *phronesis*, which he translates into German as "practice wisdom." Berti's essay contrasts this treatment with Heidegger's commenting: "Gadamer, on the contrary, does not seek to refute Aristotle, but rather to follow him" (p. 300). However, in giving primacy to practical wisdom over *theoria*, Berti disagrees with Gadamer, whom he holds is mistaken in his interpretation.

These essays represent the product of a distinguished collection of experts writing on their particular philosopher or era and showing how

that person or era related to Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. The Catholic University of America is to be congratulated for sponsoring the series and publishing the results. The bibliography and index are well done, and the whole volume makes a positive contribution to philosophic scholarship.—Desmond J. FitzGerald, *University of San Francisco.*

SALLES, Ricardo, Editor. *Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. ix + 592 pp. Cloth, $115.00—It is always a reason for marvel to see how the works of Aristotle, and also those of the Platonic School and of the Stoics, are an inexhaustible source of further analyses, discussions, and doctrinal developments. The nineteen scholarly papers of this volume intend to honor professor Richard Sorabji, known in academic circles for his initiative (dating to 1985) to publish English translations of the Greek Aristotelian Commentaries dating from the period between 200 and 600 A.D. He deserves our gratitude for making accessible to a broader public works of an important but not often thoroughly studied period. However, as many of the nineteen contributors to the volume point out, the influence of Professor Sorabji went far beyond this initiative. In the different institutes in which he lectured, he was an inspiring influence on his disciples in many fields of philosophical studies.

Some nine papers concern more directly Aristotle's thought, three deal with Platonism, and six with the Stoics. The volume closes with an essay by M. Stone on Descartes's search of how to reach moral certitude. A. Mourelatos examines Aristotle's critique of atomism, and he believes that Aristotle was mistaken insofar as atoms have parts and may not be considered indivisible in an unqualified way. A somewhat surprising theme is treated by S. Berryman: supervenience (higher order properties supervene on those of a lower level). S. Broadie may not be right when she argues against McTaggert that the "now" is always different. Salles shows that in the world of cyclical coming-into-being of the Stoics objects are the same as those of the previous cycle, but that events need not be so. In an interesting paper, D. Sedley examines which of Aristotle's four causes were accepted by the Stoics. M. F. Burnyeat argues quite convincingly that Numenius and other Platonists of his time considered the supreme principle eternal being, finding support for this view in book *Exodus.* Plato's soul fulfils several functions, as A. A. Long reminds us. However, he might have mentioned that already many years ago, Werner Jaeger and others speak of the surprising way in which the soul, principle of life, also came to be considered the seat of psychic activities. A. Kahn points out that Aristotle's doctrine of man helps us to avoid extreme dualism, but he does not draw attention to the novelty of the appearance of cognitive activities in the physical world. This topic is also dealt with by V. Castor, who says that according to Burnyeat, a spiritual change is required. In an interesting paper, A de Haas wonders about how can we seek new knowledge. In Plato's *Republic* all desires are motivated (G. R. Carone). M. D. Boeri sees a Socratic influence on the Stoic theory of *akrasia.* M. McCabe shows that Stoic altruism was understood as based on the awareness that others

are like ourselves. Later Stoics interpreted *oikeiosis* more as an extending oneself to others. C. Gill examines the Stoic theory of emotions. Contrary to what Galen wrote, there need not be a real difference between Zeno's and Chrysippus's views of the emotions. B. Inwood brings out the importance of the concept of liberty in Roman thought, and he stresses the surprising connection Seneca made between freedom and suicide. M. Stone recalls Sorabji's efforts to show the continuity of themes in ancient and modern philosophy and deals with Descartes's search for moral certitude. As our notes show, the book contains much highly valuable material for specialists, but the arguments of some of the articles get lost in the mist of probabilities, given the absence of sufficiently detailed texts.—Leo J. Elders, *Institute of Philosophy "Rolduc," Kerkrade, The Netherlands*

SANTONI, Ronald E. *Sartre on Violence: Curiously Ambivalent.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. xx + 179 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $19.95—Jean-Paul Sartre was arguably the best known philosopher of the twentieth century. But renown is not synonymous with admiration. One of the reasons why Sartre was disliked by many was his seemingly boundless tolerance for and even encouragement of violence or, as he would put it, "counterviolence." As with any caricature, this image bears a hint of truth. Were the figure less important or the topic less current, one might leave it at that. But given the inescapable presence of terrorist violence in our midst, it is imperative that we discover the truth of Sartre's assessment of this phenomenon because he gave it more thought than most philosophers in the last century. In other words, we need a study like Santoni's, and to begin with my conclusion, it is unlikely that another such thorough exposition and balanced assessment of this subject in Sartre's work will appear.

In the first half of this book, Santoni surveys the trajectory of Sartre's remarks on violence. The stage is set in *Being and Nothingness*, where Sartre claims conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others. In a footnote, he does concede that an ethics of "deliverance and salvation" is possible, but only after a "radical conversion" that cannot be described there (p. 20). Santoni proceeds to analyze the concept of violence in Sartre's posthumously published *Notebooks for an Ethics*, both volumes of the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, his preface to Franz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, and his lengthy discussions with Benny Lévy toward the end of his life, published in part as *Hope Now*. After a rather tentative espousal in the *Notebooks*, where Sartre offers his most extended analysis of violence, he admits that, even when justified, violence remains a dead end. This confirms a remark made in *What is Literature?* at about the same time that violence is a setback, albeit an inevitable setback "because we are in a universe of violence" (p. 109). One observes an increase in Sartre's defense of social violence as the structural and institutional violence of capitalism, colonialism, and racism that define our "universe of violence" enter more into view in the *Critique*. But Sartre's embrace of social violence reaches its extreme in his rather hyperbolic endorsement of the practice in his preface to *The Wretched of the Earth*. The context is racism with its structures and acts of violence. Sartre sees the violence of the natives in the

face of the dehumanizing practices of the settlers as both counterviolence and the means of their transformation from the condition of subhumans to that of men: "We too are humans" is their cry. In his last interviews, published the year of his death, Sartre is more reserved about the role of violence, questioning whether it can ever further the advent of "fraternity," which he now sees as almost equivalent to morality itself. Still, Santoni concludes that "Sartre's overall position on violence remains somewhat ambivalent (p. 79).

With this ambivalence in mind, we are introduced to the controversy that finally ended Sartre's friendship with Albert Camus in 1952. The occasion was a review that savaged the latter's *The Rebel* in Sartre's journal by one of his close associates. While part of the dispute involved opposite sides in the Cold War, what was chiefly at stake were the ethical justification of, and the limitations on, social violence. Though it is clear that, *pace* Sartre, Camus was not advocating nonviolence or pacifism in that book, he was opposed to violent revolution for being "nihilist in its deeds and in its refusal to recognize any moral demands" (p. 105). Santoni details this unhappy exchange from the perspective of Sartre's trajectory charted in part 1. The issue is one of "measure," as Santoni points out on several occasions. He compares Sartre's play *Dirty Hands* with Camus's story *Just Assassins* as an object lesson in this dispute.

A major contribution to this discussion is Santoni's use of the still unpublished "Rome Lecture Notes" of 1964 that form the core of Sartre's "second" or "dialectical" ethics. Stressing "integral humanity" as the value to be realized by breaking the alienating power of material scarcity, Sartre uses concepts and arguments from the *Critique* to justify "necessary violence" in pursuit of this goal. In partial response to the objection that this is simply a utilitarian move to justify the means by appeal to the end, Sartre speaks dialectically of the end as "the synthetic unity of the means" (p. 146). And yet he does admit of a limit when he claims that "all means are good except those that denature the end" (p. 147). In an attempt to explain what would constitute such "denaturing," Sartre lists four conditions under which Terror—used by subhumans toward the end of creating "the human"—could be deemed necessary and, on Santoni's reading, "morally permissible" (p. 149). Roughly summarized, these are: that the Terror not be a means to produce yet another exploitative system of subhumanity; that the Terror not harden into an ideology of Terror as with Stalin's "socialism in one country"; that one rigorously limit the use of Terror and acknowledge it as inhuman to those who undergo it; and, finally and perhaps curiously, that Terror arise from the masses and be assumed by their leaders who, nonetheless, denounce it as a deviation, out of necessity, from integral humanity as an end and as "a technique totally unjustifiable outside of its effectiveness" (p. 150). One senses that Sartre, in his very espousal of social violence sees it as an evil, albeit a necessary one to be employed with caution.

Santoni, who has dedicated his life to the cause of peace, has favored us with a major contribution both to Sartre studies and to the broader issue of social violence that for Sartre as for many today remains "curiously ambivalent."—Thomas R. Flynn, *Emory University*.

SOLOMON, Robert C. *Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. xiv + 259 pp. Paper, $19.95—Since the appearance of his earliest works on the subject of the emotions, namely, his article "Emotions and Choice" in 1973 and his book *The Passions* in 1976, Robert C. Solomon has never ceased to develop the idea that we are in some significant sense and to some significant degree responsible for our emotions. His presentation of this thesis in these two works was, on his own admission, somewhat polemical and stood in need of considerable revision. This present volume, which brings together twelve different articles, beginning with "Emotions and Choice" and concluding with two papers from the year 2001, allows those interested in emotion theory to follow in great detail the contours of the development of the thought of one of the most important figures working in this field.

Throughout his work, Solomon maintains that emotions are rational and purposive rather than irrational and disruptive. They are, moreover, intentional; that is to say, they are "about" something. Thus, for example, "I am angry *at John for stealing my car.*" This intentional constitution of emotions means that any particular emotion cannot be identified apart from its object. I cannot simply be angry, for example, without being angry about something. This intimate connection between emotion and object explains why a change in the object of an emotion brings about a change in the emotion itself: a change in what I am angry about, for example, brings about a change in my anger. The "aboutness" of emotions therefore explains why emotions change with our opinions and affords a basis for Solomon's claim that emotions are in a very important sense "rational."

It is precisely this contention concerning the intentionality of emotion that leads the author to assert that an emotion constitutes, in effect, a normative judgment about one's situation. Thus, for example, my anger *is* my judgment that someone has wronged me. Moreover, opines Solomon, since I can change my normative judgments on the basis of new influences, arguments, and evidence, I am as responsible for my emotions as I am for the judgments I make. Continuing his line of argument, he maintains that since emotions are judgments, and since judgments are actions, though covert, it follows that emotions are actions which aim to change the world. In other words, emotions are purposive, serve the ends of the subject, and consequently can be explained in rational terms. To posit the purposiveness of the emotions is not to say of course that they, any more than other judgments, are recognized as purposive by their subject at the time of their occurrence. This state of affairs is explained by the fact that the rationality of the emotions is prereflective and consequently prelinguistic. Unfortunately, he does not spell out in detail the implications of this kind of cognition for the life of emotion.

The author is particularly persuasive when highlighting the shortcomings of a reductionist approach to the emotions. Emotions do indeed have different *aspects* and can be viewed from different perspectives. Any emotion, nevertheless, is a *holistic* phenomenon; an exclusive emphasis on one aspect over another therefore tends to distort the phenomenon under investigation. Another kind of reductionism characteristic of much contemporary study of the emotions is to divorce them not only from any religious context but also from any moral context. To reduce the study of the emotions to a straightforwardly secular, scientific,

and "value-neutral" activity, however, is to strip them of their existential import, an import which, incidentally, the ancients and medievals appreciated.

The articles in this volume bear witness to an engagement with various philosophical traditions—principally Aristotelian, analytic, and phenomenological—in an attempt to penetrate the nature and experience of emotion. The avowedly seminal influence, however, is that of Jean-Paul Sartre, with his insistence on personal responsibility for one's own existence. Solomon's work makes an important contribution to the attempt to move beyond the divorce between emotion and reason, a divorce embraced by both Hume and Kant, albeit in radically different ways. The strength of Solomon's arguments certainly provide robust support not only for his cognitive theory of the emotions but also for his contention that virtually all of our experience is to some degree affective.

Some may still find Solomon's theory that we are responsible for our emotions to be too extreme; the present reviewer would agree to some degree with this criticism. In an age which is all too often characterized by an emphasis on affectivity loosed from the reins of reason, however, his position offers at the very least a healthy corrective. In this regard, while Solomon's work merits attention from those engaged in other philosophical disciplines, it has particular relevance for ethical theory.—Kevin E. O'Reilly, *Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy, Dublin.*

SUAREZ, Francisco. *A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics or "A Most Ample Index to the Metaphysics of Aristotle."* Translated by John P. Doyle. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004. 430 pp. Paper, $25.00—Noted Suarez scholar John P. Doyle has provided us here with another fine translation and annotation, the seventh Suarez volume in Marquette's Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation. It should be noted that this is not a commentary in the sense of a paraphrase or an exposition "by way of comment," but an exposition "by way of question" (pp. 8–9). In this mode, the examination of a text gives rise to relevant philosophical questions, which are systematically asked, arranged, and answered. Commentary on the text itself is therefore kept to a minimum. Moreover, in this particular work, Suarez will often simply refer to the relevant sections of his more famous *Metaphysical Disputations* rather than present maximally complete answers to the questions raised. Even so, the reader will enjoy Suarez's succinct and satisfactory expositions of the Aristotelian text and, most especially, his teaching concerning certain philosophical and logical issues raised by the text.

Although everything the Eximiant Doctor has to say is worthy of being mentioned, this reviewer will limit himself to the following metaphysical and historical issues.

First, there is the analogicity of being. As is well known, Suarez is a defender of the analogy of intrinsic proportion. He affirms that being is found properly and intrinsically in each of its modes, but that being's presence in the less perfect modes is due to their relation to a more per-

fect mode. He thinks that Aristotle also held this view, and that the Philosopher's use of examples of the analogy of extrinsic attribution is not intended adequately to express the relations in question (pp. 70–1).

Second, there is Aristotle's doctrine of essence. Suarez's exposition here is eminently satisfying from both historical and philosophical standpoints. As an example, we have the passage below, which explains that the individual and the species have the same essence and definition.

"For a properly enunciated definition explains the essence of a thing. Hence, just as an individual does not have another essence apart from the essence of its species, so neither is it thought to have another proper definition. Likewise the contraction of a species to an individual is as it were material in the concept of such an entity. And therefore that which an individual adds beyond a species is not so much explained by its proper definition as by an application of an essential definition to this entity" (p. 134).

But it may be asked, are essential definition and individual substance (subject) therefore identical? For Suarez, following Aristotle, they are identical in instances of *per se* predication, that is, when the essence predicated expresses what the subject itself is (for example, "Socrates is human"). But, if the essence is such as to be predicated *per accidens* of the subject (for example, "Socrates is pale") then there is not an identity, even though there can be coherent, truthful predication (pp. 125–7). Finally, he affirms (and holds to be genuinely Aristotelian) the doctrine that the essence of a corporeal thing includes its matter as well as its form (p. 157).

It must be said that Suarez's extended discussion of the logic, epistemology, and metaphysics of essence, definition, and thing defined is truly magisterial. Here he is at his most subtle and illuminating, as he skillfully employs his famous distinction (so prized by Descartes) between the formal concept (or mental word produced by the thinker) and the objective concept (or concept immediately intuited by the thinker), and expounds very well his logic of definitional part, conceptual implication, essential predication, qualitative predication, contraction, succession, and ultimate difference.

Third, there is the exposition of book 12. With regard to the eternity of time (and motion—the basis for Aristotle's proof of the unmoved mover), Suarez teaches that in order to cognize a real and simple beginning of time, one need not conceive a manifestly self-refuting real "time before," but only an imaginary "time before." Hence, "Aristotle's argument is neither strong nor necessary" (p. 209). With respect to Aristotle's unmoved mover, Suarez says that the pure actuality of one unmoved mover does not follow from eternal active causation of eternal motion.

"For a created substance could cause such perpetual motion, if such were possible. Therefore from that motion the only conclusion is that the substance of the mover is always in the act of moving [that is, causing or imparting motion—cja]. Add that for this [argument] it must also be supposed that this substance is always the same, which has not been proven; for several movers can move successively and cease to move one by one. Finally, even if the same mover is always in the act of moving, it does not follow that it cannot cease to move. For it can be moving perpetually not from necessity but from freedom" (p. 210).

The reader will note here the logical rigor, the subtlety, and the alertness for alternative possibility. Suarez displays these qualities throughout this work, and his subtlety sometimes approaches that of the great

Scotus. In fine, this is an important and generous book, as it provides us with not only a good translation but also the original Latin, an introduction, and very helpful notes. It is to be hoped that this book will spark a further appreciation of the merits of Suarez as an Aristotelian commentator and, most importantly, as an insightful and original philosopher.—Christopher J. Albrecht, *St. Basil College.*

TURNER, Denys. *Faith, Reason and the Existence of God.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiii + 271 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $27.99—This is an important book for philosophers interested in working out a realist philosophy of religion and much that such a project entails. The foil against which Denys Turner addresses his realist theory is that found in the late nineteenth century writings of Nietzsche and developed in the twentieth century by Heidegger and the later postmodernists in philosophy and religion. Of course, much of this trend is rooted in the Kantian thrust in modern philosophy, a thrust that the late Henry Veatch once referred to as "The Transcendental Turn." The shadow of Heidegger's "onto-theology" hovers throughout this discussion, which results in Turner's analysis of the differences between univocity of meaning in Scotus and analogous use in Aquinas. Turner remarks that one purpose of his extended essay is "to clear away the clutter of misconception" that surrounds discussions of these issues central to religious belief. Part of this conceptual muddle is, Turner argues, found in authors like John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, who have adroitly proposed a nonrealist account of theological propositions.

Turner is concerned that the impact of postmodernism has overwhelmed the possibility of even the consideration of alternative accounts utilizing a hard-nosed rational approach to such matters in the philosophy of religion. Turner is especially concerned with what he takes to be the near absence of rational discussion in theological matters. His arguments are directed principally at postmodernist religious authors. That this is not a straw man argument is demonstrated in Pickstock's claims in her and Milbank's *Truth in Aquinas* (Routledge, 2001), where she asserts that contemporary philosophy has adopted the position that realism is dead. Turner responds by developing an argument for the use of reason in matters of the philosophy of religion that entails a robust yet defensible philosophical realism. Central to this discussion is an account of being—in opposition to both Heidegger and Scotus—and the articulation of a meaningful theory of analogical predication. Here Turner lays out what he takes to be the radical ontological and epistemological differences found in the writings of Aquinas and Scotus, which Turner suggests are not observed by many postmodernist philosophers of religion.

Embedded within the text are significant discussions of issues in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of religion, all of which are grist for the mill of philosophers interested in philosophical realism. Among these issues are Turner's accounts of Augustine, Aquinas, and Scotus on their respective theories of mind. Turner's insights on all of these matters are well worth the reading time spent digging into his book. Within these discussions, Turner is at pains to indicate that we humans as metaphysical beings are animal beings

primarily; here he takes his hints from Aquinas. One is reminded of Martha Nussbaum' s account of the material embodiment of the human person in Aristotelian philosophy as opposed to the dualism characteristic of most Platonism and Cartesianism; Alasdair MacIntyre's *Dependent Rational Animals* (Open Court, 1999) offers many of the same insights. Fergus Kerr reads Aquinas in much the same way, taking his philosophical hints from the later Wittgenstein. Like Anthony Kenny's rather trenchant observations, Turner's criticisms of Milbank/Pickstock on the postmodernist concept of truth in Aquinas are to the point.

Turner has sat at the philosophical feet of Peter Geach, whose influence is found especially in Turner's account of the role the predicate "existence" plays in these discussions. Geach's formative essay, "Form and Existence in Aquinas" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1954–55), is still influential over a helf-century following its original publication. Turner for the most part accepts Geach's analysis of the role "existence" plays in a robust realist ontology, especially as the source of "actuality." Hence, like Kant, existence does not function as a descriptive predicate; but unlike Kant, existence does have a significant ontological role to play.

Turner adopts as his principal ontological question the one posed by Aquinas: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Brian Davies often puts the set of issues in this manner. Turner argues that it is only because of a "failure of reason" that such queries are not seen by contemporary philosophers as significant. In developing his argument, Turner shows where Aquinas and Russell are similar but also where they depart. Turner's analyses are excellent sources for considering the similarities and differences between important philosophers in the Western tradition. What is interesting is where Turner finds more similarities than differences. A case in point is his astute discussion of the conceptual similarities between Kant and Aquinas on the status of the predicate of existence.

While the shadow of Aquinas's analysis of matters pertaining to the existence of God—in particular those found in the early sections of the prima pars of the *Summa Theologiae*—hovers intently over all of these pages, nonetheless Turner is more interested in the strategy that Aquinas proposes for dealing with these issues philosophically than in defending Aquinas's arguments in any great detail. This is not another humdrum, metaphysical defense of Aquinas's philosophy of religion. Nonetheless, like several analytic Thomists, Turner takes many of his philosophical cues from the writings of Aquinas. He worries about the cataphatic and the apophatic dimensions of modern religious discussions on matters of the divine existence and the divine nature. His intent is to demonstrate that with Aquinas what one gets is an awareness of a being—God—that is unknowable. Hence, it has both cataphatic and apophatic dimensions. His analysis of these issues is one of the more persuasive I have encountered.

This book is highly recommended for philosophers interested in the issues central to a realistic philosophy of religion yet not one that is mired in ontology divorced from contemporary philosophical discussions. This book is one of the more rigorous accounts of issues in a realist philosophy of religion now in the theodicy marketplace.—Anthony J. Lisska, *Denison University*.

VAUGHT, Carl G. *Metaphor, Analogy, and the Place of Places: Where Religion and Philosophy Meet.* Provost Series, vol. 3. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2004. xv + 206 pp. Cloth, $29.95—Carl Vaught wove together a number of papers he delivered on various occasions from 1969–2004 to produce this densely philosophical book, which thus may be taken to represent some of the fundamental issues that occupied the recently deceased Vaught during his prestigious career.

The book's thesis is that religion and philosophy "stand together and apart in a rich variety of ways" (p. ix), and it undertakes to analyze some of those ways through an investigation of basic questions in the philosophy of religion—such as the nature of God, the role of language in our thinking about God and the world, and the relationship between faith and philosophical reflection—and through studies of certain figures and periods in the history of philosophy. Although Vaught approaches these investigations from an analytical perspective, he enters into areas one more often associates with the Continental tradition (for example, studies of Hegel, Heidegger, medieval philosophy, and so forth).

The first part of the book, consisting of three chapters, addresses certain general issues in the relationship between religion and philosophy. The first chapter attempts to articulate what distinguishes the two, given that both are occupied in some respect with what is ultimate. The second chapter offers an argument for the significance of medieval philosophy, which can "fill the vacuum" that is often left in the more conventional accounts of the history of philosophy that see it essentially as a conflict between the ancient and modern worlds. Chapter 3 attempts to show that there is both discontinuity and continuity in the relation between Athens and Jerusalem.

Part 2 presents a series of treatments of particular issues in historical figures. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the *Confessions* of Augustine, who is central for Vaught insofar as the tradition that he spawns "binds religion and philosophy together by claiming that faith makes understanding possible" (p. 47). The first of these chapters argues that "faith seeking understanding" represents the rhetorical structure of Augustine's quest for wisdom; the second attempts to show how Augustine is able to affirm the simultaneity of God's transcendence and immanence in the paradoxical interplay between (neoplatonic) recollection and (Christian) illumination. Chapter 6, one of the more difficult in the book, addresses the question of difference in Hegel. Here, Vaught seeks to demonstrate a kind of nondialectical difference (spatial difference rather than temporal difference) that Hegel overlooks in his system, and the need for a concept of analogy to articulate this kind of difference. Finally, the discussion of Heidegger in chapter 7 offers another argument for the significance of analogy in the question of being and space. The discussion of Jaspers in the same chapter deals with the various modes of self-transcendence that make philosophy possible, and it articulates the difference between philosophical and religious faith.

The third part of the book returns to more general themes. Chapter 8 gives a succinct presentation of a central notion in Vaught's thinking: "The Quest for Wholeness." In this chapter, Vaught argues that the notion of wholeness offers a way to avoid the fragmentation implied in the either/or of experiential immediacy and absolute comprehension. The book reaches a sort of climax here, as it describes the special appropriateness of metaphor and analogy "for articulating the meaning of ultimate reality in human terms" (p. 135). Chapter 9 draws on a number of the ideas developed in previous chapters to address the relationship between being and God. The final chapter, one of the most interesting in

the book, articulates a new conception of truth that integrates the traditional "correspondence" theory, which presupposes a concept of "Radical Otherness" (between the mind and world, and between the world and God), with aspects of the pragmatic and coherence theories of truth in modern philosophy.

The main idea governing the book is quite original: namely, that the category of "Place" serves as the point of intersection for a number of fundamental "triads" of concepts in philosophy, the most basic of which, for Vaught, are time, space, and eternity, and mystery, structure, and power. The book proceeds in an almost Hegelian fashion, penetrating the problems it addresses by breaking them down into some analogous triad, which is then illuminated through its relation to one of these original triads. Vaught's principle in this mode of analysis (a principle he apparently has drawn from Peirce, p. 23) is an excellent one: in order to show how two things may be intrinsically related without reducing to one another—that is, in a way that simultaneously respects their difference—there must be a mediating "third," which both brings them together and holds them apart. This approach occasionally leads Vaught to oversimplify complex realities, but more often it opens interesting new perspectives on traditional problems.—D. C. Schindler, *Villanova University.*

WARREN, James. *Facing Death, Epicurus and His Critics.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. x + 240 pp. Cloth, $45.00—James Warren analyzes Epicurus' and Epicureans' attitudes toward death in a dialogue with contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. His study is hard to put aside once one has started reading. The book's structure flows very well, the reader finds anticipated questions addressed, and the arguments fit together seamlessly. This is top level work.

The author himself provides an excellent summary of his arguments in the conclusions section (pp. 213–21). We start out, after an introduction and in chapter 2, with the fundamental claim from Epicurus's *Key Doctrines* 2 (*Kuriai Doxai*, "KD" hereafter) that "death is nothing to us," not merely because death is the absence of perception, but more importantly because no subject survives death to be harmed. In the context of the broader contemporary philosophical debate, however, this raises the question whether harms necessarily need to be perceived by a subject to be harmful to that person. Under "unperceived harms" would also fall so-called relational and comparative harms, with the latter including the temptation to compare the goods of one's finite life to the goods of a potentially longer or even an infinite life.

This temptation can feed two kinds of fears: one, the fear of mortality, because the goods of an infinite time would always surpass the goods of any finite time, however extended; the other, the fear of premature death, in which case one does not rebel against mortality as such but rather worries about not being able to reach one's full potential.

Contemporary stances discussed in the third chapter have tended to address the first fear, of mortality, by relying on a reading of the Epicurean so-called symmetry argument: if the time before we were born is of no concern to us, neither should the time after our death. But, as Warren points out, one version of this argument does not really add

anything substantive to the fundamental claim expressed in KD 2: if Epicureans simply mean to imply that neither the time before birth nor after death is of concern to us *then*, because there simply would be no subject in existence to be affected, then this is merely an extended version of the claim that "death is nothing to us."

The second version of the symmetry argument that dominates current debates is by contrast little, if at all, represented in Epicurean sources. This version focuses on retrospective and prospective worries *from within life*, with a subject experiencing now or at any time during life anxieties about the time before birth or after death. To address this version of the symmetry argument one may have to bring in the notion of comparative harms. Yet there is a way for the Epicureans, who reject such harms, to address this second version of the symmetry argument as well, by supplying the premise that "whatever causes no pain when present, causes only empty distress when anticipated" (pp. 101–5, Epicurus, *Ep. Men.*, 125).

The fourth chapter addresses the second fear mentioned above, that of a premature death, by examining the paradoxical Epicurean notion of a complete life. According to the Epicureans, the most complete pleasure, which consists of the absence of pain, cannot be enhanced by duration and can be reached even at a relatively young age.

The stances discussed in the third and fourth chapters leave the Epicureans with some thorny problems, which Warren addresses in his final chapter, and which, to his credit, he does not dismiss or argue away. First, if an Epicurean cannot acknowledge unperceived and relational harms, what motivation could he have for the other-directed behavior implied by a will such as the one we know Epicurus himself wrote? Second, if the good life cannot be enhanced by duration, what positive motivation could an Epicurean have to go on living once that stage has been reached, beyond a mere passive and inert sense of not feeling a need to commit suicide?

As I already indicated, Warren radically opts for an engagement with contemporary Anglo-American analytical philosophy. It is the author's right to set the scope of an inquiry, and Warren fulfils his goal admirably. He includes a wide range of secondary literature on Epicureanism and pays close attention to textual details—and yet, to this reader at least, the approach does raise questions.

Epicureans would not have faced the kind of personal identity problems created by current fertility treatments (p. 80), nor a medical scenario in which a seriously brain damaged person could be kept alive by artificial means (p. 24), to name but two examples Warren uses. This does not mean that we cannot legitimately ask if and how an Epicurean could have responded to such challenges, but the move does imply a transfer that is not to be taken for granted.

Ironically too, given that in current academic contexts the two disciplines are often pitted against each other, Warren's philosophical approach can be as painstaking as old-fashioned philology. If a reader, for instance, wonders on page 70 whether the Epicureans could perhaps have come up with a missing premise to generate the second version of the symmetry argument from the first, he still has to wait to page 101 for that hunch to be confirmed. Or perhaps this is a way to draw the reader in and create philosophical suspense?

The mere possibility of a connection between Epicurean arguments and contemporary debates does not by itself make those arguments worthy of our attention. At times, the fact that he has to enter in a clearly demarcated mode of philosophical discourse appears to restrict

Warren too much. Do we really need a reference to Bernard Williams to register the point that an eternal life would lead to unbearable tedium (p. 111)? Is Williams the most striking and articulate philosophical representative of this view merely because he belongs to a certain circle of discourse?

More serious, perhaps, is that because the possibility of immortality of some kind and god-talk do not figure prominently in the debate on which Warren focuses, these issues receive only a passing mention. Yet if, by Warren's admission (pp. 153–9), we should worry about the exact relation between *ataraxia* (unperturbed calm) and the fear of death, should we also not take into account the possible connection between fear of the gods as agents of *post mortem* retribution and the fear of death—as good old Cephalus does in the first book of Plato's *Republic*?

To be sure, as long as we are aware that a choice like Warren's has a pragmatic side to it—and the "we" here may well refer to the audience rather than to the author himself—and do not inadvertently slip into a normative judgment that this is the only legitimate or the best way to engage with ancient philosophy from a current perspective, then no harm is done—pun intended—and the power of Warren's sophisticated analysis can claim its rightful place.

To return to my starting point, this study is indeed a very rewarding read, even to a reader who cannot help marveling at human beings' knack for making "much ado about nothing"—which does not always or necessarily constitute a weakness.—Gretchen Reydams-Schils, *University of Notre Dame.*

WESTPHAL, Merold. *Transcendence and Self-Transcendence: On God and the Soul.* Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004. xiv + 235 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $22.95—This book is the work of an American philosopher recognized for his contributions to the Continental form of postmodern philosophy of religion. *Transcendence and Self-Transcendence* is a sequel to Westphal's earlier *God, Guilt, and Death* published in 1987. The readers of this latest study will soon realize that they are viewing the thoughtful work of a scholar who has mastered the relevant literature of his subject. The full, helpful footnotes throughout *Transcendence and Self-Transcendence* support that claim. This latest project completed by Merold Westphal takes one into the center of Continental philosophy of religion being engaged in from a phenomenalist perspective.

At the outset, Merold Westphal describes himself as a Christian theist assessing secular postmodern trends with the aim of reinforcing his own commitment to theism. But he writes also with the apologetic purpose of making theism clearer and acceptable to secular postmodernists. This project follows up on his earlier *God, Guilt, and Death* in which he examined the divine–human relationship. There he concluded that God properly understood is the transcendent when recognized as of intrinsic, and not instrumental, value and that the self can experience its own transcendence through love of neighbor. The experience of many in the patristic period confirmed these two claims, as seen in the judicious citations Westphal provides. Here in the latest work he documents from postmodern sources how God and the human soul can be

properly understood in terms which entail transcendence. A two-pronged approach is adopted to achieve this goal, namely, assessing (1) the decentering of the self characteristic of postmodern thought, and (2) the critique of what Heidegger labeled "onto-theology," which uses reason to ground the concept of God. These twin inquiries enable Westphal to argue dialectically for his thesis that divine and human transcendence are intertwined. His procedure is not in the traditional Hegelian triadic form. Instead, the reasoning moves in an ascending line marked by three stages: cosmological, epistemological, and ethical. The outcome sought by such analyses is heightened awareness of the mystery of God as transcendent along with increased resistance by the self to self-centeredness. Westphal proceeds by drawing out the implications of notable as well as neglected texts found in the writing of a select group of outstanding premodern and postmodern thinkers. His list of such sources is long and impressive, starting with Heidegger and including Augustine, Aquinas, Pseudo-Dionysius, Kierkegaard, Barth, and Levinas.

After agreeing with Heidegger that bad theology has been done in the rationalistic pantheisms of Spinoza and Hegel, Westphal turns to others on his list who are drawn to the otherness or transcendence of God. Proving abundant detail from these supporting sources, he shows how they present an elevated conception of God, one marked by mystery but also eliciting love. This movement is paired with a concomitant emphasis on love of neighbor that raises the sights of the self from focus on itself. Thus Westphal judges he has unearthed and grouped grounds for belief in theism featuring a transcendent God. Many of his data come from surprising sources in the philosophical writing of this secular era. Westphal also feels he has provided a matching response to those in our hedonistic age who are in the grip of self-interest. Thus he concludes his effort to provide a contemporary apologetic for theism in general, along with rewarding support for his own commitment to Christian theism in particular.

However, the question remains whether Westphal has succeeded in both of his endeavors. Has he provided an effective rebuttal to adamant atheists and agnostics? Has he strengthened his own faith in completing this project in Continental philosophy of religion? As regards the latter query, only he can answer. But the tenor of this work as a whole suggests he has helped himself. But as to whether rigid rejecters and devoted doubters would be swayed toward theism by all this documented support for divine transcendence, the reply is probably few at best. This is because such secular-minded persons have classified the concept of God as just another one of those items which have no counterpart in reality, such as Santa Claus and ghosts. Persons committed to such a view will likely give no serious consideration to any attempt to reinstate the concept of God. Westphal's emphasis on ethics that draws one out of one's self should register well with the atheistic group. So most likely, Merold Westphal's careful study of God and the soul will probably have more success in strengthening the author's Christian faith than in producing new advocates of theism. This judgment implies also that *Transcendence and Self-Transcendence* can be of value to other theists as well. This is true because indeed Merold Westphal has strengthened the case for theism from surprising sources.—Benjamin A. Petty, *Southern Methodist University.*

WILSON, Robert A. *Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences–Cognition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xvii + 369 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $24.99—The internalism versus externalism debate in philosophy of mind has proceeded to a higher level, as Wilson's remarkable book shows. Wilson describes how the metaphysical assumptions of internalism (or "individualism" as he prefers), which holds that minds are individuated by nervous systems without reference to anything external, must be seriously questioned. Many of these assumptions date from the nineteenth century, when psychology turned sharply individualistic in order to set up disciplinary boundaries against biology, sociology, and anthropology. However, these assumptions have become challengeable by the modified understandings of "individuals" and their minds that have arrived with the maturation of these "fragile sciences."

Wilson sketches the development of psychology and cognitive science in the book's first part (a second volume is forthcoming on *Genes and the Agents of Life*, and a third will treat the social sciences). These fields have recently been adopting more externalist theories about many core problems such as perception, awareness, language, memory, and other cognitive processes. The second part details Wilson's dissatisfactions with individualism's premises, particularly those adopted from reductive materialism, and introduces a metaphysics compatible with externalism. Like several other rebels (Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, John Dupré, Nancy Cartwright, Joseph Rouse, and Huw Price quickly come to mind), Wilson adopts the respectably naturalistic alternative to reductionism by admitting that sciences remain disunited and confessing that metaphysics should conform to the sciences (and not just to subatomic physics). The resulting naturalism is contextualistic and holistic rather than atomistic in its metaphysics; pluralist rather than eliminitivist in its ontology; and pragmatic rather than rationalistic in its epistemology.

However, this nonreductive naturalism faces heavy opposition from philosophy itself. Philosophy ensured its own academic survival by becoming obsessively individualistic and rationalistic, even more so than psychology, by righteously clutching exclusive control over its special provinces: pure logic; intuitions of meaning, necessity, and absolute truth; private consciousness; and the epistemic model of the isolated rational thinker. In part 3 Wilson responds with his own externalist conception of consciousness, *TESEE*: consciousness is Temporally Extended, Scaffolded, Embodied, and Embedded. Conscious states are dynamic processes, not static states with intrinsic properties; cognitions are "scaffolded" on the practical use of external things like cultural tools; minds are embodied in active purposive organisms; and minds are embedded in the surrounding environment. Wilson applies *TESEE* for externalist reconstructions of intentionality, supervenience, phenomenal states, narrow contents, representations, and related philosophical strongholds of individualism. Part 4 outlines Wilson's qualified approval of group minds. Wilson does not believe that the social mind has some logical or ontological priority to individual minds. However, many important psychological states of individuals are manifested only while they are members of social groups.

Contextual naturalism remains a mostly unexplored territory, despite the efforts of pioneers like John Dewey (who also had an externalist philosophy of mind). Although underdeveloped in this book, Wilson offers many insights into its workings and advantages; one example will have to suffice here. Unlike Wilson's earlier *Cartesian Psychology and*

Physical Minds (Cambridge, 1995), which conceded that causal agency is always local, Wilson now appears to realize that causality must be fully contextualized to best defend externalism. Individualist philosophers like Jaegwon Kim have demanded that a mental state be individuated by the physical realizer upon which it supervenes so that this realizer alone possesses that state's unique causal powers. Wilson accepts this naturalistic principle, which restrains a drift toward dualism. However, individualism additionally demands that this realizer must be narrowly located within the neurological system of that individual having the mental state. But why should this local supervenience principle be accepted? Wilson explains how the physical realizers of many biological and psychological entities and processes will typically be quite wide, encompassing not only organisms and many features of their immediate surroundings, but also further necessary background conditions. For example, species are individuated by histories and environments; circulatory systems function due to many environing conditions; perceptions result from the interaction of active perceivers and dynamic environments. Kim's potent threat of causal overdetermination against emergent naturalism assumes that causal powers are intrinsic to the smallest parts of a system. The contextual approach instead finds that many of a thing's causal powers depend on its dynamic relations with the wider relevant context. Therefore, an organic system will naturally have powers which none of its parts do, defusing the notion that a mind's casual powers must compete with those of neurons since these things reside in different contexts. Ultimately, Kim's demand for narrowly local supervenience and causation rests on vision of the unity of the sciences that never happened and begs the question against the right of the life sciences to individuate things of scientific interest to them.

Wilson's provocative pursuit of a contextual and pluralistic naturalism should be closely read by anyone intrigued by the destiny of naturalism and the role to be played by cognitive science, psychology, and the social sciences.—John R. Shook, *Center for Inquiry Transnational, Buffalo.*

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 79, No. 4, Fall 2005

John Scotus Eriugena: A Christian Philosopher, AVITAL WOHLMAN

Most commentators find Eriugena's *On the Division of Nature* to be a variation on the theme of emanation, which flows from the One and back to it, bypassing concrete reality. The intention of this article is to highlight the Christian traits of the four divisions of nature as the spiritual itinerary destined to lay bare the ontology of Augustine's saeculum. Following Augustine, Eriugena identifies true philosophy with true religion. The central value of concrete reality, the third division of nature, is rooted in the mystery of the Incarnation. Reason's conclusions and rules of true religion prepare man to envisage the aporia of freedom of will as the euporia revealed by grace.

Filiolitas*: The Short History of One of Eriugena's Inventions*, PAUL EDWARD DUTTON

The ninth-century Irish philosopher, theologian, and speculative grammarian Eriugena invented a number of words, chiefly in order to accommodate Greek terms in Latin. *Filiolitas* or "sonship" was one of these and a particularly distinctive new word, which almost no one but Eriugena seems to have used. Indeed it appears in almost all the works ascribed to him and serves both as a word for adoptive sonship in a theological context and as a relative noun in grammatical references. The appearance of the word in a letter of King Charles the Bald may also suggest Eriugena's authorship of that letter.

Édouard Jeauneau's Edition of the Periphyseon in Light of Contemporary Editorial Theory, DAVID C. GREETHAM

Textual criticism and the scholarly editions it produces have all too often been regarded by academics as well as general readers as "objective" (or even "scientific") applications of a fixed set of procedures, designed to create

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*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

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a "definitive" text. But such editions are just as much a reflection of cultural and ideological expectations as are any other "critical" activities. Thus, the Jeauneau parallel-text edition of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*, with its presentation of "matière en fusion" and its embrace of a continually evolving work in "perpétuel devenir," is to be seen as an appropriate postmodernist celebration of the "supplément," the marginal, the incomplete, and the fragmented. In this promotion of the "scriptible" (or "open," "writerly") text over the "lisible" ("closed" or "readerly"), Jeauneau stands in contrast with the precedent edition of Eriugena by Sheldon-Williams, which is a modernist attempt to arrive at "satisfaction" and the positive.

The Argument for Universal Immortality in Eriugena's "Zoology," L. MICHAEL HARRINGTON

Apparently alone among medieval Christians, Eriugena argues that all life is immortal. He relies on Plato's *Timaeus* as his primary source for this claim, but he modifies the argument of the *Timaeus* considerably. He turns Plato's cosmic soul into the genus of life, thereby taking a treatise that originally dealt with cosmology and using it to explore the ontological significance of definition. All species that fall under the genus of life must be immortal, because a mortal species would contradict the genus. No later medieval author would take up Eriugena's arguments explicitly, although Aquinas comes close. The two thirteenth-century thinkers to address universal immortality seriously—Aquinas and Bonaventure—argue against it, but they are more faithful than Eriugena himself to a literal reading of the *Timaeus*.

The Influence of Maximus the Confessor on Eriugena's Treatment of Aristotle's Categories, CATHARINE KAVANAGH

The Aristotelian categories are a fundamental element in Eriugena's philosophical system on account of his realist view of dialectic. He received his texts concerning the categories from Boethius and the *De decem catagoriis*, but key ideas in his treatment of them—namely, the metaphysical importance of dialectic, the unknowability of essence, and the origin of being in place and time, ideas fundamentally rooted in Byzantine developments of the Christology of Chalcedon—are taken from Maximus the Confessor. Eriugena's work on the categories represents an attempt, much misunderstood, to assimilate the richness of the Eastern tradition to Western philosophical and theological method. This paper examines the synthesis of Maximus' ideas with Ciceronian and Boethian elements in Eriugena's striking treatment of the Aristotelian categories.

Eriugena on the Spiritual Body, VALERY V. PETROFF

This article discusses the development of John Scotus Eriugena's teaching on the spiritual body. In his early treatise *De praedestinatione*, as well as in the *Periphyseon*, John Scotus understands the spiritual body as ethereal or aerial. This conception tacitly assumes that men and angels are connatural.

Moreover, Eriugena's angelology and demonology compel him to localize Hades in the air—a teaching in which he follows a well-established ancient and Christian tradition. John Scotus is influenced by ideas of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa in maintaining that there are two different kinds of human bodies; the interpretation of the biblical "coats of skin" as the earthly human body plays an important part in this. According to Eriugena, the soul in a sense creates an earthly body for itself. In later passages from the *Periphyseon*, he abandons the idea of individual subtle bodies, accepting a complete transformation of body into spirit at the resurrection. However, he remains ambiguous on this point as his position would contradict Christian doctrine. The *Periphyseon* culminates in a paraphrase of a section from *Ambigua ad Iohannem XXXVII*. In the light of the latter text, the nature of the eight gradual unifications from the epilogue of the *Periphyseon* becomes clear.

Causality as Concealing Revelation in Eriugena: A Heideggerian Interpretation, PHILIPP W. ROSEMANN

This article offers a reading of Eriugena's thought that is inspired by Heidegger's claim according to which being is constituted in a dialectical interplay of revelation and concealment. Beginning with an analysis of how "causality as concealing revelation" works on the level of God's inner-Trinitarian life, the piece moves on to a consideration of the way in which the human soul reveals itself in successive stages of exteriorization that culminate in the creation of the body, its "image." The body, however, conceals as much as it reveals true human nature. Moreover, it is shown that for Eriugena all of reality, as theophany, possesses this character of (un)concealing its fundamental truth. These insights lead Eriugena to a recognition of radical human finitude, as genuine wisdom requires an acknowledgment of our fundamental ignorance.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 43, No. 1, January 2006

Forgiveness, Apology, and Retributive Punishment, J. ANGELO CORLETT

This article challenges the prevalent view among philosophers that forgiveness is both a moral virtue and morally required and that moral agents who do not forgive can be held morally blameworthy—even if there is no apology forthcoming from the harmful wrongdoer. In contrast, forgiveness is construed in terms of an agent's moral prerogative; it is never a moral requirement. Distinctions are drawn between forgiving and forgiveness, the former being an expression of not holding ill-feelings toward another for what he has done to wrongfully harm him. An analysis of a genuine apology is provided, the satisfaction of the conditions of which is a necessary condition for genuine forgiveness. These conditions include one of rectification,

without which genuine forgiveness is impossible. Corresponding to the distinction between forgiving and forgiveness is one between apologizing and an apology, the former of which is the simple expression of sorrow for wrongfully harming another, while the latter is an expression of genuine sorrow, accompanied, among other things, by actions that prove one's sincerity. The entire discussion is intended to address contexts of criminal justice.

It's a Colorful World, ANNA MARMODORO

David Chalmers argues that perfect colors and perfectly veridical color experiences are to be found only in Eden, that is, in a possible world to which we do not belong. Chalmers's arguments undermine the (appealing) intuition that objects are truly colored the way they appear to us, and the view that colors are both primitive intrinsic properties of objects, and constitutively connected to our experiences. The account proposed in the paper, *Constitutionalism*, purports to retain the intuition and supplies a metaphysics for the constitutive dependences between colors and experiences that overcomes Chalmers's skeptical worries: Perceived colours are sensuous, nonrelational, properties of the constitution of the object's surface. Yet, they are corealized with the perceiver's experience in the object-perceiver causal interaction; they are codependent, codetermined, and covarying with the experience. Every object is multicolored: its surface has a set of sensuous properties realised in different perceptual conditions.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Can Humeans Ask "Why Be Rational?", EVAN TIFFANY

Humeans often claim that reasons for action must satisfy an internal constraint, meaning that there must be a conceptual connection between reasons and motivation. Humeanism is special, it is alleged, in that it uniquely satisfies this constraint. Just how plausibly to specify the constraint is exceedingly difficult, as has already been documented in the literature. This paper considers one version of the internalist constraint that is both intuitively plausible and has yet to receive critical attention from anti-Humeans the claim that Humean rationality is unshruggable in the sense that one cannot coherently ask, "Why be rational?" It is argued here that Humean rationality faces a tension between unshruggability and normative adequacy, that its putative unshruggability lends no independent weight to Humean accounts of practical rationality. Furthermore, it is argued that the unshruggability of Humean rationality presupposes a rather robust version of individualism of the mental.

Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition, MICHAEL HUEMER

Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, and yet one proposition is justified and the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, phenomenal conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.

Morally Admirable Immorality, TROY JOLLIMORE

The apparent existence of admirable immorality is sometimes taken as evidence that moral requirements may be overridden by demands arising from nonmoral values. As a result, it is often thought that in order to defend the authority of morality, one must argue against the existence of admirable immorality. This paper, however, argues that while admirable immorality does indeed exist, it is not at all clear that its existence poses this sort of threat to the authority of morality. For it turns out that some very familiar forms of normative ethical theory are implicitly committed to the possibility that an action might be simultaneously immoral and morally admirable. Moreover, the existence of morally admirable immorality is not due to any complexity in the nature of the morally good. It is due, rather, to certain sorts of complexity in the nature of the morally right.

Could an Egoist be a Friend? JOE MINTOFF

Being a friend makes our lives better, but it seems this consideration cannot guide our pursuit of friendship, lest this mean we are not true friends and that our lives are not made better. The aim of this paper is to show how, appearances notwithstanding, being a true friend is consistent with having one's own happiness as one's ultimate end. Aristotle's idea that friends are other selves, and recent accounts of practical reason, show how (1) one's acting as a friend could be motivated and justified by one's being a friend (and not directly by one's own happiness), and yet (2) one's being a friend (and not one's friendly actions) is in turn constrained and justified by one's own happiness. The paper ends by considering whether such a person's pursuit of another's good is still too circumscribed by that of their own for them to count as a true friend.

Divine Omnipresence and Maximal Immanence: Supernaturalism versus Pantheism, ROBERT OAKES

The major aim of this essay is to provide a defensible or tenable explication of a divine attribute that, while absolutely integral to classical supernaturalism, has received perplexingly scant attention from latter-day philosophical theists, namely, omnipresence. After establishing that nothing short of a metaphysically full-blown conception of omnipresence can accommodate God's absolute limitlessness or maximal plenitude—that is, omnipresence *in*

situ rather than "omnipresence" that is just operational—it is argued that (given the rational respectability of a realist ontology of space) divine omnipresence is precisely what space constitutes. While this account clearly implies that natural objects are essentially interior to God by virtue of being essentially interior to space, it can readily be seen not to imply the pantheistic conclusion that natural objects are aspects of God.

Canonical Property Designators, BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER

Nominalizations of predicative phrases are commonly used as property designators, and they play a central role in discourse about properties. In this article, three kinds of such designators are distinguished and their semantics is discussed. First, it is argued that designators of the form "the property of being F" are definite descriptions, but descriptions of a special kind: they are appositive constructions such as "the poet Burns." A consequence of this view is that another kind of property designators should be acknowledged, namely pure gerundives of the form "being F." So, second, these designators are examined, and it is argued that the semantic properties of these terms distinguish them both from proper names and from definite descriptions. Third, abstract nouns such as "wisdom" are addressed; it is argued that these terms are not names of properties either, but exhibit the same semantic profile as gerundives.

Gratitude, Reciprocity, and Need, GUDRUN VON TEVENAR

Gratitude and reciprocity are interactive responses in situations that have much in common. Hence they are often regarded as basically the same with interchangeable application. However, this is not the case. Although gratitude and reciprocity often appear together, they nonetheless have different functions: gratitude is sincere acknowledgment and appreciation of benefits received, while reciprocity responds to an implied expectation to return something fitting and of proportionate value for benefits received. Kant's account of gratitude seems to put gratitude under the maxim of reciprocity and thus tends to make of gratitude a very demanding duty indeed. This becomes obvious when considering needy recipients of potentially great benefits. While needy recipients are often able to be grateful, they are usually unable, almost by definition, to reciprocate, as this requires them to return something fitting and of proportionate value for benefits received.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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The Reasons That Matter, STEPHEN FINLEY

Bernard Williams's motivational reasons-internalism fails to capture our first-order reasons judgments, while Derek Parfit's nonnaturalistic reasons-externalism cannot explain the nature or normative authority of reasons. This paper offers an intermediary view, reformulating skepticism about external reasons as the claim not that they don't exist but rather that they don't matter. The end-relational theory of normative reasons is proposed, according to which a reason for an action is a fact that explains why the action would be good relative to some end, where the relevant end for any ascription of reasons is determined by the speaker's conversational context. Because these ends need not be the agent's ends, Williams is wrong to reject the existence of external reasons. Contra Parfit, however, a reason for action is only important for an agent if it is motivationally internal to that agent.

The Reality of Absences, BORIS KUSKO

In this paper, the author makes a contribution to a naturalistically minded theory of truthmakers by proposing a solution to the nasty problem of truthmakers for negative truths. After formulating the difficulty, Kukso considers and rejects a number of solutions to the problem, including Armstrong's states of affairs of totality, incompatibility accounts, and J. C. Beall's polarity view. He then defends the position that absences of truthmakers are real and are responsible for making negative truths true (and positive falsehoods false). According to the positive account of absences Kukso offers, absences of contingent states of affairs are causally relevant mind-independent features of the physical world, located within space and time, and capable of being discovered by scientific inquiry. Recognition of the reality of absences strengthens truthmaker theory as a naturalistic metaphysics, as truth and falsity of each and every contingent proposition finds an ontological grounding in some region of the physical universe.

The Intentionality of Memory, JORDI FERNANDEZ

Memory differs from both introspection and perception in scope. One can introspect only one's own mental states, and one can perceive only events in the external world. However, one can remember events in the world as well as one's own perceptual experiences of them. An interesting phenomenological fact about memory is that those two kinds of memories come together. One cannot apparently remember a fact without apparently remember having perceived it. And one cannot apparently remember what

perceiving a certain fact was like without apparently remembering the fact in question. Why is that? The project in this essay is to try to explain this by appealing to the content that memory experiences have.

Grammar and Sets, HARTLEY SLATER

"Philosophy arises through misconceptions of grammar," said Wittgenstein. Few people have believed him, and probably none, therefore, working in the area of the philosophy of mathematics. Yet his assertion is most evidently the case in the philosophy of set theory, as this paper demonstrates. The motivation for twentieth-century set theory has rested on the belief that everything in mathematics can be defined in terms of sets. Yet not only are there notable items which cannot be so defined, including numbers, and mereological sums, but the very notion of a set, as formalized within this tradition, is based on a series of grammatical confusions.

Colour Constancy and Russellian Representation, BRAD THOMPSON

In this paper, the author critically examines an argument proposed by Graham Priest in support of the claim that the observable world is consistent. According to this argument, we have good reason to think that the observable world is consistent. Specifically, we perceive it to be consistent. The author critiques this argument on two fronts. First, Priest appears to reason from the claim "we know what it is to have a contradictory perception" to the claim "we know what it is to perceive a contradiction." Here Thompson argues that this inference fails to be valid. Second, he gives reasons for thinking that if an observable state of affairs were to be contradictory, we would perceive it to be consistent. As such, that the world we observe appears consistent does not constitute evidence that it is in fact consistent. That we see a consistent world is no reason to believe that the world is consistent. Thompson concludes the paper with some reflections on the implications of this analysis for the plausibility of trivialism.

Functionalism about Possible Worlds, DOMINIC GREGORY

Various writers have proposed that the notion of a possible world is a functional concept, yet very little has been done to develop that proposal. This paper explores a particular functionalist account of possible worlds, according to which pluralities of possible worlds are the bases for structures which provide occupants for the roles which analyse our ordinary modal concepts. It argues that the resulting position meets some of the stringent constraints which philosophers have placed upon accounts of possible worlds, while also trivializing the question what possible worlds are. The paper then discusses a range of problems facing the functionalist position.

Simples and the Possibility of Discrete Space, NEAL A. TOGNAZZINI

What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object's being a simple (an object without proper parts)? According to one prominent view, the Pointy View of Simples, an object is a simple if and only if the region occupied by that object contains exactly one point in space. According to another prominent view, MaxCon, an object is a simple if and only if it is maximally continuous. In this paper, the author argues that both of these views are inconsistent with the possibility of discrete space. He then goes on to formulate analogs to these two views that are consistent with this possibility and to argue that if we are willing to grant the possibility of discrete space, we should endorse the analog to the Pointy View of Simples over the analog to MaxCon.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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Religion In the Public Sphere, JÜRGEN HABERMAS

This paper addresses the debate that has arisen in the wake of John Rawls's political theory, in particular his concept of the "public use of reason." How does the constitutional separation of state and church influence the role which religious traditions, communities, and organizations are allowed to play in the political public sphere and in the state in general, but above all in the political opinion and will-formation of citizens themselves? Where should the dividing line be in the opinion of the those who wish to challenge the view of these matters that has arisen since the Enlightenment?

Bodily Awareness, Imagination and the Self, JOEL SMITH

It has recently been claimed that in bodily awareness, the body is presented as the self, that the content of bodily awareness is first personal. The thesis of the paper is that this view is false. The argument rests on two claims about the nature of the imagination. The first, the dependency thesis, maintains that the content of sensory imaginings is linked to the content of perceptions for the reason that to sensorily imagine something is to imagine perceiving it. The second, Williams's thesis, maintains that when I imagine being someone else, I do not imagine anything about myself. There is good reason to accept these two claims, and when held in conjunction with certain plausible views concerning first-person content, it follows that the content of bodily awareness is not first-personal.

Propositions About Reasons, JOHN SKORUPSKI

In the last few decades controversy in epistemology and metaethics about the status of normative claims has taken a distinctive shape. On the

one side have been realists, naturalistic and nonnaturalistic, on the other have been noncognitivists. Coming in from the side have been error theorists, whose very presence suggests that the issue is of first-order importance, since—if they are right—whole classes of normative claims could not in principle be warranted. Some think this whole debate is misconceived. This paper seeks to lend support to that view by means of a cognitivist but irrealist account of the semantics and epistemology of claims about reasons (about what there is reason for someone to believe, to feel, or to do).

Value without Regress: Kant's 'Formula of Humanity' Revisited, JENS TIMMERMANN

This paper revisits Kant's "Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself" in the wake of Christine Korsgaard's influential interpretation. It presents reconstructions of the central notions of an objective end and rational nature and then proceeds to show that there is no four-step regress in the argument leading to this variant of the categorical imperative. Moreover, the formula relates not to the conferral of value, but rather on the assumption that human beings are objectively valuable by virtue of their capacity of moral choice. Kant postpones the justification of this assumption until section 3 of the *Groundwork*. The choice of nonmoral ends, the author argues, is not itself free in the requisite sense to ground dignity. Rather, it is a mere side effect of morality's upsetting the natural order.

The Conception of Character in Sartre's Early Works, JONATHAN WEBBER

Various ethical theories recommend developing a morally sound character, and therefore require an understanding of the nature and development of traits. Philosophers usually accept the Aristotelian view that traits are a combination of habit and insight. Sartre's early work offers an alternative: traits consist in projects. One aim of this paper is to show that this is indeed Sartre's view, by explaining the errors that have lead philosophers to ignore his theory of character or deny that he has one. The other is to clarify the theory, by investigating his notion of project and its relation to other prominent aspects of his philosophy, by distinguishing a broadly Sartrean theory of character from Sartre's own brand of this theory, and by comparing this broadly Sartrean theory with the Aristotelian theory. The paper focuses on *Being and Nothingness* and *The Transcendence of the Ego*, but it also discusses some of Sartre's other works.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Edith Stein's Understanding of Woman, SARAH BORDEN

This essay looks at Edith Stein's descriptions of the fundamental equality of yet distinct differences between women and men, and it attempts to make clear the ontology underlying her claims. Stein's position—although drawing from the general Aristotelian-Thomistic position—differs from Thomas Aquinas's, and she understands gender as tied significantly to our form or soul. The particular way in which gender is "written into" our soul, however, differs from the way in which both our humanity and individuality are tied to our soul. Thus, Stein wants to account for gender in a way that does not attribute it primarily to biology, nor does she understand gender as merely socially constructed. Rather, gender is a significant part of our soul, yet not in such a way that either our common humanity or our distinct individuality are compromised.

The Naming of Father and Son in Saint Anselm's Monologion, JOHN R. FORTIN

For Saint Anselm, the mystery of the Holy Trinity was not merely an object of intellectual speculation but, more importantly, the object of praise and worship. Even though he claims that there is nothing in his treatise that violates the teachings of the Fathers, especially that of Augustine, Anselm explores in *Monologion* the doctrine of the Trinity in his own unique style. One very interesting discussion that does not appear in Augustine's *De Trinitate* or in any of the Augustinian corpus is found in chapter 42, in which Anselm argues for the propriety of naming the Supreme Spirit "Father" and His Word "Son." This paper examines this chapter, first, in the context of the four immediately preceding chapters and, second, in the context of those writings of Augustine that might have influenced Anselm in his presentation. The paper then offers reasons why Anselm included this unique chapter in his discussion on the Trinity.

Interdependence and Substance, MICHAEL GORMAN

The paper takes up a traditional view that has also been a part of some recent analytic metaphysics, namely, the view that substance is to be understood in terms of independence. Taking as his point of departure some recent remarks by Kit Fine, the author proposes reviving the Aristotelian-scholastic idea that the sense in which substances are independent is that they are noninherent, and he does so by developing a broad notion of inherence that is more usable in the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics than the

traditional notion is. He ends by showing how noninherence, while necessary for being a substance, cannot be taken as sufficient without some qualifying remarks.

Heidegger's B-Theoretic Phenomenology, DAVID J. SCHENK

In this paper David J. Schenk explains the basics of Heidegger's early *Daseinanalytik*, an account that contains promising insights for the phenomenology of time. He then draws out some of the relevant lessons from his phenomenology for the debate between A-theorists and B-theorists in contemporary analytic philosophy of time, and he shows how it is that he gives a more philosophically satisfying account of the phenomenological features of becoming than one generally finds in the analytic debate. In Heidegger's theory becoming is not some contingent and misleading artifact of consciousness or of Dasein. It is a necessary and sufficient condition for their occurrence, even though it is not identical with them.

Heidegger and the Ontology of Freedom, SARAH SORIAL

In this paper, Sarah Sorial suggests that Heidegger's conception of freedom, elaborated in piecemeal fashion in *Being and Time*, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, and *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, and culminating in *The Essence of Human Freedom*, provides a way of rethinking our conception of freedom, not as a set of specific determinations and rights, but as the very condition for the possibility of both existence and community. In this elaboration, it is possible to trace Heidegger's gradual removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence. This, argues Sorial, offers us a way of thinking freedom, not in terms of a quality or attribute that Dasein possess, but in terms of community, fraternity, and hence ethics.

Merleau-Ponty and the Bodily Subject of Learning, MARIA TALERO

In the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, learning is not a paradox, as suggested in Plato's *Meno*, but the fundamental form of experience. To experience is precisely to be permeable and open to being reshaped by one's experiences. Maria Talero here explores the reconceptualization of the human subject within Merleau-Ponty's philosophy that allows us to understand how the body-subject can be a learning subject. Fundamentally, this involves a consideration of the nature of habit, and the way in which habit simultaneously locks us into a repressive attachment to a specific past and opens us up to the possibilities of meaningful engagement with the world. Through an analysis of the temporality of habit, the author concludes that understanding habit as the fundamental launching place of learning also allows us to see how essential learning is to the experience of human freedom.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
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The Rediscovery of Peter Abelard's Philosophy, JOHN MARENBON

This article surveys philosophical discussions of Abelard over the last twenty years. Although Abelard has been a well known figure for centuries, his most important logical works were published only in the twentieth century, and Marenbon argues here that the rediscovery of him as an important philosopher is recent and continuing. Marenbon concentrates especially on work that shows Abelard as the rediscoverer of propositional logic (Chris Martin); as a subtle explorer of problems about modality (Simo Knuuttila, Herbert Weidemann) and semantics (Klaus Jacobi); as a metaphysician before the reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Peter King); and as an ethical thinker who echoes the Stoics (Calvin Normore) and anticipates Kant (Peter King).

The Foundations of Freedom in Later Medieval Philosophy: Giles of Rome and His Contemporaries, P. S. EARDLEY

This article explores the philosophical and theological context in which later medieval debates surrounding the foundations of freedom emerged. In particular, the article establishes that Aquinas's famous pupil Giles of Rome (1243/47–1316) was less indebted to St. Thomas himself on the question of human freedom than has commonly been supposed. Rather, his teachings on the will and human freedom owe more to such Franciscan thinkers as John of la Rochelle and Walter of Bruges. This interpretation challenges the received view, which goes back to Henry of Ghent, and continues to be prominent in the contemporary literature.

Descartes on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, C. P. RAGLAND

The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) says that doing something freely implies being able to do otherwise. In this article C. P. Ragland shows that Descartes consistently believed not only in PAP, but also in clear and distinct determinism (CDD), which claims that we sometimes cannot but judge to be true what we clearly perceive. Because Descartes thinks judgment is always a free act, PAP and CDD seem contradictory, but Descartes consistently resolved this apparent contradiction by distinguishing between two senses of "could have done otherwise." In one sense alternative possibilities are necessary for freedom, and in another they are not. The author discusses three possible interpretations of the two senses.

Spinoza's Account of Akrasia, MARTIN LIN

Perhaps the central problem which preoccupies Spinoza as a moral philosopher is the conflict between reason and passion. He belongs to a long tradition that sees the key to happiness and virtue as mastery and control by reason over the passions. This mastery, however, is hard won, as the passions often overwhelm its power and subvert its rule. When reason succumbs to passion, we act against our better judgment. Such action is often termed "akratic." Many commentators have complained that the psychological principles that Spinoza appeals to in his account of akrasia are mere ad hoc modifications to his philosophical psychology. The author shows, on the contrary, that these principles follow from some of the most important and interesting aspects of Spinoza's philosophy of mind.

Berkeley's Immaterialist Account of Action, PATRICK FLEMING

A number of critics have argued that Berkeley's metaphysics can offer no tenable account of human agency. In this paper Patrick Fleming argues that Berkeley does have a coherent account of action. The paper addresses arguments by C. C. W. Taylor, Robert Imlay, and Jonathan Bennett. The author also attempts to show that Berkeley can offer a theory of action, maintain many of our common intuitions about action, and provide a defensible solution to the problem of evil.

Thomas Reid's Notion of Exertion, PAUL HOFFMAN

Thomas Reid uses the notion of exertion in various ways that have not been distinguished in the secondary literature. Sometimes he uses it to refer to the exercise of a capacity or power, sometimes to the turning on or activitating of a capacity or power, and still other times to the attempt to activate a capacity or power. Getting clear on Reid's different uses of the term "exertion" is essential to understanding his account of the sequence of events in human action. It is also helpful in defending Reid against the objection that his account of action is subject to an infinite regress. Some critics find that Thomas Reid thinks the mind especially problematic, "hid in impenetrable darkness." Rebecca Copenhaver disagrees. She maintains that Reid does not hold that mind, more than body, resists explanation by the new science. The physical sciences have made great progress because they were transformed by the Newtonian revolution, and the key transformation was to stop looking for causes. Reid's harsh words are a call for methodological reform, consonant with his lifelong pursuit of a science of mind and also with his frequent (though overlooked) optimism about such a science.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 102, No. 11, November 2005

A Puzzle about Disbelief, GARY OSTERTAG

According to the naïve theory of belief reports, our intuition that "Lois believes that Kent flies" is false results from our mistakenly identifying what this sentence implicates, which is false, with what it says, which is true. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is here argued that the naïve theory's analysis of negative belief reports—sentences such as "Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies"—gives rise to equally problematic clashes with intuition, but that in this case no "pragmatic" explanation is available. In particular, it is argued that there are situations at which, although "Lois believes that Superman flies" and "Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies" appear consistent, a speaker must contradict himself when he utters both. It is also argued that the hidden-indexical theory of belief reports—which otherwise respects our ordinary intuitions regarding belief reports—similarly fails to explain this intuition.

Class and Membership, KIT FINE

The author outlines a new solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes and discusses some of its technical and philosophical implications.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 102, No. 12, December 2005

Logical Relations Between Pictures, JAN WESTERHOFF

This paper analyzes the notion of an implication relation between pictures. The theoretical background of the account presented is Arnold Koslow's structuralist theory of logic. An implication relation between pictures based on the notion of informational content is defined, it is then demonstrated that it satisfies Koslow's conditions. Based on this implication relation the logical operations of conjunction, disjunction, negation, and hypothetical are defined for pictures. It is argued that these logical operations correspond to simple cognitive operations we naturally employ when thinking about pictures.

Against Fictional Realism, ANTHONY EVERETT

A number of objections are presented to fictional realism, the view that fictional characters and other fictional objects really exist. The fictional realist, it is argued, is committed to the existence of objects which are vague in unacceptable ways and which flout various laws of identity and logic. An alternative interpretation of the data motivating fictional realism is then suggested.

MIND
Vol. 114, No. 456, October 2005

II. On Denoting, BERTRAND RUSSELL

Has the Problem of Incompleteness Rested on a Mistake? RAY BUCHANAN and GARY OSTERTAG

A common objection to Russell's theory of descriptions concerns incomplete definite descriptions: uses of, for example, "the book is overdue" in contexts where there is clearly more than one book. Many contemporary Russellians hold that such utterances will invariably convey a contextually determined complete proposition, for example, that the book in your briefcase is overdue. But according to the objection this gets things wrong: typically, when a speaker utters such a sentence, no facts about the context or the speaker's communicative intentions single out a particular description-theoretic proposition as the proposition expressed. However, this is an objection only if it is assumed that successful linguistic communication requires the hearer to identify a proposition uniquely intended by the speaker. The authors of this paper argue that this assumption is mistaken. On their view, no proposition, descriptive or referential, is uniquely intended in such a context; thus, no proposition can nor need be identified as the proposition expressed. One significant upshot is that, once the aforementioned assumption is rejected, incompleteness no longer poses a threat to Russell's theory of descriptions.

Remarks on Propositional Functions, RICHARD L. CARTWRIGHT

Peter Geach has said that Russell's use of "propositional function" is "hopelessly confused and inconsistent." Geach is right, and attempts to say what exactly a Russellian propositional function is, or is supposed to be, are bound to end in frustration. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to pursue an account of propositional functions that accommodates a good deal of what Russell says about them and that can provide some of what he expected of them.

The Bike Puzzle, OLAFUR PALL JONSSON

Definite descriptions occurring within the scopes of psychological verbs provide more puzzles than are traditionally acknowledged. This article presents one puzzle that is particularly intriguing.

Reading 'On Denoting' on its Centenary, DAVID KAPLAN

Part 1 of this paper sets out the logical-semantical background to "On Denoting," including an exposition of Russell's views in *Principles of Mathematics*, the role and justification of Frege's notorious Axiom V, and speculation about how the search for a solution to the Contradiction might have motivated a new treatment of denoting. Part 2 consists primarily of an extended analysis of Russell's views on knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, in which the author tries to show that the discomfiture between Russell's semantical and epistemological commitments begins as far back as 1903. David Kaplan closes this paper with a non-Russellian critique of Russell's views on how we are able to make use of linguistic representations in thought and with the suggestion that a theory of comprehension is needed to supplement semantic theory.

Russell's Notion of Scope, SAUL KRIPKE

Despite the renown of "On Denoting," much criticism has ignored or misconstrued Russell's treatment of scope, particularly in intensional, but also in extensional contexts. This has been rectified by more recent commentators, yet it remains largely unnoticed that the examples Russell gives of scope distinctions are questionable or inconsistent with his own philosophy. Nevertheless, Russell is right: scope does matter in intensional contexts. In *Principia Mathematica*, Russell proves a metatheorem to the effect that the scope of a single occurrence of a description in an extensional context does not matter, provided existence and uniqueness conditions are satisfied. Yet attempts to eliminate descriptions in more complicated cases may produce an analysis with more occurrences of descriptions than featured in the analysand. Taking alternation and negation to be primitive (as in the first edition of *Principia*), this can be resolved, although the proof is nontrivial. Taking the Sheffer stroke to be primitive (as proposed by Russell in the second edition), with bad choices of scope, the analysis fails to terminate.

Plural Descriptions and Many-valued Functions, ALEX OLIVER and TIMOTHY SMILEY

Russell had two theories of definite descriptions: one for singular descriptions, another for plural descriptions. The authors of this paper chart its development, in which "On Denoting" plays a part but not the part one might expect, before explaining why it eventually fails. They go on to consider many-valued functions, since they too bring in plural terms, terms such as "$\sqrt{4}$" or the descriptive "the inhabitants of London," which, like plain plural descriptions, stand for more than one thing. Logicians need to take plural reference seriously if only because mathematicians take many-valued

functions seriously. The authors assess the objection (by Russell, Frege, and others) that many-valued functions are illegitimate because the corresponding terms are ambiguous. They also assess the various methods proposed for getting rid of them. Finding the objection ill-founded and the methods ineffective, Oliver and Smiley introduce a logical framework that admits plural reference, and they use it to answer some earlier questions and to raise some more.

On Designating, NATHAN SALMON

A detailed interpretation is provided of the "Gray's Elegy" passage in Russell's "On Denoting." The passage is sufficiently obscure that its principal lessons have been independently rediscovered. Russell attempts to demonstrate that the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms is untenable. The thesis demands a distinction be drawn between content and designation, but the attempt to form a proposition directly about the content (as by using an appropriate form of quotation) inevitably results in a proposition about the thing designated instead of the content expressed. In light of this collapse, argues Russell, the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms must accept that all propositions about a description's content represent it by means of a higher-level descriptive content, so that knowledge of a description's content is always "by description," not "by acquaintance." This, according to Russell, renders our cognitive grip on definite descriptions inexplicable. Separate responses on behalf of Fregeans and Millians are offered.

Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions, STEPHEN SCHIFFER

The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory is formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the Russellian theory.

The Loss of Uniqueness, SZAB GENDLER ZOLTAN

Philosophers and linguists alike tend to call a semantic theory "Russellian" simply if it assigns to sentences in which definite descriptions occur the truth-conditions Russell did in "On Denoting." This is unfortunate: not all aspects of those particular truth-conditions do explanatory work in Russell's writings. As far as the semantics of descriptions is concerned, the key insights of "On Denoting" are that definite descriptions are not uniformly referring expressions, and that they are scope-bearing elements. Anyone who accepts these two claims can account for Russell's puzzle cases the way he did. Russell had no substantive argument for the claim that "The F is G" entails "There is at most one F"; in fact, he had important misgivings about it. In this paper the author outlines an argument against this claim and argues

that by holding on to uniqueness, contemporary semanticists make a momentous mistake: they keep the illusion alive that there is a way to account for linguistic meaning without addressing what linguistic expressions are for.

MIND
Vol. 115, No. 457, January 2006

The Distinction between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties, DAVID A. DENBY

In this paper, David A. Denby proposes an analysis of the metaphysically important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties and, in the process, provides a neglected model for the analysis of recalcitrant distinctions generally. First, he recaps some difficulties with Kim's well-known (1982) proposal and its recent descendants. He then defines two independence relations among properties and states a quasi-logical analysis of the distinction in terms of them. Unusually, Denby's proposal is holistic, but he argues that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium and so probably pins down the target distinction uniquely. Finally, he suggests diagnoses of the previous failed attempts to analyse the distinction.

Access Externalism, JOHN GIBBONS

This paper argues for externalism about justification on the basis of thought experiments. The author presents cases in which two individuals are intrinsically and introspectively indistinguishable, and in which, intuitively, one is justified in believing "that p" while the other is not. Gibbons also examines an argument for internalism based on the ideas that we have privileged access to whether or not our own beliefs are justified, and that only internalism is compatible with this privilege. He isolates what is taken to be the most plausible form of privileged access to justification, and he shows that it is compatible with externalism.

The Regularity Account of Relational Spacetime, NICK HUGGETT

A version of relationism that takes spatiotemporal structures—spatial geometry and a standard of inertia—to supervene on the history of relations between bodies is here described and defended. The account is used to explain how the relationist should construe models of Newtonian mechanics in which absolute acceleration manifestly does not supervene on the relations; Ptolemaic and Copernican models, for example. This account introduces a new way in which a Lewis-style "best system" might capture regularities in a broadly Humean world; a defense is given against a charge of indeterminism that applies to any such approach to laws.

Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology, THEODORE SIDER

Eternalists say that nonpresent entities (for instance dinosaurs) exist; presentists say that they do not. Yet some skeptics deny that this debate is genuine, claiming that presentists simply represent eternalists' quantifiers over nonpresent entities in different notation. This skepticism may be refuted on purely logical grounds: one of the leading candidate "presentist quantifiers" over nonpresent things has the inferential role of a quantifier. The dispute over whether nonpresent objects exist is as genuine and nonverbal as the dispute over whether there is life on other planets.

The Trouble with Particularism (Dancy's Version), JOSEPH RAZ

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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In Defence of Magical Ersatzism, D. A. DENBY

David Lewis's objection to a generic theory of modality which he calls "magical ersatzism" is that its linchpin, a relation he calls "selection," must be either an internal or an external relation, and that this is unintelligible either way. Yet the problem he points out with classifying selection as internal is really just an instance of the general problem of how we manage to grasp underdetermined predicates; it is not peculiar to magical ersatzism, and it is amenable to some familiar solutions. He provides no compelling grounds for thinking that classifying selection as external is unintelligible, and his argument has a false presupposition. This paper concludes that magical ersatzism is still a viable option in the metaphysics of modality.

Why Aren't Duties Rights? ROWAN CRUFT

The best analyses of the concept "rights" maintain that Hohfeldian claims, privileges, powers, immunities, liabilities, and clusters of these positions, all qualify as rights when they satisfy some further condition, such as serving their holder's interests or fulfilling some alternative function. Yet duties, disabilities, and no-rights can also satisfy this further condition. For example, many duties, disabilities, and no-rights serve their holder's interests and fulfill "rightlike" functions. Why, then, do we disallow such duties, disabilities, and no-rights from qualifying as rights?

Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology, JASON BAEHR

Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while

virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. In this paper Jason Baehr argues that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and challenges for any reliabilist epistemology.

Originless Sin: Rational Dilemmas for Satisficers, ROY SORENSEN

Suppose you have an infinite past. If you had banked the spare dollar you have always had, then the interest would have made you rich by now. Your procrastination is inexcusable. But what should you have done? At any time at which you invest the dollar you would regret not investing it earlier. Satisficers can solve prospective puzzles involving infinite choice but cannot solve this retrospective puzzle about regret. A moral version of the puzzle suggests that there can be inevitable moral failure. It does so without appeal to moral luck, moral dilemmas, or original sin.

Aesthetic Judgements, Artworks and Functional Beauty, STEPHEN DAVIES

In this paper, Stephen Davies offers an analysis of the role played by consideration of an item's functions whenit is judged aesthetically. The account applies also to artworks, of which some serve extrinsic functions (such as the glorification of God and the communicationof religious lore), and others have the function of being contemplated for their own sake alone. Along the way, Davies denies that aesthetic judgments fit the model of judgments either of free beauty or of dependent beauty, given how these two came to be described in the early twentieth century.

Introducing Variable-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism, MICHAEL RIDGE

The basic idea of rule-utilitarianism is that right action should be defined in terms of what would be required by rules which would maximize either actual or expected utility if those rules gained general acceptance or perhaps general compliance. Rule-utilitarians face a dilemma. They must characterize "general acceptance" either as one-hundred-percent acceptance or as something less. On the first horn of the dilemma, rule-utilitarianism is vulnerable to the charge of utopianism; on the second, it is open to the charge of arbitrariness and lack of philosophical depth. In this paper the author presses this objection and develops and defends an alternative version of rule-utilitarianism which can evade the dilemma. He calls this new version "variable-rate rule-utilitarianism."

Four Theories of Filial Duty, SIMON KELLER

Children have special duties to their parents: there are things that we ought to do for our parents, but not for just anyone. Three competing accounts of filial duty appear in the literature: the debt theory, the gratitude

theory, and the friendship theory. Each is unsatisfactory: each tries to assimilate the moral relationship between parent and child to some independently understood conception of duty, but this relationship is different in structure and content from any that we are likely to share with anyone apart from a parent. A more promising account will concentrate on what is unique about the parent–child relationship. In this paper Simon Keller articulates and defends the special goods theory, according to which filial duties arise from the distinctive kinds of goods that healthy parent–child relationships typically involve.

Essentialism and Rigidity, SÖREN HÄGGQVIST

Michael Della Rocca has recently argued that Kripkean essentialism is subtly self-defeating: to defend it, certain modal intuitions must be reconstrued in terms of similarity, but reconstruing them in this way threatens the principled rejection of similarity comparisons on which Kripke's essentialism depends. Della Rocca holds that Kripke's strategy must assume the necessity of identity, and that the necessity of identity already presupposes essentialism, which renders the defense circular. Against this, the author argues that the necessity of identity may be accepted independently; therefore no circularity need arise. The author also argues that Della Rocca fails to rebut an objection raised by Stephen Yablo.

PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 81, No. 1, January 2006

Death Sentences, CHRISTOPHER MILES COOPE

This article presents an analysis of the doctrine of the sanctity of life and a defense of that doctrine against some trends in current "bioethics," particularly as exemplified in Jeff McMahan's book *The Ethics of Killing*.

'The Table, Which We See': An Irresolvable Ambiguity, JAMES SOMERVILLE

The argument presented on behalf of "the slightest philosophy" by Hume, that "The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration," in contrasting the seen with the real table, requires the first relative clause to be defining; but the possibility of identifying tables independently of being seen requires the clause to be nondefining. John P. Wright's objection to Reid's rejoinder is rebutted. A similarly worded argument in Alciphron avoids confusion since Berkeley denies that things like tables can be said in any unqualified sense to be seen.

The Secular Reception of Relgious Music, DAVID PUGMIRE

Sacred music expresses and evokes emotional attitudes of distinctive kinds. Even people who are irreligious in their beliefs can find themselves moved by it in these ways. It has been suggested that for an unbeliever to cherish the experience of sacred music may actually constitute a form of sentimentality. This paper considers just what the appeal of this sort of music is, to believers as well as to unbelievers. There are nonreligious musical works that have similar emotional content. Everyday life prevents many important emotions from being experienced as consummately as they could be. Art can allow this to happen, can be a vehicle for emotion of the last instance. Indeed, a religious belief system is in part a similar vehicle. In art, where there is no gesture at belief, the risk of sentimentality is, if anything, less.

Time Reconsidered, DENIS CORISH

Following observations of Aristotle, Kant, Newton, Leibniz, and Einstein (on space), we can devise a means of showing how the ontology of time supports the precedes-succeeds logic, which the temporal series shares with those of space and number, and how the past-present-future account is consistent with that. By a relativist, not absolutist, account, time turns out to be the existence and nonexistence of exactly the same thing in exactly the same respect. Both A and not-A can be the case, but not at the same time. On the relativist view, their both being the case constitutes time. This turns out to be, in the most general sense, a causal theory of time.

Does Chapter 5 of Locke's Second Treatise, 'Of Property,' Deconstruct Itself? CHARLES D. TARLTON

Chapter 5 of John Locke's Second Treatise, "Of Property," is a text that undermines itself, stammering to an unresolved and unresolvable conclusion because the structure of conditions upon which most of its moral argument about private property is based cannot be stretched to encompass the sudden twist Locke tries to make at the end. The moral conditions by which Locke defines a virtuous private possession within God's gift of the world to all mankind in common resist being extended to include an economy of money and limitless, unequal possession. The text comes to an end in total uncertainty, pointing simultaneously in two opposite directions. This paper explores just how deeply and hopelessly these distortions affect the text.

Knowledge, Wisdom, and the Philosopher, DANIEL A. KAUFMAN

The overarching thesis of this essay is that despite the etymological relationship between the word "philosophy" and wisdom—the Greek word *philosophos* means "lover of wisdom"—and irrespective of the longstanding tradition of identifying philosophers with "wise men," mainline philosophy, historically, has had little interest in wisdom and has been preoccupied primarily with knowledge. Philosophy, if we are speaking of the mainline tradition, has had and continues to have more in common with the natural and social sciences than it does with the humanities and liberal arts. In advancing

this thesis, the author of this paper divides the history of philosophy into three competing traditions: the mainline tradition of philosophy and two philosophical countercultures, one conservative the other radical. At issue between these rival traditions is precisely the relative significance of knowledge and wisdom and their respective places in inquiry. He also provides an account of the distinction between knowledge and wisdom—which he argues is greater than has perhaps been appreciated—and between the natural and applied sciences, on the one hand, and the humanities and liberal arts on the other.

Beliefs, Desires and Moral Realism, DANIEL GOLDSTICK

This paper presents an argument against the claim that moral realism cannot be sustained because moral beliefs, being affective-conative states, cannot themselves be true or false. In fact, moral claims can fail both in terms of a failure of the standard it expresses to be realized by a given agent and also in terms of whatever it commends to be good or bad, right or wrong, in actual fact.

RATIO
Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2006

Free Will and the Soft Constraints of Reason, CLAUDIO F. COSTA

This paper provides a new compatibilist definition of free will, which is an elaboration of the classic compatibilist view of free will as absence of restriction, with the help of the causal theory of action and some special categories. This new definition enables us to neutralize a very wide range of counterexamples in a systematic and compelling way, including those left unanswered by hierarchical definitions.

The Character of Virtue: Answering the Situationist Challenge to Virtue Ethics, DIANA FLEMING

Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics makes essential reference to the notion of a stable, robust character trait. It also claims to be constrained by at least a minimal degree of psychological realism. Recent developments in empirical psychology have drawn into question the evidence for the existence of such robust traits, arguing that it rests on what has been called a "fundamental attribution error." Virtue ethics has thus seemingly been made vulnerable to criticisms that it is essentially dependent on an erroneous, folk-psychological notion of character, and so must either abandon their characteristic notion of virtue or forego any pretensions to psychological realism. In this paper the author develops a two-pronged response to this objection. First, she argues that there is reason to question much of the empirical evidence and that such

evidence as does exist can easily be accommodated by virtue ethics. Next, she argues that even if we allow that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theories do sometimes presuppose a stronger conception of character traits than is warranted by the evidence, this does not significantly undermine the virtue ethicist's project.

Analysis, Abstraction Principles, and Slingshot Arguments, JAMES LEVINE

Frege's views regarding analysis and synomymy have long been the subject of critical discussion. Some commentators, led by Dummett, have argued that Frege was committed to the view that each thought admits of a unique ultimate analysis. However, this interpretation is in apparent conflict with Frege's criterion of synonymy, according to which two sentences express the same thought if one cannot understand them without regarding them as having the same truth-value. In a recent article in this journal, Drai attempts to reconcile Frege's criterion of synonymy with unique ultimate analysis by holding that, for Frege, if two sentences satisfy the criterion without being intensionally isomorphic, at most one of them is a privileged representation of the thought expressed. In this paper James Levine argues that this proposal fails because it conflicts not only with Frege's views of abstraction principles but also with slingshot arguments (including one presented by Drai herself) that accurately reflect Frege's commitment to the view that sentences alike in truth-value have the same *Bedeutung*. While Drai helpfully connects Frege's views of abstraction principles with such slingshot arguments, this connection cannot become fully clear until we recognize that Frege rejects unique ultimate analysis.

Quasi-Naturalism and Moral Reality, BRAD MAJORS

In his recent book *Moral Reality*, Paul Bloomfield has put forward an original set of arguments for moral realism. Central to his treatment is an argument for the reality of moral properties, one which models them on the property of being healthy. This paper is a critical examination of Bloomfield's central line of argument. It is contended that his proposed method of grounding moral realism fails, inasmuch as his distinction test criterion for property reality—essentially the claim that a property exists if its existence is required for distinctions that we make and must make—is inadequate. An alternative approach toward properties is suggested, which has the result, inter alia, that Bloomfield's quasi-naturalistic approach is unnecessary for the defense of moral realism.

Why Essentialism Requires Two Senses of Necessity, STEPHEN K. McLEOD

In this paper, the author sets up a dilemma, concerning metaphysical modality *de re*, for the essentialist opponent of a "two senses" view of necessity. He focuses specifically on Frank Jackson's two-dimensional account in his *From Metaphysics to Ethics*. He sets out the background to Jackson's

conception of conceptual analysis and his rejection of a two senses view. McLeod then proceeds to outline two purportedly objective (as opposed to epistemic) differences between metaphysical and logical necessity. He concludes that since one of these differences must hold and since each requires the adoption of a two senses view of necessity, essentialism is not consistent with the rejection of a two senses view.

Naturalism and the Transcendental Turn, MARK SACKS

This paper is to a large extent an exercise in philosophical geography. It traces the way in which a resilient naturalist orientation has derived support, specifically in the analytic tradition, from a central structuring tenet of transcendental idealism. It attempts to bring out the philosophical reasons that drive this Kantian alliance. Attention then turns to the identification of two salient problems that confront this alliance in its most acceptable form. To the extent that a resilient naturalism is desirable, these problems need to be addressed. While the philosophical issue is brought into focus by attending specifically to developments in the analytic tradition, this is primarily a convenience. The preference for a resilient naturalism and the avoidance of metaphysical excess is not by any means confined to that tradition.

The Universe Among Other Things, ACHILLE C. VARZI

Peter Simons has argued that the expression "the universe" is not a genuine singular term, for it can name neither a single, completely encompassing individual nor a collection of individuals. It is, rather, a semantically plural term standing equally for every existing object. This paper offers reasons for resisting Simons's arguments on both scores.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The winner of the 2005 Dissertation Essay Competition, sponsored by the Philosophy Education Society, the publisher of the *Review of Metaphysics*, is Josh Hayes. Dr. Hayes completed his doctoral dissertation, "The Desire of Dasein: Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotelian Orexis," under the direction of Professor Claudia Baracchi at the New School for Social Research.

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

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

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